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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the role anecdotes, apophthegmata, and exempla play in the 
historiography of the Macedonian king Philip II in the Roman world - from the first century BCE to 
the fourth century CE. Most of the material examined comes from moral treatises, collections of 
tales and sayings, and military works by Greek and Latin authors such as Plutarch, Valerius 
Maximus, Aelian, Polyaenus, Frontinus, and Stobaeus (supplemented with pertinent material from 
other authors). This approach will show that while many of the tales surely originate from the 
earlier Greek world and Hellenistic times, the use and manipulation of the majority of them and the 
presentation of Philip are the product of a world living under Roman political and cultural 
domination.  
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one defines and discusses anecdotal material 
in the ancient world. Chapter two examines two emblematic ancient authors (Plutarch and Valerius 
Maximus) as case studies to demonstrate in detail the type of analysis required by all the authors of 
this study. Following this, the thesis then divides the material of our authors into four main areas of 
interest, particularly concerning Philip as a king and statesman. Therefore, chapter three examines 
Philip and justice. Chapter four looks at Philip and tales of criticism and self-control. Chapter five 
studies Philip and tales of friendship and politics. The final chapter examines material mostly of a 
military nature (though not exclusively), and concerns Philip as a warrior and general. All these 
studies show in the end that the tales of Philip II speak to a wider perspective than their internal 
details would at first suggest. Instead they are an important part of the Roman world’s evolving 
dialogue on politics, power, war and society. 
This thesis argues that one notable role of this material was to present Philip didactically as 
a largely positive exemplar during the Roman Empire, particularly in terms of monarchy, 
statesmanship and generalship. Though negative tales also do exist, these seem to have their roots in 
the more hostile traditions that followed closely the works of authors such as Demosthenes and 
Theopompus and are less popular. All these tales allowed for an engagement with Philip’s legacy 
on a broad social spectrum. However, this connection occurred particularly within elite circles. Here 
the dissemination of Philippic tales through rhetorical handbooks, education, speeches, collections 
of sayings and tales, panegyric, and military handbooks gave rise to a wealth of flexible and 
recognizable images of Philip as a model and paradigm for a class of Roman and Greek politicians 
and intellectuals who faced the realities of autocratic government. However, Philip’s tales were also 
heavy in social and civic symbolism and values which could be applied to any and all individuals. 
Therefore, the themes, virtues and morals of Philip’s diverse reception provided an image and 
exemplar which easily traversed age and social class. In conclusion, this thesis emphasises a 
practice by which Philip and his image were appropriated and manipulated to become important 
touchstones for social, civic, and governmental values during the constant political and cultural 
evolutions taking place in the Roman world as it moved from republic to entrenched empire. 
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...ou[ pw eijdovq! oJmoiivou polevmoio, 
oujd! ajgorevwn, i{na t! a[ndre" ajriprepeve" televqousi. 
tou[nekav me proevhke didaskevmenai tavde pavnta, 
muvqwn te rJhth'r! e[menai prhkth'rav te e[rgwn (Il. 9.440-43).1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Toi'" de; tw'n !Aqhnaivwn dhmagwgoi'" e[fh cavrin e[cein, o{ti loidorou'nte" aujto;n                        
beltivona poiou'si kai; tw'/ lovgw/ kai; tw'/ h[qei: “peirw'mai ga;r aujtou;" a{ma kai; toi'" lovgoi"  kai;    
toi'" e[rgoi" yeudomevnou" ejlevgcein (Plut. Mor. 177E = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 7).”2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 ‘...knowing nothing as yet of evil war, nor of assemblies in which men become preeminent. For this reason he sent me 
to instruct you in all things, to be both a speaker of words and a doer of deeds.’ All translations are from the Loeb 
editions, unless otherwise stated.  
2
 ‘He (Philip) said that he felt very grateful to the popular leaders of the Athenians, because by maligning him they 
made him better both in speech and in character, “For I try both by my words and by my deeds to prove that they are the 
liars.”’ 
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Tales of Philip II under the 
Roman Empire 
  
Aspects of Monarchy and Leadership in the Anecdotes, 
Apophthegmata, and Exempla of Philip II 
 
tiv tw'/ lovgw/ kai; toi'" tou' lovgou mevresi diapraktevon ejstivn:  (Isoc. Ep. 6.8).3 
 
Thesis Rationale  
There is an intriguing gap in our knowledge of Philip II of Macedon (382-336 BCE). What 
role do anecdotes, apophthegmata, and exempla play in the historiography of this extraordinary 
Macedonian king? This gap is significant, as this material was influential in the shaping and use of 
Philip’s image and memory in antiquity.4 This means it could also have an important potential role 
in modern evaluations of Philip’s life, reign and legacy.5 To date there has been no systematic 
attempt to examine this type of Philippic material as a whole in its own right. Individually, they 
feature occasionally in modern biographies of Philip and his period, but they are often inadequately 
discussed or understood beyond their immediate context.  
This thesis argues that one notable role of this material was to present Philip didactically as 
a largely positive exemplar of words and deeds during the Roman Empire, particularly in terms of 
monarchy, statesmanship, generalship (often collectively referred to as monarchic ideology in this 
thesis), and leadership (which appealed more broadly to anyone who held authority or influence 
                                               
3
 ‘What is the object to be accomplished by the discourse as a whole and by its parts?’ 
4
 Three main works inspired the formation of this thesis - Diana Spencer’s 2002 study of Philip’s son Alexander in the 
Roman world; Brian Bosworth’s 2009 Trendall lecture on Alexander, anecdotes and apophthegm; and Agnès Molinier’s 
1995 paper on Philip in sections of Cicero and Seneca.  
5
 On Philip II - Hogarth 1897; Momigliano 1934; Wüst 1938; Cloché 1955; Kienast 1973; Ellis 1976; Cawkwell 1978; 
HM 2 – 1979; Wirth 1985; Tsimboukides 1985; Bosworth 1988: 5-18; Buckler 1989; Hammond 1994; Thomas 2006: 
69-88; Worthington 2008b and 2014: 25-119; Gabriel 2010; and Müller 2010: 166-185 – with bibliographical essay. 
See also the collections in Perlman (ed.) 1973; Hatzopoulos and Loukopoulos (eds) 1980; Adams and Borza (eds) 1982; 
and Carney and Ogden (eds) 2010. Cf. the useful review articles of Borza 1978a: 236-243; 1978b 97-101; and 
Errington 1981: 69-88. On Macedonian history and culture - Barr-Sharrar and Borza (eds) 1982; Sakellariou (ed.) 
1983;  HM 1, 2, and 3; Hammond 1989; Borza 1990; Errington 1990; Vokotopoulou (ed.) 1993; Ginouvès (ed.) 1994; 
Carney 2000; and Roisman and Worthington (eds.) 2010; cf. review essay on this material – Carney 1991: 179-89. On 
fourth-century Greek history – Hornblower 1983; and Buckler 2003.  
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over others).6 This was unsurprising for a man, ‘who had made himself the greatest of the kings in 
Europe in his time’ (Diod. 16.95.1). Though negative tales and visions of Philip also do exist – 
these seem to have their roots in the more hostile traditions that followed closely the classical works 
of authors such as Demosthenes and Theopompus and feature largely in rhetorical handbooks (e.g. 
the elder Seneca Controv. 3.8, 7.3.4, 10.5.4 and Cic. Tusc. 5.14.42).7 It is clear that Philip was far 
from forgotten after his death. Instead, he remained a significant figure in popular, scholarly, and 
political circles right through into the Roman period and beyond.8 
Tales, anecdotes, exempla and apophthegmata of Philip the king, statesman, and general 
saturated ancient consciousness. It was this cultural cognizance or collective memory which 
allowed for an engagement with Philip’s legacy on a broad social spectrum. However, this 
connection occurred particularly within elite circles. Here the dissemination of Philippic tales 
through rhetorical handbooks, education, speeches, collections of sayings and tales, letters, 
panegyric, and military handbooks gave rise to a wealth of flexible and recognizable images of 
Philip as a model and paradigm for a class of Roman and Greek politicians and intellectuals who 
faced the realities of autocratic government. Indeed, under the principate the elites’ political 
aspirations were curtailed. This disenfranchisement from power meant that tales of leadership 
provided by Philip and other notable exemplars were reconfigured to concentrate mainly on the 
imperial throne. However, Philip’s tales were also heavy in social and civic symbolism and values 
which could be applied to any and all individuals. Therefore, the themes, virtues and morals of 
Philip’s miscellaneous history provided an image and exemplar which easily traversed social 
boundaries.9  
Therefore, this thesis emphasises a practice by which Philip and his image were 
appropriated and manipulated to become important touchstones during the constant political and 
cultural evolutions taking place in the Roman world from the late Republic to the high empire.10 
                                               
6
 Propertius for one thought that Philip (and most of his successors) enjoyed a generally more positive image in his time 
(3.11.39-40).  
7
 Cf. Molinier 1995: 61; Leopold 1981: 227-246 and Opitz 1976. 
8
 For Roman attitudes towards the Greeks in general – Petrochilos 1974.  
9
 Cf. Spencer 2002: xiv, 35, 181-82, and 189. Eyben’s 1974 work on the good example or model (termed the concrete 
ideal) in the life of a young Roman argues that they were an ‘observable nature, the personification of the values one 
wishes to realize in life… a person one wishes to emulate’ (200). Moreover, as the Roman pedagogic ideal was based 
on the influence of the good example, Seneca writes that a young Roman should act like their model (who could be 
chosen from among present and past notable individuals) is always watching them (Sen. Ep. 11.8, 52; cf. Ep. 25. 5-6 
and Epict. Ench. 33). Both Plutarch (Prof. Virt. 15.85AB) and Seneca (Ep. 11.10; 25.6) advised their pupils to find their 
examples in the distant past. Though Alexander was surely more popular (cf. Eyben 1974: 202), Philip must also have 
had some interest among young Romans. On moral authorities under the early Roman Empire – Morgan 2007: 207-234, 
esp. 216-225.   
10
 E.g. Ovid’s implication that Sextus’ owned land once controlled by Philip (Ex Ponto 4.15.15); Caesar’s use of the 
threat Philip once posed towards Athens in speech to the senate as a point of comparison to the danger of Maroboduus 
to Rome (Tact. Ann. 2.63); Appian’s comparative use of Philip’s achievements (Pref. 10), as well as equating the 
punishment of Philip’s murderers to those of Caesar (Bell. Civ. 2.21.154); and even Marcus Aurelius’ use of Philip as a 
figure with which to meditate on the will of Nature (9.29).  
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While many of the tales are surely from the earlier Greek world and Hellenistic times, the use and 
manipulation of the majority of them and the presentation of Philip are the product of a world living 
under Roman political and cultural domination. Philip’s anecdotes speak to a wider perspective than 
their internal details would at first suggest. Instead, they form part of this later period’s evolving 
dialogue on politics, power, war and society. Therefore, the primary role for these anecdotes is not 
the discovery of objective historical accounts of Philip. Instead, it is their role as texts speaking to 
various contemporary literary and cultural milieus which should be appreciated.   
It was a role Philip shared with many other famous individuals of Greek and Roman history, 
some of whom were more or less popular depending on the author and his work.11 However, it was 
a role epitomized by his own son Alexander, whose fame and prominence surely aided Philip’s own 
longevity and popularity in literature and culture.12 Moreover, even though Philip’s legacy and later 
role through these texts were not of the same order or magnitude as those of Alexander – they were 
still considerable.13 Philip certainly eclipsed many other kings and statesmen of note in these texts 
(particularly many Classical heroes and Hellenistic kings), all of which goes some way to validating 
his status as an exemplar of a ruler, statesman and general of considerable value for the Roman 
world. Indeed, it is telling that Philip is the second most mentioned individual and king after 
Alexander in Aelian’s Varia Historia14 and Plutarch’s Regum et Imperatorum Apopthegmata,15 and 
has a healthy nine mentions in Valerius Maximus.16 Moreover, when it comes to tales of 
generalship, Philip is one of the more popular figures to be found in both Polyaenus17 and 
                                               
11
 Popularity is a numbers game and does not equate to status or characterization.  
12
 Philip was not the earliest Macedonian king to feature in collections of tales and sayings e.g. Archelaus – Ael. V.H. 
2.21; 8.9; 12.43; 13.4; 14.17; and Amyntas III – Ael. V.H. 4.8; 12.43; 12.60. Cf. Archelaus - Plut. Mor. 177A-B. 
Though there is considerably less material. 
13
 I disagree with Molinier’s comment that ‘les anecdotes sur lui sont relativement peu nombreuses et se recoupent plus 
ou moins’ (1995: 61). This thesis shows that there are more than is to be expected, but perhaps less than hoped for by 
Molinier.   
14
 Philip is named twenty-six times in Aelian: anecdotes – 3.45; 4.19; 6.1; 7.12; 8.12; 8.15; 12.51; 12.60; 13.11; 14.48. 
Philip mentioned only - 1.25; 2.25; 3.17; 3.32; 4.29; 10.4; 12.14 (14.46c); 12.43; 12.53; 12.54; 12.57; 12.64; 13.7; 
13.36; 14.47a; cf. 12.16 which is a double of 14.47a, but Philip has dropped out. N.b. the anecdote told at 9.36 stars 
Antigonus, but the same story is told by Plutarch (Mor. 67F) about Philip. Therefore, Philip is the fourth most 
mentioned individual in Aelian after his son (thirty-eight), and the two philosophers Socrates (thirty-five) and Plato 
(thirty-one).  
15
 Philip has thirty-one entries under his name (Mor. 177C-179D), only three less than his son Alexander (thirty-four), 
and significantly more than many other famous individuals (including Romans) e.g. Epaminondas (twenty-four), 
Antigonus (eighteen), Themistocles (seventeen), Dionysius (thirteen), Alcibiades (seven), Cato the elder (twenty-nine), 
Scipio the younger (twenty-three), Pompey (fifteen), Caesar (fifteen), and Augustus (fifteen). However, Philip is also 
one of the main protagonist in five other entries of this work (Mor. 174E-F (x2), 179D (x2), 192B), and a further eight 
in the Apophthegmata Laconica (Mor. 215B, 216A-B (x2), 217F, 218E-F (x2), 221F, 233E). This gives a grand total of 
forty-four entries in Plutarch’s collections of sayings which directly involve Philip. Only two other individuals have 
more – Alexander, with well over fifty, and king Agesliaus, who has over ninety-one (seventy-nine of which are in the 
Apophthegmata Laconica).   
16
 There are altogether nine references to Philip in Valerius Maximus. There are five by name - 1.8.ext.9; 6.2.ext.1; 
7.2.ext.10; 8.14.ext.4; 9.5.ext.1; three by unnamed reference - 1.8.ext.10; 1.8.ext.11; 6.4.ext.4; and one that is a 
reference to Philip’s destruction of Stagira, but instead names Alexander as the perpetrator - 5.6.ext.5. 
17
 Philip is the main protagonist of twenty-two exempla in book four of Polyaenus (4.2.1-22), second only to Alexander 
with thirty-two (cf. Hammond 1996: 23-53). These two kings, along with Antigonus (twenty-one exempla) account for 
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Frontinus18 with thirty-four entries dedicated to his generalship. Indeed, with one of the functions of 
literature to provide role models (Quint. Inst. 1.8.5ff., 10.1.86ff.), Philip proved to be a popular 
figure in the Roman world with tales, sayings and mentions of him to be found in a vast range of 
authors across many different genres and periods of the Roman empire.19  
 This is a valuable study because Philip’s anecdotal material should be embraced as an 
important branch of the historical tradition that surrounds Philip, his characterization, and the use of 
his image and memory – particularly in works of non-historical narrative.20 Hence, anecdotes, 
apophthegmata, and exempla had a role in the formation and dissemination of Philip’s character 
within antiquity. This reveals a strong focus on Philip’s role as a king and subsequently as a 
monarchic exemplar through the proliferation and distribution of these tales – especially for Roman 
emperors and social elites who looked to examples from the past as they adapted to monarchy. 
Therefore, the primary motivation of this thesis is to explore the idea of Philip in these tales and 
anecdotes as an archetypal monarch, statesman, and general - good and bad (agathos and kakos, 
bonus and malus).21 Moreover, as there is a tendency for modern historians to use or discount this 
material without suitable consideration of the many literary, rhetorical, didactic and educational, 
social, and political factors that lay behind it, and subsequently behind Philip’s portrayal. This 
dissertation will allow at least this one function, Philip as exemplar of leadership, to be considered 
and better understood. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
over seventy-five of the one hundred and five exempla of the Macedonians of book four. In terms of the entire 
collection, Philip is tied for fourth with Dionysius I. Philip far outshines other prominent generals and statesmen of 
Greek history such as Themistocles (eighteen), Alcibiades (nine), Lysander (five), Epaminondas (fifteen), Pelopidas 
(three), Demetrius (twelve), and Agathocles (eight). Wheeler (2010: 37-38) makes the point that Polyaenus has 
undoubtedly been selective, though his criteria for exclusion and inclusion are unknown. 
18
 Philip has twelve mentions in Frontinus – 1.3.4; 1.4.13; 1.4.13a; 2.1.9; 2.3.2; 2.8.14; 3.3.5; 3.9.8; 4.1.6; 4.2.4; 4.5.12; 
and 4.7.37. This makes Philip equal fourth with Epaminondas for foreigner exempla behind Hannibal (forty-five), 
Alexander (seventeen), and Mithradates (thirteen). This is noticeably more than other famous foreigners like Iphicrates 
(nine), Agesilaus (eight), Alcibiades (eight), Pericles (six) and Themistocles (four), Pelopidas (three), and Dionysius 
(three). It also equates well with the Roman exempla e.g. Julius Caesar (twenty eight), Pompey (sixteen), Sertorius 
(fourteen), Cato (twelve), Marius and Sulla (eleven each), and Antony (eight).       
19
 For example, (in a list not exhaustive but representative) Philip can be found in Plutarch, Cicero, Aulus Gellius, 
Athenaeus, Cornelius Nepos, Dio Cassius, Quintilian, Propertius, Ovid, Livy, Polybius, Tacitus, Suetonius, Seneca, 
Seneca the elder, Pliny the younger, Pliny the elder, Strabo, Pausanias, Horace, Appian, Marcus Aurelius, Sextus 
Empiricus, Philostratus, Josephus, Diogenes Laertius, Julian, Vitruvius, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Epictetus, 
Libanius, and Lucian.       
20
 For overviews on the ancient evidence surrounding Philip’s reign – Worthington 2008: 210-215; and Errington 1990: 
299-301; on specific ancient authors - Connor 1967: 133-154; Shrimpton 1977: 123-44, 1991; and Flower 1994 
(Theopompus FGrH 115); Barber 1935; Drews 1962: 383-92; 1963: 244-55; Rubincam 1976: 357-661; and Schepens 
1977: 95-118 (Ephorus FGrH 70); Pearson 1960: 22-49; Pédech 1984: 15-69; Prandi 1985 (Callisthenes FGrH 124); 
Heckel 1980: 444-62 (Marsyas FGrH 135); Alonso-Núnez 1987: 56-72; Hammond 1991: 496-508; Heckel and 
Develin 1994; Yardley 2003 (Pompeius Trogus and Justin); Sacks 1990; 1994: 213-32; McQueen 1995; and Green 
2006 (Diodorus Siculus); Cawkwell 1960: 416-38; Sealey 1993; Harris 1995; Worthington (ed.) 2000; Ryder 2000: 45-
89; Buckler 2000: 114-58; Carey 2000 (Demosthenes and Aeschines). See chapter three for Plutarch. References for 
all other authors of importance are found throughout. 
21
 Detailed discussion of the language of popular morality – Morgan 2007: 191-206.  
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Methodology and Approach  
 
This thesis will not consider all references available for Philip. Having surveyed the extant 
material in relation to Philip this would be both unnecessary and counter-productive.22 A thorough 
utilization of the material found in the anecdote, apophthegmata, and exempla collections by Greek 
and Latin authors such as Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, Aelian, Polyaenus, Frontinus, and Stobaeus 
(supplemented with pertinent material from other authors) serves equally well to make and illustrate 
all the necessary points and arguments bearing any relation to this dissertation’s raison d’être. 
Therefore, that material which offers possible insights on aspects of monarchy and leadership has 
been given priority.      
There are several reasons for this study. The most important is to ascertain the fundamental 
contribution that these tales and sayings make to our understanding of Philip and his role as an 
exemplar during the Roman period. This would allow this material to be an essential component of 
assessments of Philip and his reign. It will also show that by presenting Philip and articulating 
differing perspectives on his character and rule, successive generations of the ancients exploited 
much of this material to denigrate or eulogize Philip. At the very least, they exhibited details or 
opinions derivative of it. Moreover, the authors of these tales are products of the Roman world, and 
therefore they produced texts which tell us something of Philip as well as the contemporary 
concerns and agendas of a period which still held Philip up as a meaningful figure with which to 
think. Like his son Alexander, Philip offered ‘an archetype for monarchy and charismatic 
autocracy’ (Spencer 2002: xix) with which to meditate on existing political and social 
environments.  
Most of the texts of this thesis are not historical narratives. However, they do draw upon 
history, philosophical traditions, popular traditions, and popular morality to conjure up Philip’s 
image.23 Moreover, from the regular appearance of Philip in texts of the Roman world, from the late 
republic to the height of the empire (peaking unsurprisingly in the literary Zeitgeist of the Second 
Sophistic),24 it seems that there was something of an informed audience to appreciate his 
appearance. It was an audience prepared enough to receive and examine Philip as part of a wider 
                                               
22
 This reflects Tigerstedt’s thinking. He set limits to his study of the Laconian apopthegmata (1974: 16-30), noting on 
material not to be included that they ‘would needlessly make the investigation more difficult without changing the 
results’ (1974: 17).   
23
 Popular traditions were traditions that had wider circulation away from more traditional historical texts (though they 
too could proliferate them). On popular morality, Morgan defines it as, ‘ethical ideas which were in wide circulation 
around the Empire and widely shared up and down the social spectrum’ (2007: 1), or even by geographically separate 
groups (2007: 2). Though not all values will have been ‘equally applicable’ or ‘appealing’ to every person (2007: 2). Cf. 
Morgan 1997: 3-4. 
24
 Cf. Whitmarsh 2005: 4-5. 
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movement to define Roman political, cultural, social, and military activity and progress. 
Additionally, it seems assured that popular access to Philip’s tales happened beyond the textual 
world of written histories that catered mostly to the literate elite.25 Instead, performance and 
readings from alternative texts for mass audiences offered avenues for wider dissemination of 
Philip’s image into public consciousness.26 Though little direct evidence exists, it was surely from 
this wider dissemination that popular traditions and conversations (though instigated from within 
the elite) took place. Moreover, ‘the degree to which groups up and down the social scale shared 
and exchanged aspects of their culture’ (Morgan 2007: 5), must not be underestimated.  
However, these empire wide conversations about Philip were for the most part divorced 
from recovering historical facts. Instead, the examination, presentation, and dissemination of 
Philip’s tales and his image (like those of his counterparts in history) were often about cultural 
definition - that of the self and the other, in a complex and multi-valued Graeco-Roman world. 
Philip’s tales help define wider social, political, and cultural norms and values at almost any strata 
of society in an ever evolving and transitioning world. Therefore, what is offered is an image of 
Philip and Philippic qualities which were useful for individual and collective self-definition (and 
improvement) in the Roman world.27 As Morgan argues, ‘texts are products of societies as well as 
individuals, and writers, readers and listeners contribute to society as well as to their immediate 
circle (2007: 11).’ Therefore, instead of mining these tales for the ‘historical Philip’, as if one once 
existed in literary or anecdotal form – this thesis offers a different approach to these texts. 
Therefore, the Philip presented and discussed in this thesis is that which is constructed from his 
anecdotes.  
This study is ultimately more about the search for the causes and reasons behind the 
recording and dissemination of this material, and its role in Philip’s legacy as a monarch, than the 
material’s historicity.28 Indeed, with the material’s strong biographical tendencies, the search is 
ultimately more about motives and methods than truth.29 This is important in terms of assessing our 
ancient authors’ attitudes to Philip, and by extension, the support for modern views of this 
                                               
25
 The Roman world probably had around twenty per-cent male literacy (much lower female literacy). Cf. Morgan 
2007: 3; 1998: 39-42, 50-89, 120-51 and Harris 1989 3-24. Morgan argues that, ‘the written sources on which we 
depend so heavily can never be trusted to refer to the great majority of people (2007: 3).’ On the difficulties of 
recognising popular Roman culture in literary sources – Horsfall 2003: 20-30. 
26
 Cf. Spencer 2002: 31-32; Morgan 2007: 4. 
27
 Cf. Spencer 2002: 51. 
28
 Exhibiting one’s wisdom was just one such motivation e.g. Isoc. Pan. 9. 
29
 On the insoluble problem of truth in anecdotes – Beck 1998: 8. Useful also in this respect is Elizabeth Baynham’s 
1998 work on Quintus Curtius which argued that Curtius was ‘not interested in a definitive history of Alexander as 
much as in the literary, rhetorical, and moral prospects his reign presented’ (1998: 100); and with his focus on ideas like 
fortuna and regnum and the Roman ideals of libertas, fides, and pietas, Curtius’ history of Alexander was also a 
contemplation of Roman Imperial power. 
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Macedonian king.30 Certainly, the utilization or omission of this material can have profound 
ramifications. Moreover, by moving away from the persistent idea of seeking concrete facts in this 
type of material, this thesis will also make a contribution to other less studied areas and authors of 
Philippic studies.  
We might sympathise with Bent that if our estimate of men is largely made up of little 
illustrative facts, it is important that these illustrations be correct, or the deductions from them will 
be wrong.31 However, with no way of conclusively testing much of this material, it is probably 
more fruitful in the larger scheme of things to understand the contextual aspects of the material than 
whether or not the illustration is true or not. This allows for arguably larger and more interesting 
perspectives and arguments regarding the material and its generation and dissemination.  
 
Thesis Outline 
 
After defining and discussing anecdotal material in the ancient world, this study examines 
two emblematic ancient authors as case studies to demonstrate in detail the type of analysis required 
by the authors of this study. Following this, the thesis surveys four main areas of interest. The first 
three mostly concern Philip as a king and statesman, particularly around topics such as justice, 
criticism and self-control, and friendship and politics. The last is mostly martial (though not 
exclusively), and concerns Philip as a warrior and general.32 To survey these four areas, this study 
often examines how the Philippic material itself was organized, developed, utilized, and presented 
by the various authors who employed it. This has meant scrutinizing their textual composition, 
including themes, language, historical content, as well as implicit and explicit commentary. It also 
means engaging with Philip’s self-generated images, those fashioned in philosophical traditions, the 
counter images shaped by his enemies and detractors, and ultimately – how subsequent periods 
                                               
30
 Attitudes to Philippic studies and Philip have reflected an inadequacy of balanced sources, as contemporary evidence 
for Philip is largely Greek, not Macedonian. Moreover, it is Athenian and mainly anti-Macedonian (Ellis 1976: 6). 
However, Philip did enjoy support from some Athenian intellectuals (Markle 1976: 80-99). Revisionist approaches have 
taken place in recent years with wider acceptance of more positive assessments of Philip (e.g. Diod. 16.95.1), as well as 
more Macedonian orientated approaches to writing the history of the mid-fourth century (Borza 1990: 189-91; cf. 
Worthington 2008 and Gabriel 2010). With much of the material of this study separate and running counter to the main 
currents of anti-Macedonian/anti-Philip source material, this material could find itself a revised or even rehabilitated 
pool of evidence more in line with recent trends towards a more positive assessment of Philip’s goals and achievements. 
31
 1892: 354. 
32
 Future studies could focus on other tales featuring Philip under other collective headings e.g. ‘Philip and his Family’ 
– Ael. V.H. 4.19, 12.43, 13.11, 13.36; Cic. De Off. 1.26, 2.14, 2.15, 2.53; De Orat. 3.35; Plut. Mor. 70B-C, 141B-C, 
177C, 178B, 178C, 178E-F, 179C, 179D, 327E-F, 799E, 806B; Al. 2.2-3, 2.4, 3.1, 5.1, 5.2-3, 6, 9.4-5, 9.6; Per. 1.5; 
Sert. 1.4; Marcus Antoninus 27.11-12; Val. Max. 7.2.ext.10, IX.5.ext.1; Quint. 1.1.22-24; Athen. 10.435a; or ‘Philip 
and Religion, the Metaphysical, and Death’ – Ael. V.H. 3.45; Val. Max. 1.8.ext.9, 8.14.ext.4; Suet. Cal. 57; Plut. Mor. 
105A-B, 177C; Al. 3.4-5, 10.4; Phoc. 16.6; Dem. 22.1-2; Paus. 9.29.8-9.      
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understood any of them.33 Certainly, this analysis is a welcome move away from the study of more 
traditional material on Philip. However, the relationship between this anecdotal material and the 
traditional historical repositories of Diodorus and Justin could be of special interest – particularly 
the comparison between their accounts and this material’s overt didactic moralizing in the form of 
short-hand rhetorically presented virtues, vice, and curiosities. 
This thesis helps modern scholars to begin to understand how best to use, or not to use, this 
material in their studies of Philip and his reign. A thorough understanding of an author’s motives, 
sources, literary skill, agenda, and audience certainly enables better comprehension of the passage. 
This will hopefully displace the tendency of some historians to selectively deploy this material, and 
allow greater comprehension of its contextual background.34 Moreover, looking at the material 
through this particular lens also adds a layer of richness which can only further Philippic and 
anecdotal studies.  
This investigation provides a valuable contribution to classical studies in five principal 
areas.   
1. The presentation and application of Philippic anecdotes, apophthegmata, and exempla 
(Philip’s legacy and image) in broader discussions surrounding monarchy and leadership 
under the Roman empire  
 
2. Studies into monarchic ideology and its use and dissemination in anecdotal material 
 
3. The collection and use of anecdotes, apophthegmata, and exempla of famous individuals in 
antiquity  
 
4. Studies into the literary and historical value of specific authors and their genres of literature, 
particularly in terms of their aims, motives, methods, and their audience 
 
5. The role played by these tales and sayings in Philippic history and historiography 
 
 
Philip, Monarchic Ideology, and Macedonian Receptions  
To examine anecdotal material, it is necessary to discuss the specific relationship between 
individual tales and their immediate contexts. It is likely that the great majority of our material must 
have existed in earlier periods – including Philip’s own lifetime (though it is often impossible to 
prove). However, examining this material in the context in which it survives today means 
articulating its existence, function, and reception under the Roman Empire. To do this, overarching 
                                               
33
 Cf. Carney and Ogden eds. 2010: xx. 
34
 Wardle commented prior to undertaking his 1998 translation and commentary of Valerius Maximus book one – 
‘Valerius Maximus was to me one of those authors into whom historians dip for minor details, not one to be read 
continuously or to be evaluated in his own right’ (1988: Preface v).    
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relationships for our material need to be established – unifying ideas that explain both content and 
form. 
 
 
 
Kingship in the Greek World 
 
 Examining this anecdotal material, the content is a heterogeneous array of tales and sayings 
heavily imbued with moral and leadership qualities, and implicit and explicit judgements about a 
Macedonian king. The forms these tales take are for the most part necessary for the easy 
conveyance or exemplification of those qualities and judgements. These facts alone clearly relate 
our material to didactic literature, and in particular ancient ‘monarchic ideology’. Indeed, an 
essential aspect of ancient conceptions of monarchy was that a monarch could be defined in large 
part by their character, particularly through the possession or absence of certain virtues or vices.35 It 
was an idea that went at least as far back as the fourth century BCE, where justifications of 
legitimate monarchic rule rested on ascribed or proclaimed moral or character foundations.36 This 
continued into the Roman Empire, where what distinguished between a ‘good’ and ‘bad’ emperor 
was personal character.37 This unifying ideology may explain in part the survival of this material 
about Philip from his period right through into the Roman period (though most material survives 
from the Roman world through to late Antiquity). Therefore, as contemporary social and political 
structures continually evolved in the ancient world, successive generations of Greek, Hellenistic, 
and Roman leaders would have come into contact with Philip and his complex image and legacy 
through both historical narratives and this anecdotal material.38    
By the time Philip was threatening the autonomy of the Greek city-states, the Greeks were 
already involved in conversations about the merits of one-man rule, and the belief that a ruler must 
possess certain virtues.39 These conversations took the form of philosophical, biographical, and 
rhetorical texts from the period just before Philip’s accession.40 It was these texts, by writers 
sympathetic to monarchy, that gave rise to a monarchic ideology at whose heart lay a ruler’s 
                                               
35
 Noreña 2011: 38. On monarchy in Greek thought and politics – Luraghi 2013: 11-24. For the various areas of moral 
exhortation in antiquity – Malherbe 1986.   
36
 Luraghi 2013: 12. 
37
 Noreña 2011: 38. On regal image and bodily appearance as part of this reflection on the ideal monarch – Tatum 1996: 
139-41. 
38
 Cf. Spencer 2002: 29; and 2010: 175. 
39
 On pre-Hellenistic reflections on monarchy – Bertelli 2002: 17-28; Frolov 1974: 401-434; Elder 1995: 153-173; and 
Cartledge 2009: 96-103. On a ruler’s personal virtues in pre-classical thought – Noreña 2011 39 n. 3.  
40
 Goodenough 1928: 55-57; Walbank 1984: esp. 75-81; and Noreña 2009: 2. 
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personal virtues.41 However, the problem of defining the good ruler was only approachable in the 
beginning through the discourse of tyranny.42 Thereby the image of the good basileus was created 
by turning the many vices of the tyrannos into their opposites.43    
Influential in this movement were the sophists, who had helped to define the virtues, related 
them to the State as well as to personal life, and used exemplars from myth and poetry.44 Also 
influential was the development of encomiastic biography, and the writings of Isocrates - 
particularly his Evagoras, To Nicocles, and Nicocles.45 With these epideictic-toned works and 
others, Isocrates greatly aided the rhetorical development of monarchic ideology.46 This Isocrates 
did through his use of a canon of virtues in encomium (e.g. Evag. 22-23),47 and his focus on the 
ruler’s excellence and role as a paradeigma. 
Mimou' ta; tw'n basilevwn h[qh kai; divwke ta; ejkeivnwn ejpithdeuvmata: dovxei" ga;r  aujtou;"   
ajpodevcesqai kai; zhlou'n....ijscurovtaton mevntoi novmon hJgou' to;n ejkeivnwn trovpon (Isoc. Ad 
Dem. 1.36).48 
Xenophon too was influential – especially his Cyropaedia and Agesilaus. Heavy with Socratic 
influence, the former presented an idealized king who displayed in addition to his great abilities as a 
general: clemency, generosity, benevolence, and justice.49 The latter work became ‘one of the 
                                               
41
 Noreña 2011: 39. 
42
 On the ways in which tyrannoi legitimized their positions in the Greek world – Mann 2013: 25-48. 
43
 Luraghi 2013: 19 and Haake 2013: 165-206 esp. 176. Greek political discourse had a standardized portrait of a 
turannos and his characteristic vices of cruelty, greediness, cunningness, sexual incontinence, annoyance at flattery and 
intolerance of free speech (Luraghi 2013: 17 and 2013B). It is no surprise that when leaders such as Philip were 
attacked as tyrants by orators and the like (e.g. Demosthenes, Hyperides and Theopompus), it was these vices – the 
opposites to the virtues of the good basileus - which are routinely referenced. Moreover, any image of a powerful sole 
ruler was always at odds with the ideology of the Greek polis (Haake 2013B: 179).  
44
 North 1966: 85-120, 123. On sophists and the earliest literary discussions of monarchy – Stroheker 1954: 381-412. 
45
 On Isocrates, Xenophon and the development of encomiastic biography – Hägg 2012: 10-66. This biographic focus 
on statesmen was paralleled and no doubt influenced by that which centred on philosophers and wise men. On Isocrates 
in general – Papillon 2010: 58-74; and monarchy – Bringmann 1965: 19-27 and Blois and Bons 1992: 169-173. Cf. 
Jaeger 1947: 84-105 on To Nicocles.  
46
 On Isocrates popularity in later periods (including Rome’s Imperial age), Blois and Bons argue that Isocrates 
‘featured prominently in the koine of popular ideas that was passed down in the rhetorical-literary education of the 
Greeks in Hellenistic and Roman times’ (1992: 185; cf. 168, 172-73, 187). Certainly, quotations from Ad Demonicum, 
Ad Nicoclem, and Nicocles had an enduring popularity in gnomic anthologies (Morgan 2007: 94). On rhetoric in 
Graeco-Roman education – Clark 1957. 
47
 Cf. North 1966: 143, 145-147; and Blois and Bons 1992: 169. The Evagoras is focused on the virtues of justice, 
wisdom, courage, and sophrosune (the so called cardinal virtues). However, Isocrates (like Xenophon in his Agesilaus) 
adds piety when he praises Theseus (Helen 31; cf. On the Peace 63; and Panath. 204, 216) (North 1966: 147). Isocrates 
also often used hierarchies among the virtues – Ad Dem. 6, 19, 38; Phil. 125 ff.; Ad Nic. 30, 31; and Panath. 72 (North 
1966: 146 n. 68). On Isocrates and Xenophon – Gray 2000: 142-54. 
48
 ‘Pattern after the character of kings, and follow closely their ways. For you will thus be thought to approve them and 
emulate them…but consider their manner of life your highest law.’ Cf. Isoc. Ad. Dem. 2, 11, 12; Ad Nic. 31, 38, 40; Nic. 
57; Ad Phil. 113; Evag. 76-77 and Jaeger 1947: 101. 
49
 Ambler 2001: 4. On Xenophon – Gray (ed.) 2010; Dillery 1995; and Anderson 1974. On the Cyropaedia – Gray (ed.) 
2010: 327-453; 2011: 25-30; Ambler 2001; Gera 1993: esp. 26-131 (on Socratic influence); Nadon 1996: 361-74; 2001; 
Due 1989, 1999, 2002; and Tatum 1989. On the influence of the Cyropaedia on later ideas of leadership – Due 1993: 
53-60. N.b. Alexander’s career reflects considerable familiarity with the Cyropaedia – and later Scipio Africanus, 
Cicero and Julius Caesar certainly read and made use of it (Gray 2011: 9-12, 54-55 with refs).    
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fountainheads of eulogy in Graeco-Roman rhetoric and historiography’ (North 1966: 129).50 
Drawing on the rhetorical tradition, Xenophon was at the forefront of developments in praise and 
blame literature in the fourth-century BCE - using techniques which led to authors like 
Theopompus.51 Moreover, like Isocrates, Xenophon also thought that a king should be a 
paradeigma for his subjects (e.g. Ages.10.2; Cyrop. 8.1.30) and enjoy their eunoia and charis (e.g. 
Mem. 4.6.12; Hiero 11.7ff.; and Oec. 21).52 Because of the special influence of these two authors on 
most aspects of leadership and monarchic ideology around Philip’s period (including the way in 
which many of Philip’s own tales would have been conceived, framed, and received), this thesis has 
noted comparative material and references from them throughout so as to contextualize Philip’s 
tales better in the intellectual and elite (perhaps popular) ideologies of his world.  
 Also influential in monarchic ideology were the philosophical works of Plato with its 
philosopher kings,53 and Aristotle who favourably defined monarchy (sharply distinguished from 
tyranny), not by institutions, but through emphasizing the character of the monarch (Pol. 
5.1310b).54 Aristotle even explicitly refers to the Macedonians as an example of kingship-
monarchy, and of his five subclasses of kingship (Pol. 3.1284b35–1285b33), the heroic type 
matches well literary views of the Macedonians (e.g. Arr. 7.9.1-10-7).55 Monarchy was quickly 
becoming conceived in almost purely ethical terms. Moreover, as ‘writers do in fact help to mould 
the values of the age in which they write’ (Ferguson 1989: 4), these authors and their values were, 
in all likelihood, also the dominant ethical currency of Philip’s period. It was an influence that went 
right through to the Roman period.56 As such, they are inherently important interlocutors in any 
Philippic anecdotal discussions. 
These texts and ideas did not come from nowhere. They reflect an attempt by critics of 
democracy in the fourth century BCE to address perceptions of oligarchy and monarchy as only 
                                               
50
 On the Agesilaus – Walbank 1984: 75-6; Luppino 1991: 89-107; Manes 1992; Forsdyke 2009: 9-10; Pontier 2010: 
259-383; and Noreña 2011: 39-40; and Gray 2011: 30-32. Xenophon’s Memorabilia was influential also in a more 
general and perhaps wider sense for its use of a cannon of virtues to eulogise the dead Socrates (cf. Gray 2011: passim). 
The judgement of Agesilaus (Ages. 10.1) reflects that of Socrates (Mem. 1.2.2). Nor can the influence of the epitaphios 
logos (funeral oration) in Athens be forgotten, with its praise for the heroic attributes of the dead (North 1966: 93-94, 
106-7, 123).   
51
 Gray 2011: 70. 
52
 On Isocrates and eunoia – Blois and Bons 1992: 171-72; and De Romilly 1958: 92-101. For a comprehensive 
analysis of Xenophon and his ideas on leadership – Gray 2011; cf. Hutchinson 2000 and Wood 1964: 33-66. 
53
 Some have theorized that the rule of Philip II was influenced by Plato’s Academy (Hatzopoulos 1, 1996: 158–60). 
Luraghi (2013: 18) argues that the first formulation of the good basileus could go back to Socrates (cf. Xen. Mem. 
4.6.12).  
54
 Noreña 2011: 40. See esp. Plato’s Republic, Laws, and Statesman, and Aristotle Politics. Even other genres, like 
historiography, saw the influence of this concentration on personal character e.g. Theopompos (Noreña 2009: 2-3). 
55
 King 2010: 380. On Aristotle, kingship, and philosophy – Vander Waerdt 1985: 249-73 and Greenwalt 2010: 154-
161. On Greek and Macedonian kingship in general – Adcock 1953: 163-80.  
56
 E.g. Isocrates’ influence on his students, contemporaries, and later orators and especially Hellenistic historians is 
evident in their use of rhetorical eulogy and censure (e.g. Theopompus). This tendency was seemingly so widespread 
that Polybius felt it necessary to denounced historians who substituted eulogy for history (12.25C; cf. 10.21). Moreover, 
by the Roman period, it was common to use the cannon of virtues as a framework on which to approach history 
biographically (North 1966: 148, 149).   
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being tyrannic in nature. It was an idea reinforced by the fact that the positive features of democracy 
were regularly articulated through the graphic illustration of the more negative aspects of 
autocracy.57 By focusing on the moral education and attributes of rulers, these critics developed new 
models of monarchy and oligarchy which distanced themselves from the famous abuses of tyranny. 
Therefore, these new types of rulers were conceived of in purely ethical and moral terms – with a 
particular focus on the political virtues of wisdom and self-restraint,58 which incidentally feature 
heavily in Philip’s tales. This thinking and increasing interest in monarchy (mostly theoretical) took 
place before a ‘backdrop of political and ideological change in the Greek world’ (Noreña 2011: 
41).59 This change stemmed from reflections on different political constitutions since the events of 
the Peloponnesian war and the failure of democratic Athens.60 It also coincided with the rise of 
powerful rulers on the periphery of the Greek world (Philip among them) who seemed to offer 
strong, stable, alternative possibilities and models of rule.61   
Among other things, these individuals were evaluated against what would later be the 
cardinal virtues in the writings of the moral philosophers.62 Socratic in origin, they were justice 
(dikaiosuvnh), courage (ajndreiva), wisdom (frovnhsi"/sofiva) and temperance (swfrosuvnh).63 
Originally, Plato talked of ajrethv having these four parts, plus piety (oJsiovth" - eujsevbeia).64 
However, from the Euthyphro on Plato omits oJsiovth", and restricts the canon to four (Rep. iv, 
428A).65 Aristotle dropped this constraint and extended the range of virtues, including giving 
prominence to praovth" (Eth. Nic. iii-vi; succinct list at Rhet. 1366B1.9.4-6).66 Following Plato’s 
lead, and Zeno’s teachings, the Stoics re-established the idea of a cannon of four (listing other 
virtues only as derivatives).67 Their example would prevail among most rhetoricians and 
philosophers in later periods.68 Indeed, by Cicero’s time (and under his influence too), they were 
ingrained in moral philosophy as prudentia/sapientia, fortitudo (sometimes virtus), iustitia, and 
                                               
57
 Forsdyke 2009: 5-6. 
58
 Forsdyke 2009: 9. 
59
 Cf. Goodenough 1928: 55-56. 
60
 Eckstein 2009: 6. 
61
 Noreña 2011: 41; cf. Balot 2006: chap. 6. Even from the time of Herodotus there had been some sympathy for a 
virtuous monarchy as an ideal polity (Hdt. 3.82; Goodenough 1928: 55). 
62
 On the cardinal virtues - Dover 1974: 66f.; Ferguson 1979: 24-52 and Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 300-301. 
63
 N.b. As early as Pindar and Aeschylus there had been some tentative support for four or five primary virtues (North 
1966: 151). 
64
 Cf. Xenophon’s Agesilaus e.g. Ages. 1.27, 1.34, 2.13, 3, 11.1, 11.8 (eujsevbeia), 4 (dikaiosuvnh), 5 (swfrosuvnh); 6.1-
3, 10.1, 11.9 (ajndreiva); 6.4-8 (sofiva). Xenophon also adds patriotism and several other minor qualities to these virtues 
(e.g. 1.36, 7, 9.7). In his Cyropaedia (8.1.23-33), Xenophon details the piety, self-control, and justice of Cyrus. At the 
end of his Memorabilia (4.8.11), Xenophon recalls the piety, justice, self-control, and wisdom of Socrates.  
65
 On the history of the Platonic canon – North 1966: 165f.  
66
 Though Fragments of the Protrepticus show that he did not immediately repudiate this tetrad (Frag. 52 Rose; North 
1966: 198).  
67
 Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 301. 
68
 North 1966: 198, and 214. 
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temperantia/continentia. Moreover, they were consolidated under the rules of rhetoric which 
expected the praise of men and kings through the revelation of these virtues.69 
 Philip (along with Alexander) falls into a somewhat complex formative period in monarchic 
ideology. He lies between the more systematic articulation of kingly virtues found before his time, 
and the more formal attribution of virtues found in the Hellenistic period.70 Even so, this anecdotal-
Philippic material is not isolated or unrelated. It appears to come closest to the ideas behind the 
greater part of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (written late in the 360s just before Philip took the throne). 
In this work the focus is still on character as the ‘key prerequisite for ideal rulership’, but Cyrus’ 
character is explored through tangible actions and not just individual virtues.71 This is done 
throughout the narrative with a particular emphasis at times on narrative based tales reminiscent of 
anecdotes and apophthegmata. This equates well with much of our anecdotal-Philippic material. 
Therefore, there seems to be a continuity of sorts between the two. The later writings of Xenophon 
such as Agesilaus, but particularly his Cyropaedia, were either reflective of, or informative to a 
climate in the Greek world whereby the circulation of tales of more concrete actions and 
happenings were utilized to reflect (and reflect on) the character of the ruler. The veracity of these 
tales was from the very beginning probably of secondary concern – as is revealed by Xenophon’s 
Cyropaedia. It was primarily about ideal monarchy and ideal monarchs and leadership. It was 
inevitable that the ‘spectre of Philip’ would be drawn into these conversations at this time.72 
Hence, it was this climate of monarchical deeds and their association with virtues or vices 
which probably gave birth to the circulation and recording of much of our anecdotal-Philippic 
material (cf. Xen. Ages. 1.6). Much of it may have come from Philip’s own lifetime, where it surely 
started life as gossip, propaganda, or even eyewitness accounts (e.g. Satyrus, Theopompus, Ephorus 
etc.). It was a state of affairs which no doubt expanded exponentially after Philip’s successes. 
Moreover, it would have continued well into the reign of his son whose even greater achievements 
refocused dramatically the prism through which Philip’s character and achievements were accessed 
and judged. Therefore, speaking on the value of Diodorus’ account of Philip’s exploits, Lane Fox 
argues that oral repetition of Philip’s exploits at the Macedonian court would have reached authors 
like Theopompus and Ephorus just as it did Alexander (2011: 348).73 Philip’s extraordinary story 
                                               
69
 Wallace-Hadrill 1981: 301. 
70
 Cf. Luraghi 2013: 20. On the justification of monarchic power in the Hellenistic world – Murray 1971 and Gehrke 
2013: 73- 98 (who ascribes much of it to charisma, restless military activity and personal achievement). On Hellenistic 
monarchy – Préaux 1978: 181-294, Walbank 1984: 64-100, Mooren 1983: 205-40 and Ma 2003: 177-195. 
71
 Noreña 2011: 40. 
72
 Cf. Ellis and Milns 1970. 
73
 It is interesting in terms of Philip’s later image and legacy that both Ephorus and Theopompus were among the 
authors which Theon (65.29ff.) recommended as school text books for learning passages by heart (cf. Bonner 1977: 
273). 
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along with his personality and success left his life a fertile resource of apophthegmata, anecdotes 
and exempla – each readily available for easy excerption and use. 
  
Philip and Alexander 
This was even truer for his son Alexander, who must also be considered when trying to 
understand or evaluate Philip in any period.74 Certainly their contemporaries and successive 
generations of the ancients often thought of the accomplishments and qualities of one in comparison 
to the other.75 For example, the tale told of the deathbed utterance of the emperor Marcus Aurelius 
in the Historia Augusta (27.11-12), and Cicero’s comparative comments in De Officiis (1.26)76 are 
perfect examples of this connecting reception of these father and son kings. Significant too is the 
first apophthegma of Plutarch’s Phillipic collection in which Philip is described in relation to 
Alexander as ‘meivzona genevsqai kai; metriwvteron’ (Mor. 177C), and evaluation of Alexander 
given by envoys visiting Philip’s court that they ‘regarded the much-talked-of ability of Philip as 
nothing compared with his son’s eager disposition to do great things’ (Plut. Al. 5.1). But perhaps the 
most extensive example is Justin’s long comparative conclusion to his Philippic section of his 
epitome (9.8). 
In recent times, Alexander’s story or reception in Rome across various different texts has 
been examined, revealing a complex positive and negative dichotomy of traditions.77 This thesis 
shows that Philip’s story also comes with its own dichotomy or paradox of sorts in which Philip can 
play the drunken-debauch buffoon or classic tyrant; or the charismatic, intelligent, just, moderate 
and determined king and commander.78 These were both fundamental features of his persistent 
relevance to the Graeco-Roman world as a paradigm.79 However, when it comes to anecdotes, 
exempla, and apophthegmata, indications are that it was the latter image which dominates. It was 
                                               
74
 Molinier highlights this connection. She argues that Alexander’s brightness has driven Philip’s personality somewhat 
into the shadows, and that the Romans less naturally made recourse to Philip than Alexander, but when they did, it 
could have profound significance (‘cela pouvait avoir une signification d’autant plus profonde’ - 1995: 61).  
75
 Cf. Carney and Ogden eds. 2010: xix. 
76
 ‘Philip, king of Macedon, I observe, however surpassed by his son in achievements and fame was superior to him in 
affability and refinement. Philip, accordingly, was always great; Alexander, often infamously bad. There seems to be 
sound advice, therefore, in this word of warning: ‘The higher we are placed, the more humbly should we walk.’’ N.b. 
Philip’s facilitas and humanitas in opposition to Alexander’s rebus gestis et Gloria, which make Philip semper magnus 
and Alexander saepe turpissimus. For discussion – Molinier 1995: 66-69 and Fears 1974: 117-21. 
77
 Spencer 2002 has examined Philip’s son Alexander and his reception in Rome. Cf. Spencer 2006: 79-104; Bayham 
1998; and Carney and Ogden (eds.) 2010. 
78
 On Philip’s personality – Lévêque 1980: 176-187. Philip’s charisma was reminiscent of Agesilaus’ 
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his son Alexander’s career which far more epitomised the decent into tyranny that so worried the 
Roman elite. His was the more popular and spectacular tale of the dangers of unfettered autocratic 
power. Philip’s tales were still popular, appealing to Roman appetites for vicarious and intimate 
access to elite circles of power, past and present. 
Recently, it has been argued that the image and legend of Philip as an ideal Macedonian 
ruler in comparison to his son, emerged as a reaction or ‘glorified counter-image’ to Alexander’s 
unpopular political style among Macedonian aristocratic opposition.80 As Alexander moved beyond 
the traditional concept of a Macedonian king as a primus inter pares, many Macedonians began to 
judge him ‘by their idealized memories of Philip’ which in turn justified representation of 
Alexander as a degenerate king.81 The image of Philip as an ideal Argead king, which was 
referenced to bolster oppositional claims, was derived from the memories of the greater influence 
wielded by Macedonian elite families during Philip’s reign.82 Therefore, the idealized image of 
Philip was a fiction, or a myth divorced from the realities of the historical king who curtailed the 
autonomy of the upper Macedonian nobles and laid the ground work for Alexander’s more 
forthright autocratic style. Philip’s memory became a myth, a logos of an ideal Macedonian king 
which was born from the loss of influence felt by some Macedonian nobles.83  
There is merit to this argument.84 Indeed, it helps to explain the survival of such a large 
amount of positive tales regarding Philip’s reign. However, some care must be taken. Though some 
parts of Philip’s memory might be aptly referred to as a ‘fiction’ or ‘myth’ created from idealized 
memories articulated during Alexander’s period, we should be careful not to overstate the influence 
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P a g e  26 | 270 
 
and perspective of a later period. This might bring about some neglect of this material, with Philip 
possibly seen as only the sum of Alexander’s period when positive assessments are made. 
Moreover, despite the castigation Philip receives from authors like Demosthenes and Theopompus, 
their works leave little doubt regarding Philip’s popularity among his so called debauched, corrupt, 
and well rewarded followers among the Macedonian nobles during his own lifetime. A possible 
disservice might be done to Philip’s style of leadership by viewing our reception of it through the 
tempering effect offered by the political posturing of another period. Philip’s style of leadership 
may have been somewhat idealized after his death to reproach an ever more autocratic Alexander 
(and later imitators), but there had to be some truth to these claims for them to have had any hope of 
traction at the time – perhaps where there is smoke…85  
 
 
Philip and Kingship in the Hellenistic and Roman Worlds 
 
What then of the material’s survival, relevance, and possible use during the Hellenistic 
period after the deaths of Philip and Alexander? It seems that the ideas of the period preceding 
Philip and Alexander had had little influence beyond intellectual circles. However, after these two 
Macedonian kings and the rise of the Hellenistic dynasties, debates were conditioned by the 
necessity of accommodating philosophically the legacies of these two great Argeads and the 
dominating presence of real monarchs.86 To do this, and to combat an enduring political distrust of 
sole rule, theories of monarchy flourished by which autocratic power was curbed through the image 
of the ideal king or the admonition of the tyrannical despot.87 It is the relationship between our 
Philippic material and these theories which is crucial. What better paradigms to use, or at least be 
informed by, than that of these two famous Argeads? These were kings who had forced a new 
political world onto the Greeks, and given monarchy a new prestige broadly based on 
effectiveness.88 Even though there are many negative exempla also to be found, many Hellenistic 
dynast were eager to claim associations with these men and the Argead dynasty for legitimising 
purposes.89 Moreover, among the educated classes, theories that based their material on distinct 
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moralistic tales and sayings of monarchs and leaders such as these, would have more immediate 
relevance and persuasive power with monarchs and scholars alike.  
We know that there were a number of treatises written ‘On Kingship’ (Peri Basileias), some 
by famous men, and addressed to the kings of this period.90 These dealt with, among other things, 
the moral foundations of monarchy. It was a genre which sought in essence to domesticate 
monarchy ‘in the framework of Greek political culture’ (Luraghi 2013: 21). None survive, making it 
difficult to know for sure to what extent royal virtues were emphasized, or which ones in 
particular.91 However, going on later summaries and references, it seems that a genuine king was a 
model of all virtues – being just, generous, wise, courageous, kind, benevolent and magnanimous 
(though the institutional aspects of monarchy are somewhat obscure).92 Certainly, the virtues of 
philanthropia, epieikeia, praotes, philanthropia and euergesia were to the forefront of political 
thinking,93 and it is no accident that all our Philippic-anecdotal material is very rich in all the above 
virtues.  
The main functions of these treatises seems to have been to educate rulers in the use of their 
absolute power, and to teach people why monarchy was tolerable.94 Moreover, by accepting the 
advice of the treatises the ruler proved himself not to be a tyrannos but a basileus.95 It is difficult to 
argue that these texts contained similar tales and sayings to our anecdotes, at least explicitly.96 
However, monarchic themed anecdotes and sayings surely already formed a substantial body of 
influential material by this time from which elements and ideas were implicitly drawn.  
It is true that Hellenistic monarchy rested primarily on militaristic platforms and ideals, as is 
reflected in the Suda.97 However, this did not mean that ethical conceptions of monarchy were no 
longer important, as is shown by the above virtues, various extant texts, honorific decrees, royal 
letters, propaganda and titles.98 Indeed, these things attest to an atmosphere in which the ideal king 
was still imagined to a large extent in moral terms. Therefore, autocratic power was still being 
articulated primarily in an ethical vocabulary (as it would be for the later Roman emperors, who 
were expected to enforce the Pax Romana whilst maintaining a range of civilian virtues). At the 
heart of this language were the virtues (particularly the cardinal ones – dikaiosune, sophrosune, 
pronesis, andreia), each primarily manifested in deeds. It was this ideological apparatus with its 
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portrait of the ‘good’ Hellenistic king, along with earlier classical Greek ideas,99 that would have a 
profound impact on Roman imperial ideology for centuries.100 Therefore, the survival of our 
Philippic material through the Hellenistic period would seem to be testament not only to any 
popular or historical value it had, but also to its enduring relevance to intellectual and political 
meditations occurring on the nature of ideal kingship and leadership. Moreover, it was a relevance 
that continued into the Roman period, becoming particularly prominent once more when autocracy 
returned at the end of the Republic and under the Principate. Philip’s true legacy was intimately tied 
up with his leadership and the exercising of power. Indeed, Philip’s aptitude for command and 
governance were the strong threads by which he and these stories were pulled through history.  
There were various avenues by which the ideas and practices that promoted the association 
between monarchs, attributes and virtues reached Rome from the Greek East under the Republic.101 
One of these, which has not received much attention, was through various collections of anecdotes 
and sayings, especially those associated with former rulers and leaders like Philip. However, it was 
during the late Republic that personal virtues really come to great prominence in the public arena. 
The watershed moment was Caesar’s cultic introductions which associated his person with 
traditional ideals, opening the way for virtues at Rome to be autocratically monopolized. The 
complete integration of the ideology of monarchy and virtue came with the rise of Augustus, and 
culminated with the senate’s gift of the Golden Shield with its inscribed virtues of virtus, clementia, 
iustitia and pietas.102  
As monarchy dawned on the Roman world, so too did the expectation that a ‘good’ emperor 
have certain attributes or virtues.103 Indeed, the majority of political thought during the Empire was 
to be either direct appeals to or judgements of individual emperors,104 often with reference to former 
leaders and rulers (indigenous and foreign). This ensued with the acceptance of the institution of the 
Principate after Tiberius’ accession. Indeed, as an institution it moved beyond any real formal 
analysis much like Macedonian kingship before it. However, the emperors themselves were 
transient and a potentially appealing topic – particularly their characters, which in theory stood as 
the sole constraint on their behaviour.105 For the majority of the population of the Empire, the 
emperor’s constitutional position was irrelevant.106 What mattered was that his virtues gave him the 
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necessary qualifications, and a charismatic justification for his position.107 However, Wallace-
Hadrill argues that the elite could care less for any justification of autocracy. They accepted the 
emperor as a political fact and the only circumstance under which stability was possible. ‘What 
mattered was the conduct of the individual ruler, the use to which he put his inevitable power’ 
(1981: 318).108 Moreover, with the constant necessity for adoption, the need to question the 
qualities on which one could be chosen emperor became ever more prominent.109 Therefore, during 
the following centuries various texts dealing with imperial virtues and vices addressed to or about 
emperors were written (e.g. the corpus of Panegyrici Latini).110 Among these texts, there were 
many that contained anecdotal-Philippic material which allowed the long dead Philip to act as a 
guide, comparative, and exemplar for the emperor down (e.g. Valerius Maximus, Seneca, and 
Plutarch). 
There were other texts (in Greek) which also dealt with the nature of ruling in general – 
related by their ethical conception of one-man rule.111 What is apparent is that up to the time of 
Constantine,112 there was a relative stability in the vocabulary and topoi used to define autocracy 
and evaluate individual leaders. There was also a strong underlying belief that monarchy was best 
conceptualized through the emphasizing of royal character and individual ethical qualities.113 
However, while noting this tenacity of idiom and ideology, attention should still be given to the 
contexts surrounding a text’s production, as well as to where the exempla are being sourced (such as 
from Classical notables, Hellenistic monarchs, Republican generals, and imperial predecessors) to 
fully comprehend its intended message.114 Philip’s status as a successful monarch of some repute 
gave him authority to be considered as a source, and collectors and authors a valid licence to 
include his tales and sayings.   
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Writers under the Empire, despite the restraints of monarchy, used Philip’s anecdotes to 
contribute to a ‘shared project’ which articulated the ‘ethics for autocracy’.115 However, it is 
impossible to determine what impact this really had on politics, or how effective it was in regulating 
monarchical behaviour. That said, it seems it may have been quite substantial.116 A quick survey of 
the virtues found in Pliny’s Panegyricus or Suetonius’ Caesars (e.g. moderatio, humanitas, 
comitas, civilitas, continentia, abstinentia) shows the emphasis placed on social virtues, particularly 
self-restraint.117 Hence, for Wallace-Hadrill, ‘the focus is not on the possession of power, but on the 
control of it in deference to other members of society’ (1981: 316), and, ‘the justification for the 
emperor’s possession of power becomes his willingness to abstain from using it to the detriment of 
those concerned’ (1981: 318). Therefore, it is little surprise that Philip’s tales also reflect this focus 
on social qualities, and his responsible and restrained use of power. 
As for the virtues and vices themselves – it is apparent that in all periods, monarchs and 
individuals could be associated, praised and damned for a multitude of them.118 However, not all 
virtues and vices were considered equal in value. Indeed, different virtues were valued to a greater 
or lesser extent during different periods by different authors, by different groups in society, and by 
different rulers.119 This is an important idea which directly impacts on which anecdotes and sayings 
(with their associated qualities) were mobilised in whatever context they are found.   
It is also essential to realize that this Philippic material features significantly (like his son’s) 
in constructing the edifice that was normative Imperial behaviour.120 Indeed, this Philippic material 
seems to have had a role in the formulation of classical monarchic ideology almost from its very 
inception. Philip emerges from these diverse anecdotes, exempla, and apophthegmata as a resilient 
image and exemplar of leadership. Despite his heritage, Philip persisted as a recognizable paradigm 
of enduring relevance to the Graeco-Roman world – powerful in his reflective and instructive 
qualities.121   
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Philip the Macedonian 
 
Finally, this material of Philip’s is another source of evidence in general receptions of the 
Macedonians and Philip under the Roman Empire (particularly during the Second Sophistic).122 
Other studies, which generally do not use this material, argue that the Macedonians were generally 
associated with warrior-hood, cultural and ethical ambiguity, and at times, barbarism.123 During the 
Second Sophistic, views of the Macedonians were to some degree influenced by their image in fifth 
and fourth century BCE historians and orators.124 However, there were still images that stemmed 
from the Macedonian warrior stereotype which was commonplace in Hellenistic times.125 As for 
Philip more specifically in Roman times, the two surviving narratives of Diodorus (16) and Justin 
(7.6-9, epitomizing Pompeius Trogus) both praise and criticise Philip - Diodorus does much more 
of the former, and Justin much more of the latter.126 However, their criticisms are more limited than 
writers contemporary with Philip such as Theopompus and Demosthenes (e.g. Diod. 16.93.3-4; 
Just. 8.6.5-8, 9.8.6-7).127 Moreover, in relation to Alexander, both authors have a higher opinion of 
Philip. This is based on their interest in kingship and what makes a good ruler.128 
 During the Second Sophistic, leaders like Philip were a means by which many writers could 
express their existence ‘between Greek culture and Roman power’ (Asirvantham 2010A: 194). 
They even allowed Greek authors to claim some authority in the ‘Roman province of power’ 
(Asirvantham 2010A: 194 n.10). Overall, Philip sparked a diverse range of reactions in the Second 
Sophistic.129 However, there is a tendency to downplay the achievements of Philip – no doubt 
related to the ‘overwhelming shadow cast by the historical and romantic presence of Philip’s son’ 
(Borza 1990: 198),130 his bad reputation in Classical Athens, and the enduring popularity of 
Demosthenes’ oratory.131 Reactions include that of Aelius Aristides, who echoes Demosthenic 
rhetoric and slurs in his anti-Philip Theban Orations, which uses the history of Macedonia as a ‘foil 
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to the superior might of Rome’ (Asirvatham 2010A: 194; 2000: 10).132 In Plutarch’s biographies 
Philip is a subsidiary character. His successes and role are understated in the Alexander to highlight 
his son’s achievements, and he is viewed almost entirely from a Demosthenic point of view in the 
Demosthenes.133 This influential and hostile perspective which viewed Philip as the liberty-ending-
power-mad barbarian of the north originates mostly with Demosthenes (supplemented by others 
such as Theopompus and Hyperides).134 Moreover, because of Demosthenes’ enduring popularity in 
later antiquity, it surfaces throughout the ages in various authors such as in Cicero’s use of the title 
Philippics for his own orations is telling.135 Indeed, scholars cannot be sure that when an author like 
Diodorus (supposedly representative of a more historical tradition) states that Philip used his wealth 
to extend his kingdom (16.8.7, 53.3 and 54.3-4), that he represents ‘a historical tradition even semi-
independent of Demosthenes’ (Ryder 1994: 230). However, Philip is never referred to as a 
barbarian in Plutarch, even though associated with gold and bribery (Dem. 14.2). Moreover, Philip’s 
philanthropia is noted in Plutarch’s criticism of Athenian reactions to his death (Dem. 22.3).136 In 
general, Plutarch, like other authors such as Dio Chrysostom and Arrian, used Philip to support and 
promulgated an idealized image of Alexander.137 However, Philip’s role in anecdotal material, 
though related to these findings, seems to be slightly different. The nature of the material often 
allowing Philip to exist in a world separate from that which continued to be obsessed and haunted 
by his son’s achievements.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Dialogues with Philip’s legacy and image required Roman world auditors (be they ruler, of 
the elite class, or of a more humble background) to choose which aspects of Philip ‘the model’ they 
embraced or rejected. This decision allowed anecdotal-Philippic material to have a public and 
political function in the conception of cultural, social and monarchic identity.138 The key to that 
                                               
132
 The enduring popularity of Demosthenes meant that Philip’s image was decidedly more negative in some of rhetoric 
of late antiquity e.g. drawing heavily upon Demosthenes’ attacks on Philip (and as part of their progymnasmata), both 
Aphthonius and Libanius provided for burgeoning orators uncompromising sample invectives against Philip which 
condemned all aspects of Philip’s person and behaviour (Aphth. Prog. 28.8-31.5; Lib. Prog. Invective 3; Flower 2013: 
49-51; Long 1996: 78-80; Gibson 2008: 283-9; Cribiore 2013: 109-116; and Kennedy 2008: 54-72, 150-162. On 
progymnasmata – Kennedy 2003. 
133
 Asirvatham 2000: 109, 153. On Plutarch’s enthusiasm for Athens and her role in Greek history – Beck 1998: 52 
(with refs). 
134
 On Demosthenes and Philip – Ryder 2000: 45-89. On Demosthenes and his speeches – Ellis and Milns 1970; Sealey 
1993; Tuplin 1998: 276-320; MacDowell 2000; and Worthington (ed.) 2000. 
135
 On Cicero’s Philippics and their Demosthenic model – Wooten 1983. Molinier (1995: 65) argues that Cicero saw 
Demosthenes harangues against Philip as a ‘simple modèle littéraire’ and did not identify Philip completely with 
Anthony because of the coinciding publication of De Officiis with its positive image of Philip.   
136
 Cf. Asirvatham 2000: 109, 154. 
137
 Asirvatham 2010A: 193-195. 
138
 Cf. Spencer 2002: 1. 
P a g e  33 | 270 
 
function was in Philip’s appeal and afterlife, his style of kingship, his incongruent reputation, his 
success, his son, and his personality. All of these aspects offered flexible potential imagery, the 
result of which were dynamic interpretive traditions referencing Philip’s figure.  
This conflicting evidence means that there is no strict universal definition or consensus 
possible regarding viewpoints on Philip and his image in the Roman world – even though the 
majority of evidence of this thesis suggests a generally positive attitude. However, it is 
incontestable that Philip had a broad appeal and value as an important figure with which to consider 
contemporary concerns and values. This is conspicuous at times in the political and cultural 
considerations of the Romans and Greeks of the Graeco-Roman world as they faced a pressing need 
to define and redefine (good and bad) imperial government, and more broadly, life under said 
rule.139 In the end, to evoke Philip’s name in anecdotal material was to call forth a formidable 
exemplar of kingship, statesmanship, and generalship for contemplation.   
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1 
 
 
Anecdotes, Apophthegmata and Exempla - 
Methodological Considerations 
 
o{ti h{kista me;n oiJ ejpifanevstatoi tw'n ajnqrwvpwn lanqavnousin o{ ti a]n poiw'sin - Xen. 
Ages. 5.6.140 
 
This chapter is a short introduction to anecdotes, apophthegmata and exempla in antiquity. It 
provides definitions for our three main areas of interest, helping to establish parameters for the 
thesis in terms of material for study. It also presents some contextual background, and an outline of 
the more important scholarly ideas and debates – particularly those of authors such as Dover, Saller, 
Bosworth, and Goldhill. This enables better comprehension of the difficulties and opportunities that 
this kind of material presents to historians. It also demonstrates many important tenets and ways of 
approaching these tales which should be remembered when examining material from later chapters. 
Therefore, this chapter grounds the evidence used by this thesis in its ancient-cultural context, and 
details what that might mean for modern scholarship on this material. 
 
Defining Anecdotes   
 
‘The oral tradition does not cleave to literal exactness, but becomes typical; that is to say 
that it does not cleave to a factually exact grounding of the events narrated, but brings out 
their inner significance, what is characteristic about them, what has a general human or 
popular content. Often an anecdote is all that remains of a long chain of events, 
circumstances, and personalities’ (Burckhard 1919: 188-89). 
 
Anecdotes are the hardest of our three areas to pin down in terms of definition.141 It is 
certainly the broadest category and can incorporate the other two. In ancient times the great 
exemplar and master was Herodotus. Pledging to document the memorable, Herodotus recorded a 
                                               
140
 ‘But we all know this, that the greater a man’s fame, the fiercer is the light that beats on all his actions.’ 
141
 Scholars do not even agree on if there is anything really definable in the term anecdote i.e. can the anecdote be 
considered a specific ‘form or genre’ in its own right (Grossman 2003: 147). 
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myriad of entertaining and informative anecdotes in his narrative of the Persian Wars.142 Ever since 
Herodotus, historians have seen anecdotes as both ‘indispensable and notoriously unreliable’, 
although their ‘use by posterity can be illuminating’ (Africa 1995: 70). However, to date relatively 
little scholarly literature has been dedicated to the use of anecdotes in ancient literature.143 Indeed, 
studies in general into anecdotes are uncommon.144  
 Among the earlier studies into anecdotes in antiquity was Haight (1940). One of her more 
intriguing findings was that –  
 
‘The Romans saw such aesthetic and moral possibilities in the small story that the 
composition of it was a serious part of their education. They used the anecdote not only to 
enliven their literature but to convey great truths (vii).’  
 
However, this study was not comprehensive either in scope or depth. Moreover, there is nothing 
directly concerning Philip II. Therefore, a shorter and more enlightening examination of the topic is 
Saller (1980: 69-83). Like Haight though, Saller also has a Roman orientated focus. Therefore, until 
Bosworth’s Trendall Lecture (2009) to the ‘Australian Academy of the Humanities’, little work had 
been done on anecdotes (and apophthegmata) originating from the earlier Hellenistic period on 
Macedonian kings. This reflects the fluctuating value given to anecdotes in trying to understand 
historical events and persons. They are either worthless rubbish based on the accretion of gossip, 
invention, reinvention, and literary embroidery, or fascinating factual accounts from eyewitnesses 
privy to extraordinary moments of history.145  
Elements central to these tales are prone to creative exaggeration or modification by the 
narrator to suit his purposes and the tastes of his audience. Furthermore, behind a vast majority of 
anecdotes is an anonymous tradition of transformative transmission, which makes it difficult to 
satisfactorily take account of a narrator’s interests and biases in the received text.146 Some argue 
that anecdote is among the least dependable traditions for reconstructing history. But as Bloomer 
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 Bosworth 2009: 10. On Herodotus and his methods, including the Greeks’ early use of oral history and anecdotal 
material –Baragwanath 2008; Fehling 1990; Gray 2002: 291-321; Johnson 1994: 229-255; Murray 1987: 93-115; 2007: 
314-325; Waters 1985; Thomas 1992; and Veyne 1988: 5-15.    
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 Nb. Bosworth 2009: 1 no.1 and Goldhill 2009: 100. Among the best to date – Gemoll 1924; Haight 1940; Wehrli 
1973: 193-208; Saller 1980: 69-83; Mack 1987; Dover 1988: 45-52; Africa 1995: 70-75; Morgan 2007: 122-59; 
Goldhill 2009: 96-113; Bosworth 2009: 1-12. There has of late been a revival of interest in Plutarch and his 
anecdotes/apophthegmata – Tigerstedt 1974: esp. 16-30; Pettine 1988; Santaniello 1995; Beck 1998; 1999: 173-87; 
2000: 15-32; Fuhrmann 1998; Pelling 2002b: 65-90; Stadter 1996: 291-303; 2008: 53-66. Although, these kinds of 
studies have a long history – Schmidt: 1879. 
144
 Apart from some German scholars’ interesting attempts to define the nature, form, and function of the anecdote. For 
a full listing of this material – Grossman 2003: 148 n.10. In terms of English – perhaps the oldest work is Dissertation 
on Anecdotes (1793) by I. D’Israeli. 
145
 Grossman 2003: 145. Bent argued that, ‘we are by anecdotes made more nearly contemporaneous with great men 
than were most of their contemporaries’ (1892: 350). However, Dover concedes that anecdotal material is occasionally 
banished from historical studies ‘as if it were in all circumstances second-class evidence’ (Dover 1988: 46).  
146
 Cf. Saller 1980: 79. Despite these drawbacks some continue to argue that ‘the anecdote is the literary form that 
uniquely lets history happen... the anecdote produces the effect of the real... by establishing an event within and yet 
without the framing context of historical successivity’ (Fineman 1989: 61). 
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states, historians may bristle at anecdotal and traditional history, ‘but the readers have not’ (1992: 
9). Moreover, the ‘peculiar and unseasonable charm’ of an author like Valerius Maximus is tied up 
with anecdote which ‘has an unmistakable, universal fascination’ (1992: 9).147 
In the past scholars cautioned against the use of anecdotes on account of their unfixed forms 
and changing content. This was largely owing to the use of creative invention by each successive 
narrator as they seek to develop and improve the narratives of the tales with every new telling.148 
Therefore, the original anecdote – where locatable, can have a ‘stripped-down, almost abstract 
character’ which leaves some scope for variant details (Grossman 2003: 144). Consequently, great 
damage could be done to any historical integrity the tale might have once contained.149 
Many anecdotes in the ancient world found their way from oral form into literature. Often 
though, there is no named authority, and little clue as to when this transmission from oral to literary 
form occurred.150 However, for famous individuals, the transmission of most material was surely 
either during or shortly after their own life-times, as the motivation of later periods to continue to 
circulate (in oral form) non-contemporary material often diminished. It could happen though, along 
with the fabrication of new tales, as well as the mistaken allocation of tales between individuals.  
Whatever changes occurred during the anecdote’s written transmission were probably minor 
compared to the modifications occurring during its oral circulation.151 Transmission could also 
occur once again out of written form for repeated oral circulation. This scenario allows for the 
prospect of infinite-variant cycles of transmission and circulation of any given anecdote. Therefore, 
the anecdote ‘crosses the boundaries between oral and literate in a way that shows the 
interdependence of both spheres’ (Goldhill 2009: 111).  
It is also true that literary form does not crystallize any material into fixed form or content. 
Hence, imagination and literary pretension can also modify the anecdote. However, literary form 
must establish some set of parameters, however flexible, within which certain details or themes 
cannot be altered too much before the integrity or meaning of the original tale is lost. If this occurs, 
the anecdote ceases to be useful to the author, who initially selected it for certain ideas or themes it 
originally contained and conveyed.  
Currently, the fortunes of anecdotes as historical evidence for Philip II mirror the various 
interpretations of Philip himself. As one anecdote finds favour with one historian, another anecdote 
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 Cf. Murphy 1991: 378. 
148
 Saller 1980: 69. 
149
 Vansina’s 1965 work on oral traditions argues that there is a tendency for the historical component to become mere 
background so as not to detract from the unfolding tale. Moreover, where historical details are lacking, they are readily 
supplied, often with introduced characters and personalities. Minor characters have no real status, and better-known 
ones become ideal types. Traditions are often easily combined, or singular ones divided among several parts (Vansina 
1965: 159; cf. Saller 1980: 73-4). 
150
 On literacy and orality in ancient Greece – Thomas 1989 and 1992. 
151
 Saller 1980: 74. 
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falls out with another. As a result, the historian’s relationship to an anecdote can vary from 
dismissive to enthusiastic.152 Moreover, certain anecdotes are regularly exhibited when arguments 
falter upon the leanness of other evidence – becoming filler to plug the gaps of historical narratives. 
Anecdotes are also often thought of as only the darlings of biography – interesting sources of 
amusement or shallow edification, which scholars often relegate to footnotes or emphasise in 
attention grabbing quotes (often without any real critique).  
The word anecdote itself originates from antiquity from the Greek word anékdotos 
(ajnevkdoto").153 Originally the word meant ‘unpublished texts’ when technically applied.154 The 
extension of this meaning began with Procopius and his Historia Arcana. Much later, from the 
seventeenth century on, ‘anecdote’ developed into its more modern definition.155 The English word 
‘anecdote’ seems to come directly or via French from the modern Latin word anecdota.156 The 
Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed. 1989: 454) defines ‘anecdote’ as ‘the narrative of a detached 
incident, or of a single event, told as being in itself interesting or striking (at first an item of 
gossip).’ Gärtner (Brill’s New Pauly 2002: 690-1) defines anecdote as, ‘a short oral story, often with 
one punch line, also including humorous words, and which has a claim to be factually 
representative of some specific aspect of personalities or political-social circumstances.’  
Certain words or phrases are regular features of modern definitions. Most serve to 
distinguish the anecdote from more complex narrative forms.157 Therefore, anecdotes can be 
detached and/or form the basis for collections (e.g. Aelian’s Varia Historia), or they can be 
embedded in larger narratives;158 being particularly popular in biography for example. However, 
there is a complication in that features of anecdotes from the ancient world correspond often to 
other literary genres such as the apomnemoneumata, the apophthegma, the gnome (maxim), the 
chreia, the aphorism, and the exemplum (paravdeigma).159 Hence, it is accurate to argue that, ‘of all 
genres of utterance, none eludes definition quite so persistently as ‘anecdote’’ (Dover 1988: 45). 
 
 
 
 
                                               
152
 Grossman 2003: 143. 
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 For other working definitions in ancient history – Saller 1980: 69; Dover 1988: 45; Beck 1998: 6; Bosworth 2009: 1; 
and Goldhill 2009: 100. Cf. Grossman 2003: 147-50. In breaking the word anékdotos (unpublished) down we get; an + 
ekdotos – given out; ekdidonai – to give out, publish; ek – out, out of + didonai – to give out. 
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 Diod. 1.4.6; Cic. Att. 14.17.6; Clem. Al. strom. 1.1.14; Synesius Ep. 154a. 
155
 Gärtner in Brill’s New Pauly 2002: 691; and Grossman 2003: 151-2. 
156
 On the history of the word in early modern Europe – Grossman 2003: 151-155.  
157
 Cf. Grossman 2003: 148. On the tripartite structure of occasio, provacatio, and dictum in anecdotes – Beck 1998: 
12-18. 
158
 Grossman 2003: 148-9. 
159
 Brill’s New Pauly 2002: 691. 
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Defining Apophthegma  
 
Many anecdotes from the ancient world build up to a memorable punch line, what the 
ancients termed the apophthegma (ajpovfqegma - pl. ajpovfqegmata; Latin facete dictum or 
sententia).160 However, these apophthegmata could often stand alone in antiquity. Either with or 
shorn of many of the narrative elements of an anecdote, they were assembled into collections know 
best to modern readers as ‘Sayings’.161 There are collections of apophthegmata from particular 
epochs and categories of individuals such as philosophers, kings and military commanders.162 Philip 
II himself exemplifies the last two areas. 
To the Romans, with their love for the individual, the particular, the curious detail, and 
character, apophthegmata were considered a ‘delight’ (Haight 1940: 4) which should form part of a 
good early education - particularly in terms of character building. 
 
...I would urge that the lines, which he is set to copy, should not express thoughts of 
no significance, but convey some sound moral lesson. He will remember such 
aphorisms even when he is an old man, and the impression made upon his unformed 
mind will contribute to the formation of his character. He may also be entertained by 
learning the sayings of famous men and above all selections from the poets, poetry 
being more attractive to children (Quint. Inst. I.1.35-36).163 
 
Their popularity is demonstrated by Cato the Elder’s, Cicero’s and Julius Caesar’s collections of 
sayings from both Greek and Latin sources (Plut. Cat. Mai. 2, 4);164 and that Melissus (librarian of 
the Porticus of Octavia), wrote one hundred and fifty books of maxims (gnome) called Ineptiae.165  
One could simply define apophthegma as being the witty-spoken-punch-line to a short tale 
or anecdote. Often concise, its defining feature is its implicit claim to authenticity. These elements 
are clearly demonstrated by the oldest surviving apophthegmata from the likes of Anaxagoras 
(Aristot. Metaph. 1009b26), Theramenes (Xen. Hell. 2.3.56), Stesichorus (Aristot. Rh. 1395a 1-2), 
and Pittacus (Aristot. Rh. 1389a 14-16).166 In the end, the form was adopted by Christianity, so that 
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 On apophthegma, gnome/sententia, apomnemoneumata, and chreia/exemplum – Stenger 2006: 203-221; Beck 1998: 
30-40 and Morgan 2007: 5-8, 84-121; 122-59.  
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 Bonner 1977: 175-6. E.g. Plutarch has three extant collections of apophthegmata. They give some idea as to the 
structure of other lost collections – Sayings of Kings and Military Commanders (Mor. 172-208a), Sayings of Spartans 
(Mor. 208b-240b) and Sayings of Spartan Women (Mor. 240c-242d). 
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 Gärtner in Brill’s New Pauly 2002: 886. 
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 On Quintilian and education – Dorey 1972b: 98-118.   
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 Still in circulation in Cicero’s time (De Off. I.29, 104); cf. Bonner 1977: 176 and Laurence and Paterson 1999: 189-
190. 
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 On the maxim (gnome) – Biscardi 1970: 219-232; Wehrli 1973: 193-208; Bonner 1977: 173-5, 248, 258; Karavites 
1990: 9-34; Morgan 1998: 120-51 and 2007: 84-121; Too (ed.) 2001: 248-250, 294; Stenger 2006: 203-221; Mouraviev 
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 Gärtner in Brill’s New Pauly 2002: 886. 
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Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis has a lot in common with a work like the Varia Historia of his 
contemporary Aelian.  
There is a close relationship between apophthegmata and anecdotes.167 Bosworth 
recognized this close relationship, and as such, both formed part of his discussion.168 Although not 
all anecdotes must end in an apophthegma (e.g. Philip and the oracle from Delphi concerning a four 
horse chariot – Val. Max. 1.8.ext.9), or all apophthegmata reported be done so in direct speech (e.g. 
Diogenes’ rebuke of Philip at Chaeronea – Plut. Mor. 606c). 
 
Anecdotes and Apophthegmata in Theory and Practice 
 
Saller has shown that apophthegmata need not always be part of studies into anecdotes from 
the ancient world.169 Therefore, after defining anecdote Saller emphasizes two important points – 
anecdotes must have a narrative element which simple apophthegmata do not have (though Roman 
anecdotes may contain apophthegmata); and an anecdote must be of a detached incident, and thus 
lengthy historical narratives do not meet the definition.170 This articulates what constitutes material 
for Saller’s study and what does not. However, before detailing why this dissertation seeks to 
discuss both elements without strict limitation of this kind, it is worth quoting Saller further –  
 
It cannot be pretended that this definition produces clear-cut distinctions. Roman authors 
frequently provide some context for bons mots, and it is not always clear at what point the 
extra details transform a simple apophthegm into an anecdote (1980: 69).    
 
By seeking a concrete distinction between apophthegma and anecdote, Saller imposes a 
difficult general constraint on his discussion. This could leave the evaluation of important evidence 
to one side for reasons of conjectural classification based on the use of the term anecdote – which is 
itself unstable. Therefore, this thesis examines apophthegmata and anecdotes together because both 
are important to any study in which the characterization of Philip’s image is a strong focus. Many 
complex ideas of Greek and Roman literature bind them, but it is a connection most easily 
expressed, and more comprehensively contained in one Greek word (or concept) - h\qo".171   
It is what each may reveal about ethos or character that unites both anecdote and 
apophthegma (even exempla) together, no matter where one is said to end and the other begin.172 
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 Cf. Beck 1998: 36. 
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 1980: 69. The apophthegmata collections of Plutarch contain many anecdotes, indicating that the simple 
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This connection is revealed by Plutarch’s famous programmatic statement in his Alexander (1.2-
3).173 Here Plutarch explains his methods, which give preference to characterization rather than 
spectacular description or detailed narrative.174 Though the terms anecdote or apophthegma are not 
explicitly stated, their use is implicitly foreshadowed and endorsed by Plutarch’s opening remarks. 
Plutarch’s Alexander, like the rest of his writings, were inspired by Platonic idealism,175 and 
Plutarch’s belief (Peripatetic in origin) that character manifested itself in actions (pravxei"). 
Certainly, the application of strings of anecdotes concerning famous individuals to exemplify kinds 
of bivoi reflects Peripatetic biographical works.176 Consequently, Plutarch’s focus is primarily to be 
on a hero’s character (h\qo") which is best illustrated through their pravxei", and in this particular 
case, chance remarks or even a joke (pra'gma bracu; ... kai; rJh'ma kai; paidiav ti").177 Plutarch cares 
little for his subject’s place in history,178 only in character itself, which manifests itself most visibly 
through examples of virtue or vice (ajreth; h[ kakiva). It is unsurprising then that the Life of 
Alexander is replete with numerous anecdotes, many containing dramatic punch lines or famous 
sayings. For Plutarch, in his search for character, anecdotes and apophthegmata were valid markers, 
giving an impression (e[mfasi") of character (cf. Kim. 2.2). This is important as a great deal of our 
anecdotes concerning Philip come from Plutarch.179 
Bosworth agrees with Plutarch’s position that an anecdote undoubtedly ‘tells us a certain 
amount about the characters involved’ (2009: 1). However, he noted two further problems with this 
type of evidence (like Saller). One - there are problems of verification - not unique to anecdotes, but 
particularly acute to this genre. Two - the anecdote is often transferred at a relatively early stage 
from one individual to another.180 As Bosworth argues, ‘the framework is agreed, but the actors are 
fluid’ (2009:1). This presents difficulties for the historian. However, this thesis is focused on the 
material’s use and purpose in a literary and cultural sense – on what it suggests regarding the 
authors and their characterization of Philip and his words and deeds, and the relationship this has 
with monarchic ideology and contemporary values? Whether true or scurrilous, anecdotes, 
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apophthegmata, and exempla are still evidence – depending on the questions asked of them.181 This 
study defines how in relation to Philip by moving away from historicity towards their wider 
literary/social function.  
To understand Philip’s reception in anecdotes, the process of anecdote formation in the 
Greek world needs examination. Dover has made some attempt at this.182 Firstly, noting the genre’s 
elusive definition, he tried to define anecdote by instead noting some of its features.183 One of 
which was that the anecdote, ‘must be self-contained; a side-step, like a visual illustration, from a 
more general context..., or an item in a chain (e.g. a collection of apophthegms) of similar items’ 
(1988: 45). This criterion is not always easily applied when identifying an anecdote. Sometimes the 
anecdote is skilfully woven into the fabric of the surrounding material, to call it self-contained could 
be difficult, and yet it may still be classed as an anecdote for a variety of other reasons. ‘Self-
contained’ does not have to mean ‘not connected’ or ‘not related’, either in a temporal or narrative 
sense to the material surrounding it.184 Having said this, ‘self-contained tales’ are a good marker of 
an anecdote. The majority of the material found in this thesis falls easily into this category.  
Dover also discusses the historicity of anecdotes by making two problematic points. Firstly, 
his notion that ‘there is no smoke without fire’ is untenable when consideration is given to who 
generated the smoke, and to what purpose? Flawed too is the idea that, ‘if there had been nothing in 
it, it could not have been said, because everyone would have known it was not true’ (1988: 46). 
Considering Philip alone in relation to these two ideas supports this. For example, during Philip’s 
life and after his demise, when the circulating material concerning him, particularly that of a gossip 
like nature, found its way into literary anecdotal form in histories, speeches and the like, the 
motivation to exaggerate, bend truths, suppress details, or simply invent material is obvious 
depending on the material’s creator. Now add in the turbulent political climate of the Successors’ 
period, and the intellectual and literary ferment of the Hellenistic period, and it is easy to see how 
significant the distortion could be long before the biases and agendas of the Roman period. In 
addition, Philip’s career could serve as a philosophical and rhetorical exemplum, and it is highly 
probable that different philosophical schools exerted influence on both the rhetorical and historical 
traditions surrounding Philip, as they did with his son Alexander.185 
 Dover also argues that an anecdote’s ‘date of birth’ must be ascertained, as a contemporary 
date to its subject demonstrates whether a story could be true or not – for the fact that it seemed to 
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its author likely to be credible to his readers is noteworthy. Therefore, there is an important 
distinction between ‘unrealistic’ and ‘untrue’.186 Moreover, this so-called ‘contemporary anecdote’ 
says much in relation to ‘contemporary perceptions’ of the individuals involved. This principle 
seems applicable to Philip where attributed-contemporaneous material can be sourced. As always 
though, biases must be considered when studying a figure such as Philip, who was highly 
controversial in his life time, and whose image and legacy were of some interest to later 
generations.  
Sadly, there is usually no acknowledgment of any individual authority for anecdotes, and 
material from an earlier account could be contaminated by material from other sources or by the 
excerpting author’s re-working of the material.187 It is difficult to discover to what extent this 
problem affects the authors of this dissertation. However, the search is not futile. Much of the extant 
historical writing which survives, including anecdotal material, is a ‘reworking of material already 
familiar to its readers; and the primary objective of the authors was not the discovery [or invention] 
of new facts but the literary presentation of a known tradition’ (Bosworth 1988b: Preface v).  
Educated assumptions can be made about an author’s motives, but more so their aims. 
Among these were surely to present an engaging, persuasive and clear miniature narration –for the 
anecdote must be told with one eye towards its auditors. Selection of material must leave nothing to 
subtract from its final form; its meaning must be clear; its style simple and its language of everyday 
life; it should ring probable despite any remarkable claims or details; and it should be intensely 
vivid in order that persons and objects shall seem present.188 Finally, it should be easy to excerpt for 
effortless retelling.189   
Dover also notes a clear difference in the ‘function’ between two categories of anecdote – 
those which have a named individual, and those which are ‘detachable’.190 The latter type is one 
which is able to detach from its original individual, location or time and join to different ‘points of 
reference’ or even remain detached.191 This has happened to some material concerning Philip (see 
chap. 3).  
The processes of transition between the above two categories appears to be 
straightforward.192 For example, during any number of stages of transmission, anecdotes concerning 
named individuals can become ‘detached’ when people forget names – particularly if the anecdotes 
do not lose their purpose or deeper meaning by the loss. Conversely, anecdotes can attach 
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themselves to names (especially famous individuals like Philip) because it adds that extra bit of 
conviction and persuasion to the tale. Moreover, the narrator appears more erudite if the figure 
belongs to the past; or if the individual is a living contemporary, the narrator may appear to be privy 
to exclusive information.193 However, it seems that many tales concerning Philip are distinctly more 
public than private (i.e. they take place at dinner parties, in law courts, and during military 
operations). This suggests a more assertive public or even parochial ownership of (or identification 
with) the exploits of one of Macedonia’s most renowned and popular figures.194  
Another way that a name can be attached to material is when details illustrate what the story 
teller considers, ‘rightly or wrongly, to be the character of the subject’ (Dover 1988: 49). This is 
important when looking at a man like Philip. For example, if Philip was popularly perceived as 
exemplifying a type of behaviour for whatever reasons, he could become the (common) subject of 
anecdotal material about individuals of that kind. This accumulation of material would then further 
confirm and increase any distortion of Philip’s image – if the original tales or perceptions were 
erroneous.195 Therefore, caution is needed, as material of this nature might surround a controversial 
figure like Philip.196 Moreover, a significant proportion of this material would be semi-divorced 
from the more narrative based traditions of our extant Philip historians, making it almost impossible 
to attribute the data to individual authorities or even periods (if not from Philip’s lifetime). 
Additionally, many anecdotes concerning someone prominent or especially famous, could be either 
political apparatuses employed to reconcile or estrange, or devices for utilization in either a literary 
or historical controversy.197  
Philip has competing traditions – both in a historiographic and anecdotal sense. Some are 
hostile, some apologetic, and some hagiographic. Hence, for every alienating anecdote, apothegm, 
exemplum (most linked to various vices), there is a conciliating counterpart (most often associated 
with virtues). It is this constant divergence or disagreement, and its perpetuation (even in modern 
times), that has given birth in many respects to the different Philips of history. Any firm 
conclusions regarding character or characterization are undoubtedly undermined and destabilized by 
such a phenomenon. In the end, anecdotes have the power to elevate or depress our opinions of 
individuals.198 This was no different in the Greco-Roman period for Philip II.  
Dover also notes some factors which determined the role anecdotes and the like had in 
Greek historiography and biography.199 Two are significant in relation to the birth of material 
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concerning Philip. Firstly, educated and wealthy writers were often alienated from politics and a 
political life. Therefore, many regarded politics, and by association ‘authority’, as a grubby business 
whereby political events were influenced for the most part by base actions associated with various 
vices. Secondly, there is the porous nature of the boundary between ‘historical enquiry and creative 
fiction’ in the ancient world (Dover 1988: 51).200 Certainly features praised by readers and critics 
alike (e.g. cavri", pavqo", deinovth") are produced just as well by fiction – perhaps even better.201 
This indifference at times to the line between historical truth and fiction was widespread and 
entrenched in the Greek world, and probably arose from a scarcity of documentation in a society 
and culture which mined the past for exempla, and saw remembrance of the dead as extremely 
important.202 The latter two comments are equally true of the Roman world from which survives the 
anecdotal material concerning Philip of this thesis. 
 
 
Anecdotes in the Roman World: Form and Function 
     
As anecdotes could be generated and transmitted by a variety of means in the Roman world, 
there are problems with using them as historical evidence. Indeed, a study like Saller’s is dedicated 
to this very problem (during the Principate). However, the primary concern of this dissertation is an 
author’s willingness to record the material, the formulation it takes, the function it serves, and its 
relationship to conceptions and characterizations of Philip in association to monarchic ideology and 
contemporary mores. Its historicity is largely immaterial.203  
Nevertheless, beyond the search for truth, there is much worth noting regarding how 
anecdotes were generated and transmitted in the Roman world, and what changes could (and 
frequently did) occur during transmission.  For example, it is hard to ascertain if what appears to be 
the first author transmitting an anecdote witnessed it (not an issue with our Roman period authors 
regarding Philip), invented, altered it, or was merely passing it on. Moreover, since details of the 
anecdote’s initial author seldom came with the anecdote, other ancient authors, often far removed in 
time from the incident, were as incapable as modern historians of determining its ultimate origin.204 
This is often true with the anecdotal material surrounding Philip – particularly in authors like 
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Aelian, Valerius Maximus and Plutarch.205 However, some tales can come with a named authority 
(e.g. Athen. 13.605b-c = FGrH 115 F 248). In the end, Roman period authors do not seem 
(rhetorical manipulations aside)206 to have invented their material on Philip, but transmitted in their 
works selections of what was available to them. That material was often supplemented with 
personal touches (most often contextual and stylistic) that subordinated it to their own literary 
agendas. 
There were also various circumstances important to understanding transmission of anecdotes 
in the Roman world.207 There was gossip – the narrators of which were not greatly concerned with 
its origin and trustworthiness. There was also story-telling, which was common to dinner-parties 
and other similar social gatherings. Here the entertainment value of an anecdote was more 
important than its historicity. Here, the survivial of many tales linked to the fact that they were just 
good stories. Moreover, similarities in details from various sources may indicate the existence of 
traditional core motifs around which a range of anecdotes were composed. There were also 
historical exempla used in oratory, which regularly took the form of anecdotes. These anecdotes 
were used both as ‘illustrative material’ and to lend authority to arguments.208  
This common use of exempla in oratory is probably reflective of pervasive Roman views 
concerning moral authority.209 Indeed, there are many other contexts in which words or deeds were 
either commended or dammed by reference to moral exempla. Hence, the use of anecdotes in moral 
treatises as illustrative information was quite common. For example, in authors such as Plutarch and 
Seneca, the authors draw on anecdotes as archetypes to illustrate virtues or vices, and for their 
didactic value – which remained foremost at all times (e.g. Q. Nat. 5.15.1-3). The accuracy of 
details also mattered little, as they would be adapted in each recounting to exemplify the moral 
principle under consideration.210 
 Philip’s tales often fulfil this role – providing essential evidence for attitudes and 
ideologies.211 Although, something of the Greek and Hellenistic context of the source material for 
these Roman period authors should also be remembered, as anecdotes after the reigns of Philip and 
Alexander were in all likelihood influenced to a large extent by Hellenistic traditions of kingship 
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and leadership. Therefore, working at an ideological level, these anecdotes also reflected 
contemporary opinion (informed or otherwise), as to what ideas people had regarding correct 
behaviour among monarchs, leaders, and commanders in the Hellenistic world (at least they had at 
some point to ensure survival through this period for later generations). Therefore, Philip’s tales are 
complex paradigmatic material which probably underwent transformative change during 
transmission to accord with successive generational mores and ideas on how a good or virtuous 
king, leader or emperor should or should not behave. Moreover, far removed in time from Philip by 
this period, they might or might not be Philip’s actual historical behaviour – as this could easily be 
fabricated at any point.212  
Two other contexts for transmission are crucial to this dissertation. Firstly, having become 
part of the literary tradition, various tales concerning famous individuals were collected from an 
assortment of sources and retold by antiquarians for entertainment purposes because of their value 
as good stories, and as displays of learning or erudition.213 They were also assembled into eclectic 
collections of memorable acta et dicta. Examples include – Cornelius Nepos’ Exempla; Valerius 
Maximus’ collection of acta et dicta; Aulus Gellius’ Attic Nights; Aelian’s Varia Historia; 
Athenaeus’ Deipnosophistai; and Macrobius’ Saturnalia. Philip was a popular individual (along 
with Alexander) in such collections (see Introduction). 
The final means of transmission was through biographies.214 However, correct information 
and reliability of the sources were not the principal concerns of the biographer. Often there was 
little hope of tracing an anecdote’s true basis or origin, so an overly analytical attitude achieved 
little.215 Therefore, an author like Plutarch is not excessively sceptical towards much of his 
anecdotal material.216  
Saller has also made some relevant conclusions regarding the stability of anecdotes during 
transmission through a comparative study of various elements in different versions of certain 
anecdotes. Firstly, the chronological setting in which the story takes place is one of the least stable 
aspects of anecdotes. The alteration could be small, or, as was common, the element of time was 
either added or removed.217 There are numerous Philippic anecdotes, apophthegmata, and exempla 
which have no chronological markers whatsoever. However, there are others in which internal 
references to battles (e.g. Chaeronea) or other known events allow some dating.  
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An anecdote’s physical backdrop or setting is only a slightly more stable component. 
Nevertheless, particulars about locality are often either in conflict or omitted entirely.218 A good 
example of this in our Philippic anecdotes is the indefinite location of the supposedly impregnable 
fortress/city before which Philip made his famous remark concerning its vulnerability to an ass 
laden with gold.219 Moreover, the unnamed Frouvrion... ojcurovn of Plutarch and the tina povlin of 
Diodorus becomes the universal omnia castella of Cicero (Letters to Atticus, i.16.12). 
When Saller considered the protagonists of anecdotes, it was apparent that the identity of 
minor characters could be altered, removed, or added without considerably changing the 
anecdote.220 A good example of this is the anecdote which involves Philip giving an unjust 
judgement whilst either tired or drunk.221 The other protagonist of the tale is entirely different (an 
old woman in one - Machaetas in the other).  
Alterations in characters could also happen among the more important protagonists – even 
the main characters.222 Though occurring less regularly, this change demonstrates that authors were 
willing to reassign anecdotal material between individuals if stereotypical qualities or personalities 
made it possible.223 This happens on several occasions to tales involving Philip. For example, 
Plutarch holds Philip the man responsible for the memorable wise words of a tale regarding the 
treatment of slanderers.224 Amazingly, Plutarch also assigns the words to a different individual – 
Pausanias, king of Sparta (Mor. 230D). This use of anecdotes suggests that they may not always be 
historical, but that their successful fabrication and transmission is still a type of evidence.225 It 
demonstrates that the focus was often more on the sentiment or moral. Any names attached to 
incidents were sometimes more important for their ability to stand for a broader category of 
individual such as a king or philosopher. Paradoxically, the naming of renowned individuals also 
added to an incident’s status and impact – as well as its popularity and longevity, and was therefore 
also important. 
Changes in minor details are extremely common also in anecdotes.226 This is to be expected. 
Anecdotes exist to expose the remarkable by their very nature, and mundane detail offers little 
beneficial material for either moral edification or amusement. A good example are the differences 
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in minor details and language between the two accounts of Philip’s letter to Alexander regarding his 
abortive attempt to woo the people with money.227 
Additionally, the mutability of details does not seem to have decreased significantly once 
the anecdotes were written down.228 The tale of Philip, the oracle and the chariot in Valerius 
Maximus (1.8.ext.9) and Aelian (V.H. 3.45; cf. Cic. De facto 5) is a good example. It suggests that 
either authors recounted anecdotes from memory, or strict adherence to their written sources was 
not their highest priority.229 Ancient writers had little motivation to fabricate unimportant or minor 
details, but they also had no incentive to accurately replicate them either.230 This thesis documents 
many instances in Philippic anecdotes where minor details play some role in Philip’s 
characterization and image.   
In stark contrast is the relative stability of the punch-line or apophthegma of the anecdote. 
However, even this could change depending on an author’s intention for its use. Therefore, although 
elements of anecdotes like the apophthegm were less inclined to change, there was still ‘no limit to 
the possible alterations’ (Saller 1980: 79) that could take place. One example of a changing 
apophthegma in our Philippic corpus even comes from the same author – Plutarch. It is supposedly 
spoken by Agesipolis upon hearing of Philip’s destruction of Olynthus.231  
 
“ajll! oujk ajnasth'saiv ge toiauvthn” e[fh “povlin ejkei'no" a[n dunhqeivh’’ – Plut. Mor. 40E. 
 
“ma; tou;" qeouv",” ei\pen, “a[llhn toiauvthn ejn pollaplasivoni crovnw/ oujk oijkodomhvsei - Plut. Mor. 
215B. 
 
“ajll! oujk a[n ajnoikivsai ge povlin ejkei'no" duvnaito thlikauvthn,” – Plut. Mor. 458C. 
 
Overall anecdotes in the Roman world must be handled differently from other sources of 
evidence, as their generation and transmission remained primarily outside any critical discipline.232 
However, Saller argues that not all anecdotes are lies, there may be ‘kernels of truth in them’, but 
these ‘kernels’ are of little use unless some universal methodology can be devised to identify them 
(1980: 79). His study’s opposition to anecdotes as evidence could be overcome for specific 
anecdotes, but only by demonstration on each occasion.233  
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Bosworth had rather different ideas on the value of anecdotes and apophthegmata as 
historical evidence – 
 
Our attitude to anecdotal evidence should be less sceptical than it has been in the past. 
Unless it is proven otherwise, we should accept its historicity, assuming that the tradition 
goes back to some memorable deed or apophthegm... The material that I have examined 
here... has little in the way of narrative context, but internal analysis reveals nothing self-
contradictory or implausible. Instead, I have traced a line of consistent anecdotes... This is 
exactly the detail that is remembered and passed on by contemporaries, and the anecdotes 
that provide the evidence should be treasured and exploited, not casually ruled out of court 
(2009: 10).      
 
This conclusion is a result of Bosworth’s methodology which focussed upon the examination of 
‘anecdotal strings’. This involved the study of similar anecdotes by following their ideas and 
themes, and comparing them to material found elsewhere. This is essentially the individual 
demonstration demanded by Saller, but applied to thematically related anecdotes tied together for 
larger exposition. This thesis makes some use of this approach. 
 
 
Anecdotes and the Second Sophistic 
   
Speaking and oratory were one route to power and influence during the Second Sophistic. In 
fact, performing rhetoric (often containing anecdotes) was integral to understanding the Second 
Sophistic and the self-representation of the authors of this period. It was ‘a fundamental aspect of 
the social and intellectual life of this period’ (Goldhill 2009: 98). This is important to remember 
when it comes to considering work by authors such as Aelian, Athenaeus, and even Plutarch. 
Indeed, in a work dedicated to a discussion of anecdotes and the ‘bookish culture’ of the Second 
Sophistic, Goldhill argues that in the highly literate culture of the Empire, there existed parallel to 
its focus on the book another current in which knowledge was parcelled for oral circulation – 
anecdotes.234  
Therefore, during this period, the pepaideumenoi exchanged in agonistic-discursive jousting 
brief paragraphs of paradoxes, curiosities, and moral paradigms (of which Philip is a good 
example). This increasing circulation of anecdotal material was fundamental to paideia – the 
education and culture which bound the elite of the Empire as a social collective.235 In this way, by 
constant exposition of the weird, wonderful, and extraordinary, anecdotes help ‘define and delimit 
the normal, to eikos’ (Goldhill 2009: 111). This is the fundamental principal behind monarchy 
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ideology and general behavioural paradigms of leadership in anecdotes. Therefore, anecdotes 
facilitate the performance of paideia at an everyday-oral level, allowing the elite (and lay auditors) 
‘to place themselves socially’ (Goldhill 2009: 111). This suggests that in this time Philip and his 
tales offered elite Greco-Roman culture both positive and negative paradigms - moral paideia for 
the privileged and influential. Therefore, depending on the details, Philip as exemplar was either to 
be followed or rejected. This demonstrates that centuries after his death, Philip’s tales continued to 
form a key informative element in the culture and education of the world’s ruling elite.  
Goldhill also argues that as an anecdote has a narrative and normally no author, it is to be 
distinguished from a quotation - therefore, Athenaeus’ work consists of mostly quotations.236 
However, this distinction between quotation and anecdote might not be so clear. Taking the 
example of Athenaeus in relation to Philip, while Athenaeus 4.167a-c is very much a quotation like 
the following -  
Theopompus in Book LIV of his Histories says that in Philip’s domain around Bisaltia, 
Amphipolis, and Macedonian Grastonia, the fig trees produced figs in mid-spring and the 
vines produced grape clusters, and the olive trees produced olives at a time of year when 
they should have been budding; he claims that Philip was lucky in everything (3.77d-e). 
 
Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander liked apples, according to Dorotheus in Book VI 
of his History Involving Alexander (7.276F).  
 
Athenaeus 13.605b-c is a good example of a quotation containing some of the elements of an 
anecdote.  
 
And Onomarchus, he (Theopompus) claims, gave Physcidas the son of Lycolas of 
Trichonium, who was a good-looking boy, a laurel-garland made of gold that had been 
dedicated by the Ephesians. This boy’s father took him to Philip’s court, where he was 
treated like a whore and then sent home with no reward (13.605b-c).  
 
Goldhill also discusses the chreia (creiva) (sometimes equated with the exemplum). ‘Closer’ 
to the anecdote, it is normally a short exchange or single sentence which ends in a particularly 
clever or insightful comment or retort. Particularly good examples are found in the work of Machon 
(c. first half of the third century BCE).237 It had a utilitarian object originally - hence its origin in the 
more practical Cynic and Stoic philosophical schools (e.g. Plut. de Stoic. repugn. 21), before 
gradually passing to those of the grammaticus and of the rhetor.238 The chreia was something akin 
to an attitude, a genre minus rules or argument that represents a view of the world through 
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‘exemplary expression’ (Goldhill 2009: 101; cf. 104).239 It is memorable, brief, easily repeated, and 
powerful, having ‘a signoff power’, which is in many ways a demonstration of authoritative power 
(Goldhill 2009: 101).240 Some argue that an anecdote is different from the chreia, as it is not so 
committed to a single witticism – nor is it such a ‘vivid demonstration of the power or persona of 
the speaker’ (Goldhill 2009: 102). This is highly subjective and demonstrates the closeness between 
anecdote and other literary genres. The best example of a chreia involving Philip comes from 
Plutarch.241 
 
...to; tou' Diogevnou" “!Aristotevlh" ajrista'/ o{tan dokh'/ Filivppw/, Diogevnh", o{tan            
Diogevnei,”...and what Diogenes expressed when he said: ‘Aristotle lunches at Philip’s 
pleasure, Diogenes at his own,’... (Mor. 604D). 
 
It is clear from this example alone that a chreia is a sharp or sententious aphorism of a kind. 
However, it differs from the maxim or gnome (gnwvmh), in that it is related to a particular event or 
person. Moreover, it can be used in a narrative which explains it – as is the example above.242 
Overall, the distinctions between an anecdote, the quotation, the chreia, and even the 
paradox are not so clear cut.243 Even Goldhill acknowledges this difficulty, for although they are 
‘particularly useful frames for understanding the anecdote within Greek literary tradition...,’ the 
forms themselves should not be thought of as ‘absolutely discrete genres’ (2009: 103; cf. 104). This 
is good advice when looking at material concerning Philip II. 
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Exempla  
 
Exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio ([Cic.] 
ad Herennium 4.49.62).244 
 
 
Like the genres above and anecdote, the line between an exemplum and an anecdote is at 
times illusory.245 A good definition of exemplum is found in the ad Herennium (see above),246 
which also goes on to state that, ‘it places its subject before the eyes since it describes everything so 
clearly that I would say it can almost be touched by the hand (4.49.62).’247 Therefore, an exemplum 
renders a thought more brilliant, clearer, and more plausible.248 Overall, Exempla are in essence the 
Roman equivalent of what might be understood to be an amalgamation of the modern terms 
example and anecdote. Goldhill sees the exemplum as being an ‘institutionalized, packaged 
narrative form’, which was repeatedly exploited as a component of Roman discourse, and 
something akin to the anecdote in the Greek tradition (2009: 105).  
The Greek equivalent of the exemplum was paradeigma, or sometimes chreia. Collecting 
them began in Classical times, becoming more popular in the Hellenistic period, and endemic in 
Greek and Latin literature by the beginning of the Roman Empire.249 Aristotle discussed 
paradeigma in breaking down the proofs of rhetoric into two areas – paravdeigma kai; ejnquvmhma 
(Rhet. 2.20ff.). The former he broke down further into two main areas – examples drawn from 
history and those which are invented (but drawn to some extent from real life).  
 
Paradeigmavtwn d! ei[dh duvo: e{n me;n gavr ejsti paradeivgmato" ei\do" to; levgein  
pravgmata progegenhmevna, e{n de; to; aujto;n poiei'n - Rhet. 2.20.2.250  
 
Much later, Quintilian also noted the fictitious as well as historical nature of the subject matter of 
exempla, further remarking on its usefulness in persuading the audience of the orator.  
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Potentissimum autem est inter ea quae sunt huius generis, quod proprie vocamus exemplum, 
id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id quod intenderis commemoratio - 
Institutio Oratoria 5. 6. 6. 
  
Roman teachers and parents were greatly concerned about conduct and character,251 and as 
such bona and mala exempla (like chreia) also had an important role in the education of Roman 
young.252 They taught morals, as well as being used as ornaments of style which could persuade the 
hearts and minds of listeners.253 Seneca advocated that boys should memorize in school chreia (as a 
form of exemplum) because their young minds can comprehend them, and through them discover 
wisdom –  
 
Ideo pueris et sententias ediscendas damus et has quas Graeci chrias vocant, quia conplecti 
illas puerilis animus potest, qui plus adhuc non capit – Ep. 33.7.  
 
This thesis documents how Seneca makes use of Philippic exempla in his works.254 However, they 
are too long and detailed to be considered the chreia variety mentioned above. Instead, they are 
relatively traditional exempla, with their details speaking to more mature edification.  
Quintilian tells us more than Seneca on anecdote writing in the schools of the Grammaticus 
(Institutio Oratoria 1.9.2-6). He gives express directions as to their teaching, stating that each 
student should learn to paraphrase in simple and restrained language the fables of Aesop, and also 
practice writing aphorisms, moral essays (chriae) and ethologiae (Sententiae quoque et chriae et 
ethologiae) (basically maxims and exempla). Moreover, he thinks deeds no less than sayings should 
be presented for treatment (et tam factorum quam dictorum ratio est). Quintilian argues that above 
all, an orator should have a plentiful store of exempla, as many as possible (sciat ergo quam 
plurima), both old and new, those recorded in history, those transmitted by oral tradition, those that 
occur from day to day, and even those fictitious exempla invented by the great poets. The former 
have the authority of evidence or even legal decisions, the latter, either have the warrant of antiquity 
or are regarded as having been invented by great men to serve as lessons to the world (Institutio 
Oratoria 12.4. 1-2; cf. 12.2.29).255  
Quintilian followed his own advice when it came to Philip II on at least one occasion, using 
him as an excellent exemplum from history for the proving of his point (Institutio Oratoria 1.1.22-
24). Therefore, Philip, like others (e.g. Alexander)256 was a figure of Roman rhetorical education, 
                                               
251
 Bonner 1977: xi. 
252
 On Roman and Greek education – Wilkin 1905; Freeman 1907; Marrou 1956; Eyre 1963: 47-59; Beck 1964; Gwynn 
1964; Clarke 1971; Bowen 1972; Bonner 1977; Bloomer 1997; Morgan 1998, 2007; Too 2001: and Joyal 2009.   
253
 Haight 1940: 7. 
254
 On Seneca and his use of exempla – Mayer 1991: 141-76; and 2008. 
255
 On the moral authority and importance of exempla or chreiai – Plin. Pan. 45.6; cf. Fronto Ad Ant. Imp. 2-3 (Naber p. 
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his image an important touchstone in the preparation of successive generations of Roman politicians 
and leaders for public life. Philip serves Rome in the creation and exploration of cultural values 
from an early educative phase, but also enduring as an exemplar in more mature 
accomplishments.257  
Returning to Cicero, who used many exempla, he referred to exempla as the most useful 
embellishments of the style of an oration (de Orat. 3.52.201),258 mentioning the use of them among 
the ornamenta of an oration in his description of the art of the ideal orator (Orator. 40.138; cf. de 
Orat. 3.53.205).259 Cicero reflects these thoughts in the several mentions of Philip he makes in his 
works.260 Cicero often introduces Philip’s exempla/anecdotes quite naturally into his work (almost 
conversationally) to illustrate some point. Moreover, most references to Philip, like most of 
Cicero’s anecdotes in general, are often succinct and to the point. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 There are numerous difficulties regarding the formulation of any methodology for working 
with anecdotes, apophthegma and exempla from the ancient world. Indeed, these terms can be 
difficult even to define, and their associated material often challenging to categorise with any real 
certainty – let alone approach with any sure method of examination. Moreover, their formation and 
dissemination in different periods was a complex evolving process which spanned centuries, 
cultures, languages, genres and applications. These difficulties have been shown to be particularly 
acute in terms of gathering true historical information from them. However, this thesis is not 
focused on their historicity. Instead, its primary attention is on how they function in their respective 
texts and in society at large. What larger role/s animate the recording and distribution of this 
material? As a result, many of the problems cited above are manageable. By concentrating on a 
selection of these tales and their themes, ideas and qualities; it is possible to obtain meaningful 
information regarding the reception of Philip’s persona and legacy in the Roman world. However, 
to realize this possibility, critical assessments must still be undertaken towards the authors and the 
works in which these tales are located (as shown next in chap. two). 
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2 
 
Ancient Sources – Two Case 
Studies 
 
Excerptors are responsible for choosing their material, both the individual quotations and the 
overall topics....In this, at least, they must exercise judgement and taste...They are also 
responsible for the organization of the work…The double process of selection and ordering 
leaves ample scope for originality. The excerptor’s choices will to some degree reflect 
contemporary values and concerns, and in this regard may serve as a window on the age; but 
they may also be the product of individual preference and decisions... and so help to shape 
the interests and views of future readers... The anthologizer may thus play a crucial role in 
the transmission of a cultural heritage (Konstan 2011: 10).    
 
The sources of this thesis demonstrate Philip’s popularity as a figure with which to negotiate 
and engage with the concerns and interests of the Roman world from the late republic to the height 
of empire. These same sources also suggest the existence of an extensive audience primed for 
Philippic tales, as there is a large amount of ancient sources to consider in a dissertation of this kind. 
Some are simple excerptors such as Stobaeus – but many are more complex than this with their 
reworking of the material to fit either context or agenda. Therefore, because of this large volume of 
reference material, this chapter is intended as a detailed example of some of the analysis required of 
any approach towards these authors. Hence, two authors have been chosen to stand in many 
respects for the countless authors mentioned during this thesis (though relevant discussion of 
particular authors is appended where necessary to the main text of the thesis). Indeed, the critical 
approach demonstrated here is applied throughout the thesis to all authors cited. However, space 
limitations demand its omission from the text.  
The two authors selected are Valerius Maximus and Plutarch. These two authors are in 
many ways emblematic of the majority of our authors or various aspects of them. They will enable 
consideration of such areas as monarchic ideology, collections of exempla, collections of 
apophthegmata, Roman/Latin authors, Greek authors, the role of rhetoric, the use of anecdotes in 
treatises, the second sophistic, intended audiences, ethics and morals, the selection and reworking of 
material, agendas, contextual issues, dedicated works, and many other themes. Moreover, Plutarch 
in particular accounts for a good proportion of the material of this thesis, and seems to have had 
access to earlier Greek material on Philip that surely helped to shape many later traditions. 
Each section is not exhaustive. More details concerning these authors and their Philippic 
material is found throughout this thesis where appropriate. Moreover, many of the points made 
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below should be understood to have larger more universal relevance to other referenced authors of 
this thesis. Therefore, what follows is an analysis of each author and their work so as to better 
contextualise their material on Philip into their philosophies and aims.   
 
Valerius Maximus  
 
The Roman author Valerius Maximus261 has nine mentions of Philip amongst the 967 stories 
of his Facta et Dicta Memorabilia (see introduction).262 Some argue that the work is of little use to 
the historian of events and individuals.263 However, Valerius was not writing history.264 Hence, 
others argue that Valerius’ work gives us insight into what aspects and individuals of the past were 
deemed worthy of remembrance, and what was said about them in the social and cultural milieu of 
early first century CE Rome under Tiberius.265 Indeed, reworked-excerpted exempla could displace 
the original source material as new paradigms of historical memory – providing the basis for 
education and acculturation into imperial Roman elite circles,266 as their leading protagonists were 
referenced as models for the culture of a new age.267 Philip was one of these past individuals 
deemed worthy enough of remembrance in Rome under this new imperial reality.268 Consequently, 
Philip’s exempla offer insights to aspects of the culture of the first century CE. 
Valerius’ work is a mass of rhetorically shaped stories and details of varying lengths 
arranged into nine books. Each book has a variety of different chapter headings of mostly abstract 
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own behaviour (Wardle 2005: 142). Philip was in a similar position, though his presentation cannot be expected to 
match in substance or quantity that of his more famous son.  
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categories of morality or immorality.269 In most cases they offer both Roman exempla (domestica) 
followed by foreign externa (mostly Hellenic) exempla.270 This methodology consciously involved 
the juxtaposition of Roman and foreign exempla.271 Scholars are divided as to whether there is any 
real (successful) organization of the material.272 There are also deep divisions as to the overall 
purpose of the work.273 Nonetheless, scholars fall into basically two not wholly irreconcilable 
camps. Some argue that the work was meant as a pedagogic aid for practitioners and students of 
rhetoric and declamation.274 That declamatory composition directs and informs the work’s structure 
and organization.275 Thus, it was a hand-book or reference-scrapbook of exempla and stylistic 
paradigms meant for adding ‘colour, variety and persuasiveness to both conversation and formal 
oratory’ (Carter 1975: 34).  
Others see the work as having a powerful moral purpose, whereby exempla of a didactic 
tone were employed to bring about ethical persuasion.276 Skidmore is adamant that Valerius is a 
source of moral exhortation. He argues that any glory attained by individual exemplars would serve 
to encourage their audience to imitate their impressive deeds and words (e.g. ...ut eorum quoque 
respectus aliquid praesentibus moribus prosit – Val. Max. Praef. Book 2). Whereas individuals 
whose deeds and words brought infamy would serve as deterrents. Therefore, Valerius seeks to 
deter vice and encourage virtue. The preface to the work (including its dedication to Tiberius) 
seems to support this.277  
 
I have determined to select from famous authors and arrange the deeds and sayings worthy 
of memorial of the Roman City and external nations, too widely scattered in other sources to 
be briefly discovered, to the end that those wishing to take examples may be spared the 
labour of lengthy search... Therefore I invoke you to this understanding, Caesar…by whose 
celestial providence the virtues of which I shall tell are most kindly fostered and the vices 
most sternly punished (Val. Max. Praef.).278    
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However, it also supports the arguments Bloomer makes regarding the work being defined in terms 
of practical utility.279 Bloomer argues that the purpose, method and audience of Valerius are all 
declared in the preface. Indeed, he feels that the needs of Valerius’ audience, that is public speakers, 
lawyers and declaimers for a collection of exempla of ‘authoritative literary pedigree’, are the main 
inspiration for his work.280  
The latest scholarship is working towards an uneasy reconciliation between the two camps, 
though with more emphasis on the moral aspects of the work. Spencer recently commented that any 
distinction between rhetorical and ethical is not ‘practicable or desirable’ (2010: 176 n.5).281 Wardle 
makes a similar argument noting that the fundamental or serious moral purpose of the work should 
not be separated from its practical use to its primary audience (those involved in declamation).282  
Owing to disagreement on the work’s purpose, different audiences have been proposed for 
the work. They include declaimers, school boys (apprentice declaimers), the Roman elite (or 
Italians and provincials) active in Rome’s imperial bureaucracy and military – that is imperial 
supporters and beneficiaries, and those in public life whose business was law and politics.283 
Whatever the truth, Valerius’ work probably reached a wider audience than even the author had 
envisaged after publication – particularly if it was known to be on the emperor’s reading list. 
Therefore, Philip’s exempla were available to various audiences drawing upon the work for various 
purposes – including leisure.284    
There was once great focus on and disagreement about Valerius’ sources. Now, there seems 
to be consensus, at least on a larger compositional level.285 Though Valerius mentions a few 
different authors, he deviates little from mainstream and orthodox authors like Livy, Cicero, Varro, 
and Pompeius Trogus (externa exempla).286 Possible sources for material relating to Philip II 
include Cicero, C. Julius Hyginus, Pompeius Trogus, a collection of exempla externa, and 
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Theopompus (cited at 8.13.ext.5, and 8.4.ext.5),287 though it was once denied that Valerius could be 
using Greek sources.288   
It is impossible to give detailed analysis of Valerius’ source use and influences with so 
much literature from antiquity lost or corrupt.289 Moreover, there is the ‘elusive influence’ of the 
more oral and fluid versions of exempla found in the schools of rhetoric, and the fact that not all 
exemplum must have one source (Wardle 1998: 16). Maslakov argues that the search for Valerius’ 
sources for some more common exempla is pointless, as they were often dealt with in rhetorical 
compositions and handbooks, ‘accumulating with time standardized imagery and vocabulary that 
particular authors (without necessarily borrowing from one another) varied at will’ (1984: 460). 
Famous dicta and facta could also preserve their form throughout numerous presentations, but not 
necessarily reflect dependence on any given source, as both oral and written traditions would keep 
the essential component of the story unaltered – while scene and characters were fluid.290 Indeed, in 
popular imagination, Philip’s wit and use of bribery were commonplaces – and formed themes 
around which tales, real or invented, clustered in the schools of rhetoric and declamatory halls.291 
Additionally, if Valerius had himself been a practitioner of declamation, he would have memorized 
countless famous exempla and dicta of just this kind.292 
Philip’s own fame, as well as his paternity to one of Rome’s greatest foreign obsessions, 
Alexander, no doubt hastened the accumulation of material.293 Therefore, Philip’s fame, image and 
memory were the playthings of exempla literature, increasingly vulnerable to the ornamentation and 
fabrications of recurring topoi.294 Philip’s memory outside of historiography reduced and purified 
into some kind of fusion of rhetorical tradition and popular memory – which informed it, and was 
informed by it.295 Therefore, Philip’s exempla in Valerius might rightly be considered artificial and 
stylised representations of his career and image that have been subjected to a fluid process of 
elaboration and refinement divorced of any discernible historical tradition.296 However, even if this 
were substantial true, it in no way decreases their contribution to discussions regarding monarchic 
ideology or contemporary values. 
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Scholars have undertaken analysis into Valerius’ use and adaptation of source material 
where possible. Hence, when phrases are not copied verbatim, modification takes place usually in 
the form of paraphrasing, abbreviation or compression, alteration of word order, use of synonyms, 
change of emphasis, and the switching of nouns and adjectives.297 There is also rhetorical 
embellishment and amplification of source material, which is possibly just the stylistic reworking of 
the material for easy insertion into declamation.298 Moreover, there are historical mistakes in 
Valerius (usually on account of simplification and confusions of memory).299 However, by 
comparison to possible source material Valerius does reveal his understanding of issues and 
institutions.300 This brings us to Valerius’ style and method, which is important when competing 
versions of Philippic material exist elsewhere.  
 Exempla were an important aspect of moral education for Romans, and it was from history 
that exempla were mined for deeds and words that were worthy of praise (laus) and reproach 
(reprehensio).301 Valerius offers his audience a catalogue of mined exempla animated by a strong 
sense of Roman patriotism, conservatism and traditionalism (e.g. the panegyric on Rome at 
2.7.6).302 However, Valerius is still open to the use of foreign material (externa), though somewhat 
less (c. three to one ratio), and despite some occasionally explicit anti Greek invective (e.g. Val. 
Max. 4.7.4). Moreover, the externa are separated and subordinated to what he considered superior 
Roman material, and sometimes included for reasons mainly relating to variety or entertainment 
(e.g. Val. Max. 1.6. ext.1).303 This variety provides interest for the reader, and enables Valerius to 
be more persuasive by providing exempla from all periods, races, and classes.304 Therefore, 
entertainment meets instruction, and compliments Valerius’ moralistic aims.305 There are also more 
subtle methods used to prioritise Roman material. For example, in the final chapters of book 1 there 
is the contrast between national (Roman) and individual (foreign) greatness. The numerous foreign 
examples, in which Philip first appears in the work, are not ordered by chronology or national 
origin, but appear as a catalogue of disconnected abnormal events. This contrasts significantly to the 
careful ordering and praise of the Roman exempla.306 Bloomer would have us play down this 
general disparagement of Greece and Greeks, citing one of Valerius’ methodological predecessors 
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Cicero and his ‘stated, prescriptive preference’ for exempla of Roman origin (Bloomer 1992: 78-79; 
cf. Cic. Orat. 132).307  
The exempla themselves are ordered under chapter headings, with key introductions which 
serve either as links/transitions between chapters, or as vehicles in which Valerius justifies material 
selected.308 Each exemplum is presented in a regular format that includes an introduction, substance 
or body, and conclusion.309 The introduction to each exemplum can be ornate and rhetorical or 
simple and clear, even predictable. In regard to the material on Philip, it either stands alone or 
coalesces into the body of the exemplum.310 It is also in the introductions/transitions that Valerius 
often enters the text. Along with other first person comments elsewhere, this provides important 
moral guidance. It helps to condition the audience’s attitude, and communicates ways in which to 
begin to appreciate the subsequent material.311  
 In addition, Valerius’ transitions are a sophisticated signalling of a change of topic. This 
was an essential skill for the declaimer who must hold his audience (often deeply familiar with the 
proffered material) by novelty of transition and treatment.312 Introductions were also important as 
they helped to assert the relevance of the exemplum to the rubric under consideration. They often 
establish a hierarchy to the sequence of exempla.313 In many ways these 
prefaces/introductions/transitions substitute for the argument found in a theoretical thesis.314   
Some would argue that while Valerius is capable of clear, lively, well-organized, and 
informative narrative, his overall style of writing is filled with verbal flourishes, ‘epigrams and 
other ornaments of variable quality’ couched in language, ‘ponderous, stilted, and strained’ 
(Shackleton 2000: 3-4). Carter argues that Valerius has a ‘pompously didactic tone’ (1975: 27), and 
that his approach is ‘uniformly dull, monotonously turgid and oppressively forced’ (1975: 29). 
However, in considering Valerius’ Philippic exempla almost in isolation from the rest of the text, 
we tend to lose the more negative cumulative effects of many of these elements.  
 It is in the conclusions to Valerius’ exempla that we find his most elaborate ‘flowers of 
rhetoric’ (Shackleton Bailey 2000: 3) and moralistic comment.315 Valerius’ gaze is mostly focused 
upon virtues, but he does include vices for moral comment (91 chapters worth).316 However, 
Valerius is cautious of their possible adverse moral impact on his audience (n.b. 9.1.Praef). Though 
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he also realizes they are necessary to his work (e.g. 9.13 and 5.2.Praef), and includes them owing to 
their excellent ability to make a point through contrast.317    
Finally, does Valerius provide a consistent characterization or picture of an individual? This 
is important when considering a figure like Philip as an exemplar and the possibility of finding 
historical material free of rhetorical deposits and fictions. Others have touched on such questions in 
relation to other individuals with interesting results.318 Overall though, scholars argue that as 
Valerius is not committed to a systematic account of events, and is using a vast amount of 
heterogeneous sources, it is unlikely that he would present a unified perspective of an individual.319 
Instead, he amasses a collection of morally and politically contradictory and conflicting material, 
the result of which is various shades of unfavourable and favourable references.320 It is ‘a 
dichotomy of patterns’ which relates not only different facets of personalities, but also reflects 
natural debates and controversy, or a ‘tradition of dispute’ from the wider community permeating 
the schools of rhetoric (Maslakov 1984: 488-89). Valerius offers in each exemplum a picture of 
these personalities which ‘obliterates ambiguities, removes specifics and imposes narrow, negative 
[or positive] verdicts’ (Maslakov 1984: 482). Philip too is not immune to this accumulation of 
incongruous and paradoxically unambiguous material.  
However, the kind of book Valerius wrote did not call for a consistent historical outlook on 
events or individuals. Instead, Valerius wrote to present valuable paradigms from history. He did 
have favoured villains and heroes though,321 for although Valerius was no systematic compiler, 
‘eclectic or indiscriminate compilation would undermine the consistency of his moral types’ 
(Bloomer 1992: 163). Therefore, different view-points are discernible when the focus is not to 
suppress dissonant material, but only to praise the good and denounce the bad.322 The Philip of 
Valerius’ work offers both these aspects for consideration – reflecting the contentions of competing 
historical traditions. Valerius allows Philip’s behaviour and values in any given tale to be judged on 
their own, free of any consistent agenda regarding presentation of a good or bad Philip. For 
Valerius, Philip is a multi-functional exemplar from the past – his tales individual elements in a 
connected whole that has purpose. Therefore, each Philippic tale should be interpreted on its own 
merits, whilst remembering the larger purpose for which it is being used. 
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Plutarch  
  
There are many Philippic anecdotes, apophthegmata and exempla in the works of Plutarch 
(c. 46-120 CE). Some are to be found in his Parallel Lives,323 but a great deal of come from the 
slightly less read Moralia – particularly the Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata.324 The Moralia 
itself is a large collection of works in which Plutarch deals with a multiplicity of themes (e.g. 
education, ethics, antiquities, religion, philosophy, literature etc.), in various forms (e.g. letters, 
diatribes, lectures, dialogues, sayings). It paints a picture of Plutarch as an earnest mentor intent on 
helpful lessons.325 Many of those lessons are centred on personal conduct, as Plutarch was above all 
else a moral philosopher, with a moral message.326 Indeed, the teaching of his fellow man in how to 
lead a better life was perhaps the greatest virtue for Plutarch.327    
Written in Greece under Roman rule, all Plutarch’s works bear the hallmarks of an author 
working in the early phases of the second sophistic, a classicising movement obsessed with the 
Greek past and Greek paideia.328 Ideally placed at Delphi in Apollo’s service to advertise his values 
and the cultural memory of Greece,329 Plutarch’s hope was to ‘convey the essence of Hellenic 
paideia to his pupils, to his powerful contemporaries, and to posterity’ (Russell 1973: 17).330 
Plutarch wrote for readers, many of whom were very influential men, ‘whose ambitions, virtues, 
and weaknesses he recognized and whom he wished to help achieve a more philosophical based 
life’ (Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002: 1). Therefore, in his Lives and other non-biographical 
works, some featuring Philip, Plutarch uses historical deeds and sayings as exempla or 
                                               
323
 Plut. Alex. 2.2-3; 2.4; 3.1; 3.4-5; 5.1; 5.2-3; 6; 9.4-5; 9.6; 10.4; Tim. 15.4; Eum. 1.1-2; Per. 1.5; Pel. 18.5; Phoc. 9.5; 
16.1-2; 16.2-3; 16.5; 16.6; 17.4-5; Dem. 9.1-2; 16.2; 20.3; 22.1-2. N.b. this is a subjective list due to problems in 
defining anecdotes (chap. one). Moreover, Philip is not always a major protagonist in these anecdotes. In some he is 
merely a reference point (e.g. many of the anecdotes in Phocion). On anecdotes in Plutarch’s Lives – Beck 1998. 1999: 
173-87; and 2000: 15-32. On Plutarch’s biographies – Beck (ed.) 2014: 249-528. 
324
 Moralia references = On listening to lectures (Mor. 40E); Sayings of Spartans (Mor. 215B; 216A; 216B; 217F; 
218E-F; 218F; 221F; 230D; 235A-B; 235B); On the control of anger (Mor. 457E-F; 457F; 458C); How to tell a 
flatterer from a friend (Mor. 67F; 70B-C; 70C-D); Sayings of kings and commanders (Mor. 177C-179D); On the 
fortune or the virtue of Alexander (Mor. 331B; 334C-D; 339C); Table-Talk II (Mor. 632B; 634C-D); Table-Talk VII 
(Mor. 707B; 715C); On exile (Mor. 602D; 606C); On Chance (Mor. 97D); A letter of condolence to Apollonius (Mor. 
105A-B); Advice about keeping well (Mor. 123E-124A); Advice to bride and groom (Mor. 141B-C; 143F); Whether an 
old man should engage in public affairs (Mor. 790B); Precepts of statecraft (Mor. 799E; 806B); Concerning 
talkativeness (Mor. 511A; 513A); Greek and Roman parallel stories (Mor. 307D); Lives of the ten orators (Mor. 845C; 
845D; 848F-849A). On the range of exempla used by Plutarch in the Moralia – Grilli 1991: 41-46.  
325
 Russell 1968: 131; cf. Van Hoof 2014: 135-148. 
326
 Nikolaidis 2014: 350-372. 
327
 Gianakaris 1970: 81. 
328
 On the second sophistic – Van Groningen 1965: 41-56; Bowersock 1969; Bowie 1974; and Whitmarsh 2005, 2013. 
On Plutarch and his Roman world (including the Second Sophistic) – Barrow 1967; Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002; 
Stadter 2014: 13-31 and 2015; and Schmitz 2014: 32-42. On other literary activity in Achaea during Plutarch’s life – 
Bowie 2002: 41-56, who argues that during his time, Plutarch was ‘a man whose influence as a philosopher is very 
considerable’ (2002: 51). 
329
 Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002: 1, 11. 
330
 Cf. Preston 2001: 100. A sound Greek paideia was for Plutarch a man’s most valuable asset – one which could guard 
against filotimia (Swain 1990A: 129-33; 1990B: 192ff.). Cf. Blois and Bons 1992: 162.  
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paradeivgmata for instruction.331 Indeed, in Plutarch’s non-biographical material, often he 
deliberately neglects historical setting for these exempla. What really matters to Plutarch is their use 
as proofs and as models of behaviour.332 Therefore, seemingly cut adrift from historical context, 
Plutarch’s world of moral apophthegmata often ‘leaves an impression of timelessness’ (Schmidt 
2002: 58). 
It is Philip’s role within this whole process of paideia that is of most interest. With 
Plutarch’s principal concerns being man, his character, and his ethical nature,333 the moral tone of 
his Philippic material is no surprise. Plutarch’s fascination with history (and her protagonists) was 
always driven by moral considerations, by his concern for humanity and compassion, as well as 
overall civilized values.334 Plutarch was fixated on the idea that serious moral education could come 
from the observing and interacting with past and present personalities.335 This is highly visible in 
his Philippic material.   
 For Plutarch the importance of history was very much utilitarian in nature. Moreover, this 
utility (wjfevleia - as opposed to pleasure - tevryi") was not political or militaristic, but wholly 
moral.336 Plutarch believed as part of his general moral framework that to improve character the 
words and deeds of notable individuals formed examples which served either as models for 
imitation or for avoidance.337 This moralism though is for the most part implicit in Plutarch’s texts, 
the onus of praise and blame left to the reader’s judgment. However, frequently the moral 
categories invoked are not contentious, so that the reader’s response to the moral message is 
foreseeable.338 Therefore, rarely are there imperatives or prescriptions, merely material for moral 
reflection.339 Philip’s general role in Plutarch particularly exemplifies this approach.  
                                               
331
 Valgiglio 1992: 3963-4051; and Duff 1999: 50. On this aspect in the Lives – Stadter 2000: 493-510; also Jiménez 
2002: 105-114 on exempla in the Lives and the education of rulers. A key-Vita for this aspect was the Numa. Here 
Plutarch offers an image of the ideal ruler which owes much to Greek philosophy and literature – particularly Isocrates 
and Plato (Blois and Bons 1992: 159-188.   
332
 Cf. Duff 1999: 50. 
333
 Gianakaris 1970: 39, 80 and Nikolaidis 2014: 350-72. 
334
 Russell 1968: 135. 
335
 Jiménez 2002: 105; Valgiglio 1992: 4012-13; Frazier 1996: 59-65; Duff 1999: 37-41; 49-51; Stadter 2000: 493-510.  
336
 Duff 1999: 51-53. Cf. Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus 79c-e and 84b. 
337
 Duff 1999: 50-51, 72; Beck 1998: 2; and Stadter 2015: 215-30. Cf. Aem.1.1-4; here the model reader uses ‘the mirror 
of history to adorn life and make it like the virtues of those men’.... taking what is most effective ‘for the improvement 
of character’ (pro;" ejpanovrqwsin hjqw'n); cf. De liberis educandis 14a; and Per. 1.4-2.4. On these two programmatic 
statements - Duff 1999: 30-45. Cf. De Lat.Viv. 1129b-c - on great men being examples. This thinking was certainly 
nothing new – being present before Philip in both Isocrates and Xenophon (e.g. Isoc. Evag. 46, 75-76; To Dem. 8, 12; 
Ep. 7.7; Nic. 55; Xen. Ages. 10.2; Mem. 1.2.1-8, 3.5.14; Oec. 4.4-25; and Cyrop. 1.1.3, 2.2.30, 7.5.85, 8.1.12, 21-39). 
Cf. Gray 2011: 51-53. On Plutarch as an Antiquarian – Payen 2014: 235-49.     
338
 Duff 1999: 53-55. Pelling (1988: 10-18) details two different types of moralizing. ‘Protrepic’, which contains 
implicit or explicit counsel, and ‘descriptive’, which broaches moral concerns but does not try to direct conduct (cf. 
Duff 1999: 68-9). 
339
 Duff 1999: 69-70. 
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Conservatively inclined, Plutarch’s work reflects his strongly held civilised morals.340 
Plutarch’s values and ethics come from contemporary-classicizing-philosophic currents and his 
declared Platonic devotion.341 He is especially interested in the subordination of emotions or the 
irrational (pavqo") to reason (lovgo") (especially in adverse circumstances), and in the gaining of the 
right mean (mesotēs) between excesses, which was necessary to display virtue.342 This is a key 
theme in Plutarch’s biographies and permeates his other works, particularly as Plutarch thought that 
genuine virtue came only through action – mostly political or public (the majority of Plutarch’s 
Philippic material would agree with this).343 Great virtue also came from education or culture 
(paideiva) for Plutarch, which was an important feature of Greek self-definition in his time.344 This 
education, which allows for the control of emotions, produces certain virtues in the individual.345  
Most common are pra/ovth" – which is a calmness or self-restraint that shuns every kind of 
excess (physical or emotional) both within the individual and in relations with others; it is an 
internal moral state which is discernible in the decorum of a person’s guise, emotional continence, 
and patience in dealings with others.346 The other is filanqrwpiva (humanity), which has an 
expansive usage in Plutarch.347 Indivisible from (Hellenic) civilization, it is the ‘virtue par 
excellence of the civilized, educated man; and it manifests itself in any manner that is proper for 
such a man, be it affability, courtesy, liberality, kindness, clemency, etc.’ (Martin 1961: 174). 
Unsurprisingly, or perhaps surprisingly (for Philip’s detractors), it is these virtues which pervade 
Plutarch’s Philippic-anecdotal material. It is a fact which connects them to a letter written to Philip 
from Isocrates in which special emphasis was placed on these two qualities in Philip’s dealings with 
the Greeks (5.113, 116).348  
With Plutarch’s view that active political participation was the indispensable human activity 
in the pursuit of ajrethv,349 it is important to outline Plutarch’s political thought, particularly as 
regards monarchy and leaders like Philip.350 Plutarch’s views on politics were profoundly 
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 Russell 1973: 64, 81. 
341
 On Plutarch’s philosophy and morals – Russell 1973: 63-99; Dillon 1977: 184-230 and 2014: 61-72; Froidefond 
1987: 184-233; Opsomer 1998; 2005: 161-200 and 2014: 88-103; and Becchi 2014: 73-87. On ethics and morals in the 
ancient world (particularly Greek) - Huby 1967; Rowe 1976; and Ferguson 1979: 1989.   
342
 Duff 1999: 70-76, 78-82; Beck 1998: 108; and Russell 1973: 85, 88. On the rhetoric of virtue in Plutarch – Stadter 
2015: 231-45. 
343
 Duff 1999: 66. 
344
 See Duff 1999: 76-77 on the link between virtue and education in Plutarch’s Lives.   
345
 de Romilly 1979: 275-307; and Duff 1999: 77-8. 
346
 Martin 1960: 73. 
347
 For list of references dealing with philanthropia – Martin 1961: 164 n.1, including the important Hirzel 1912: Chap. 
4. ‘Philanthropie’. Cf. Roskam 2014: 516-28. Bell 1949: 31-37 and Ferguson 1979: 102-117 are still useful. 
348
 On Plutarch’s familiarity with Isocrates – Blois and Bons 1992: 167.  
349
 An seni 791C; cf. Cato Mai. 30.3; Adv. Colot. 1126ff. At Aristid. 6 Plutarch focuses upon ajpethv, which as the only 
divine good attainable by man, must be nurtured and pursued by rulers. Thus, glory from virtue rather than power was 
an ideal ruler’s aim. Cf. Schettino 2002: 203.   
350
 On Plutarch’s most important political works – Zecchini 2002: 191-200. Plutarch does still have much in his non-
political works on statesmanship e.g. De tuenda sanitate 137C, where he states that he is writing for filovlogoi and 
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influenced by his attachment to polis structures and his acknowledgment of his place in Rome’s 
empire.351 Thus, Plutarch is influenced by the panhellenistic ideology of authors of the fourth-
century BCE, and is sensitive to the freedom and unity of the Greeks.352 This may explain, along 
with his dislike of tyrants and Hellenistic kings, his negative view of the Macedonians in general, 
and perhaps Philip, who ended Greek freedom.353 However, Plutarch seems to have admired 
Alexander. This reveals that in spite of his affection for Greek traditions, he had sympathies for a 
world ruled by an able, wise and humane monarch.354 This feeling was surely influenced by his 
acceptance of the principate, by the Platonic ideal of kingship, and by peripatetic ideas of 
moderation and pragmatism.355  
Plutarch believed that kingship was the supreme constitution (cf. Ad princ. Inderud. 780E-F; 
An seni 790A), a great and divine gift (mevga kai; qei'on dw'ron - Num. 6.1; cf. Isoc. Evag. 40), and 
differed from tyranny, not in institutions, but in its just treatment of the governed.356 Therefore, his 
highest concern was for the personality or moral virtues of those ruling, virtues such as sobriety and 
wisdom, but particularly divkh (justice) through pra/ovth" and humanity. The ideal king was a just 
ruler, a basileus dikaios. Indeed, Plutarch concurs with Agesilaus when he questions the greatness 
of the Great King, ‘rightly and nobly thinking that justice must be the royal measure wherewith 
relative greatness is measured’ (Ages. 23.5-6).357 It is a position he backs up in his biography of 
Demetrius (who embodied everything contrary to a basileus dikaios) where he highlights the role of 
                                                                                                                                                            
politikoiv. Cf. Aalders 1982: 8. On Plutarch’s political views (apart from Alders 1982) – Carriere 1977; Blois 1992: 
4600-4611; Duff 1999: 90-94 and Pelling 2014: 149-62. 
351
 Aalders 1982: 11. 
352
 Aalders 1982: 18-19. 
353
 Aalders 1982: 16-17, 21-22. N.b. Plutarch’s view of Philip in the Pelopidas – ‘This was the Philip who afterwards 
waged war to enslave the Greeks (toi'" $Ellhsin u{steron polemhvsa" uJpe;r th'" ejleuqeriva"), but at this time he was a 
boy and lived in Thebes with Pammenes. Hence he was believed to have become a zealous follower of Epaminondas, 
perhaps because he comprehended his efficiency in wars and campaigns, which was only a small part of the man’s high 
excellence; but in restraint (ejgkrateiva"), justice (dikaiosuvnh"), magnanimity (megaloyuciva"), and gentleness 
(pra/ovthto"), wherein Epaminondas was truly great, Philip had no share, either naturally (fuvsei) or as a result of 
imitation (mimhvsei)’ (26.5). Aalders (1982: 23-25) noted Plutarch’s positive appreciation of Alexander, making some 
reference to the Sayings of Kings and Commanders (179ff.) – yet ignored this collection in relation to Philip, where the 
characterization of Philip is far more positive. However, any argument that this collection is Plutarch’s needs to be 
reconciled with Plutarch’s opinion of Philip above. Though, Epaminondas was Plutarch’s über hero (cf. Barrow 1967: 
51), and any comparison made between him and Philip was bound to highlight Philip’s failings. This attitude may have 
softened if Plutarch had written a Philip using the Philippic apophthegmata of (his?) Sayings of Kings and 
Commanders. Perhaps the task of reconciling Philip - the good ruler of the apophthegmata, and Philip - the conqueror 
of Greek freedom (arch-nemesis of Demosthenes), appealed little to Plutarch. His Alcibiades had perhaps shown him 
the difficulties of extraordinarily ambiguous heroes. Lane Fox recently argued that Plutarch wrote no life of Philip 
because of the hostile source tradition in Demosthenes and Theopompus – especially the latter’s, ‘dark, personal 
presentation’ (2011: 350).  
354
 Aalders 1982: 25, 28-30. 
355
 Aalders 1982: 33, 65; and Blois and Bons 1992: 164 n. 19. 
356
 Aalders 1982: 28, 32. 
357
 See Schettino 2002: 203-4, noting Plutarch’s familiarity with the basileus dikaios from Hellenistic political thought, 
and the stress placed on law and justice by his contemporaries.   
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law and administration of justice through Demetrius’ unjust and vicious behaviour (Demtri. 42).358 
For example –  
 
For nothing so befits a king as the work of justice. For ‘Ares is tyrant,’ in the words of 
Timotheus, but ‘Law is king of all things,’ according to Pindar (Demetr. 42.5). 
 
Demetrius’ behaviour (in anecdotes) is contrasted with that of Philip, whose approachability 
and reasonableness in such matters is recalled by the Macedonians 
(Filivppou mnhmoneuvonta"... wJ" mevtrio" h\n peri; tau'ta kai; koinov" - Demetr. 42.3). It is these 
aspects in relation to justice and law which are curiously enough also emphasised in Plutarch’s 
Philippic apophthegmata (chap. three). Moreover, in correlation with other contemporary authors 
(e.g. Pliny and Dio), it suggests a widespread diffusion of common ideals and values (particularly in 
relation to monarchic ideology) in the age of Trajan.359  
Certainly, these connections between Plutarch, Philip and Trajanic ideology will be one area 
of special interest, particularly as Plutarch thought the governed were also formed by their leaders 
(e.g. Lyc. 30.4). Indeed, the moral standard of a leader was a guideline for the ruled (e.g. Num. 6.2; 
8.1).360 Therefore, Plutarch thought that kingship was a difficult and serious duty filled with the 
most ‘concerns and toils’ (An seni 790A), and one which demanded great ability. However, 
Plutarch believed ultimately that power or even success were of less value than a ruler’s moral 
values.361 Therefore, Plutarch believed that a good king had high moral standards, was just in his 
dealings, sober, dignified, attentive, peace-loving, liberal, and dedicated in full to his subjects.362 
Kings should not be too harsh or severe, but also not too indulgent, governing instead with 
persuasion and mildness.363 Using practical reason (cf. Praec. 798C) and following a moderate 
path, the statesman should not be swayed by either praise or criticism, or even personal gain. He 
must also avoid ambition (filotimiva), greed, anger (ojrghv), and arrogance.364 Moreover, he must 
take account of the unique nature of his people (Praec. 800A-B), winning them to himself without 
buying them through acts of demagogy (Praec. 823A). Confidence in a ruler by the people was his 
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 On Demetrius and Antony as negative paradigms – Duff 1999: 45-49. 
359
 Schettino 2002: 204. 
360
 Aalders 1982: 33, 44-45; and Blois and Bons 1992: 175-76. Pliny makes much of Trajan’s character as a model for 
the people (e.g. Pan. 41.4, 45.6, 46.5, 47.6, 70.3-4, 83.2, 84.4).  
361
 Aalders 1982: 19. 
362
 Cf. Numa 6.2-4; Ad. Princ. Inerud. 781C and E; Apophth. Lac. 221D; Reg. Et. Imp. Apophth. 179C-D; Demetr. 42.7.  
363
 Aalders 1982: 31, 34, 36. Plutarch had a strong aversion to tyrants and demagogues, describing them using many of 
the topoi of classical Greek literature (e.g. Septem Sapientum Convivium – which distinguishes between a king and a 
tyrant, and condemns the latter). Plutarch even considered tyrannicide laudable (e.g. De fato 570D; Aalders 1982: 34-
35). However, while relating the assassination of Philip in his Alexander, there is no praise of Pausanias as a 
tyrannicide, only mention of possible conspirators and his motive – which was his failure to get ‘justice’ from Philip 
(mh; tucw;n divkh" ajnei'le Fivlippon) (Al. 10.4). With Plutarch’s focus on justice in leaders, this could serve as a valid 
reason for killing Philip in Plutarch’s eyes.         
364
 Cato. Mai. 32.4; Agis 2.3; Coriol. 15.4; Philop. 1.3; Aalder 1982: 46, 51. On ambition and anger – Duff 1999: 83-
89; Frazier 1988: 109-27; Wardman 1955: 105-7; 1974: 115-24; and Bucher-Isler 1972: 12-13, 31, 41, 58-9. 
P a g e  68 | 270 
 
greatest protection.365 All these ideas are strongly present in Plutarch’s Philippic material, and 
reflects a less negative approach by Plutarch towards Philip’s image and legacy than other material 
might suggest.366 
Plutarch is more interested in praising than censuring (which influences his selection of 
Philippic anecdotes). He believed that the moral historiographer’s duty was to document virtuous 
and inspiring deeds.367 If criticism was needed, in accordance with the generosity, tolerance and 
compassion of an educated man, it was to be reasonable and warranted.368 Plutarch also saw 
tendentiousness commentary as a more emotional, subjective and rhetorical approach to giving 
examples. When he was faced with variant examples, he always went with the more generous 
interpretation.369 This has interesting implications when comparing variant traditions with his 
Philippic material.    
Plutarch believed a ruler should be wise, or at least counselled by one who was i.e. a 
philosopher (cf. Praec. 798C).370 This contact between the politically powerful and philosophers 
was to the advantage of the many people dependent upon these leaders (Max. c. princ. 776B ff.; 
778D. ff.).371 It also highlighted a virtue which was particularly attributed to the philosopher (e.g. 
Diogenes – chap. six), and thought a fundamental right of the free citizen, parrhesia (free-
speech).372 This edification of the powerful was something Plutarch put into practice at the highest 
levels of Roman government (the Lives aside) – if the disputed dedicatory letter to Trajan of the 
Apophthegmata regum et imperatorum is authentic (Mor. 172B-E).373 According to the latest 
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 Arat. 25.7; cf. Plin. Pan. 85.5-6 and Tact. Hist. 4.7. 
366
 Beck argues that, ‘hovering in the intellectual circles composed of the Greaco-Roman elite,’ Plutarch was aware of 
the ‘historical tradition’ and ‘current climate of educated opinions’ about his biographical subjects (1998: 116). This 
was surely valid to some extent for the individuals of his collection (many of whom, like Philip, were intimately linked 
to the subjects of his biographies).   
367
 Duff 1999: 56, 58. 
368
 Duff 1999: 56, 58-59. Duff argues that Plutarch did not write about men such as the Spartan regent Pausanias and 
Philip II because immoral individuals might be misconstrued as sympathizing with their misdeeds, or creating a 
downbeat condemnatory narrative (1999: 59).  
369
 Russell 1973: 60-61. 
370
 Aalders 1982: 45. Plutarch believed strongly that it was a philosopher’s duty to communicate with influential men 
(Max. c. princ. – Mor. 776B-779C). Plato had attempted to educate in philosophy a young ruler (Dionysius II), and 
perhaps in part out of sense of emulation it became a central doctrine in Plutarch’s thinking. On Plutarch’s ideal of 
collaboration between ruler and philosopher – Roskam 2002: 175-189. On Roman rulers and philosophic advisers – 
Rawson 1989: 233-57. For the social role of philosophers in the second century CE – Dillon 2002: 29-40; and Trapp 
2014: 43-58 (Imperial period generally). 
371
 This philosophic council would induce leaders to do what was useful and good, thus conforming to moral law or 
reason (lovgo"). This bestows on the leader wisdom, greatness, mildness and simplicity 
(frovnhma kai; mevgeqo" meta; praovthto" kai; ajfeleiva"), and evokes the virtues of prudence (eujbouliva), 
justice/righteousness (dikaiosuvnh), honesty/goodness (crhstovth"), and greatness of mind/magnanimity 
(megalofrosuvnh) (Max. c. princ. 776E). In the Ad principem ineruditum the virtues are good-order (eujnomiva), 
justice (divkh), mildness (praovth"), and uprightness (ajlhvqeia). Cf. Zecchini 2002: 192-3.  
372
 Haake 2013B: 182-83. 
373
 For a concise discussion on the three main pieces of evidence, including the dedicatory letter of the apophthegmata 
collection, linking Trajan and Plutarch – Barrow 1967: 45-49. On Plutarch and Trajan, particularly reception of his 
collection – Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002: 7-8, 11-13. On the collection itself – Morgan (2007: 154-55) who notes 
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scholarship it appears genuine.374 If correct, it would have profound implications for the collection 
as a whole – making it a contemporary document of moralistic and behavioural edification for an 
emperor akin to that of Valerius Maximus or some of Seneca’s works under Nero.375 It would be a 
document of primary importance for monarchic ideology during this period. 
Plutarch’s Apophthegmata regum et imperatorum is the most important source of Philippic 
apophthegmata surviving. Available at least by the time of Stobaeus (who quotes frequently from 
it) as an independent volume, it was long thought to be a forgery of material taken from earlier 
collections and the Lives.376 However, work done by Beck, Pelling, and Stadter, would seem to 
confirm Plutarchian authorship.377 The latter two scholars argue that it was an independent work, 
but differ on some fundamental points. For example, Pelling argues that it was taken from 
preliminary narrative hypomnemata made for individual lives. While Stadter argues that the 
collection is a selection of apophthegmata edited by Plutarch from a larger, earlier, ongoing, 
unpolished, quasi-annotated, and flexible collection in which he had arranged anecdotes planned for 
use in some of his lives (in the order that they might occur).378  
The collection itself of over 500 anecdotes is arranged by peoples (barbarians, followed by 
Greeks then Romans), subdivided by nations/cities, then by individuals (roughly chronological – 
with a couple of retrogressions). The apophthegmata are separated from each other (few 
exceptions), and show statesmen navigating the turbulent waters of private and public life. Many of 
these statesmen feature in Plutarch’s Lives with their anecdotes normally running parallel to those 
of the collection. However, there is a tendency for the collection to omit anecdotes which are 
negative or unsuitable for imitation.379 This suggests that the collection was edited and lightly 
polished selection from a larger collection - meaning that more negative Philippic apophthegmata 
which were available to Plutarch were excised as being unsuitable for his purposes and the needs of 
the collections’ intended recipient. This ‘selection’ has an impact on the overall presentation of 
Philip in our surviving material. 
If the dedicatory letter to this collection is genuine (as I think it is), it is the best means of 
assessing the aims of Plutarch for the collection – and Philip’s role in it. It begins with two 
apophthegms which emphasize that wise leaders understand the value of humble but 
                                                                                                                                                            
the most popular themes are ‘friendship and justice, followed by courage, fortune, self-control, generosity, frugality and 
the treatment of one’s enemies (155).’ Most are present in Philip’s tales.  
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 Beck 2002: 163-173.  
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 Cf. Beck 2002: 169-70. 
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 Babbitt 1949: 3-5; Jones 1971: 30-31 and Hahn 1989: 185-186. Many of the apophthegmata are found in earlier 
writers e.g. Cicero and Valerius Maximus (Stadter 2008: 55). With the Philippic material though, some tales are found 
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 Beck 1998: 19-28 and 2002: 163-173, Pelling 2002b: 65-90, and Stadter 2008: 53-66; cf. Fuhrmann 1998: 3-15; 
Tigerstedt 1974: n. 814, and Babbitt 1949: 3-4. 
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 Stadter 2008: 53-7; cf. 2015: 119-29. 
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 Stadter 2008: 55, 58 n.17; cf. Pelling 2002b: 82. 
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enthusiastically (th'/ proqumiva/) given gifts, and the value of apophthegmata as illustrations of 
admirable behaviour. Plutarch then offers Trajan his own humble gifts and tokens of friendship, and 
what he calls the common offerings of the first-fruits from philosophy 
(koina;" ajparca;" prosfevronto" ajpo; filosofiva"). Trajan is urged to accept the utility of these 
sayings and to understand and learn from them if they have anything of value for the understanding 
of the characters and values of leaders (hjqw'n kai; proairevsewn hJgemonikw'n), which are to be found 
in their words rather than in their actions 
(ejmfainomevnwn toi'" lovgoi" ma'llon h] tai'" pravxesin aujtw'n) (cf. Isoc. To Dem. 18).380 Finally, 
Plutarch notes that in his Lives the statements (ajpofavsei") of his characters lay alongside 
(parakeimevna") their actions awaiting the leisurely consideration of the reader 
(scolavzousan filhkoi?an perimevnousin); but here in this collection, their very words have been 
collected to serve as samples and seeds of their lives which will not be a burden on Trajan’s time to 
peruse (w{sper deivgmata tw'n bivwn kai; spevrmata suneilegmevnou" oujde;n  oi[omaiv soi to;n kairo;n  
ejnoclhvsein). Therefore, allowing Trajan to review in abridged form many men who have been 
deemed worthy of being remembered (ejn bracevsi pollw'n ajnaqewvrhsin ajndrw'n ajxivwn mnhvmh"  
genomevnwn lambavnonti).381 
Plutarch, like Valerius Maximus, offers to an active and busy emperor an alternative means 
of pleasurable, practical and engaging moral instruction other than that of longer more time 
consuming historiographic, biographic or philosophic compositions. Plutarch’s gift is inspired by 
the usefulness of such pre-digested collections for politicians, especially busy Roman statesmen 
who possessed a fervent fascination for apophthegmata and exempla.382 Also like Philip’s role in 
Valerius Maximus, Philip is invoked as an easily assimilated paradigm of behaviour for Roman 
leadership at its highest levels. Each Philippic tale meant to form a didactic dialogue with the past. 
It is one in which discussion leads ultimately to self-appraisal, and in true Plutarchian style – gentle 
and correct ethical council and edification. As a result, the ‘student’ hopefully acquires through 
acquaintance with several exempla of pre-selected behaviour a certain orientation in public life383. 
The highest and most profound application of this education is obviously to be seen in terms of 
monarchic ideology where Philip’s example was for direct appraisal by those who ruled and those 
who were ruled. 
                                               
380
 N.b. aiJ de; gignovmenai para; ta; e[rga kai; ta; pavqh kai; ta;" tuvca" ajpofavsei" kai ajnafwnhvsei", w{sper ejn  
katovptroi" kaqarw'" parevcousi th;n eJkavstou diavnoian ajpoqewrei'n - Mor. 172D; cf. Al. 1.1-3 for the superiority of 
words over deeds in revealing character, and Aem. 1.1-3 for another use of the mirror simile (Beck 2002: 167). For 
ancient views on personality – Gill 1990: 1ff. and Halliwell 1990: 32ff. 
381
 Laurence and Paterson 1999: 191. 
382
 Beck 2002: 168; and Stadter 2002: 55. Cf. Conjugalia Praecepta 138C – on the benefits of concision for the 
retention of information. 
383
 Cf. Jiménez 2002: 106. 
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This connection between Plutarch, Trajan, contemporary ideology, and Philip raises some 
interesting considerations.384 For example, having noted Plutarch’s firm belief in praovth" as an 
indispensable virtue of the ideal leader (evident in his Philip material), it is of note that it comes at 
the expense of ejpieivkeia or clementia (prominent in earlier intellectuals like Seneca).385 Some 
argue that this is because clementia, which is associated with the autocracy of absolute power, is 
somewhat abandoned in the second century in favour of praovth".386 It is this ‘mildness’ that would 
appeal to Trajan, as it recalls Caesar (an approved model of rule for Trajan’s principate) and his 
mansuetudo and misericordia.387 Therefore, after the despotism of previous emperors, and in an 
atmosphere of mutual agreement between ruler and ruled, it was essential for the bonus princeps not 
only to behave more flexibly in matters of justice, but to respect the law and to pardon where 
appropriate.388 
This intense focus on praovth" in matters of justice under Trajan, and its reflection in many 
of Plutarch’s Philippic anecdotes, suggests an agreed ideological agenda of sorts whereby clementia 
was less and less associated with justice.389 Where it is found, it has a new distinctive meaning, 
whereby the unilateral act of a dominus is replaced by a more moderate and temperate 
programmatic interpretation of the law by a bonus princeps.390 Therefore, Plutarch demonstrates, 
particularly with those judicial Philippic tales he gifted to the emperor, his close connections with 
contemporary political ideology. Moreover, by echoing Trajanic propaganda and themes Plutarch is 
able to act as a mediator between ‘ideological aspects of the principate and the milieu of Greek 
culture’ (Schettino 2002: 206). Indeed, it is as an intermediary and an advisor that Plutarch has 
utilized Philip’s anecdotal persona in his work (particularly in the Apophthegmata regum et 
imperatorum) to reflect not only his values, but also to contribute and influence Trajanic and elite 
ideals and values.391  
                                               
384
 Stadter and Van der Stockt (eds.) 2002 and Stadter 2015: 165-178.  
385
 Zecchini 2002: 193. 
386
 Clementia was distrusted by many as an imperial prerogative. Even Pliny refers to Trajan’s moderatio rather than 
clementia in his Panegyric (Schettino 2002: 205).   
387
 Zecchini 2002: 194. 
388
 Zecchini 2002: 194. 
389
 Scholars have shown that when it came to Trajan’s legal activity clementia was still apparent, but in a somewhat 
modified guise i.e. Trajan’s clementia does not indicate his forgiveness but his moderation, which was an indication of 
his innocentia, and a contrast with the avaritia of past emperors (Schettino 2002: 204).  
390
 Schettino 2002: 205; cf. Noreña 2011: 293-297. 
391
 Coming from a member of the ruling elite, Pliny’s Panegyric is of interest here. It not only praises the virtues of 
Trajan, but provides a prescription of what a good leader should be like. Pliny stresses the social virtues, those which 
involve the decent treatment of fellow citizens. Therefore, the general theme is the emperor’s humanitas (cf. Plutarch’s 
filanqrwpiva). Hence, Pliny highlights qualities associated with this humanitas, such as mansuetudo 
(gentleness/mildness), facilitas (easiness/kindness/good-humour), temperantia (moderation), simplicitas (simplicity), 
hilaritas (joyfulness), iucunditas (pleasantness), suavitas (politeness/agreeableness), but particularly - moderatio 
(moderation) and modestia (modesty/moderation) (Stadter 2002: 229). It is no coincidence that it is these qualities and 
similar (with their own Greek hue) which feature in Plutarch, and particularly in his Philippic material. Stadter (2002: 
231-234), for example, has shown well the relationship between Plutarch and Pliny in areas like restraining ambition 
and respect for citizens. As part of the latter, Pliny makes much of Trajan’s accessibility to both populace and senators. 
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It was literature and rhetoric which educated and wrought Rome’s powerful.392 Indeed, real 
decisions of state were often decided, not by practical or economic interests, but by a statesman’s 
conceptualization of themselves as it was reflected in the mirror of the literature they had studied. 
Therefore, it was an influential position held by those who controlled interpretations of the past and 
decoded her great figures for contemporary-power elite to measure themselves against.393 Plutarch 
was such a figure. His Philip was just one of his many implements of persuasion and influence. 
Therefore, Philip’s enduring image and legacy were still present as Rome ascended the heights of 
its empire, their role in Plutarch’s tales predominantly scholastic in nature. 
All of Plutarch’s original collected material was also available for use elsewhere, such as in 
lectures and philosophical treatises. Here the material is not arranged in simple list form, but 
integrated into the arguments of connected discourse. This process involved amalgamation with 
credible detail, as well as other elements of discourse – particularly rhetorical devices and 
interpretative comments.394 Moreover, where there are multiple treatments of particular anecdotes, 
Plutarch rarely narrates them in the same words. Instead, in trying to adapt a story more effectively 
to its context and enhance its meaning, there are slight variations in language, as well as expansion 
and condensation.395 Indeed, Plutarch’s variant Philippic anecdotes often show just how crucial 
context is in terms of the presentation or even interpretation of this material. For example, more 
complex settings, other than that of the apophthegmata collection (where context is almost wholly 
neglected in deference to their value as uncomplicated positive exempla), can cause more 
ambivalent and intricate interpretations.396 In addition, attempts to compare different versions of 
these anecdotes (even as far back as the 19th century)397 in the hopes of discovering which is derived 
from which, are unconvincing. All versions may not reflect all the details Plutarch had access to. It 
is better to look at each version and their presentation in relation to the work’s aims, audience, and 
Plutarch’s personal beliefs,398 and how these relate to monarchic ideology and other contemporary 
values.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
This provides direct correlation to Philippic material concerning approachability in Plutarch (see chap. three). For more 
on Pliny’s Panegyricus as a ‘key document in the evolution of imperial leadership ideals’ – Roche (ed.) 2011 (quote 
from ix).   
392
 Mattern 1999. 
393
 Stadter and der Stockt (eds.) 2002: 6-7. 
394
 Stadter 2008: 58, 64; cf. Pelling 2002a: 143-70. 
395
 Babbitt 1949: 6. Cf. Stadter 2008: 61, 63; Beck 1998, 1999: 173-87; 2000: 15-32. 
396
 Stadter 2008: 61-64. 
397
 e.g. Schmidt 1879. 
398
 Stadter 2008: 54, 63-64. 
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Conclusion 
 
Any analysis of an author and any Philippic material they possess is best done individually. 
However, it must be performed with full contextual knowledge of the larger work’s aims, methods 
and audience – as well as the authors own beliefs in regard to monarchic ideology and other 
contemporary political, cultural, and literary mores. This is the approach that has been adopted here 
whilst examining the Philippic material of Plutarch, Valerius Maximus, and all the sources of this 
thesis.  
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3 
 
Judge Philip 
 
The Judicial Tales of Philip II and the Role of Justice 
under the Roman Empire    
 
 
‘The reason we hear and remember the golden sayings and great deeds of people of the past 
is also so that we can conform ourselves to their wisdom. It is to prevent the rise of the self-
centred mind’ (Yamamoto Tsunetomo’s Hagakure 1.6). 
 
‘Now, if I am giving you sufficient instruction as to what manner of men you ought to 
be….well and good; if not, then you must learn it form history of the past, for this is the best 
source of instruction’ (Xen. Cyrop. 8.7.24). 
 
 
This chapter considers those tales and sayings surviving in the Graeco-Roman world relating 
to Philip’s involvement in judicial matters. It explores the role played by the cardinal virtue ‘justice’ 
(dikaiosune/iustitia) in these tales, and what this material reveals about Philip, his responsibilities as 
a Macedonian king, and isegoria and parrhesia and the Macedonian legal system.399 Moreover, 
aside from demonstrating Philip’s role as a monarchic paradigm of some worth, this chapter shows 
that these judicial tales also contain elements of paideia, declamation, entertainment, and popular 
moral edification. In the end though, they are united by more unifying and serious traditions 
concerned with not only the morality or ethics of monarchy (or more specifically of the monarch 
himself e.g. wisdom, generosity, humour, and forgiveness), but with general ideas of contemporary 
Graeco-Roman culture, politics and society. Deeply integrated with the various motives and 
methods of those who propagated these tales and sayings, these traditions have forged a complex 
and substantial relationship for the majority of this material. It is a connection woven around the 
image and personal character of Philip II as understood under the Roman Empire.  
 
 
 
                                               
399
 On the king’s duties and relationship with the people – Hammond 1989: 21-4, 60-70; and Hammond and Griffith 
1979: 383-404. Cf. Billows 1995: 60f. 
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Macedonian Judicial System  
 
Little is known of Macedonia’s judicial system except that anecdotes indicate that the 
reigning monarch was the supreme judge or final judge of appeal.400 Other evidence also suggests 
that in capital trials involving threats to the king, an assembly of the troops under arms had some 
kind of function. However, nothing is known of any code of laws – nor do Philip’s activities imply 
that there was one. Even so, other evidence suggests that those who dealt with the Macedonians had 
reasonable expectations of justice under some unknown system.401  
Anecdotes provide evidence for a court presided over by the king himself. Many of these 
tales are found in Plutarch, where their inclusion and number in his apophthegmata collection (5 of 
the 31 Philippic anecdotes) highlight the importance of this activity for a Macedonian king – 
particularly for Philip personally.402 It is difficult to argue on the evidence of Plutarch only that such 
a percentage of Philip’s time (one-sixth) was taken up with judicial matters. However, it was one of 
the king’s most essential functions as regards legitimacy, and all Macedonia kings were supposed to 
find the time to carry it out.403 This was exactly the point made by the parrhesia or isegoria (free 
speech) of the woman who shouts at Philip not to be king when he complained of his lack of time to 
hear her case (example 3.2). This high occurrence of judicial anecdotes for Philip reflects not only 
the necessity to carry out some kind of royal-judicial function, but also strongly indicates the 
longevity of Philip’s good reputation among the Macedonians regarding justice and its associated 
cardinal virtue dikaiosune – particularly in light of the activities of later rulers of Macedonia.        
The anecdote in which the friend of Antipater was made a judge, then removed because of 
his hair (example 3.3), suggests that there were royally appointed judges operating in Macedonia. 
Macedonia was certainly a big kingdom and Philip would have found it difficult to be 
everywhere.404 However, these men may have just been epistatai (personal servants or 
administrators of the king) among whose responsibilities were judicial matters. Indeed, our only 
evidence for any kind of ‘urban judicial system’ comes from a board of judges (dikastai) later 
known only from Thessalonike – but they too could have been royal judges.405 Therefore, the exact 
                                               
400
 Errington 1990: 222; and Hammond 1992: 65. It is possible that tales showing Philip acting as judge are appeal cases 
after hearings by local judges (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 395).  
401
 Hammond and Griffith 1979: 392-393. 
402
 Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 12, 23, 24, 25, and 31.  
403
 Hammond and Griffith 1979: 393-4. Cf. Plut. Al. 23.2 - where ‘judging’ was one of the four ways Alexander might 
pass a normal day  It has also been postulated that the Macedonian king may have been supported by a group of 
Companions who advised him during cases, but had no part in the final decision (Hammond and Griffith 1979: 393 n. 
7). 
404
 Hammond and Griffith 1979: 394. 
405
 IG 10.2, 1028; ISE 111; Errington 1992: 222. Cf. Hammond and Griffith 1979: 395 n. 1. 
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nature of the king’s delegation of power for judicial activity is not fully understood.406 Nevertheless, 
deputized by the king, these men were probably based in the principal population centres of Lower 
Macedonia and the administrative centres of Upper Macedonia.407 Moreover, there was little doubt 
that they came from the most influential sections of society, and that the ‘quality of these 
appointments was as vital to the well-being of the kingdom as the qualities of the generals’ 
(Hammond and Griffith 1979: 394). This fact is clearly reflected by Philip’s strong regard for the 
appointment in the example 3.3.  
 
 
Isegoria and Parrhesia  
 
Some of these tales raise interesting ideas regarding free speech and petitioning the king 
(parrhesia and isegoria), which are important to understanding any Macedonian constitution.408 
Therefore, expanding on Granier’s (1931) idea of a basically constitutional Macedonian state with 
specific duties and rights for its people and limitations on royal power, Aymard (1950: 129f.) added 
the argument that Macedonians also had the right to isegoria before the king using evidence from 
an incident under Philip V (Polyb. Hist. 5.15; 5.27.5-7) e.g. 
ei\con ga;r ajei; th;n toiauvthn ijshgorivan Makedovne" pro;" tou;" basilei'" (5.27.6).409   
Some proponents of a more autocratic Macedonia in which ‘the king was dominant in a 
highly personal relationship with his people’ (Adams 1986: 43) argue that there was no constitution 
(building on Piero de Francisci).410 There was only the personal authority or royal will of the king, 
who granted or denied whatever rights he wanted.411 Errington even rejected isegoria in any 
constitutional sense,412 noting that any real power beyond the king was in the hands of the Hetairoi. 
More recently, Adams looked at the question of isegoria – including evidence from anecdotes 
(though not all their variants).413 He states that the basic problem was one of law versus personality, 
and that the question of isegoria obviously involves a judicial context as well as the idea of freedom 
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 Cf. Hammond and Griffith 1979: 395. 
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 Hammond and Griffith 1979: 394. 
408
 On parrhesia – Baltussen and Davis 2015: 1-17; Konstan 2012: 1-11; and Sluiter and Rosen (eds.) 2004. 
409
 ‘...with such freedom did the Macedonians always address their kings...’; cf. Walbank 1957: Vol. 1. 550-1. Briant 
later added an ‘Assembly of the People’ to the argument (1973: 237-250).  
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 1948: 345-495. 
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 Lock 1977: 91-107; Errington 1978: 77-91; cf. Adams 1986: 45. 
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 1978: 80-86. 
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 1986: 43-52. 
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of speech.414 He concluded that hearing petitions was part of being king and that subjects had the 
right to say so.415  
Such conclusions (though reasoned) can be questioned on the grounds that Adams only 
examined certain versions of the anecdotes. Moreover, little space is dedicated in his study to the 
contexts of the anecdotes and authorial agenda – particularly as they may relate to more 
contemporary cultural ideas around the virtues or vices of ideal or tyrannical rulers. Hence, the 
manifestations of monarchic ideology of later periods may have shaped and distorted possible 
contemporary tales about Philip. Therefore, any possible interpretations or inferences these tales 
make or have in relation to the Macedonian legal system and isegoria are problematic.  
 
Dikaiosune  
 
It is unquestionable that one of the most important roles of the Macedonian king concerned 
his responsibilities as chief judge. This responsibility entailed being the arbiter of justice (dike), and 
afforded the opportunity for the king to show himself to be dikaios (just). It was also a duty that 
may have had deeper religious connotations (like the virtue dikaiosune itself). The king of the gods 
Zeus was commonly conceived of as the ultimate arbiter or judge of the universe.416 Therefore, in 
light of the deep significance of the relationship between Zeus and the Argead dynasty – it is 
unsurprising to see Macedonian kings emulating this role within the confines of their somewhat 
more humble terrestrial kingdom.417     
The dikaios man conformed to social customs, refusing to break conventions for any reason, 
even self-interest. He respected the justified claims of others, and was under obligations towards 
others, which he acknowledged and fulfilled.418 It was an important (perhaps the most important) 
virtue, which under the guise of dikaiosune (justice) became one of the four cardinal virtues 
(Theognis 147; Aristot. E.N. 1129b29). Moreover, by emphasising respect for the proper claims of 
others, it conceived of morality in terms of personal relationships.419 It is the product of a society 
moving away from the purely shame-culture of the Homeric epics (whereby public opinion or guilt 
was the main sanction), and towards one whereby sanction lies with personal conscience.420  
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As a cardinal virtue justice was extremely important in monarchic ideology from early on in 
the Greek classical period.421 Aeschylus (Sep. 610) named it as a virtue early on (though it had been 
an important royal virtue in the ancient Near East).422 Nearer to Philip’s period, Xenophon argued 
that Agesilaus possessed it (Xen. Ages. 4), so too his Cyrus in the Cyropaedia. He had been a model 
of arete for among other things - his commitment to justice (Xen. Cyrop. 8.1.26).423 Isocrates also 
held justice in the highest regard,424 and argued that dikaiosuvnh along with aijscuvnh (self-control) 
and swfrosuvnh (moderation) were the highest of adornments (Ad Dem.15). It was better than 
riches, provided glory after death, and the wicked had no part in it (Ad Dem. 38).425 Isocrates also 
advised the Cypriot king Nicocles to show himself in the highest degree a good and just man 
(bevltiston kai; dikaiovtaton - Ad Nic. 20; cf. 10, 18).426 He later put justice (often paired with 
swfrosuvnh) into the mouth of Nicocles as being one of the most important kingly virtues (e.g. Isoc. 
Nic. 2, 29-30, 31-5, 43-5, 48).427 It was part of the canon of virtues used in Isocrates’ encomium to 
king Evagoras (Evag. 22-23),428 who apparently gained his rule in accordance with piety and justice 
– both of which qualities characterised his every act (Evag. 26, 38). Isocrates also believed that 
virtues needed testing under different conditions, and believed dikaiosune should be tested in times 
of want (dikaiosuvnhn ejn tai'" ajporivai" - Nic. 44). It was also an important virtue for Plato around 
this time.429 He defined the ‘most kingly man’ (basilikōtatos) as being among other things – 
dikaiotatos (most just) (Resp. 580c), and the ideal statesman (politikos), as one who guided the state 
with virtue and knowledge, distributing justice (ta dikaia) to all (Plt. 301d).  
In Hellenistic times, the Rhetoric to Alexander has ‘moral worth’ as an important concern of 
the king, and strongly hints at justice being vital to kingship.430 In the Letter to Aristeas Ptolemy II 
is instructed in dikaion (justice) among other things. These examples of course reflect the 
expectation among subjects of Hellenistic monarchs that their kings show benevolent concern for 
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 N.b. Hesiod’s focus on the dispensation of justice by basileis (Theog. 83-6; Op. 219ff.), where the focus is not on 
any personal virtue per se, but on the service to the community (cf. Noreña 2011: 39 n. 3).   
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 Raaflaub 2000: 52-7. 
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 Cf. Xen. Anab. 7.7.41; Hell. 5.4.25-34; and Cyrop. 1.2.6-7, 15; 1.3.16-18. 
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35); cf. Peace 31-35.   
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partake (mhd! ajgapa'n livan ta;" toiauvta" ajreta;" w|nkai; toi'" fauvloi" mevtestin, ajll!  ejkeivna" w|n oujdei;" a[n  
ponhro;" koinwnhvseien - Ad Phi. I.10; cf. Ad Nic. 30). Indeed, Isocrates often promotes justice, sophrosune, and 
wisdom, but is inclined to leave out andreia (e.g. On the Peace 63). The sophists of the fifth century BCE had favoured 
sophia and andreia over dikaiosune and sophrosune (North 1966: 146 n. 68). 
426
 Such men had a greater hope of enjoying the gods’ blessings (Ad Nic. 20; cf. Helen 37).  
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 Writing to the Spartan king Archidamus, Isocrates praised king Agesilaus for showing himself to be in the highest 
degree just (dikaiovtato"), self-controlled (ejgkratevstato" - used sometimes instead of sofrosuvnh), and statesmanlike 
(politikwvtato") (Isoc. Ad Arch. 13). 
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 A slightly different set of virtues feature when Isocrates recommends one of his pupils (Diodotus) to Philip’s regent 
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 E.g. Phd. 69C; Leg. I 631C; and Smp. 195BC. 
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 Cf. Noreña 2011: 42. 
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them through various means, one method of which was the provision of justice.431 This idea found 
its highest expression in the epithet Dikaios (‘The Just’) taken by many of the Hellenised dynasts of 
Pontus, Parthia and Cappadocia.432 
During the Roman period justice (iustitia) was still the royal virtue par excellence, and 
fundamental to imperial ideology.433 In order to be iustus an emperor could not rule despotically, 
but instead had to submit himself to the rule of law. Indeed, despite Augustus never referring to 
himself as iustus in inscriptions, the epithet ‘most just’ (iustissimus) later became a stock imperial 
designation, even used of those wielding authority in their name such as provincial governors.434 
Certainly, iustitia became quite prominent once more in official discourse during the reigns of 
Nerva and Trajan after the unrestrained autocracy of Domitian (Plin. Ep. 10.55 and 97) 
(coincidently the period of Plutarch in particular).435 This is particularly evident in the ‘kingship 
orations’ of Dio Chrysostom,436 and later in the work of Aelius Aristides. The latter’s encomium to 
an unnamed emperor (Eis Basilea), holds justice as a characteristic virtue of royalty (Or. 35.8, 15, 
17).437 Moreover, dikaiosune/iustitia was also significant among the stoic writers under the 
principate – particularly for Marcus Aurelius, who knew what it truly meant to rule.438 This royal 
virtue was highly prominent in the ‘pseudo-Pythagorean’ kingship texts (Peri Basileas) of 
Diotogenes, Sthenidas, and Ecphantus of the second or third centuries CE, and also important in the 
imperial panegyrics and literature of the late third and fourth centuries CE (Pan. Lat. 3.21.4, 4.1.5, 
6.6.1, 7.3.4 etc.).439 It was one of the virtues which Menander Rhetor thought crucial to 
distinguishing between a despot and a king in his manual on how to praise a king (374-5).440   
Justice could also be represented by the imperial virtue aequitas. Its principal meaning 
associated with fairness or justice in decision making, particularly in judicial settings.441 Paired on 
occasion with iustitia or other virtues of a good judge (e.g. integritas, fides, mansuetudo, 
humanitas, temperantia, prudentia, and misericordia), it could also be equated with the Greek 
dikaiosune. There are also a number of literary references to aequitas as an imperial (judicial) 
virtue, including from the reigns of Tiberius, Claudius, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, and Julian.442 All 
these emperors coincidently have literary connections to the authors of the anecdotes of this 
chapter. 
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Overall, this focus on justice as a royal virtue and a fundamental feature of monarchic 
ideology reflects an anxiety or a concern (among politicians and philosophers) to regulate the 
appropriate relationship between monarchs, the law, and the rights of citizens. It is unsurprising 
then that the enduring and popular theory by which the good ruler not only dispensed justice fairly, 
but himself freely submitted to the same laws that governed his subjects was developed, expanded, 
and reiterated.443 It spoke to the immense power of autocrats in all periods, and provided one of the 
few genuine moral checks to their almost unaccountable dominance. Philip’s judicial tales are part 
of this tradition. 
Finally, aside from those virtues directly associated with the judicial role of the Macedonian 
king, these tales show that this role allowed for the display of other important qualities associated 
with good or bad monarchic rule. Indeed, this layering of multiple secondary qualities underneath 
the tale’s primary focal virtue or vice is also important in understanding the use and survival of 
these tales about Philip.  
 
Judicial Philippic Anecdotes  
 
Philip and Variant Versions – A paradigmatic Analysis  
 
The first judicial tale is found in three authors (example 3.1). Each has utilized the tale 
differently to accord better with their individual motives and contexts. The version of Valerius 
Maximus offers a more negative Philip – almost the stock character of the foreign tyrant. The 
purpose of this unflattering role was to reflect contemporary concerns about monarchic behaviour 
under the fledgling principate. However, this function is deftly filtered through the safe distance of 
a foreign example of somewhat ambiguous importance. In Plutarch, Philip is a far more positive 
paradigm of monarchy and justice. Therefore, so as to align with shifting contemporary values – 
Philip and his actions patently articulate and disseminate the virtues of Trajanic Rome.444 It is the 
burgeoning contextual mores of the Second Sophistic which allow this foreign king to be posited 
both as a benchmark and exemplar for a mature and entrenched autocratic system once more 
seeking validation, rehabilitation, and stability after the notorious failings and abuses of previous 
emperors. The concise version of Stobaeus has obvious pedagogical motivations which dictate both 
form and content. Stobaeus exploits the universal applications inherent in the virtues or vices that 
make up monarchic ideology for rather more humble purposes. 
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 On Trajan’s admiration for Alexander – Cassius Dio 68.29f.; Hist. Aug. Hadrian 4.9; and Julian Caes. 335d. 
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 3.1.A          
Inserit se tantis viris mulier alienigeni sanguinis, quae a Philippo rege temulento immerens 
damnata, <provocare se iudicium vociferata est, eoque interrogante ad quem> provocaret, 
‘ad Philippum’ inquit, ‘sed sobrium.’ Excussit crapulam oscitanti, ac praesentia animi 
ebrium resipiscere causaque diligentius inspecta iustiorem sententiam ferre coegit. Igitur 
aequitatem, quam impetrare non potuerat, extorsit, potius praesidium a libertate quam ab 
innocentia mutuata (Val. Max. 6.2. ext.1).445  
 
3.1.B 
 
Macaivta/ dev tina krivnwn divkhn kai; uJponustavzwn ouj pavnu prosei'ce toi'" dikaivoi" ajlla;  
katevkrinen: ejkeivnou de; ajnabohvsanto" ejkkalei'sqai th;n krivsin, diorgisqeiv"  “ejpi; tivna;” 
ei\pe: kai; oJ Macaivta", “ejpi; sev, basileu', aujtovn, a[n ejgrhgorw;" kai; prosevcwn ajkouvh/".”  
tovte me;n ou\n ajnevsth: genovmeno" de; ma'llon ejf! eJautw'/ kai;  gnou;" ajdikouvmenon to;n  
Macaivtan th;n me;n krivsin oujk e[luse, to; de; tivmhma th'"   divkh" aujto;" ejxevteisen (Plut. 
Mor. 178F-179A = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 24).446  
 
3.1.C 
 
!En taujtw'/. Presbu'ti" dikazomevnh ejpi; Filivppou, wJ" eJwvra nustavzonta e[peita mevllonta
ajpofaivnesqai, ejdei'to sugcwrh'sai aujth'/ ejfei'nai. o} de; ‘ejpi; tivna;’ ei\pen. ‘ejpi; Fivlippon’ 
ajpekrivnato ‘ejgrhgorovta’ (Stob. 3.13.49).447 
 
Taken together this is the perfect anecdote. It is a brief, self-contained story, with a mere six 
lines in its longest version. It has a mix of indirect and direct speech – the latter being extremely 
witty and scathing.448 It is clear and easily understood, and has an entertaining point. Furthermore, 
despite their obvious differences, there is enough common internal threads and themes to suggest a 
strong relationship between all three.449 Indeed, all three are different versions of the same 
anecdote. They also have analogous messages or morals underpinning their diverse presentations 
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 ‘A woman of alien race inserts herself among these great men. Wrongfully condemned by king Philip when he was 
in liquor, she cried out that she appealed, ‘to Philip,’ she said, ‘but to Philip sober.’ She dissipated the fumes of wine as 
he yawned, and by her ready courage forced the drunkard to come to his senses and, after a more careful examination of 
the case, to render a more just verdict. Thus she extorted the equity which she could not get by asking, borrowing 
recourse from freedom rather than from innocence.’ 
446
 ‘While he (Philip) was hearing the case of Machaetas, he was near falling asleep, and did not give full attention to 
the rights of the case, but decided against Machaetas. And when Machaetas exclaimed that he appealed from the 
decision, Philip, thoroughly enraged, said, ‘To whom?’ And Machaetas replied, ‘To you yourself, Your Majesty, if you 
will listen awake and attentive.’ At the time Philip merely ended the sitting, but when he had gained more control of 
himself and realised that Machaetas was treated unfairly, he did not reverse his decision, but satisfied the judgement 
with his own money.’ 
447
 ‘An old woman who was being heard before Philip, as she saw that he was nodding off, then about to give his 
judgement, begged him to allow her to appeal.  And he said, ‘To whom?’ ‘To Philip,’ she replied, ‘when he has woken 
up.’’ 
448
 The tone of the direct speech recalls the language of a Diogenes in his chriea involving famous and powerful 
individuals. 
449
 There is also a version in the late collection Philogelos – a collection of 265 amusing stories ascribed to the 
unidentifiable Hierocles and Philagrius. With the work’s purpose and audience equally obscure, it is difficult to come to 
any real conclusions about the material. The stories are not about named individuals, though some can be linked back to 
other known tales where individuals are named. No. 264 is one such example – 
Eujtravpelo" ejpi; hJgemovno" ejdikavzeto. tou' de; nustavzonto" ejbovhsen: !Ekkalou'mai, oJ de; e[fh: !Epi; tivna; kajkei'no": !
Epi; se; grhgorou'nta - A witty man is pleading a case before a leader/judge. When the judge nods off, the man shouts, 
‘I appeal!’ ‘To whom?’ asks the judge – ‘To you awake!’ Despite being severely abridged, it is clearly related to 
Philip’s tale. On the Philogelos – Thierfelder 1968 and Ritter 1955.  
P a g e  82 | 270 
 
and structures. These revolve around the abstract ideal of justice – but particularly as concerns the 
responsibilities of those sitting in judgement (i.e. being dikaios or displaying dikaiosune). However, 
within that basic moral message (clearly part of Philip’s role as a conduit of monarchic ideology), 
there are nuances involved in each of the three tales worth investigating. 
The first arrangement comes from the second chapter (entitled Things Freely Spoken or 
Done) of book six of Valerius Maximus. It has its own Preface and contains twelve domestica 
(Roman examples) and three externa (foreign examples). The Preface or transition to this section is 
significant (Val. Max. 6.2. Praef.). Here Valerius makes his usual authorial intervention and signals 
his change in topic. He also gives his familiar moral guidance -priming his audience for his 
preferred reception of the exempla to follow. In this instance, that guidance relates to the ambiguous 
nature of his current topic.450 It is prone to be either a virtue or vice (inter virtutem vitiumque 
posita), and is more attractive to the vulgar than the wise (ac vilgi sic auribus gratior quam 
sapientissimi cuiusque animo probabilior est). Even so – Valerius defends its inclusion because of 
his overall purpose (sed quia humanae vitae partes persequi propositum est).451   
Philip’s exemplum is the first of the foreign exempla. However, its introduction reveals that 
Philip is not the primary subject.452 Therefore, forming a transition from the list of Roman exempla, 
the first sentence reports that it is a foreign woman who inserts herself amongst these great men. 
The contrast is deliberately stark between the great Romans of the Republic and this obscure 
unnamed woman. With her appearance Valerius boldly reasserts the ambivalent temperament of 
freedom of speech, and its propensity for problematical paradigms. Even so, it is a problem that the 
chapter’s Preface has in part provided for with its paradigm for judging – si salubri modo se 
temperavit, laudem, si quo non debuit profudit, reprehensionem meretur.453 Moreover, if the reader 
is unable to discern which is which, Valerius himself will offer his guidance – propria aestimatione 
referatur.  
Comparing the first part of the exemplum with that of the other authors shows that Valerius 
was most likely not Plutarch’s source. Plutarch’s version of the anecdote is very different – and not 
just cosmetically. His anecdote, part of his apophthegmata of Philip, begins at an earlier phase of 
the tale than Valerius’ report. Philip (who is the focus) is still listening to the rights of the case 
before proceeding to making his decision. The case concerns a man named Machaetas.454 As in 
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 Bloomer 1992: 54. 
451
 Cf. Bloomer 1992: 55. 
452
 It is debatable whether either protagonist are the subject of the exemplum as it is the tale’s theme of free speech that 
is Valerius’ main concern. 
453
 Cf. Bloomer 1992: 55. 
454
 Machaetas was a noble Macedonian whose sister Phila was married to Philip (Athen. 13.557C – from Satyrus FGH 
iii, frg. 5; on Phila – Carney 2000: 59-60). This was Philip’s brother-in-law in other words, and the father of 
Alexander’s friend and treasurer Harpalus (Heckel 1992: 213), and therefore I agree with Fuhrmann – ‘il est surprenant 
qu’il soit mentionné ici à la manière d’un inconnu’ (1998: 261).  
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Valerius, Philip makes his decision against the defendant on account of lack of attention, but unlike 
in Valerius, it seems to have been on account of tiredness (for unknown reasons). When Machaetas 
appeals the decision, an angry (diorgisqeiv") Philip asks to whom, only to receive the reply 
(appreciably longer than that in Valerius), ‘to you yourself, Your Majesty, if you will listen awake 
and attentive.’ Here Philip does not appear to be drunk, and despite its focal witticism, Machaetas’ 
reply is somewhat more diplomatic and respectful with its deliberate use of basileu'.455 The focus is 
deliberately kept on the relationship between monarch and subject, judge and plaintiff, Philip and 
Machaetas.  
Valerius, after introducing the woman and the anecdote, presents the woman crying out in 
appeal against the judgement of an intoxicated (temulento) Philip, who has apparently wrongfully 
condemned her (immerens damnata). When asked to whom she appealed, the woman replies 
sharply – ‘to Philip... but sober’ (ad Philippum...sed sobrium).456 Philip is all but humiliated by the 
woman’s witty retort. The famous wit of Philip (chap. five) is upstaged. Moreover, the use of a 
woman suggests that Valerius is attempting to utilize the rhetorical technique of ‘argument from 
unlike’ (argumenta imparia).457 This technique uses individuals of lower social status to persuade 
audiences. Valerius uses it elsewhere (e.g. 1.1.9; 1.1.10; 3.3.ext 7; and 3.8.7), as part of his moral 
scheme whereby the appeal to pursue virtue is open to all classes and races (e.g. 3.3.ext.7; 8.14.5; 
cf. 5.6.ext.5). Its utilization adds greater believability or fides.  
These unequal examples are an important reason Valerius has externa, as the more 
‘barbarous and unexpected’ the example – the more successful its potential.458 What is also 
important to this theory is Philip, but not Philip per se, only his status and role as monarch and 
judge. Therefore, Valerius or his antecedents have compressed a figure out of the anecdote in 
transmission (possibly Machaetas with his attendant status), replacing them with a lowly, generic 
and anonymous figure to serve as rhetorical device. These nameless figures are predominantly the 
stuff of rhetorical exercises and not historical record.459 Valerius exploited this device to play the 
more expansive and identifiable everyman he needs to best articulate and transmit his particular 
values and views regarding monarchic ideology.460 
Argumenta imparia also add to the contrast inherent in the tale’s uneven power dynamics. A 
powerless, convicted, criminal woman seeks justice from a drunken autocrat flouting due process. 
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 Plutarch’s use of basilikov" was nearly always complimentary (Aalders 1982: 33), and with the overall tone of 
Plutarch’s apophthegmata being consciously positive, any deliberate use of the title basileu' should be seen as 
approving.  
456
 As usual in Valerius, the direct speech is broken up by the use of inquit. It is one of Carter’s many criticisms (1975: 
46), but here it adds delay and dramatic effect into the woman’s reply. 
457
 Skidmore 1996: 87-89. On ‘argument from unlike’ – Quint. 5.11.10 - giving the example of the bravery of a woman. 
458
 Cf. Quint. Inst. 5.11.10-12; Skidmore 1996: 89. 
459
 Bloomer 1992: 72. 
460
 On representative figures in anecdotes – Beck 1998: 10-11.  
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Philip’s actions are those of a classic (foreign) tyrant, not an ideal or just (dikaios) monarch. They 
are not the actions of a just (iustus) Roman emperor. This type of contrast is almost entirely lost 
with the use of Machaetas in Plutarch. The loss is not complete though – the juxtaposition of 
defendant and judge, man and king, and the ultimate reversal of those roles when one teaches the 
other implicitly of justice remains. Plutarch’s monarch is able to transcend Valerius’ negative tone 
and the tyrant’s mould through his positive reception of that lesson. This service to ‘justice’ is all 
the more appealing through the definite naming of the king’s fortunate subject.  
Another difference is that Valerius has the woman condemned by Philip. Whereas Plutarch 
merely has the decision go against Machaetas. It is reported later that the decision involved only the 
levelling of a pecuniary fine of an unknown amount. Valerius’ version is more abbreviated – more 
dramatic. The woman’s situation is more precarious than that the wronged Machaetas. Her very life 
is at stake.461 Aside from ‘selling the drama’, this particular difference may reflect popular unease 
with the introduction of cognitio (see below), which would have reshaped debate and evolving 
perceptions of Tiberius’ autocratic power and responsibility. 
Stobaeus was the author of an Anthology of the fifth century CE.462 The focus for him is 
squarely on the apophthegma of the old woman. It is the witticism, not the outcome that matters. 
His version of the anecdote, written in the early fifth century CE as part of a work of instruction for 
his son, is the shortest and the latest. It contains elements found both in Valerius and Plutarch. For 
example, Stobaeus’ defendant is an old anonymous woman (Presbu'ti"), again perhaps of 
rhetorical linage like that of Valerius. However, like Plutarch, Philip’s inattention is caused by 
unexplained sleepiness (has drinking been condensed out?). The retort is sharp and pointed as in 
Valerius, but is focused on Philip being awake, not sober (ejgrhgorovta).  
Stobaeus has one feature that is all his own though. His defendant calls for the right to 
appeal the decision before Philip even hands it down (mevllonta ajpofaivnesqai). This is perhaps 
done because the reader of Stobaeus is left completely uninformed as to the outcome of the old 
woman’s plea. Indeed, he offers little other material to the reader. The retention of Philip himself is 
really the only historically significant or distinguishing fact Stobaeus imparts. That Philip’s name 
and fame could instil the anecdote with credibility, lustre and poignancy - and promote its longevity 
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 Of the other exempla from Valerius’ chapter – three involved trials (6.2.1, 4, 5), two of which definitely involved life 
and death situations (the third is unclear – 6.2.5). This clustering suggests either heavy reliance on the arrangement of 
an older collection, or Valerius’ strong interest in this contextual setting for his chapter’s theme.    
462
 Stobaeus dedicated the work to his son Septimius to improve his reading memory (i.e. as a didactic-pedagogical 
text). The work is a diverse assortment of texts of various lengths (chreía, apophthegmata, gnome etc.) arranged by 
thematic chapters. They are linked by lemmata which usually give titles and authors’ names. Moreover, with more than 
500 Greek authors represented, it covers all of Greek literature from Homer to Themistius. The complex layering of the 
work makes it difficult to distinguish Stobaeus from his sources. However, some kind of anthology of various authors is 
likely to have been one such source, as it is unlikely he had direct access to all 500 odd authors. His work is preserved 
in four books, books three and four (our concern here) are referred to as the Florilegium or Sermones. Their 
dissemination no doubt helped by their ethical character (Piccione in Brill’s New Pauly 2002: 846-50 and Reydams-
Schils (ed.) 2011).  
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(through repeated inclusion in, and citation from rhetorical handbooks etc.), are probably factors 
here.463 Even so, the austere arrangement of Stobaeus completely de-emphasises Philip’s 
personality, reducing Philip and his role to that of simple authority/judicial figure. Therefore, the 
overall sense of the tale is still somewhat about justice. However, for Stobaeus, the simple lesson 
and memorable nature of the witticism were all that were really needed for his son’s education. 
Monarchic ideology fades easily into the background behind the rhetoric and universal moralism of 
justice. This allows the tale’s foreground to deliver its simple pedagogical lessons unfettered by 
more complex debates.  
The apophthegm is also the focus for Valerius, but he offers more than just the neat rhetoric 
of its witticism. For him, the result of the woman’s outspokenness or free-speech (her Greek 
parrhesia) was highly relevant to his stated rubric. Certainly, Valerius felt that he must also point 
the way rhetorically to any moral possibilities of the tale. Therefore, the woman’s pointed reply 
causes Philip to re-examine the case more carefully and render a ‘more just verdict’ (iustiorem 
sententiam). This raises four important points. Firstly, the idea of ‘just reward’ is a central theme in 
Valerius and is evident here.464 Secondly, there is the blatant contrast between the praesentia animi 
of the woman and the ebrium of Philip.465 Thirdly, was it moral argument that has forced Philip to 
re-examine the case, or has the woman’s parrhesia (or exercising of libertas) taken place in more 
insidious circumstances, such as a public hearing whereby community opinion could influence 
matters? However, Valerius’ omission of this would be understandable. Any perceivable external 
reasons for Philip’s reversal would detract from the more personable moral point of the exemplum. 
It is this more relatable moral which can be secured with greater relevance to autocratic 
responsibilities, autocratic tolerance of free-speech, and a monarch’s just treatment of their subjects. 
Therefore, it must be the forceful call of due process and justice which remits the drunken Philip’s 
decision (his direct internalisation of the external plea of the woman). This gives the exemplum 
more impact – making it arguably more persuasive, entertaining and memorable.  
The last point is that Valerius replicates somewhat the lack of interest of all our authors in 
the actual mechanics of rule or practical consequences by not elaborating on the reconsidered ‘more 
just’ verdict. Instead, the woman’s plight is to be made completely unambiguous by Valerius’ last 
line. Valerius reveals here that he does not just record anecdotes, but supplies his audience with 
apposite interpretation.466 This is the final reiteration of Valerius’ views by which the lesson or 
moral of the tale is presented and received as he would have it. It is this simple rhetorical 
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 Cf. Beck 1998: 8-9. 
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 Skidmore 1996: 54-7. 
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 The introduction/transition to the next externa (6.2.ext.2) subtly directs the reader backwards to reconsider the 
previous example of the libertas of the woman as brave (fortis). Her actions are undoubtedly meant to be viewed as 
positive.   
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 Cf. Bloomer 1992: 11. 
P a g e  86 | 270 
 
reinforcement which structures his work and drives his dual agendas of moral instruction and 
monarchic ideology. Philip’s tale is a well-oiled cog in big machine driving all the agendas of 
Valerius.  
 Valerius returns to his characteristic affected style in order to insert his moralizing 
comment, and ends the exemplum with fashionable rhetorical antithesis.467 As rhetoric describes 
reality and seeks to manipulate how it is perceived, Valerius seems to want to ‘guide’ the 
perceptions of his audience more than the other authors with the overt use of it. This agrees with 
what is known of Valerius’ aims and agendas. Rhetoric was certainly his favoured device for the 
conveyance of his particular ‘brands’ of moralism and monarchic ideology. 
In the final line, the woman claims justice through her free speech rather than through any 
claims to innocence (quam ab innocentia mutuata). There is a paradox at the heart of this 
moralizing comment, which also stands at the heart of the entire exemplum. Valerius was deeply 
attracted to commemorating the incongruous and paradoxical tale, stories which reveal exceptional 
reversals of fortune.468 The clever Philip, who taught so many lessons to the whole of Greece, is 
sharply schooled in one himself in justice or fairness (aequitatem) by a humble woman. However, 
this justice seems to be of the imperial aequitas variety, the use of which implied ‘judicial fairness’. 
Its specific use in this sense (which invokes iustitia) can be traced back to the time of Tiberius 
under whom Valerius wrote.469 Indeed, aequitas became greatly important to imperial subjects after 
the introduction and extension of cognitio – a judicial procedure by which emperors and provincial 
governors were not constrained by any traditional external rules or law (unlike iudices), and thus 
open to arbitrary judgements.470 Therefore, the paramount virtue of this Philippic tale is old and 
traditional, new and innovative, but more importantly – it is contemporary and praiseworthy. There 
is no ambiguity for Valerius in the outcome of this tale as far as the actions of the woman are 
concerned and its moral didactic implications… even if her ultimate fate is a mystery.  
Valerius makes remarkable circumstances like those of Philip’s tale more pertinent to the 
everyday lives of his audience.471 Hence, contemporary Roman issues surely lie beneath the 
presentation of both Philip and the woman, especially regarding the roles of individuals under the 
principate in matters of justice and free-speech. As seen above dikaiosune had its Roman equivalent 
somewhat in iustitia and aequitas. It is known that the work’s dedicatee Tiberius received not only 
the appellations ‘iustus’ and ‘iustissimus princeps’ (I.L.S. 159; 3783),472 but was also thanked 
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officially in the senatus consultum de Gnaeo Pisone Patre for his aequitas and patientia (patience 
or forbearance – cf. example 4.11).473 Moreover, Velleius Paterculus held Tiberius responsible for 
the renewal of aequitas and iustitia (2.126.2). These facts strongly link the anecdote to publically 
known Tiberian attributes, and also suggest acknowledgement of authorised imperial propaganda. 
Such associations in Valerius reflect well the author’s pursuit of relevance to his audience. They 
also show him operating within the established, but evolving parameters of monarchic ideology, 
which often looked backwards to validate and reinforce contemporary values in the hope of 
promulgating them yet further and transmitting them to future generations. 
With the tale’s focus on acceptable free-speech and iustitia, the anecdote strongly hints at 
clementia (ejpieivkeia) playing some role in the woman’s fate beyond the scope of the immediate 
tale.474 It is true that praise could be gained in Republican times by leading figures through 
clemency, and that it was ‘later integrated into the image-factory of the Principate’ (Spencer 2002: 
171). Clementia was certainly a very conspicuous virtue of Tiberius’ reign, and was publically 
recognized at least twice during his life.475 The most significant being the erection of an altar to 
clementia by the Senate after the sparing of Agrippina and Nero (Tact. Ann. 4.74.1-3). Moreover, if 
clementia was to take place, the anger of Philip would have to give way to moderatio (sophrosune 
or enkrateia), another heavily stressed virtue of Tiberius’ reign.476 Velleius Paterculus certainly 
lauded Tiberius’ ‘singularis moderatio’ (2.122.1).477 As such, Valerius allows the lessons present in 
Philip’s anecdote, and those of the subtext, to speak to a range of contemporary issues relevant to 
emperor, elites, and anyone else who could read or listen.  
Plutarch’s version appears to be less ‘handled’ by the schools of rhetoric and their 
practitioners.478 The finale to Plutarch’s anecdote brings the focus back to Philip and his (good) 
actions, and away from the apophthegm of Machaetas. Philip is said to end the sitting, gain control 
of his anger later, and realise that the defendant has been treated unjustly (lovgo" finally overcoming 
pavqo").479 This is the enkrateia or sophrosune (the moderatio) explicitly missing in Valerius. For 
Plutarch, it becomes the first step towards displaying dikaiosune.  
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 SCPP (CIL 22/5.900), 11.17-20. Cf. Noreña 2011: 65. 
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 On clementia – Adam 1970; and Dowling 2006; as an imperial virtue – Fears 1981. It was also a significant factor in 
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 Ferguson 1979: 188. North (1966 301ff.) argues that the coalescence of sophrosune and praotes might have formed 
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 Under the guise of temperantia, clementia was linked by Cicero with aequitas as part of his unofficial cannon of 
virtues (Cat. 2.25). 
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 As do most of his Philippic apophthegmata – suggesting the use of older, less contaminated or reworked source 
traditions. 
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 Philip’s initial anger was understandable to Plutarch who believed that human nature was not perfect – for him 
complete control of the irrational by logos was unattainable. On anger as dangerous and destructive (to individual and 
society) – Mor. 581b-c.  
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Philip does not though reverse his decision. Instead he pays the fine of Machaetas out of his 
own money (suggestive of the liberalitas that would later come to define a good emperor in 
Plutarch’s period – chap. five). Philip’s actions admit to some kind of procedural unfairness during 
the case – but the original decision is still upheld. It seems that Philip was unable to explicitly admit 
that a wrong decision was made. Upholding the decision and paying the fine himself allow Philip to 
appear just (dikaios), but this action does not call into doubt his original judgment. Instead, it shifts 
the focus subtly onto the procedures or factors upon which that judgement was originally made. The 
difference in emphasis is delicate but distinct. The king has not made a mistake – only a decision 
that could have been better informed. Even so, when mistakes happen, Philip shows himself ready 
to right the wrongs. But it is done in his way, and on his terms. Plutarch’s Philip seems a far more 
positive, if wilier figure than that found in Valerius. Philip has the monarchic virtues of dikaiosune 
and sophrosune/enkrateia, but he also shows himself to have among other things political phronesis 
(wisdom). It is a wisdom (or prudentia) completely missing from Valerius more abrupt ending.  
Philip’s tale provided Plutarch a powerful example of wise, moderate, just and accountable 
autocracy.480  His main interest though was to present a positive tale and praise implicitly an 
inspirational deed for moral edification (n.b. the implicit presence of the popular Plutarchian themes 
of pra/ovth" and filanqrwpiva to go along with divkaio"). This was in accordance with his belief in 
moral historiography. Plutarch offers few details beyond those immediately relevant to the tale’s 
moral. The focus is on a monarch upholding justice (divkh), no matter the source of the chastisement, 
and no matter the cost to him personally. As always for Plutarch the ideal king was a just ruler – a 
basileus dikaios. Nevertheless, as Plutarch retains the Atheno-centric idolizing mores of the Second 
Sophistic, Philip remains a slightly ambiguous figure to him here. Philip makes a mistake, but 
understanding true justice, he remedied what he could. But also understanding power, Philip did it 
on his terms – seeking advantages from error. There were layers to Plutarch’s simple paradigms.481  
This fairly positive Philippic tale also appears appropriate to Plutarch’s general aims 
regarding his apophthegmata collection. Its moral is clear and the lesson obvious to any audience – 
even those wearing purple. As such, this anecdote is steeped in the ideology of what made a good 
monarch or statesman. Here Philip shows himself to be a clear example of Plutarch’s supreme 
constitution – kingship, and no tyrant (it is his just treatment of the governed that marked the 
difference).482 Moreover, by highlighting Plutarch’s favoured theme of praovth" at the expense of 
                                               
480
 Was the decision to stand against Machaetas to his liking though (public reproach was possible after adverse 
judgements – e.g. Mor. 179A)? Silence or positive comments were probably the most likely outcome - on account of 
the pecuniary settlement of the fine, the notoriety gained personally for such an event, and the wish not to push Philip 
too far. Machaetas had what he wanted (to a degree), quitting while ahead made good (safe) sense. 
481
 Cf. Duff 1999: 71. 
482
 Isocrates (Ad Phil.154) advised Philip explicitly that the Macedonians would be grateful to him (soi cavrin e{xousin) 
if he reigned over the Macedonians, not like a tyrant, but like a king 
(Makedovne" d! h]n basilikw'" ajlla; mh; turannikw'" aujtw'n ejpistath/"). 
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the more traditional ejpieivkeia or clementia, it harmonizes well with known Trajanic ideals, and 
what it meant at this time to be a bonus princeps.483 Indeed, Pliny noted that Trajan ‘administers 
justice with fairness (aequitas - Pan. 77.3; cf. 38.7),’ and that he was expected in judicial matters by 
his subjects, ‘to prevent unfairness on the part of magistrates, to reverse anything done amiss...’ 
(Pan. 80). All this was part of Trajan’s ‘reverence for the laws’ (legum reverential - Pan. 77.3; cf. 
34.2),’484 which left him with a great reputation for justice (Cass. Dio. 68.6), and shows the 
contemporary relevance of Philip’s tale in constructing and supporting early first century CE 
imperial monarchic ideology.485  
Valerius’ version also functions within the realm of monarchic ideology, but its use within 
this ideological framework is different. Philip is a wholly negative figure – the convenient foreign 
autocrat, drunk on wine and power, and liable to the humiliation and lessons of even women when 
abusing justice. He is contemptible with his openly (classical) tyrannic traits and candidly 
contrasted with the heroes of the Republic. Therefore, Philip becomes an illustrative paradigm for 
the first Roman emperor to inherit imperium, particularly in the exercising of it in relation to free-
speech and the virtue of justice (iustitia – or more accurately in this case – aequitas).  
Philip’s heritage also renders this a safe exemplum for Valerius. The action and implicit 
censure of the paradigm pass through the distancing and distorting effect created by its foreign 
origin. This removes any direct and immediate relevance to the author’s addressee, whilst retaining 
the subtle instructive tones of the exemplum. In addition, any positive judgments concerning 
Philip’s ‘just’ decision in the end are merely circumstantial, for this second decision must be given 
for the anecdote to be of use as an exemplum. Philip is only the foil by which the woman’s actions 
are to be highlighted. He is a foreign autocratic power against which justice from free speech must 
prevail.  
This point is strongly reinforced contextually by the interesting company Philip keeps in the 
externa of this chapter. These externa also involve individuals, one named, the other another 
anonymous woman, who speak up against other autocratic leaders. Philip’s companions include the 
tyrant of Syracuse Dionysus – described as excessively harsh, responsible for excessive burdens, 
and crueller than his predecessors (superioribus importuniorem); and king Lysmachus, who loses 
his temper and orders a man crucified. It is not flattering company for Philip, who is one of a set of 
foreign despots. It is taint through association – Valerius deliberately grouping this triumvirate of 
                                               
483
 In Hellenistic kingship treatises philanthropia and epieikeia occur in combination with dikaiosune (Adam 1970: 36-
8; Billows 1995: 58).  
484
 Cf. Pliny’s praise of Trajan’s iustitia in a letter and Panegyricus (Ep. 6.31.2; Pan. 33.2, 56.6-7, 59.3, 76.4-5, 78.2, 
80.1-5). For more references to Trajan’s iustitia – Wickert 1954: 2,250-1. Dio Chrysostom’s ‘kingship orations’ 
(probably addressed to Trajan) invoke justice constantly as an essential quality of a king e.g. 1.45, 2.26, 2.54, 3.7, 3.32, 
4.24 (cf. Noreña 2009: 7). Finally, any filanqrwpiva shown here by Philip correlated well with the known humanitas of 
Trajan e.g. Plin. Pan. 2.6-7, 3.4, 4.6, 71.5 etc. 
485
 For Trajan’s mansuetudo, clementia and abstinentia – Plin. Pan. 2.6, 3.4 and 38.5. 
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autocrats and anecdotes for blackening effect. These foreign leaders represent the abuse or misuse 
of power by which free-speech can have a positive evaluation. This is in direct contrast with the 
Roman examples given, especially those featuring Pompeius Magnus who is prominent among 
them (6.2.4-9, six of the twelve exempla). As a Roman who at times wielded power akin to that of a 
foreign autocrat (explicitly noted in the anecdotes), Pompey offers a useful comparison. The theme 
of his six exempla is spelled out clearly in the introduction/transition to the first –  
 
Therefore we ought the less to wonder that Cn. Pompeius’ enormous authority so often 
struggled with such freedom, and not without great credit, since with unruffled countenance 
he let himself be a mockery to the license of all sorts of men (6.2.4). 
 
Six tales follow showing this to be the case.  
Pompey reflects how proper Romans (with imperium) should correctly behave in the face of 
free-speech and actions (which come in for some strong censure in these six exempla). As a result, 
Valerius’ chapter as a whole presents two sides of the same coin. In the domestica, free speech and 
action is mostly abused or unjustly used with correct indulgence and self-control (or moderatio) 
being giving to it by those with power. In the externa, are more acceptable uses of free speech – but 
only because examples are given of arbitrary or abusive use of autocratic power by leaders who 
have transgressed constructs of ideal monarchy. The contrast for Valerius is between good moral 
behaviour (virtus) and bad moral behaviour (vitia) – between the ideal monarch and the tyrant.486 
The message is clear. Free speech was a good thing against abuses of power. However, good 
Romans leaders as a rule do not abuse power. Therefore, being out-spoken, particularly against an 
emperor or his representative, should be frowned upon or censured (reprehensio). Nevertheless, 
power and justice must be exercised with caution and due diligence, as the slope from ideal ruler to 
tyrant was slippery. The deliberate contrast Valerius makes between the heroes of the Republic and 
Philip and his motley co-companions tries to encapsulate that fall.  
It is a pointed message in the context of Tiberian Rome. It could be addressed to the 
emperor himself, his representatives, or even to those whom he ruled.487 Indeed, it was a message 
for a collective Roman world in transition, and one in which Philip’s exemplum had a role to play. 
But that role was expressly defined by Valerius by both his selection and tinkering. As such, 
Valerius seeks to impose the conduct of those individuals of the past on those of the present.488 It is 
the conceptualization and transmission of a new moral culture for the principate, a moral culture 
                                               
486
 Cf. Skidmore 1996: 54. 
487
 Val. Max. 2.1.10 – demonstrates the moral aspect of Valerius’ work and the use that his material might have in 
respect of imitation (Skidmore 1996: 60). 
488
 Skidmore 1996: 58. Valerius often explicitly and implicitly contrasts between the morally high standards during 
most of the Republic and the moral degeneration of the current age (Skidmore 1996: 58-63). 
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upon which the Empire itself may be dependent.489 This is Philip’s role in Valerius, as it is in our 
two other authors – to instruct by example (and entertainment), and disseminate virtues or vices of 
monarchic ideology for didactic edification. In Valerius, Philip performs this role as a negative 
paradigm. In Plutarch, Philip is a far more positive exemplar. The abridgement of Stobaeus 
unfortunately has left little of Philip to evaluate either way.  
This study shows three versions of the same anecdote animated in three entirely differently 
ways. Each account speaks to a different world through various authorial agendas, and underlines 
the importance of examining all versions of a tale where possible. Even so, collectively they 
highlight the use of Philip’s image to address not dissimilar moral and didactic ends across a wide 
expanse of time. 
  
 
Philip: Paradigm of Justice 
    
In the next judicial anecdote (example 3.2), the role assigned to Philip in the apophthegma 
is also attached to other famous rulers. That the individual could change like this suggests that the 
ideal was more important than the individual. This indicates the primacy of monarchic ideology and 
the reduction of the role of individual monarchs to almost stock element. This also implies that 
accuracy in transmission was subordinated to contemporary interests around the character of the 
ideal ruler or tyrant. It is the tale’s function in the exemplar tradition which appears its most 
important feature when questions of attribution are unsolvable. 
 
3.2.A 
Presbuvtido" de; penicra'" ajxiouvsh" ejp! aujtou' kriqh'nai kai; pollavki" ejnoclouvsh",e[fh  
mh; scolavzein: hJ de; presbu'ti" ejkkragou'sa, “kai; mh; basivleue,” ei\pen. oJ de;  
qaumavsa" to; rJhqe;n ouj movnon ejkeivnh" ajlla; kai; tw'n a[llwn eujqu;" dihvkousen (Mor. 179C-
D = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 31).490  
 
3.2.B 
 
kaiv pote presbutevrou gunaivou kovptonto" aujto;n ejn parovdw/ tini; kai; deomevnou pollavki"
ajkousqh'nai, fhvsa" mh; scolavzein, ejgkragovnto" ejkeivnou kai; “Mh; basivleue” eijpovnto",  
dhcqei;" sfovdra kai; pro;" touvtw/ genovmeno" ajnevstreyen eij" th;n oijkivan, kai; pavnta 
poihsavmeno" u{stera, toi'" ejntucei'n boulomevnoi", ajrxavmeno" ajpo; th'" presbuvtido" ejkeiv
nh", ejpi; polla;" hJmevra" ejscovlasen (Plut. Demetr. 42.3-4).491 
                                               
489
 Bloomer 1992: 12 and Skidmore 1996: 63. 
490
 ‘When a poor old woman insisted that her case should be heard before him, and often caused him annoyance, he said 
he had no time to spare, where-upon she burst out, ‘Then give up being king.’ Philip amazed at her words, proceeded at 
once to hear not only her case but those of the others.’ 
491
 ‘An old woman once assailed him as he was passing by, and demanded many times that he give her a hearing. ‘I 
have no time,’ he said. ‘Then don’t be king,’ screamed the old woman. He was stung to the quick, and after thinking 
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 3.2.C 
 
!Ek tw'n Serhvnou. !Antipavtrw/ ajgroi'ko" a[nqrwpo" ejpedivdou biblivon ejntucivan e[con, o}  de;
 ouj scolavzein e[fh. “kai; mh; basivleue” eijpen ejkei'no" “eij mh; scolh;n a[gei"” 
(Stob. 3.13.48).492  
  
 3.2.D 
 
ajmevlei gunaiko;" pariovnto" aujtou' oJdw'/ tini deomevnh", to; me;n prw'ton ei\pen aujth'/ o{ti    
“ouj scolavzw,” e[peita wJ" ejkeivnh ajnakragou'sa e[fh “kai; mh; basivleue,” ejpestravfh  
te kai; lovgon aujth'/ e[dwken (Cass. Dio 69.6.3).493 
 
These are four versions of essentially the same anecdote. With the tale’s attribution to two 
kings (possibly), a regent, and an emperor - all of them are clearly centred on the ideology of 
monarchy as appreciated through its responsibilities.494 Its core elements and messages certainly 
concern the responsibilities of power and the accountability and approachability of rulers to their 
subjects,495 factors which are manifest in the tale’s implicit concern for the virtue dikaiosune.  
As such, Cassius Dio’s (c. 164 – after 229 CE) account of the episode is not really about its 
significance as a piece of history about an emperor per se. Instead, it is given as an example of 
character, but that characterization is not made exclusive by external ties to more concrete historical 
circumstances. Indeed, there is no unique or discriminating material within the tale itself which 
would exclude other attributions.  
The structure and central themes of Cassius Dio’s tale suggest that they reflect 
contemporary expectations regarding imperial character, accessibility, duty, and justice. As always, 
this kind of reflection orientates an anecdote towards the ideology of autocratic power. Plutarch’s 
two versions also reflect this orientation, offering insight into fourth-century BCE Macedonian 
monarchic values, and (like Cassius Dio) glimpses into more contemporary imperial ideology and 
expectations. They also illustrate Plutarch’s diverse methodologies regarding anecdotes used in his 
collection and those found in his biographies. The brief version of Stobaeus is again dictated by the 
agenda of the material’s more humble pedagogical aims, but its core element remains the ideology 
of power.  
                                                                                                                                                            
upon the matter, went back to his house, and postponing everything else, for several days devoted himself entirely to 
those who wished an audience of him, beginning with the old woman who had rebuked him.’    
492
 ‘A rustic man gave to Antipater a petition book he had, and Antipater said he did not have time. ‘Then don’t be 
king’, said that man, ‘If you don’t have the time.’’  
493
 ‘At any rate, once, when a woman made a request of him (Hadrian) as he passed by on a journey, he at first said to 
her, ‘I haven’t time,’ but afterwards, when she cried out, ‘Cease, then, being emperor,’ he turned about and granted her 
a hearing.’ 
494
 Laurence and Paterson have written that - ‘if the issue of ascribing a particular dictum to a specific emperor is set on 
one side, then it soon becomes clear that many dicta cluster round a number of themes, which can illustrate perceptions 
of the imperial role (1999: 195).’ 
495
 E.g. ‘The Macedonians act as a moderating force against Demetrius (Asirvantham 2000: 160).’ 
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Cassius Dio’s version concerns Hadrian who came to the throne in 117 CE, only a couple 
years or so before the death of Plutarch.496 Even if one disputes the attribution of the 
apophthegmata collection to Plutarch (with its Philippic version and Trajanic dating), the version 
from the Demetrius was surely already written before Hadrian’s accession.497 Even if one wanted to 
date Plutarch’s Demetrius nearer to his own death (under Hadrian), it seems unlikely that Plutarch 
would reassigned a known contemporary tale about an emperor to a long dead king (a cautionary 
paradigm no less!).498 Therefore, it is reasonable to dismiss Hadrian’s attribution, though it is still 
important, as it speaks to the role of the tale in reflecting on contemporary expectations of imperial 
responsibilities in the second-century CE.  
Despite this discrepancy between Plutarch and Cassius Dio, Dio’s language is more akin to 
that found in Stobaeus. This suggests that Dio has drawn upon the same tradition as Stobaeus, who 
sourced his version from a certain Serenos.499 However, this would mean accounting for the change 
in attribution. Even so, ancient audiences understood and accepted to some extent the fluidity of 
persons and detail in these more character focused tales. Dio certainly uses the anecdote this way, 
giving it solely as an example of Hadrian’s ‘biographical character’ and his personality as a ruler. It 
is a facet of contemporary Roman-imperial-monarchic ideology that hovers somewhere between 
Dio’s period and that of Hadrian’s, and has little real historical weight.500 However, the possibility 
cannot be ruled out that Dio genuinely heard it told of Hadrian. This suggests that the story itself, 
whatever its origins or final designation, had long since made the transition to a stock moralizing 
tale of monarchic ideology. Its value resting in the exemplar tradition – not the search for history.   
Serenos’ attribution to Antipater in Stobaeus is more difficult to dismiss. Despite the fact 
that Antipater never took the title ‘king’ (rendering “kai; mh; basivleue” problematic), it may reflect 
                                               
496
 Fergus Millar (1967: 9-19) first used this anecdote about Hadrian as evidence that ‘the ideology–and practice–of the 
Empire was that the Emperor was personally accessible to his subjects in a way which now seems incredible...’ (1967: 
9). Later, once aware of parallel versions – Millar stated that ‘there persisted long-established conceptions of what a 
‘king’ should be which... help to transform a Roman princeps into a descendant of the Hellenistic kings’ (1977: 3). One 
of these conceptions was reflected in this anecdote, which was ‘easy and not wholly misleading, to quote’ (1977: 3) as 
evidence for the required and accepted role of the emperors. Millar also argues that we should not reject as ‘irrelevant 
literary affectation’ Plutarch’s ‘display of classical quotations’ from which he derives his expectations of a king’s 
conduct (1977: 4). Birley (1997: 172) notes the parallel versions in passing, but concludes on no real evidence that 
Dio’s version ‘is likely to be genuine for all that.’     
497
 On the sequence of the Lives – Nikolaidis 2005: 283-324.   
498
 According to the Historia Augusta, when Hadrian arrived in Greece during his world tour, he followed the example 
of Hercules and Philip and had himself initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries (Eleusinia sacra exemplo Herculis 
Philippique suscepit - Hadrian 13.1). This action (and the above anecdote) suggests some kind of link or relationship 
between the two rulers. What it could have been cannot be easily guessed. 
499
 He might be identified as the Athenian grammarian Aelios Serenos (Fuhrmann 1998: 44 n.4). There is also the 
outside chance (as Stobaeus seems to use wholly Greek sources), that the reference may be to Serenus Sammonicus (? - 
212 CE; RE 6). This man addressed his antiquarian work Res reconditae (which could have contained Greek tales – 
possibly in Greek) to Septimius Severus (and possibly Caracalla), making his work contemporaneous with Dio himself 
– who could have taken his version from this work for reworking in his own history.  
500
 On Dio’s ‘Biographical History’ and the early Principate – Pelling 1997: 117-144. He notes that Dio is fairly 
anecdotal, but to some effect, ‘grouping his stories to illustrate important themes’ (1997: 124). Here, it is Hadrian’s 
character that is being illustrated. However, Pelling also argues that Dio’s ‘biographical analysis’ does not penetrate 
very deep psychologically (1997: 135).  
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a tradition that seems to acknowledge Antipater’s desire to be a king (Plut. Mor. 180E; Curt. 
10.10.14).501 Antipater, like Demetrius (another possible attribution), was involved in the upheavals 
that followed Alexander’s death. As such, it is easy to understand why stories showing Philip 
upholding Macedonian kingly qualities (if chronology is right to imply Philip’s original attribution), 
could easily have become valuable weapons in the propaganda wars that followed Alexander’s 
death. Connections to Philip and Alexander were certainly invaluable in this period of turmoil. Why 
stop there when association is easily superseded by appropriation. Therefore, the version of Serenos 
and that of the Demetrius could reflect competing traditions of adoption and misinformation. Even 
so, if there was such a dispute, at its centre is the embracing of Philip’s tale and its associated 
qualities. The paradigm of Philip functioning in a judicial role as king was so powerful its 
wholesale appropriation was an attractive possibility for those trying to claim Macedonia’s throne 
or legitimize themselves before Macedon’s citizens. 
Plutarch’s version in the Demetrius is problematic if Plutarch is also supposed to have been 
the author of the version in the apophthegmata collection. However, some have argued that Philip is 
clearly the antecedent for the anecdote and not Demetrius.502 This seems the best reading of the text 
of the Demetrius. As a result, there are two versions of the anecdote concerning Philip – both 
(possibly) from the same author. There are certainly close similarities in language and sequence 
(especially up until the apophthegm itself), despite Plutarch’s obvious working up of the Demetrius 
version for insertion into a biography.503 This ‘biography’ version comes in a chapter dedicated to 
Demetrius’ defective behaviour as king of Macedonia. This behaviour is directly contrasted with 
that of the more just Philip before him by the Macedonians themselves through the use of this 
anecdote which adds weight to the preceding comments. The anecdote then gives way to an 
excursus on justice, which ends with a very Plutarchian remark on injustice (Demetr. 42.6). This 
foreshadows events to come, and completes the contrast with Philip. It is typical Plutarch – 
structured, meaningful, and entertaining. 
This entire section of Plutarch is heavy with monarchic ideology – particularly in relation to 
being dikaios (showing dikaiosune) and self-controlled (showing enkrateia) in the face of abuse. 
Plutarch uses these virtues to distinguish between the two monarchs in the hope that this will guide 
his audience’s ultimate reaction to the behaviour of Demetrius as a king – aligning their response 
with his principles. However, this ‘coercive structure’ with its alignment of ethics is not just about 
making correct judgements on the past, but building values and ideologies for the present and 
future. Plutarch speaks to a contemporary audience regarding expectations placed on current leaders 
and their deputies – by themselves and others. To educate the present, Plutarch embeds in his 
                                               
501
 On Antipater – Heckel 2006: 35-38.  
502
 Adams 1986: 48; cf. HM 2: 394 n. 2. 
503
 Cf. Stadter 2008: 58-64; and Beck 1999: 175-186 on Plutarch’s methods. 
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curriculum the tales and values of great individuals and statesmen from the past like Philip as 
models.504 This education was a broader appealing example of monarchic ideology – itself 
constantly evolving and always unique in a sense to a time, to a place, to a culture, and to an author.   
These two versions of the anecdote also offer insight into Plutarch’s methodology in terms 
of preparing apophthegmata for his biographies. The unembellished apophthegma of the 
apophthegmata collection certainly gives the impression of having been worked up for the 
Demetrius. As a result, there are discernible differences aside from the more complex contextual 
setting of the Life version. For example, the details about the woman and the language used to 
describe her actions are different. Hence, Presbuvtido" de; penicra'" has become the milder 
description presbutevrou gunaivou; and pollavki" ejnoclouvsh" has become the more reasonable 
deomevnou pollavki" ajkousqh'nai. However, most of the modification occurs after the woman’s 
pointed apophthegma (kai; mh; basivleue - unsurprisingly stable in all versions). Moreover, the 
unadorned details of the apophthegmata collection give way to the more complex sequence of 
events and details of the Demetrius.  
The differences are not great, but they are there – and they do have their effect. The main 
differences are the softening of the woman’s actions and the introduction of a more reflective Philip 
whose actions are further fleshed out (cf. Isoc. Ad Dem. 34). This could also suggest Philip’s 
possession of that other cardinal virtue phronesis – practical wisdom. But it is more likely done for 
greater effect in contrasting the spectre of Philip, and the disturbing figure of Demetrius. 
Additionally, the more austere version dedicated to Trajan in the apophthegmata collection 
conforms well to the aims of that work. The ultimate focus there was on the conveyance of the 
moral(s) or lessons ingrained in the tale, not on any sophisticated acts of contrasting or 
characterization. Monarchic ideology worked best when operating on a simple level – even when 
addressed to the highest of individuals. Therefore, the messages of individual tales like Philip’s 
were left concise and clear for the emperor Trajan - and any others who cared to utilize such a large 
collection.   
Despite any differences, there are common ‘Plutarchian’ ideas or ideals behind both 
Philippic versions (many discussed in chap. four). There are ideas around the approachability of 
rulers to petitioners (cf. Plut. Polit. Parang. 31 = Mor. 823A-D). There is the lack of anger (ojrghv) 
by Philip at the woman’s rebuke, instead Philip is tolerant and controls what would have been a 
natural reaction to the criticism or free speech (parrhesia). Thus, his lovgo" overcomes pavqo". 
Moreover, this emotional restraint and calmness (his pra/ovth") allows Philip to use his practical 
reason to accept the woman’s comment, and dedicate himself fully to the needs of his subjects – 
especially as regards divkh (justice). These actions are highly suggestive of the virtues 
                                               
504
 Stadter 2015: 215-30. 
P a g e  96 | 270 
 
enkrateia/sophronsune and phronesis. Even so, it was above all the active concern with justice for 
his subjects (dikaiosune) which separated kingship from tyranny – not only for Plutarch, but for 
most political intellectuals.505 When united with filanqrwpiva, this concern for justice also gave 
people the most confidence in their ruler, and was a leader’s greatest protection in Plutarch’s eyes. 
The presence of all these themes almost guaranteed Plutarch’s interest in selecting this tale of 
Philip’s for his purposes. It was rich in the values Plutarch wished contemplated and practiced in his 
own time, as well as associated with his own persona by his auditors.506 
Despite the broad parameters of monarchic ideology, if the tale is truly linked to Philip 
(whether historical or not), there could be some subtle disparity between how Plutarch uses and 
wishes this anecdote to be received and interpreted, and any original ideas it was meant to reflect 
and disseminate in its original Macedonian context.507 Therefore, the themes of the Demetrius 
version seem initially focused on the king’s royal duties, accessibility, and free speech or petition 
(isegoria/parrhesia) before the king by his subjects. All of these would have been of particular 
concern for a Macedonian audience. However, by following the tale in the Demetrius with an 
excursus on justice, Plutarch shifts the focus away from these contextually relevant Macedonian 
themes towards justice in a more practical and wider cultural sense. Plutarch’s reasons for doing so 
accord well with his values and philosophical beliefs, as well as the agenda of his work. Plutarch’s 
monarchic ideology is formulated to appeal to a broader audience which was far removed culturally 
from fourth-century BCE Macedonia. Philip’s tale, which accorded with ancient values of his 
period,508 is manipulated by Plutarch to align more with contemporary values regarding its ideas 
and themes so as to be most effective. Macedonia’s isegoria is still prominent – but it is subsumed 
by Plutarch’s ‘Justice’.     
The minimal version of the apophthegmata collection, which is devoid of any real context 
or Plutarchian commentary, is more open to interpretation. This was deliberate too. Greater scope 
for interpretation had the potential for facilitating greater assimilation of the tale’s core elements by 
almost anyone. Therefore, with Roman emperors also expected to be accessible to their subjects 
(e.g. Suet. Aug. 53.2; cf. Vesp. 23.2), and praised for it (Plin. Pan. 23.3, 24.3, 48.1), the anecdote 
was well placed to cross the temporal and cultural divide between Macedonian and Roman concerns 
regarding the duties of rulers, their approachability, and their services to justice.509 The structure in 
which these primary elements were set certainly needed to maximise any coalescence with 
                                               
505
 Cf. Erington 1990: 220. 
506
 Beck 1998: 61. 
507
 As two of our other possible candidates are also Macedonian, it seems safe to accept an original Macedonian 
context.   
508
 E.g. Xen. Ages. 9.1-2; Cyrop. 7.5.55; and Anab. 4.3.10-13. 
509
 Cf. Beck 1998: 15. This approachability to petitioners continued to be emphasised by other Greek authors of the 
imperial period – e.g. Aristides Eis Bas. 9.23-4 and Themistius Or. 15.190C (Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 35).   
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contemporary mores. Nevertheless, the principal values and morals of the tale were perfect in 
themselves for influencing monarchic ideology in any period. In the end, Plutarch believed Philip’s 
willingness to listen to the woman provided a positive model of leadership that was in itself well 
worth the attention of his readers.            
The next judicial anecdote (again from Plutarch) concerns Philip’s appointment of a judge 
and his subsequent removal for amusing pseudo-rational reasons (example 3.3). The virtues in such 
a tale would seem to revolve around dikaiosune and phronesis. The anecdote seems to come in only 
one version, though there might be some affiliation with a similar anecdote in Aelian. Nevertheless, 
the tale’s underlying function is again the blending of past and contemporary interests in the 
relationship between appearance, character, and a leader’s role in true justice. Certainly, the tale 
offers a slightly different approach to dikaiosune with its top down focus on where ultimate 
responsibility for its expression lies.    
 
3.3.A 
Tw'n de; !Antipavtrou fivlwn tina; katatavxa" eij" tou;" dikastav", ei\ta to;n pwvgwna         
baptovmenon aijsqanovmeno" kai; th;n kefalhvn, ajnevsthsen eijpw;n to;n a[piston ejn qrixi; mh; 
nomivzein ajxiovpiston ejn pravgmasin (Plut. Mor. 178F = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 23).510  
 
 3.3.B 
 
!Anh;r eij" Lakedaivmona ajfivketo Ci'o", gevrwn h[dh w[n, ta; me;n a[lla ajlazwvn, hj/dei'tode; ejpi;
tw'/ ghvra/ kai; dia; tau'ta th;n trivca polia;n ou\san ejpeira'to bafh'/ ajfanivzein.parelqw;n ou\n
eij" tou;" Lakedaimonivou" kai; toiauvthn uJpofaivnwn th;n kefalh;n ejkei'na ei\pen uJpe;r w|n   
kai; ajfivketo. ajnasta;" ou\n oJ !Arcivdamo" oJ tw'n Lakedaimonivwnbasileu;" “tiv d! a[n” 
e[fh “ou|to" uJgie;" ei[poi, o}" ouj movnon ejpi; th'/ yuch'/ to; yeu'do", ajlla; kai; ejpi; th'/ kefalh'/   
perifevrei;” kai; ejxevwse ta; uJp! aujtou' lecqevnta,  diabavllwn tou' Civou to;n trovpon ejx  
w|n eJwra'to (Ael. V.H. 7.20).511 
 
The moral sentiments in both anecdotes appear to be similar, that the dying of one’s hair 
implied a deceptive or untrustworthy personality.512 Even so, it is impossible to reconcile the two as 
they stand (if they are indeed related beyond the idea of appearance reflecting character), or to 
assign priority. Each is explicitly focused on a different individual (though both are kings – which 
marks them both as being related to monarchic ideology). One concerns the appointment of a judge, 
                                               
510
 ‘He (Philip) appointed one of Antipater’s friends to the position of judge, but later, on learning that the man dyed his 
beard and hair, he removed him, at the same time remarking that he did not believe that a man who was untrustworthy 
in the matter of hair was fit to be trusted in actions.’  
511
 ‘A man from Chios arrived in Sparta. He was elderly, vain in many ways, and ashamed of his age, and for this 
reason he tried to dye his white hair. He appeared before the Spartans, revealing his head as described, and explained 
the business for which he had come. Archidamus the Spartan king rose and said: ‘How could this man have anything 
sensible to say when he carries around falsehood not only in his soul but also on his head?’ He rejected the proposals 
with a denunciation of the Chiot’s character based on his appearance.’ Cf. Stob. 3.12.19 (abridged). 
512
 In Plutarch the deceit or denunciation is in relation to the man’s actions or deeds (pravgmasin). In Aelian, it relates to 
the man’s soul (th'/ yuch) and his character as a whole (to;n trovpon). However, both anecdotes assign the exposition of 
the condemnation to the king, which is given publically (Plutarch – indirect speech; Aelian – direct speech).   
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whilst the other relates the hearing of some embassy (both concern unnamed individuals – one is a 
man of Chios, the other a friend of Antipater). There are also minor differences. For example, 
Aelian gives the reasons for the Chian’s wish to dye his hair (detail wholly lacking in Plutarch). 
Whereas Plutarch tells us that it was the man’s beard (pwvgwna) as well as his hair that was dyed.513 
To avoid too much speculation as to their relationship, it is more profitable to focus on Plutarch’s 
version and what it reveals concerning both Philip, its author, and its message. 
The moral is straightforward and reflects a common belief in Plutarch’s era that appearance 
could reflect character (h\qo").514 In Plutarch’s other works they are often implicitly or explicitly 
connected.515 It was Plutarch after all who believed that his concern to reveal character 
(ta; th'" yuch'" shmei'a) was similar to that of a portrait painter.516 Moreover, Plutarch thought 
appearance could reflect both positive as well as negative attributes such as anger and cruelty.517 
Here the deception inherent in the man’s hair is linked explicitly to a deceptive character, 
particularly as would be manifested in his actions. For Plutarch, using Philip as wise mouthpiece, 
‘deception’518 had no part in justice, which was itself of fundamental importance to his conception 
of the harmonious state. In addition, it also reflects Plutarch’s belief that ostentatious, pompous, or 
pretentious exhibition (often involving over the top clothing or appearance), was something akin to 
dramatic performance, and suggestive of arrogance or ‘a gap between appearance and reality’ (Duff 
1999: 125-6). Moreover, from just following Plutarch’s account it is clear that there was no one 
‘correct’ reading of body parts/quirks etc. These could vary considerably depending on individual 
interpretations, though it is known that hairstyles certainly could ‘reflect the self-image of 
individuals against the background of prevailing cultural and political views’ (Haas, Toppe, and 
Henz 2005: 298). For the Romans, too much care for the hair could indicate effeminacy – thus 
external characteristics represented internal moral character (e.g. Cic. P. red. in sen 16).519    
Plutarch presents Philip as prudent ruler (showing phronesis) whose direct intervention 
vividly demonstrates his concern with justice (his dikaiosune). Philip is anxious that proper justice 
is done in his name. The king’s representatives are just as accountable as the king himself in matters 
of justice; they too must be dikaios.520 Justice was a chain at the head of which was the king. It was 
                                               
513
 For another instance of the linking of hair to moral character in Plutarch – Lys. 1.3 (with Stadter 1992b: 42). On 
physiognomics in the ancient world – Evans 1969; Boys-Stones 2007: 19-124; Rohrbacher 2010: 92-116; and Gladhill 
2012: 315-348. 
514
 It is particularly prevalent in Suetonius (Rohrbacher 2010: 92-116), who records one instance whereby Vespasian 
removes one man’s commission because he smelt of perfume (Vesp. 8.3). 
515
 Duff 1999: 164, 166-67; cf. 92-3; Georgiadou 1992: 4617-18.  
516
 Al. 1.3; cf. Cat. Min. 24.1; Duff 1999: 16-17. On a good portrait conveying a subject’s character – Xen. Mem. 3.10.1-
8; Arist. Poet. 1450a27-9; Ael. V.H. 4.3; and Plin. N.H. 35.100.  
517
 Duff 1999: 78. 
518
 Plutarch calls the man to;n a[piston. 
519
 Cf. Corbeill 1996: 163-5, 169. 
520
 The tale could in fact represent a more mundane tradition of political power wrangling at the highest levels of 
Macedonian political/judicial structures. As such, the man’s hair may have merely formed a publicly palatable pretext 
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he that was responsible for their positions, and ultimately for their dikaiosune or their injustices (cf. 
Xen. Cyrop. 8.1.8). It is a slight shift in the traditional styling of dikaiosune, even within the fluid 
edifice of monarchic ideology. Nevertheless, it is about accountability at all levels, a concept that 
had already been well articulated in Isocrates’ advice to Nicocles. He advised the young king to 
manage the state like his ancestral estate, and in its appointments – to act ‘splendidly and royally’ 
(lamprw'" kai; basilikw'" - Isoc. Ad Nic. 19), because; 
 
‘When you put men in charge of affairs which are not under your personal direction, be 
governed by the knowledge that you yourself will be held responsible for whatever they do 
(Isoc. Ad. Nic. 27).’ 
 
Isocrates also advised Demonicus that – 
 
‘When you are placed in authority, do not employ any unworthy person in your 
administration; for people will blame you for any mistakes which he may make (Isoc. Dem. 
37).’ 
 
This advice would seem to secure Philip’s actions to the standards of his period. But its 
inclusion in Plutarch’s apophthegmata collection also suggests something of Plutarch’s own values 
– and a more contemporary and pointed message for Trajan and those servants of his 
administration. Pliny certainly made much of Trajan’s wise choices in this regard.521 The moral 
soon becomes the dominate feature when the tale is regarded this way. Philip’s role as ‘himself’ is 
superseded – his importance as Philip II of Macedon diminished in importance to the messages of 
the anecdote. Plutarch utilizes the tale to contribute actively to an aspect of contemporary 
monarchic ideology which focused its discourse around responsible justice. As such the tale 
illustrates the divide between merely the appearance of justice (symbolically embodied by the 
man’s hair) and true justice. It allows leaders no escape from their duties by hiding behind the 
failings of subordinates. Ultimate responsibility for justice lay with those in charge – they were the 
accountable captains of the ship of state. The recording and dissemination of this tale underscores a 
complex blending between past tales and existing preoccupations, ideologies and agendas. Philip’s 
positive representation as a king taking on the full weight of justice in the past is again proffered as 
a model with which to vie in the present.  
Example 3.4 (again from Plutarch’s collection) highlights the strong connection between 
actions, which were the manifestations of certain qualities or virtues (wit and humour among them), 
and monarchic ideology. 
                                                                                                                                                            
for action that was otherwise problematic. Therefore, contemporary Philippic propaganda may lay behind this tale, as 
indeed it might be behind any one of a number of extant tales i.e. it could all be the subversion of Philippic political 
necessity by more agreeable moral paradigmatic symbolism.    
521
 E.g. ‘There is even greater merit in your choice of procurators, the sort of men whom most of your subjects choose 
to try their cases in preference to anyone else….’ (Plin. Pan. 36.5). 
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3.4. 
 
Genovmeno" de; krith;" duoi'n ponhrw'n ejkevleuse to;n me;n feuvgein ejk Makedoniva"  to;n de;  
e{teron diwvkein (Mor. 178A = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 12).522  
 
This tale shows that Philip as king had some kind of judicial role (krith;") in what seems to have 
been a private dispute between two individuals. However, the anecdote’s brevity allows for a 
multiplicity of interpretations and speculations, so it is best to focus on the fact that it highlights one 
of Plutarch’s fundamental themes – true virtue came only through action, which could be political 
or public. In this tale that action is publicly judicial. Moreover, despite so few details, with the rest 
of Plutarch’s apophthegmata of Philip positive in nature, it suggest that this tale is likewise meant 
to be read as such. Therefore, Philip’s decision (seemingly the exile of both fellows) is probably 
best thought of as being moderate as well as clever.523 Like Plutarch’s earlier judicial anecdotes, 
any judicial moderation shown by Philip may have had direct contemporary associations with the 
noted abstinentia (restraint), mansuetudo (forgiveness), temperantia (moderation) and indulgentia 
(mildness) of the emperor Trajan (e.g. Plin. Pan. 2.6-7; 21.4). In addition, Philip’s actions could be 
equated with some minor act of clemency which would accord philosophically with Plutarch’s own 
idea of the basileus dikaios. A just leader whose actions (and words) always implied some kind of 
use of the Plutarchian favourites - filanqrwpiva and pra/ovth". These virtues were the staples of 
Plutarch’s own monarchic ideology, Plutarch’s own principles, and the principles of the principate 
(in Greek terms) as Trajan and others would have wished it understood. They reveal the ideal 
monarch or individual – especially as associated with dikaiosune.  
There are other elements also at work here. With so few details given, the slight rhetorical 
cleverness of Philip’s decision unsurprisingly becomes the focal point of the apophthegma. 
Certainly, the received form of the apophthegma only allows it to be read that way (as Plutarch 
surely intended). Therefore, by sacrificing a more complex structure and context, and focusing 
almost completely on the apophthegma itself, this anecdote has lost much of its paradigmatic value 
in regards to dikaiosune. In its place the tale elevates the wit and humour of Philip almost into an 
exemplary virtue (see chap. five). As such, this tale offers a less conventional aspect of the ideal 
monarchic model. Indeed, with this configuration of the tale as some kind of vehicle of light 
amusement, the entire thing has become more entertaining. Its didactic element is also made less 
bombastic. However, as will be seen below, this focus on humour does not always diminish the 
value of tale to the initiated in terms of its contribution or value to monarchic ideology. 
                                               
522
 ‘Being called upon to decide a suit between two knaves, he (Philip) ordered the one to flee from Macedonia, and the 
other to pursue him.’ Cf. Just. 8.3. 
523
 Plutarch had no problem with statesmen who were nobly serving their states using rhetoric as a kind of co-worker 
(sunergo;n.... peiqou'") (Praec. Ger. 801C ff.).   
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The amusing tone of 3.4 links it to another of Philip’s apophthegma recorded by Plutarch. 
This tale (example 3.5) again involves Philip forming some kind of judgment between two fellows 
(brothers in this case). The context of the incident is difficult to establish, though a judicial setting is 
certainly not out of the question. If it were judicial, like the tale above, it is Philip’s wit which 
upstages the more traditional virtue dikaiosune. Either way, the entertainment of the king’s rhetoric 
and witticism usurp the role of more ‘serious’ virtues. Even so, this tale can still to be regarded as 
important to Plutarch’s ideology in terms of a model leader.  
 
 3.5. 
Duoi'n de; ajdelfw'n !Amfoterou' kai; @Ekaterou', to;n me;n @Ekatero;n e[mfrona kai;              
praktiko;n oJrw'n, to;n de; !Amfotero;n eujhvqh kai; ajbevlteron e[fh “to;n me;n @Ekatero;n        
ajmfovteron ei\nai, to;n de; !Amfotero;n oujdevteron (Plut. Mor. 177F = Reg. et imp. apoph. 
Phil. 10).”524  
 
The two individuals mentioned may be the two historically attested brothers Amphoterus 
and Craterus – both of whom rose to prominence under Alexander.525 This may affect views on the 
tale’s historicity for some. However, with so few details and no context, the real focus should be on 
the sophistic language and amusing tone of the entire tale (mostly playing on the words 
!Amfotero;n and @Ekatero;n), and Plutarch’s reasons for including it. The tale again projects 
Philip’s image as a quick witted man who was not above lowbrow puns or rhetorical word play.526 
It is for this amusing quality that Plutarch uses it in his collection.527 Moreover, (like 3.4) its 
inclusion provided the reader with a measured and somewhat droll break from the more serious 
reflective nature of other material (cf. Valerius’ use of such material in his collection). 
This amusement though still retains a significant aspect of monarchic ideology. Jokes were 
still a valid indicator of character for Plutarch and others (Al. 1.2; cf. Suet. Vesp. 22), and the 
collecting of such things by him was to be expected. Here, its purpose suggests an underlying 
message concerning the usefulness of retaining a sense of humour despite all the cares and toils of 
state. It was something Philip evidently was able to do, as the numerous tales of his wit and humour 
clearly reveal. A good sense of humour was also seen as an important virtue of the ideal leader, and 
was a sign of civilitas or being demotikos. This suggests a definite reason for including such tales as 
                                               
524
 ‘Of two brothers, Both and Each, he (Philip) observed that Each was sensible and practical, and Both was silly and 
foolish, and he remarked that Each was both and Both was neither!’ 
525
 Heckel 2006: 23, 95-99. Cf. Ars. 382; and Apost. 12, 72. Fuhrmann seems sceptical of the attribution noting, ‘bien le 
caractère fantaisiste de l’ –apophtegme – paraît-il évident (1998: 260 n. 5).’ Amphoterus held several important 
commands under Alexander – and also handled some delicate missions for him (Arr. 1.25.9-10; 3.6.3; Curt. 4.8.15). 
Whilst Craterus rose to highest levels becoming one of Alexander’s most trusted and powerful marshals. 
526
 See also Plut. Mor. 177F = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 9. (cf. Dem. De Cor. 67; Aul. Gell. N.A. 2.27). Their close 
proximity in the collection suggests a common source in which they were thematically linked by their rhetorical play on 
words (this could of course be Plutarch’s own doing).      
527
 This type of humour using puns on names was called interpretatio nominis (Cic. De or. 2.257; cf. Quin. Inst. or. 
6.3.55-56). For other examples from Plutarch and Suetonius – Reekmans 1992: 201-203.  
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this in a work Plutarch would dedicate to the emperor Trajan. They were certainly not liable to be 
overlooked by an emperor who was noted for his facilitas and hilaritas (e.g. Plin. Pan. 2.6-7; 4.6). 
Therefore, with this type of amusing tale Plutarch moved away from the more conventional cardinal 
virtues of monarchic ideology (probably dikaiosune here). This approach reflects a more 
comprehensive, but less overbearing effort to entertain and educate those in power in the moral 
paideia of leadership and autocracy.  
The final judicial apophthegma of Plutarch’s (example 3.6) brings us back in a sense to our 
first example (3.1). It also brings us back to the cardinal virtues of dikaiosune and phronesis, which 
seamlessly make the transition from their fourth-century BCE Macedonian context to imperial Rome 
of the second-century CE.  
3.6 
!Epei; de; $Arpalo" uJpe;r suggenou'" kai; oijkeivou Kra;thto" ajdikhmavtwn divkhn e[conto"   
hjxivou th;n zhmivan eijsenegkei'n ajfeqh'nai de; th'" krivsew", i{na mh;  loidorhqh'/, “bevltiovn    
ejstin,” ei\pe, “tou'ton aujto;n h[ hJma'" dia; tou'ton kakw'" ajkouvein  (Mor. 179A = Reg. et 
imp. apoph. Phil. 25).”528  
 
The focus of the anecdote concerns Philip’s interest in true justice and public image, the latter of 
course the whole point of Harpalus’ shifty proposal. This Harpalus was probably either a brother or 
cousin of Machaetas.529 Moreover, his lobbying for Crates to be absolved of the adverse decision by 
the paying of the fine recalls somewhat the fine/decision dichotomy of Machaetas’ case (which 
precedes it in the text).  
It is a well-constructed anecdote, which builds quickly to its concluding apophthegm. This 
time the apophthegm is Philip’s – and its meaning is clear. Crates should suffer the stigma attached 
to his crime.530 Any reduction of that shame through Philip’s intercession would amount in essence 
to a reversal of the decision. This would reflect badly upon Harpalus, for lobbying such a proposal 
on behalf of the man – but more importantly on Philip, for allowing what was essentially a 
miscarriage of justice. True justice was not only in the punishment of the crime, but also in its 
recognition. Crates was trying to circumvent his true acceptance of the crime (if this was originally 
his idea and not Harpalus’). Paying the fine amounted to no mea culpa, nor any act of contrition by 
Crates. These could only come after truly taking responsibility for the crime. Justice and the fine are 
separate issues, and Philip’s apophthegm speaks directly to this distinction. Any monarch who truly 
                                               
528
 ‘When Harpalus, acting in behalf of his kinsman and intimate friend Crates, who was under condemnation for 
wrongdoing, proposed as a fair solution that Crates should pay the fine, but be absolved from the adverse judgement so 
that he should not be subject to reproach, Philip said, ‘It is better that the man himself, rather than that we because of 
him, should be ill spoken of.’’ 
529
 Heckel 1992: 213. Fuhrmann (1998: 261 n.5) thinks this Harpalus was the son of Machaetas.  
530
 N.b. the long tale in Seneca in which Philip goes so far as have a man’s crime carved upon the man’s brow (stigma) 
(Ben. 4.37-38). The tale itself contains some interesting material in relation to Philip’s powers regarding gift giving, 
guest/host relationships, justice and punishment – but falls outside the parameters of this thesis due to its unusual 
length. Discussion in Molinier 1995: 74-75. Cf. Isoc. Evag. 19-20 and Xen. Cyrop. 1.2.7.  
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possessed the virtue of dikaiosune would act as Philip had done. Real justice has no price. Crates’ 
rank, friends, and money have no effect on Philip’s judgment. Instead, Philip dispenses justice in a 
manner that is seen to be fair, transparent, and unsupportive of sly acts of injustice.531 Here Philip is 
Plutarch’s dikaios monarch.    
It is not explicitly stated that Philip was the original judge in the case, but either way, any 
intercession would reflect badly on him.532 Plutarch was always adamant that the greatest defence a 
leader had was the confidence of his people, especially in terms of justice. If that relationship or 
trust were undermined by actions such as were proposed here by Harpalus, then a leader’s actions 
were probably base and possibly dangerous (cf. Isoc. Ad Dem. 43). Certainly, it was Philip’s failure 
to attend properly to justice for Pausanias that was thought to have led to his death (Diod. 16.91.2-
94.4; Just. 9.7). Isocrates was certainly aware early on of this crucial relationship between justice, 
which was the key component of virtuous rule, and the interests of the monarch - particularly as 
related to the longevity of his regime (Ad Nic. 8, 15, 21). Plutarch’s tale is both a lesson and a 
warning regarding justice.   
The entire matter is also tinged with other monarchic virtues. For example, Philip displays 
his wisdom with his decision not to allow Crates to do as proposed. But it is not the theoretical 
sophia of a philosopher, instead it is the more practical phronesis (prudentia or sapientia) of the 
statesman. It is a functional good sense that sees wrong and does right. This wisdom allows Philip 
to exhibit a strong sense of decency and show great integrity. He is also not afraid to use candour. 
Interestingly enough, like iustitia and aequitas, all these virtues are known to have been explicitly 
praised virtues of Trajan (e.g. pudor - Plin. Pan. 2.8; simplicitas – Pan. 4.6; and integritas - Pan. 
92.2).533 Plutarch is not shooting in the dark. This symmetry of morality and values again reflects 
the universal nature of the virtues (and vices) associated with monarchic ideology. It also shows that 
despite the vast expanse of centuries, Plutarch was still able to exploit Philip’s tales in such a way 
as to have Philip play a meaningful and ongoing-dynamic function in the evolving paradigm of the 
ideal leader – from education to validation. Overall, Philip’s positive portrayal in these judicial tales 
speak to his status as a positive role model in terms of ‘justice’ for later leaders of antiquity.      
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
531
 Cf. Isoc. Ad Dem. 16-17, 29, 37, 39; and Nic. 52. 
532
 Where did any fine paid by Crates go? If it went to the state, and then ultimately to Philip, the implications of such 
an arrangement were not good. Philip was to receive payment for what amounted to no conviction being recorded. 
533
 Pliny is exceptional though in his wide and unprecedented set of virtues (Roche 2011: Introduction). 
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Conclusion  
   
These judicial anecdotes reveal much of Philip’s role as a monarchic paradigm in the Roman 
world. They also show something of the characterization of Philip personally performing his 
judicial responsibilities. Often Philip’s character is tied to the moral of the tale or reflects the 
author’s wish to highlight other features present. Hence, Philip’s character is an interpretive key to 
the anecdote, and the author’s aims and agenda. For example, Valerius portrayed Philip in negative 
terms to underscore aspects of free speech. Plutarch presents a different Philip, whose wise concern 
for justice and exhibition of other various virtues underline much of Plutarch’s own ethics. 
Moreover, most of the judicial anecdotes are found in Plutarch. This suggests that Philip’s regular 
concern with justice contains an implicit barbed and ironical lesson of Plutarch. Almost every 
reader who read them also knew of Philip’s murder. But more importantly, they would have known 
of Pausanias’ reported motivation – Philip’s failure to punish Attalus and afford proper justice to 
Pausanias (Arist. Pol. 5.8.10, 1311b2). Philip suffered (fatally) the consequences of this neglect of 
justice. Plutarch’s judicial anecdotes as a whole serve the dual function of explicitly educating and 
implicitly warning.  
The simplicity of all the above tales belie in many cases the complex functions they serve. 
For example, they reveal something of the role of the Macedonian king, isegoria or parrhesia 
within the Macedonian justice system, though they allow for few definitive statements about 
Macedonia’s justice system. They do suggest though that Philip’s powers regarding fines and 
judgments were unregulated by anything other than his own personality. Certainly, Philip’s 
character was a defining quality of just about every judicial anecdote studied here. Even when that 
character was only as important as the kingly role it fulfilled. Moreover, despite the loss of 
historical context and other important details, these tales still function well to convey that character. 
It is this role which brings us back to monarchic ideology.  
These anecdotes are entertaining tales of morally charged edification, which are meant to 
play a purpose in promoting Philip, or at least the virtues inherent in his actions as exemplars of 
leadership and monarchy. However, these paradigms could move beyond any exclusivity to rulers, 
and appeal to other broader segments of the population beyond the ruling class using the 
universality inherent in most virtues. The virtuous ruler is after all only a virtuous man with power.  
Philip’s judicial anecdotes are good mediums for the characterization of Philip and sources 
of contemporary views on the virtues and vices of leadership. However, historians must use them in 
full knowledge of their limitations. Therefore, this investigation has provided no definitive answers 
in terms of historicity, or even history itself (as foreseen). What it has shown is that there were 
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various ways to manipulate and interpret Philip’s image to suit contextual aims, and contemporary 
motives and issues – particularly those associated with monarchic ideology in the Roman world. 
What is most surprising in regards to that image, is the largely positive perception of Philip in 
matters of justice (apart from one rhetorically minded version of a tale in Valerius Maximus). 
Therefore, Philip’s judicial tales generally advance positive examples of a monarch performing 
‘justice’.         
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4 
Slandering Philip   
 
Philip II, Criticism and Self-Control in the Roman 
World   
 
 
 
w|n ta;" dovxa" zhloi'", mimou' ta;" pravxei" (Isoc. Ad Nic. 38).534 
  
a{panta" me;n ou\n crh; tou;" nou'n e[conta" to;n kravtiston uJposthsamevnou" peira'sqai    
givgnesqai toiouvtou", mavlista de; soi; proshvkei. to; ga;r mh; dei'n ajllotrivoi" crh'sqai     
paradeivgmasin, ajll! oijkei'on uJpavrcein, pw'" oujk eijko;" uJp! aujtou' se paroxuvnesqai, kai;  
filonikei'n o{pw" tw'/ progovnw/ sauto;n o{moion paraskeuavsei"; levgw d! oujk wJ"                
dunhsovmenon aJpavsa" se mimhvsasqai ta;"@Hraklevou" pravxei"... ajlla; katav ge to; th'"    
yuch'" h\qo" kai; th;n filanqrwpivan kai;th;n eu[nioan, h{n ei\cen eij" tou;" $Ellhna"... (Isoc. 
Ad Phil. 113).535 
  
 
Part of Philip’s continuing popularity and status was his accessibility as a means by which to 
enlighten or critique imperial behaviour and policy, provide a historic (moral) exemplar, or to 
underscore Roman culture and achievements.536 To highlight these roles, this chapter examines 
those anecdotes, apophthegmata, and exempla which illustrate how Philip responded to slander, 
criticism, and free speech (parrhesia). Other important themes raised are the roles of reputation, 
paideia, declamation, entertainment, and popular moral edification. However, in the context of the 
Graeco-Roman world’s unending dialogue on how to hold and wield power, this chapter is 
governed by the more unifying tradition of monarchic ideology, particularly as manifested in the 
cardinal virtue sophrosune (self-control – sometimes expressed as enkrateia). Indeed, Philip’s 
attendance at these negotiations is bought on by discussions that surrounded the relationship and 
interaction between supreme monarch and citizen that occupied so much political discourse under 
the Roman Empire. The anecdotes are united and made more accessible and comprehensible by 
their use of Philip as a paradigm of leadership with which to ponder more contemporary concerns. 
It is this approach which influences the range and presentation of themes.  
 
                                               
534
 ‘If there are men whose reputations you envy, imitate their deeds.’ Cf. Isoc. Nic. 62. 
535
 ‘Now, while all who are blessed with understanding ought to set before themselves the greatest of men as their 
models, and strive to become like him, it behoves you (Philip) above all to do so. For since you have no need to follow 
alien examples but have before you one from your own house, have we not then the right to expect that you will be 
spurred on by this and inspired by the ambition to make yourself like the ancestor of your race? I do not mean that you 
will be able to imitate Heracles in all his exploits….but in the qualities of the spirit, in devotion to humanity, and in the 
good will which he cherished towards the Hellenes.’ 
536
 Cf. Alexander’s role in Spencer (2002: 3). 
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Sophrosune and Philip’s Period  
 
 One of the most important virtues of this chapter, and one which is particularly important to 
monarchic ideology, is another of the cardinal virtues – sophrosune (sometimes enkrateia).537 
Philip’s judicial tales have already shown that this virtue can carry the meanings self-control, 
restraint, caution, temperance, moderation or continence (hence the use of temperantia, moderatio 
and even continentia by the Romans to render the idea). Whatever the exact wording, sophrosune 
always carried the idea of ‘a tempering of dominant emotions by gentler thought’ (Ferguson 1979: 
32-33), or ‘the harmonious product of intense passion under perfect control’ (North 1966: x). Found 
early in Greek thought,538 it was early and securely one of the four cardinal virtues.539  
 This moderation or self-control was never thought of as a gift from the gods, but instead 
recognized as coming from the practitioner themselves to their credit. Moreover, such displays were 
thought to also benefit the community, which grew ever more harmonious.540 It had a variety of 
associated applications. For example, it could stop the mind from being carried away by emotion, 
passion, lust, and greed (which could denote connotations of modesty or modestia); it could enable 
individuals to stand steadfast in the face of failure or even great success; it could bring individuals, 
who were once enemies, into friendship.541 However, it was a virtue that is particularly remarked 
upon when being breached by men and women, rather than being observed.542       
 Xenophon shows the broad intellectual and moral scope of sophrosune just before Philip’s 
period in the fourth century BCE in his frequent and diverse use of the word.543 Interested in several 
aspects of the word (including its value to the ruler and the State), Xenophon links the quality to the 
notion of the ideal ruler in his Agesilaus and Cyropaedia.544 In the Agesilaus, sophrosune is filtered 
through the necessities of a military career. It is made up of enkrateia (self-control – cf. Mem. 4.8.1) 
and karteria (endurance), and is part of a cannon of distinction along with justice, piety, courage, 
patriotism, wisdom and cordiality.545 There is also Agesilaus’ simplicity, affability, and friendliness 
                                               
537
 It was related to intellectual and moral qualities such as aidos, eunomia, metriotes, kosmiotes, hagneia, and 
katharotes. The antitheses were aphrosune, hubris, andreia, akolasia, anaisthesia, and truphe (North 1966: x; break-
down of the word sophrosune itself at 3 n.10). It is the comparative of metriotes which Plutarch uses when quoting from 
Theophrastus on the moderation of Philip in his first Philippic apophthegma (Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 1 = Mor. 177C).  
538
 E.g. Hom. Od. 22.411; 23.30; cf. 4.158-60; 18.125; and Il. 21. 462-64. 
539
 Aesch. Sept. 610; and Pl. Phd. 69C; Leg. I 631C. Helen North’s 1966 study of sophrosune remains the definitive 
treatment to date of this quality from the Heroic period until the period of patristic literature.  
540
 Morgan 2007: 146. 
541
 Morgan 2007: 145-7. 
542
 Noreña 2009: 7. 
543
 North 1966: 123-132. On sophrosune in the Hellenica, Anabasis, Memorabilia, and Oikonomikos – North 1966: 
123-129. 
544
 North 1966: 129-132. 
545
 North 1966: 130. 
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(contrasted with the pride and aloofness of the Persian king – Ages. 8.1-6, 9), which Xenophon 
summarises as praotes (Ages. 10.1). Already in this thesis, Philip has had some association with this 
quality, which is constantly found in association with sophrosune and enkrateia,546 and this chapter 
shows yet more instances.  
In the Cyropaedia, Xenophon devotes some time to the instilling of virtue through the 
education of the ruling class in his idealised Persian state. One of the virtues to be gained is 
sophrosune (1.2.8-9; cf. Const Lac. 2-4). However, later in the treatise, Cyrus and Tigranes discuss 
whether it was possible to acquire sophrosune (3.1), and make some interesting points along the 
way, such as that all other qualities like courage, power, wealth, and strength are useless without 
sophrosune (3.1.16). Throughout the Cyropaedia there are many recognisable connotations of 
sophrosune such as moderation, prudence, restraint, control of appetite, and even chastity.547 
However, like the Agesilaus, it is the military aspects of sophrosune which are conspicuous like 
orderliness, knowledge of strategy, obedience, and discipline.548             
    In that other important author for monarchic ideology in the fourth century BCE, Isocrates, 
sophrosune not only referred to individual morality, but expanded as a political virtue (e.g. 
signifying a restraint in international relations).549 In his Nicocles, Nicocles or the Cyprians, and 
Evagoras, the portrayal of the ideal ruler includes the virtue sophrosune as a moral quality which 
encompasses self-control and being able to resist the temptations of power and pleasure (e.g. Isoc. 
Nic. 36ff.).550 Isocrates also paired it with dikaiosune as the most important of the virtues for their 
benefits to mankind (Nic. 29-30, 43). Moreover, the base could have no part in either virtue, for 
‘justice and temperance are the possessions of the good and noble alone’, and are the virtues, 
‘which are the truest and the most abiding and deserve the greatest praise’ (Isoc. Nic. 43). Indeed, 
Isocrates praises king Theseus for his other virtues and his prudence 
(a[llhn ajreth;n kai; th;n swfrosuvnhn), but particularly in the way he governed Athens 
(mavlist! ejn oi|" th;n povlin diwv/khsen) (Helen 31). Certainly, Isocrates believed that the king is 
meant to be an exemplar of this quality for his people.551 
 
...ajlla; th;n sautou' swfrosuvnhn paravdeigma toi'" a[lloi" kaqivsth, gignwvskwn o{ti to; th'
" povlew" o{lh" h\qo" oJmoiou'tai toi'" a[rcousin - Isoc. Nic. 31.552 
 
                                               
546
 Cf. North 1966: 130 
547
 E.g. 1.2.8-9; 1.5.9; 3.1.16-17; 6.1.46-47; 7.3.12; 7.5.75-76; 8.1.30, 36-37. 
548
 E.g. 3.3.58; 5.3.43; 5.4.44; 11.10. North 1966: 132. 
549
 North 1966: 143. On sophrosune in Isocrates – North 1966: 142-149. 
550
 North 1966: 145. It is interesting that it was Theopompus (Isocrates’ student) who castigated Philip most for his lack 
of sophrosune (Frags. 27, 224, 225, 236).     
551
 Cf. Nic. 37; and Cic. Ep. ad Fam. 1.9.12 – ‘quales in republica principes essent, tales reliquos solere esse cives.’ 
552
 ‘…let your own self-control stand as an example to the rest, realizing that the manners of the whole state are copied 
from its rulers.’ Elsewhere, Evagoras was meant to have instilled in his people the virtues of gentleness and moderation 
(praovthta kai; metriovthta- Evag. 49; cf. 75, 76), which are both related to sophrosune (North 1966: 147). 
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Furthermore, like dikaiosune, sophrosune was also to be tested, but only when in power 
(th;n de; swfrosuvnhn ejn tai'" dunasteivai" - Nic. 43).553 Therefore, as a king and statesmen, Philip 
was apparently in the best position to have his sophrosune or self-control tested. 
Plato had a more philosophical contribution to the virtue sophrosune. His ideas influencing 
the development of sophrosune not only in the fourth century BCE, but for centuries to come.554 
However, it is the thirty-first Socratic Letter (apparently written by Plato to Philip II during the 
reign of his brother Perdiccas) which is of most relevance.555 Primarily about the harmony between 
the two brothers, Plato offers Philip advice on how to keep things from becoming discordant 
between the two men. Therefore, towards the end of the letter, Plato directs Philip to outdo the 
actions which his brother has performed on behalf of the State, but also the benefactions 
(eujergesiva") that he has rendered him personally (16-20). But most of all, Plato advises Philip that 
he ‘must esteem above all the attainment of temperance in yourself and heed your brother who acts 
towards you as he now does’ – Peri; pleivstou de; dei' se poiei'sqai swvfronav te ei'nai kai;  
kathvkoon tou'  ajdelfou', o[nto" peri; se; oi|ov" per nu'n ejstin (20-23). Here is a direct appeal to 
Philip by Plato in regard to attaining sophrosune. With the letter’s authenticity disputed, the 
influence of such an appeal is unknowable. Even so, Philip’s actions in many tales and sayings 
accord well with this appeal from the great philosopher.    
 Sophrosune was therefore an important virtue in Philip’s period – particularly for leaders. 
This did not change as the centuries passed and Rome rose to power. As already stated, the virtue 
sophrosune was understood in Rome under many guises (e.g. temperantia, moderatio and 
continentia).556 Its enduring presence and relevance in monarchic ideology meant that it remained a 
powerful apparatus with which to not only understand many of the tales and sayings of Philip, but 
with which to reflect on contemporary values and leaders. It is no accident that it is a dominant 
feature in many of the tales and sayings of Philip which Plutarch dedicated to the emperor Trajan 
(see below), and also features heavily in Pliny’s Panegyricus to the same man.557        
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
553
 Cf. Plato Laws 649-50. 
554
 Space permits only that the reader to be directed to the work of North (1966: 150-196) on this particular aspect. 
However, references to other more recent work on Plato have been noted where relevant. 
555
 For the text and a discussion of this letter – Natoli 2004: 161-174. 
556
 On these values in Rome – North 1966: 258ff. 
557
 E.g. 2.7, 3.2, 3.4, 4.3, 9.1, 10.3, 16.3, 17.4, 38.4, 51.1, 54.5, 55.5, 56.3, 60.5, 63.8, and 83.7-8 on the moderation of 
Trajan’s wife. 
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Criticism and Self-Control  
 
The first anecdote (example 4.1) demonstrates the role of certain virtues in these 
thematically similar tales and the impressive versatility of Philippic apophthegmata. This tale 
appears in two (possibly three) very different contexts. Plutarch achieves this accomplishment by 
engineering each version to better suit his immediate purposes and needs through the use of 
surrounding contextual material and/or the slight manipulation of details. This allows the anecdote 
to speak to a variety of meanings, and ‘to diverse and seemingly incompatible audiences’ (Patterson 
1992: 4710) centuries after the events it claims to recall.  
 
4.1.A 
!Aganaktouvntwn de; tw'n fivlwn, o{ti surivttousin aujto;n ejn !Olumpivoi" eu\ peponqovte" oiJ 
Peloponnhvsioi, “tiv ou\n,” ei\pen, “eja;n kakw'" pavqwsi (Mor. 179A-B = Reg. et imp. apoph. 
Phil. 26);”558 
 
In the last judicial anecdote (3.6) Philip expressed his concern as to how he and Harpalus 
would be viewed if he granted Harpalus’ dubious request. This sentiment is attached specifically to 
justice in an internal Macedonian context. The example above (which immediately follows that of 
Harpalus’ request in Plutarch’s text) again takes up the issue of reputation - but this time it is 
attached to a more external context. The concern here is Philip’s ability to endure insults. It is a test 
of Philip’s pride, self-restraint, and moderation. In many ways it is an examination of the king’s 
sophrosune and enkrateia on a pan-Hellenic stage. Its pronouncement, in keeping with its setting, is 
also far more universally appealing. Even so, there is some ambiguity in the wording of the 
witticism. It highlights Philip’s self-control, wit and the ungrateful behaviour of the Greeks – but it 
also implies the possibility of a threat. It suggests that self-control just might have its limits for a 
king who faced an increasingly belligerent Greece under Athenian guidance.  
This particular apophthegma also comes with two other Philippic variants and another 
version which concerns Pausanias.559  
 
 4.1.B  
 
ejn !Olumpivoi" de; blasfhmiva" peri; aujtou' genomevnh" kaiv tinwn legovntwn wJ" oijmw'xai   
proshvkei tou;" $Ellhna" o{ti eu\ pavsconte" uJpo; tou' Filivppou kakw'" aujto;n levgousi, “tiv
ou\n,” e[fh, “poihvsousin, a[n kakw'" pavscwsin (Mor. 457F = De Cohib. 9);”560  
                                               
558
 ‘When his (Philip’s) friends were indignant because the people of the Peloponnesus hissed him at the Olympic 
games, although they had been treated well, he said, ‘Well, what if they should be treated ill!’’ 
559
 Cf. Stob. 4.23.52 (abridged). There are similarities to one of Alexander’s aphorisms in Plutarch’s collection – 
Puqovmeno" de; uJpov tino" loidorei'sqai, “basilikovn,” e[fh, “ejsti;n eu\ poiou'nta kakw'" ajkouvein” (Plut. Mor. 181F). Cf. 
Plut. Al. 41; Diog. Laert. vi.3; Epict. Disc. iv.6; M. Aur. Med. vii. 36; and Dio Chrys. Or. xlvii.    
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 4.1.C 
 
tovt! ou\n dei' mavlista th;n nou'n e[cousan ajpokleivein ta; w\ta kai; fulavttesqai to;n          
yiqurismovn, i{na mh; pu'r ejpi; pu'r gevnhtai, kai; provceiron e[cein to; tou' Filivppou.           
levgetai ga;r ejkei'no" uJpo; tw'n fivlwn paroxunovmeno" ejpi; tou;" $Ellhna" wJ" eu\              
pavsconta" kai; kakw'" aujto;n levgonta" eijpei'n “tiv ou\n, a[n kai; kakw'" poiw'men aujtouv";” 
o{tan ou\n aiJ diabavllousai levgwsin o{ti “lupei' se filou'san oJ ajnh;r kai; swfronou'san,” 
“tiv ou\n, a[n kai; misei'n aujto;n a[rxwmai kai; ajdikei'n; (Mor. 143F = Conjug. 40).”561  
 
4.1.D 
 
Tw'n de; fugavdwn aujto;n protrepomevnwn ejpi; tou;" !Aqhnaivou" a[gein th;n stratia;n          
legovntwn te o{ti toi'" !Olumpivoi" ajnakhruttomevnou aujtou' ejsuvritton aujto;n movnoi,“tiv   
ou\n oi[esqe,” e[fh, “tou;" o{te eu\ e[pascon surivttonta" paqovnta" kakw'"  poihvsein (Mor. 
230D = Apoph. Lac. Paus. 2);”562  
 
 
This disputed attribution makes it impossible to assign ownership. Chronologically speaking, 
Pausanias comes first, but Philip has more versions attributed to him. Both could have genuine 
historical claims to the apophthegma as it stands, so there is the possibility of two historically 
similar events or mistaken attribution.563 Therefore, whilst noting any differences between these 
tales, it is best to focus on Philip’s versions and what they reveal.  
Certainly there are enough differences between the Philippic version of the Apophthegmata 
regum et imperatorum and its Pausanian counterpart, to understand Plutarch’s use of these similar 
tales in the same collection.564 However, one of the more important differences is that in Philip’s 
                                                                                                                                                            
560
 ‘So in Olympia when Philip was being defamed, and some persons said that the Greeks should smart for it since they 
spoke evil of Philip though they were being well treated by him, Philip said, ‘What will they do, then, if they are badly 
treated?’’ 
561
 ‘So, at such a time especially, a woman who has sense ought to stop her ears, and be on her guard against whispered 
insinuations, so that fire may not be added to fire, and she ought to have ready in mind the saying of Philip. For it is told 
that when he was being incited by his friends against the Greeks on the ground that they were being well treated, but 
were speaking ill of him, he said, ‘What would happen then, if we were to treat them ill?’ So when these back-biters 
say, ‘Your husband treats grievously his loving and virtuous wife.’ ‘Yes, what would happen, then, if I were to begin to 
hate him and wrong him?’’  
562
 ‘When the exiles were inciting him (Pausanias) to lead his army against the Athenians, and saying that, when his 
name was proclaimed at Olympia, they were the only people who hissed him, he said, ‘What do you think that those 
who hissed when they were being well treated will do if they are treated ill?’’ 
563
 Philip’s version is datable to the Olympics of mid 336BCE, which puts Philip in Macedonia just before his 
assassination sometime after early July (on this date – Ellis 1976: 222 n. 53). However, there is the intriguing possibility 
that ejn !Olumpivoi" is actually meant to refer to the Macedonian Olympia which was possibly celebrated at Aegae in 
October (Hatzopoulos 1982:38-42). If so, the anecdote could date to around the time of Philip’s death. The use of 
Peloponnesians in the version of the apophthegmata collection would be a logical mistake from an incorrect assumption 
as to the setting of the hissing.      
564
 There are the obvious differences in protagonists and antagonists (Philip’s version = oiJ Peloponnhvsioi; Pausanias’ 
version = tou;" !Aqhnaivou"). It was exiles whom tried to incite Pausanias to action 
(Tw'n de; fugavdwn aujto;n protrepomevnwn), whereas in Philip’s version it is his friends (tw'n fivlwn), and they were only 
indignant (!Aganaktouvntwn) – not actively seeking to provoke. Moreover, the insults that provoke these actions appear 
a little different. In Philip’s version it is the hissing of him at the Olympics, whereas it is reported to Pausanias that his 
name was hissed at by the Athenians when it was proclaimed at the Olympics. The latter implies that Pausanias was not 
present to hear the hissing himself, though his presence cannot be ruled out. The exiles might be restating for their own 
purposes what Pausanias had already heard for himself. There is also no other evidence to suggest that Philip was ever 
in attendance at an Olympic games in person (cf. Romano 1990: 67), and can only speculate like Fuhrmann (1998: 45 
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version he is being hissed at by those who have been treated well (eu\ peponqovte"). This particular 
information is in the tale’s narration. It is not left to the direct speech of Philip’s apothegm, which 
gives it an air of truth. Whereas Pausanias makes this contention himself in his apothegm 
(tou;" o{te eu\ e[pascon surivttonta"). This raises the possibility that their sound treatment was only 
his opinion. It also elongates what is the far simpler apothegm of Philip’s version. This reduces its 
wit and diminishes the effectiveness of the double edged humour. 
 Plutarch’s interest in either version of the anecdote was undoubtedly related to the idea of a 
statesman’s immunity to criticism – his self-control. It is this invulnerability to public scorn that is 
unmistakable in both versions, despite the darker undercurrents. It reflects thinking which held the 
statesman or monarch who showed himself impervious to (public) insults to be an imposing model 
of sophrosune or enkrateia. Philip’s humour is a defence mechanism which clearly reminds people 
of where power truly lies, but it is the pointed joke of a powerful man who seeks due respect. The 
tale is a lesson in two aspects of self-control – that lost by the crowed, and that shown by Philip 
while still managing to voice its possible limits. 
One of our variant Philippic versions is embedded in Plutarch’s 
Gamika; Paraggevlmata (Marital Advice), a work that ‘consists of a collection of similes or 
comparisons, each with a lesson, with only modest amount of connected argument’ (Russell 1973: 
90).565 It is one of three references to Philip in the work (141B; 143F; 144E) which was dedicated to 
a Pollianus and Eurydice (the latter a known Macedonian regal name and possibly the name of 
Philip’s last wife).566 Borrowing from the stoics and others, this work of Plutarch’s has an intimate 
focus on the marital relationship,567 its advice reflecting ‘traditional, popular and pragmatic marital 
concerns’ (Patterson 1992: 4714).568 Despite its modest scope, it covers the three areas of marital 
interaction essential to marriage as defined by the Stoics – property, body and soul. The most 
important of these for Plutarch being ‘harmony and homonoia (likemindedness) of soul, the third 
and highest form of marital koinonia’ (Patterson 1992: 4715, 4719-21).  
Plutarch’s concern is to emphasize the importance of practical marital harmony. This is the 
context of Plutarch’s use of Philip’s apophthegma. It is squarely aimed at the promotion of personal 
and practical harmony between wife and husband, but particularly as comes from sophrosune or 
                                                                                                                                                            
n.1) that the hissing was ‘soit aux attelages qu’il y faisait courir sous ses couleurs, soit à des hérauts se livrant à 
certaines proclamations de sa part’. It is also possible that it was a direct reaction to the construction of the Philippeion, 
which was either completed or nearing completion at this time (mid 336 BCE) (Schultz 2007: 209-210). On this building 
commissioned after Chaeronea (Paus. 5.17.4; 5.20.9-10) – Schultz 2007: 205-33; Miller 1973: 189-218; Townsend 
2003: 93-101; HM 2: 691-695; and Worthington 2008: 164-166. On Philip and the Olympics – Romano 1990: 61-79. 
565
 On this work – Ziegler 1951: 791-2; Aguilar 1990-1: 307-25; Montano 1991: 331-38; Patterson 1992: 4709-23; 
Pomeroy 1999; and Tsouvala 2014: 191-206. 
566
 Carney 2000: 74. On the two dedicatees – Puech 1992: 4849 and 4873. 
567
 Patterson 1992: 4710. 
568
 On Plutarch and the Stoics – Opsomer 2014: 88-103. 
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enkrateia. Therefore, combined with a proverb,569 and presented somewhat as an analogy, Plutarch 
distils the larger context of Philip’s apophthegma (i.e. gone is the Olympic setting to the insults) to 
its universal elements and sentiment for use by the new wife in her more personal situation. This 
would have her disregarding the whispered insinuations (to;n yiqurismovn) of slanderers 
(aiJ diabavllousai),570 with her own apophthegma which reiterates the sentiment (and the language) 
of Philip’s famous dismissal of the slanders of the Greeks.571 It is powerful advice aimed at 
promoting essential harmonies and reducing marital disagreements and jealousies 
(aiJ pro;" tou;" a[ndra" diaforai; kai; zhlotupivai). Plutarch has taken a traditional idea surrounding 
marriage, and through illustrative analogy given it ‘a sharper and somehow more compelling 
expression’ (Patterson 1992: 4723). He has distilled the sophrosune, enkrateia, and humour of 
Philip so as to appeal to the interests of a more immediate audience. Therefore, despite the focus of 
monarchic ideology, concerned as it was with promoting the ideal ruler or castigating the despotic 
tyrant, the (evolving) constituent virtues that were its essential feature had wider properties and 
application which Plutarch exploited here. The sentiment and values were transferable from context 
to context. It is about the virtues of kings, not virtues for kings. 
The second variant is embedded in Plutarch’s dialogue peri; ajorghsiva" (On lack of 
Anger).572 In this dialogue the main speaker Fundanus treats the theme in both a particular and 
general fashion, finishing with an account of his own cure. The apophthegma is found amongst a 
grouping of like anecdotes collected by Fundanus (Plutarch) which demonstrate the conquest of 
anger.573 Apparently Fundanus (Plutarch) always strove (ajei; peirw'mai) to collect and peruse 
(sunavgein... ajnaginwvskein), not only the sayings of philosophers, but even more those of kings and 
tyrants (basilevwn kai; turavnnwn) which demonstrate this conquest (Mor. 457D-E), for; 
 
to erect in the soul a trophy of victory over anger.... is proof of a great and victorious 
strength (megavlh"...kai; nikhtikh'" ijscuvo") which possesses against the passions (ta; pavqh) 
the weapons of its judgements...(Mor. 457D).    
 
Plutarch was always directly interested in the control of emotions through logos. Here that 
emotion is anger, which Plutarch thought to be particularly dangerous and destructive (e.g. Mor. 
481B-C) – and especially in leaders. Plutarch has selected this apophthegma of Philip’s as an 
                                               
569
 Well reduced with Plutarch’s use of - i{na mh; pu'r ejpi; pu'r gevnhtai(so that fire may not be added to fire), a proverb 
found in Plato (Laws 666A), and used elsewhere by Plutarch to introduce another Philippic anecdote (Mor. 123F).  
570
 Philip’s friends (fivlwn) and the Greeks (tou'" $Ellhna") are both cast somewhat in the role of  diabavllousai. This 
reflects the idea that Philip’s friends are just as culpable as the Greeks, their reporting of slander could in turn be slander 
(fire on fire, two wrongs etc.).  
571
 The use of ‘Greeks’ agrees also with Mor. 457F, whereas Mor. 179A-B only mentions Peloponnesians.  
572
 On the De. Cohib. Ira – Ingenkamp 1971: 14-26; Becchi 1990; Van der Stockt 1999: 517-26; van Hoof 2007: 59-86. 
On anger in the ancient world – Harris 2002, Braund and Most (eds.) 2003, and Konstan 2008: 243-254. 
573
 On thematic clustering of anecdotes in Plutarch (often around ethical concepts) – Beck 1998: 175ff.  
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example of emotional control (or more specifically an example of the absence of the emotion). 
Though not mentioned specifically, it is again a sign of that ideal monarchic virtue of self-control 
(sophrosune or enkrateia) which had widespread appeal and application. It follows another 
Philippic tale (Mor. 457E-F; example 4.10), and is one among many similar themed tales.  
Compared to our other Plutarchian versions, the story and details have remained relatively 
stable. The setting is once more Olympia (ejn Olumpivoi"). This wider more publically orientated 
context for the defamations (blasfhmiva") of the Greeks (tou;" $Ellhna"), unlike that of the more 
intimate contextual impression of the Gamika; Paraggevlmata, gives Philip’s comment greater 
standing on an argumentative level. Concern for reputation and self-pride, or the anger they could 
rouse when insulted, are humbled by Philip’s logos despite the more embarrassing public setting of 
the abuse. This logos manifests itself in Philip’s self-control (his sophrosune), which is implicit in 
his actions.574 Philip’s kingly restraint or moderation in the face of provocation is given as a virtue 
from which to learn. It is one of a number of powerful examples in Plutarch’s philosophical treatise 
which demonstrated that if the pride and anger of powerful kings could be overcome by self-
control, then more humble persons surely faced an even easier task. Nevertheless, the overall 
message of the treatise with its elite and famous examples worked at any level of the social and 
political scale.    
This version also has unspecified persons (tinwn legovtwn) actively seeking to incite Philip 
to punish the Greeks (wJ" oijmw'xai proshvkei), as his friends do in the Gamika; Paraggevlmata (i.e. 
paroxunovmeno"). This is a little different from the merely indignant friends 
(!Aganaktouvntwn... fivlwn) of the Philippic version of the apophthegmata collection. However, the 
dedicatee of this collection (Trajan) could be a factor here. Any assimilation of the tale’s message 
(devoid of the contextual argument of a philosophical treatise), demanded the greater universality 
that comes with less specific detail. Certainly on occasions an emperor was expected to act in 
accordance with the good advice of friends – thus displaying his approach to ruling with civilitas. 
The more generalized the detail, the greater the chance of analogy or correlation between Philip’s 
actions and any Trajanic associations, aspirations or expectations (e.g. Cass. Dio. 68.6). The 
transference and assimilation of (good) monarchic ideology worked when rulers saw and judged 
themselves through the prism created by the displayed and lauded virtues of other rulers, and the 
prevailing traditions and expectations of contemporary standards. This was an ideal in the mind of 
philosophers such as Plutarch. One of the keys to this was the simplicity of the form and content of 
the message. Complicated or unnecessary details posed a danger to this process. This suggests that 
                                               
574
 N.b. aidos also caused one to avoid what was disgraceful in public, whereas sophrosune and enkrateia could also do 
this in private (Prodicus, Frag. 10; North 1966: 92-93, 131 n. 23).  
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Plutarch has prudently mitigated this possibility with a subtle simplification of detail allowing 
greater chance of identification and assimilation. 
This anecdote demonstrates the versatility of Philippic apophthegmata and their inherent 
virtues. Moreover, these nuanced treatments of the tale all show Philip caring little for the 
provocation of public criticisms and slanders to his reputation. Philip avoids vengeful outbursts of 
anger despite the personal agitation of those around him – though his wit cleverly warns of a more 
considered reckoning. This apophthegma of Philip (true or not) speaks to an astute, practical, 
moderate, and reasonable leader who was far from a soft-touch – Plutarch’s favourite kind. Such 
leaders and tales were easily utilized for his moralistic purposes, and made flexible examples 
capable of functioning as models of monarchic ideology, or as moralistic parables of popular 
edification in the Roman world. 
 
Self-Control in an Anecdote Cycle 
  
There are other Philippic apophthegma which concern Philip’s public reputation and various 
aspects of self-control. They too offer insight into ideal kingly qualities, monarchic ideology, and 
the public and political functions these tales have in the conception of cultural, social and 
monarchic identity. One such instance introduces a grouping of five anecdotes in Plutarch’s 
apophthegmata collection with similar themes (Mor. 177C-F = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 4-8). This 
speaks to deliberate authorial arrangement, as the first and final anecdotes of the sequence act as 
bookends to the sequence (the concluding anecdote’s post Chaeronea setting echoes the setting of 
the first).  
The first anecdote (example 4.2), has a vague historical setting of ‘after his victory over the 
Greeks’. This probably refers to just after the battle of Chaeronea, a time which has left a mass of 
tales concerning Philip (see chap. six). It shows Philip being advised, no doubt by his closest and 
most influential companions, as to what to do in terms of the Greek cities.575   
4.2. 
!Epei; de; nikhvsanti tou;" $Ellhna" aujtw'/ sunebouvleuon e[nioi frourai'" ta;" povlei"         
katevcein, e[fh ma'llon polu;n crovnon ejqevlein crhsto;" h[ despovth" ojlivgon kalei'sqai       
(Mor. 177C-D = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 4).576 
                                               
575
 The S. P. Gnom. Vatic., 105, Sternbach has Alexander give this response in almost identical terms (Fuhrmann 1998: 
259 n.6). There was a strong expectation in Greek thinking that a king should conspicuously seek the advice of his 
closest advisors on most matters, but by virtue of his position he was free to go against such advice at his own risk (cf. 
Luraghi 2013: 14). On the portrayal of the philoi of kings as advisors – Savalli-Lestrade 1998: 334-354 (though focused 
on the Hellenistic period, there is a lot of material relevant to earlier periods). 
576
 ‘After his (Philip’s) victory over the Greeks, when some were advising him to hold the Greek cities in subjection by 
means of garrisons, he said that he preferred to be called a good man for a long time rather than a master for a short 
time.’    
P a g e  116 | 270 
 
 
Their advice, though seemingly prudent or even wise (though not really true political phronesis), 
would have been incredibly unpopular in Greece. Philip knew this well. There was certainly a 
general reluctance to garrison the main southern Greek cities until long after his death.577 Philip’s 
apophthegm to this effect, couched in the familiar rhetorical juxtaposition of crhsto;" and 
despovth", speaks more to Philip’s political shrewdness and even caution or restraint in this 
instance (his sophrosune), than to any superficial ideas about ego and public perception. Philip 
shows the true phronesis of this tale. Philip is to be viewed as a benevolent and moderate victor. 
Couched in Philip’s familiar wit – the tale offers up a powerful model of moderation in victory and 
success for Plutarch’s auditors be they emperor, governor, or general.   
Plutarch’s interest in this apophthegma is to be expected in light of his strong aversion to 
tyrants (chap. two). Philip deliberately chooses to be called a good man (crhstov"), and notes the 
longevity of such a reputation. It is this concern for a long term positive reputation which is 
indicative of the argument used to convince rulers of the necessity of ruling well, namely that it was 
fundamentally in their own interests.578 Virtuous rule was seen to guarantee affection, eternal glory, 
fame, and a respectable posthumous reputation.579 Vicious or dissolute rule meant eternal-historical 
damnation, or worse – obscurity. This was particularly important to rulers, especially those raised 
on the paradigmatic tales of past monarch’s like Philip. It facilitated an introspective questioning by 
which rulers were obliged to confront the very real volatility of what was to be their legacy when 
they too joined the pantheon of rulers about whom such tales were told.580 Pliny well highlights this 
aspect on several occasions.581 It was an aspect of monarchic ideology which must have had a 
powerful influence on later rulers. 
Unsurprisingly for a Plutarchan tale, the response of Philip to his advisors is also a 
wonderful display of both pra/ovth" and filanqrwpiva. Indeed, the apophthegm’s moderation and 
pragmatism appear to be textbook peripatetic, and Plutarch would have appreciated both features. 
Coincidently, it was also these two qualities of pra/ovth" and filanqrwpiva which Isocrates 
highlighted in his address to Philip in opposition to harshness. Philip was to strive for a reputation 
based on these qualities rather than cruelty. 
  
                                               
577
 For strategic reasons Philip did of course garrison Thebes, Corinth and parts of Ambracia after Chaeronea (Thebes = 
Diod. 16.87.3; Paus. 4.27.9-10, 9.1.8, 9.6.5, 9.37.8; Just. 9.4.6-10, 11.3.8; Arr. An. 1.7.1; Ambracia = Diod.17.3.3’ 
Corinth = Plut. Arat. 23). On Philip’s settlement after Chaeronea – Roebuck 1948: 73-92; HM 2: 606-613; and 
Worthington 2008: 154-157.      
578
 Noreña 2009: 10. 
579
 Cf. Isoc. Evag. 70, 71, 73-4; Ad. Nic. 32, 36, 37; Ad. Phil. 134; Xen. Cyrop. 11.7; Ages. 9.7. 
580
 Noreña 2009: 10. 
581
 E.g. Pan. 53.5, 53.6, 55.9-10, and 63.1. 
P a g e  117 | 270 
 
Kai; mh; qaumavsh/", eij dia; pantov" se tou' lovgou peirw'mai protrevpein ejpiv te ta;"           
eujergesiva" ta;" tw'n @Ellhvnwn kai; praovthta kai; filanqrwpivan: oJrw' ga;rta;" me;n          
calepovthta" luphra;" ou[sa" kai; toi'" e[cousi kai; toi'" ejntugcavnousi, ta;" de;              
praovthta" ouj movnon ejpi; tw'n ajnqrwvpwn kai; tw'n a[llwn zwvwn aJpavntwn eujdokimouvsa"...  
w|n ejnqumouvmenon ejqivzein sauto;n crhv, kai; meleta'n o{pw" e[ti ma'llon h[ nu'n toiauvthn     
a{pante" peri; sou' th;n gnwvmhn e{xousin (5.116).582 
 
Philip’s actions in Plutarch’s tale represents the fulfilment of ideal kingly behaviour as understood 
in the fourth-century BCE. They were also in line with future values and aspirations when it came to 
later even more powerful autocratic leaders under the Roman Empire – allowing Philip’s words to 
take on an exemplary role far beyond that ever imagined at their utterance.        
Philip’s tale is part of Plutarch’s philosophic counsel. It sought to induce leaders and 
individuals to do what was right – to inspire greater wisdom and mildness, and evoke prudence and 
goodness (crhstovth"). Philip’s advisors, who were probably not philosophers, would have had 
him almost certainly doing the opposite. Only Philip’s political nous and care for his reputation 
prevent such a mistaken policy. Plutarch could not openly praise Philip’s concern for his public 
image though, as leaders were not supposed to be swayed by criticism, praise, or even personal 
gain. These were supposed to be of little consequence to those who did the right thing. However, 
there is no overt statement that it was ego outright that motivated Philip’s decision, only an honest 
desire to avoid despotic behaviour and enjoy the reputation of having done so.583 For Plutarch, 
kings and emperors (even the everyday person) needed good advisors and good friends - preferably 
philosophers like himself.584 But on occasion a leader needed to be guided by their own sense of 
right and wrong. It was essentially the phronesis, sophrosune and enkrateia of the ideal ruler which 
should guide such decisions. Philip’s tale was of relevance to any good leader. However, Plutarch’s 
collection aimed at the emperor himself, where it could do the most good.     
Focusing on the last anecdote of this thematic sequence in Plutarch for a moment (Example 
4.3), it too shows Philip’s forgiveness, moderation, and wit.      
 
4.3 
 
Tw'n de; !Aqhnaivwn, o{soi peri; Cairwvneian eJavlwsan, ajfeqevntwn uJp! aujtou' divca luvtrwn,  
ta; de; iJmavtia kai; strwvmata prosapaitouvntwn kai; toi'" Makedovsin ejgkalouvntwn,         
                                               
582
 ‘And do not be surprised if throughout my speech I am trying to incline you to a policy of kindness to the Hellenes 
and of gentleness and humanity. For harshness is, I observe, grievous both to those who exercise it and to those upon 
whom it falls, while gentleness, whether in man or in the other animals, bears a good name… Bearing ever in mind 
these truths, you should habitually act and strive to the end that all men shall cherish even more than they do now such 
an opinion of your character.’ 
583
 Cf. the other tale in Plutarch’s collection which again highlights Philip’s concern for reputation in regard to the 
Athenians – ‘Those who counselled him to treat the Athenians harshly he said were silly in urging a man who did 
everything and underwent everything for the sake of repute to throw away his chance to exhibit it (Plut. Mor. 178A = 
Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 11).’ 
584
 Roskam 2002: 175-189. 
P a g e  118 | 270 
 
gelavsa" oJ Fivlippo" ei\pen, “ouj dokou'sin uJmi'n !Aqhnai'oi nomivzein ejn ajstragavloi" uJf!  
hJmw'n nenikh'sqai’’(Plut. Mor. 177E-F = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 8).585 
 
Philip’s benevolence after Chaeronea has here a more specific target. It is the Athenians who have 
been introduced in the preceding tale (linked strongly to this one).586 The anecdote begins with 
Philip setting free the Athenians after the battle without ransom.587 However, this act of respect and 
forgiveness, overflowing with pra/ovth" and filanqrwpiva (even sophrosune),588 meets with further 
requests. Philip’s reply is given as a witty apophthegma to his men and not to the Athenians 
themselves (though probably within their earshot). It makes it clear that Philip’s virtues, his 
pra/ovth" and filanqrwpiva, introduced at the beginning of this sequence, might again just have 
their limits (the same undercurrent of threat was met earlier in the abusive Olympic anecdote). 
Indeed, Philip’s quip underscores just how generous and forgiving his actions currently were. Greek 
warfare had long accustomed itself to severe or harsh treatments for the defeated. Nevertheless, 
Philip was willing to be restrained and moderate under the circumstances – he was now master of 
Greece after all. But loyal Macedonians and friends had paid for that privilege, and Philip was in no 
mood to quibble with the vanquished. Philip’s humour was black and sharp. His joke was a stark 
reminder and a warning to the Athenians. 
Ultimately it was the lack of grateful acknowledgement by the Athenians of Philip’s 
relatively benevolent actions which called forth his cutting wit. This suggest that leaders and rulers 
may have had something of a fixed obligation to display the virtues of ideal monarchs, but equally 
important was the obligation of those who benefited from these displays to graciously acknowledge 
them. This was a key factor in monarchic ideology later in the Hellenistic period and under the 
Principate, where it could be taken to sycophantic extremes. Even so, it was incumbent upon those 
who expected and profited by such virtuous displays to recognize and salute the modest and 
deferential use of power that came with such actions. It was a complex system that provided 
incentive and positive reinforcement to monarchs – while defining the limits of virtuous power. 
Philip’s example here was a potent exemplar for an emperor like Trajan (a civilis princeps), praised 
for his abstinentia (restraint), mansuetudo (forgiveness), temperantia (moderation) and indulgentia 
(mildness or kindness) (e.g. Plin. Pan. 2.6-7; 21.4). 
                                               
585
 ‘When all the Athenians who had been taken captive at Chaeronea were set free by him without ransom, but asked 
for the return of their clothing and bedding besides, and complained against the Macedonians, Philip laughed and said 
to his men, ‘Does it not seem to you that the Athenians think they have been beaten by us in a game of knuckle-
bones?’’ 
586
 On Philip and Athens – Cawkwell 1980: 100-110; and Perlman 1973. 
587
  Cf. Polyb. 5.10; Diod. 16.87 and chap. six. 
588
 Under the stress of constant warfare in the Greek world in the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, the scope of the 
meaning of sophrosune was extended (by authors like Isocrates) to include restraint and moderation in international 
relations (North 1966: 122).  
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The next anecdote (example 4.4) precedes the anecdote above in the collection. It 
introduces the Athenians to this series and makes a perfect preamble to example 4.3.  
 
4.4 
 
Toi'" de; tw'n !Aqhnaivwn dhmagwgoi'" e[fh cavrin e[cein, o{ti loidorou'nte" aujto;n beltivona 
poiou'si kai; tw'/ lovgw/ kai; tw'/ h[qei: “peirw'mai ga;r aujtou;" a{ma kai; toi'" lovgoi" kai; toi'"  
e[rgoi" yeudomevnou" ejlevgcein (Plut. Mor. 177E = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 7).’’589 
 
Philip’s actions after Chaeronea somewhat confirm this righteous declaration. Certainly, the 
anecdote concerns Philip’s reputation and character (tw'/ h[qei), and what he considers to be 
counterproductive disparagement. There are three important points here. Firstly, Philip was 
probably referring to his most bitter and vocal opponents like Demosthenes when he speaks of 
toi'" de; tw'n !Aqhnaivwn dhmagwgoi'".590 Secondly, the full force of Philip’s wit and personality are 
once more vehicles of display. In fact, the entire apophthegma is a wonder stroke of verbal jousting. 
Philip essentially thanks his enemies for maligning him. This was surely more frustrating to them 
than any overt hostile invective could ever have been. Philip claimed that it was they who were in 
fact making him better in speech and character (tw'/ lovgw/ kai; tw'/ h[qei) as he set about proving them 
to be liars (yeudomevnou").591 It is mischievous, antagonistic – and typical of the anecdotal Philip. It 
could also be inspirational depending on your point of view (a reoccurring theme throughout 
Philip’s apophthegmata for obvious reasons). Philip’s remark insults, and it challenges. It also 
defends Philip powerfully with its idealistic moral high road. Moreover, it undermines any further 
efforts to denigrate Philip by reducing criticism to fuel for still greater actions. Ironically, the 
anecdote is a sophisticated dig at Philip’s detractors, and a witty comment worthy of the Pynx from 
an ‘autocratic barbarian’. Thirdly, Philip’s final comment regarding his words and his deeds has 
Homeric tones. Indeed, these two things are often found together in Homer to represent the two 
most important functions or measures of an individual (e.g. Il. 9.440-43).592 
They were common measures in Greek thought and historiography, and often rulers could 
be criticized for doing one and neglecting the other. However, the real barb in this apophthegma is 
no doubt the toi'" e[rgoi". Philip is specifically calling his detractors out on their deeds – or lack 
thereof; calling attention to their inability to back their utterances with real action. Philip deftly 
                                               
589
 ‘He (Philip) said that he felt very grateful to the popular leaders of the Athenians, because by maligning him they 
made him better both in speech and in character, ‘For I try both by my words and by my deeds to prove that they are the 
liars.’’ Cf. Antonios Mel., II.69, p. 1165; Ars. 469.  
590
 There were many others about whom Isocrates (Ad Phil. 73, 78-80) tells Philip not to worry, as they were jealous of 
him and worried only about their own interests (which included conflict with Philip). In a letter to Philip, Isocrates goes 
further and pleads with Philip to ignore those who reported back to him the slanders circulating in Athens about him 
and to be nice to Athens (Ep. 2.14-15, 20-21).       
591
 The connecting of tw'/ lovgw/ kai; tw'/ h[qeiwould have appealed to Plutarch who strongly believed that one was a good 
measure of the other. 
592
 On Philip and Odysseus – example 4.11 and chap. six. 
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shows that while their verbalizing of him has called forth his own matching verbal banter (in one 
sense his toi'" lovgoi"), his mention of deeds is a direct challenge to his opponents for theirs. When 
Philip states that deeds are one of the means by which he will prove them to be liars, he is implicitly 
admitting that deeds could be in fact used against him, if his detractors had the courage to act. Philip 
believes they do not have the nerve, and seems to taunt them so. This is Philip’s implicit criticism 
here. It is an incisive sneer at men of words from one who believes himself to be something more – 
a hero of old, a man of words and deeds. Plutarch’s interest in this anecdote was to be expected. He 
no doubt also saw true ajreth in the statesman as the product of both virtuous words and deeds, and 
settled on this anecdote as a fairly simple medium to convey that obvious message. Philip emerges 
once more as a positive paradigm of kingly behaviour with which any ruler could meditate his own 
leadership.  
The last two anecdotes of this series (examples 4.5 and 4.6) might be different accounts of 
the same story. However, there are some significant differences which would seem to argue against 
this identification. The first tale is simple and very similar to another story given elsewhere by 
Plutarch about Pyrrhus (example 4.7).593 
  
 4.5 
To;n de; loivdoron exelavsai tw'n fivlwn keleuovntwn, oujk e[fh poihvsein, i{na mh;  periiw;n ejn 
pleivosi kakw'" levgh/ (Plut. Mor. 177D = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil.5).594 
 
 
4.7 
 
ejn de; !Ambrakiva/ kakolovgon tina; kai; blavsfhmon a[nqrwpon oijomevnwn dei'n metasth'sai  
to;n Puvrron “Aujtou' mevnwn,” [fh, “ma'llon hJma'" ejn ojlivgoi" h[ perii>w;n pro;" a{panta"  
ajnqrwvpou" kakw'" legevtw (Plut. Pyrrh. 8.5).”595    
 
The similarities between these two stories are obvious. However, the version concerning Philip has 
fewer details (e.g. ejn de; !Ambrakiva/) and less verbal/literary embellishment. Moreover, it has the 
universal anonymous figure, which allowed for greater identification with the figure and the 
anecdote’s moral. This is to be expected given the respective contexts of each tale.596 There are also 
a range of possibilities that could account for the apparent relationship between the two tales, such 
                                               
593
 Cf. Antonios Mel. 11. 69, p.1165. 
594
 ‘When his (Philip’s) friends advised him to banish from his court a man who maligned him, he said he would not, so 
that the man should not go about speaking ill of him among more people.’ 
595
 ‘And in Ambracia there was a fellow who denounced and reviled him, and people thought that Pyrrhus ought to 
banish him. ‘Let him remain here,’ he said, ‘and speak ill of us among a few, rather than carry his slanders round to all 
mankind.’  
596
 The version found in the Pyrrhus is part of a sequence of anecdotes which serve to show Pyrrhus’ kindness and mild 
temper (ejpieikh;" kai; pra'/o" ojrghvn), which would play no small role in his eventual claim on the Macedonian throne 
(cf. prav/w"...filanqrwvpw" - Plut. Pyrrh. 11.4). However, this sequence divorces the anecdote from any datable 
historical circumstances except possibly during time spent in Ambracia.    
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as imitation or mistaken identity in transmission. However, it is more profitable here to look closer 
at Philip’s version and the tale found along-side it in Plutarch.  
This example shows Philip’s friends (tw'n fivlwn ) exhorting him to banish an unnamed 
individual who had maligned him (To;n... loivdoron).597 Philip’s clever quip then follows, 
highlighting both the simple overall structure of the apophthegma, and Philip’s concern regarding 
evils spoken about him among more people (pleivosi kakw'" levgh). But this comment is a 
superficial reference to Philip’s egotistical self-interest and reputation. The tale is really about the 
fact that Philip ignores those closest to him and makes a more practical, moderate, and forgiving 
gesture towards the man which undermines his slanders. Philip displays both phronesis, 
sophrosune/enkrateia – though probably thought of better in terms of the more Plutarchian favoured 
virtues of praotes and philanthropia. Moreover, Philip’s actions accord well with the common 
notion that a leader or monarch should consult and take advice from friends and intellectuals, even 
if he chooses to go his own course (cf. Isoc. Evag. 41, 44; Xen. Hell. 1.1.31). It was the tyrant’s role 
to be suspicious of everybody (particularly friends), and to see advice as a dangerous form of free-
speech (parrhesia).598 Philip listens – but goes one better. 
This apophthegma once more makes known Plutarch’s strong desire that leaders be moved 
to emotion (pathos) neither by criticism nor praise. The core of this tale demonstrates this well with 
its implicit focus on the moderation, self-restraint, calmness and forgiveness of Philip. Philip is 
again a model leader, ruler and man. His witty reply is the simple illustration of the ideal virtues of 
a temperate king. This tale of moderation, and the many others like it (especially in Plutarch), show 
that after Philip’s death, his image as a restrained king was a somewhat legitimate tradition. 
Furthermore, it was one which travelled down through the centuries as an iconic element and 
measure in monarchic ideology for later men of power and influence – finding some voice in 
Plutarch’s period under an emperor noted for these same virtues.  
Attaching some cynicism to the tale, Philip exemplifies the old adage of keeping one’s 
enemies close – especially as the ultimate fate of the individual mentioned is unknown (it could 
have been bleak).599 This was not really the point though, as there was rarely any follow up to the 
anecdote’s lesson. However, given its undeniable positive impression, this brief apophthegma could 
be the first part or phase of a much longer more complete anecdote, whereby Philip reaches some 
kind of reconciliation with his detractor. There are certainly two or three possible candidates. The 
first is set alongside it in the apophthegmata collection of Plutarch (example 4.6).     
 
                                               
597
 The use of keleuovntwn would seem to imply stronger language than merely advised. 
598
 Haake 2013B: 184. 
599
 Irony may also be present if Philip’s ultimate fate was recalled. In fact, there is nothing here to preclude the unnamed 
individual actually being Pausanias (though accounting for this shift into anonymity would be challenging).    
P a g e  122 | 270 
 
 
4.6 
 
Smikuvqou de; Nikavnora diabavllonto" wJ" ajei; kakw'" levgonta to;n Fivlippon kai;              
tw'neJtaivrwn oijomevnwn dei'n metapevmpesqai kai; kolavzein, “ajlla; mhvn,” e[fh, “Nikavnwr  
ouj faulovtato" ejsti Makedovnwn: ejpiskeptevon ou\n, mhv ti givnetai par! hJma'".” 
wJ" ou\n e[gnw to;n Nikavnora qlibovmenon ijscurw'" uJpo; peniva" hjmelhmevnon de; uJp!  aujtou',  
prosevtaxe dwreavn tina aujtw'/ doqh'nai. pavlin ou\n tou' Smikuvqou levgonto"   o{ti              
qaumasta; peri; aujtou'pro;" a{panta" ejgkwvmia levgwn oJ Nikavnwr diatelei', “oJra'te  ou\n,” 
ei\pen, “o{ti par! hJma'" aujtouv" ejsti kai; to; kalw'" kai; to; kakw'" ajkouvein  
            (Mor. 177D-E = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 6).”600 
 
With a more complex (and dramatic)601 structure of alternating phases of indirect and direct 
speech, Philip is again informed by a certain Smicythus (apparently maliciously – diabavllonto"), 
of the constant slurs (ajei; kakw'" levgonta) of another man named Nicanor.602 What was implicit in 
earlier anecdotes regarding the informant activities of Philip’s companions is made explicit in the 
censure here of Smicythus. Philip’s companions (referred to this time as eJtaivrwn) again have very 
definite opinions on what should be done. However, again Philip disregards their collective counsel, 
and replies with his calculated jibe (Nikavnwr ouj faulovtato" ejsti Makedovnwn). This comment 
was most likely intended as a direct jab at, or censure of the bearer of the news itself – Smicythus 
(cf. Xen. Ages. 11.4, 5). Moreover, the clear moderation, kindness and generosity with which Philip 
treats Nicanor in the end (again reflecting those Plutarchian favourites of praovth" and 
filanqrwpiva), was perhaps further subtle chastisement for what amounted to slander and intrigue 
by Smicythus. The audience rightly expects some kind of pathos and punishment from Philip, but 
with Plutarch’s collection dominated by positive examples, instead they read of logos manifested in 
inquire, moderation, kindness and wit. Therefore, Philip discovers for himself what is wrong (cf. 
Isoc. Evag. 42), and accepts his responsibility for Nicanor’s slanders. These were apparently due to 
his neglect or ignorance of the man’s financial plight (qlibovmenon ijscurw'" uJpo; peniva"). It is a 
problem Philip remedies with a gift (prosevtaxe dwreavn tina aujtw'/ doqh'nai), though the more 
cynical might say bribe (cf. Isoc. To Dem. 25 and 28).603 This overt and quantifiable generosity 
(signs of eujergesiva or ejleuqeriovth" - see chap. five), which the Romans would have easily 
                                               
600
 ‘When Smicythus remarked maliciously of Nicanor that he was always speaking ill of Philip, and Philip’s 
companions thought that he ought to send for Nicanor and punish him, Philip said, ‘But really Nicanor is not the worst 
of the Macedonians. We must investigate therefore whether something is not happening for which we are responsible.’ 
When he learned therefore that Nicanor was hard pressed by poverty, and had been neglected by him, he directed that a 
present be given to the man. So when again Smicythus said that Nicanor was continually sounding the praises of Philip 
to everybody in a surprising way, Philip said, ‘You all see that we ourselves are responsible for the good and the ill that 
is said of us.’’  
601
 Cf. Beck 1998: 57. 
602
 Fuhrmann (1998: 41 n.1) notes that both men are unknown under Philip, though many bore the name Nicanor in the 
entourage of Alexander. He also thinks that he could be the slanderer of the preceding anecdote. Cf. Sugars 1997: 365 
n.1.  
603
 N.b. Cleobulus of Lindus’ statement that ‘we should do a favour to a friend to bind him closer to us and to an enemy 
in order to make a friend of him’ (Diog. Laert. 1.91).  
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understood as liberalitas or indulgentia, causes the man to sing Philip’s praises to everyone 
(a{panta").604 The reversal is miraculous (qaumasta;). The slanderer has now become the 
panegyrist. This is the acknowledgement of Philip’s (monarchic) virtues which was conspicuously 
lacking above by the Athenians after Chaeronea. 
Philip’s apophthegm concludes the anecdote by summarising and underscoring the meaning 
of the tale regarding restraint and the responsibility of rulers or people for what is ultimately said of 
them. This ties in suitably with earlier anecdotes whereby Philip linked his actions to the opinions 
held of him. Philip holds the position in multiple apophthegmata that it is ones’ actions for which 
one is to be ultimately judged, not the slanders or words of others. This abuse or vilification should 
be risen above using moderation, generosity and even humour where possible. This was at least a 
vital part of Philip’s personality and image as it was perceived in antiquity through these types of 
tales, and of some use to philosophers like Plutarch and statesmen like Trajan – who ‘paid little 
attention to slanders and was no slave to anger’ (Cass. Dio. 68.6; cf. Plin. Pan. 46.8).  
Ultimately, this tale has a variety of aspects worth consideration. There is the role of the 
hetairoi or advisors of Philip, particularly Philip’s relationship with them and their opinions 
(counsel). This highlights the disparity between friends and flatterers (on which Plutarch also 
wrote). It also emphasises the role and censure of Smicythus – surely coloured by Rome’s 
experience of the dreaded delatores in Plutarch’s presentation.605 There was also Philip’s actions or 
display of Plutarch’s two cardinal virtues (both born of Philip’s sophrosune), pra/ovth" and 
filanqrwpiva, which manifested themselves his restraint, kindness and practical wisdom in his 
approach to both the slanders and the news of the Nicanor’s plight. Therefore, this anecdote reflects 
Plutarch’s philosophy and his favourite virtues (and others like sophrosune, phronesis, and 
euergesia), and was a moralistic-monarchic tale which was easily understood by a Roman 
(Imperial) audience. Indeed, this particular tale exemplifies how virtues and values relevant to all 
individuals could easily cross cultural, temporal, and terminological divides, and be reflected upon 
through the examples of famous monarchs and leaders. That deliberation was also possible at the 
highest and lowest levels of society, as the messages of these tales were unrestricted in their 
application. Plutarch speaks to an emperor using a king’s example – but he could be heard by 
anyone.  
Looking past the moral agenda/s of Plutarch’s anecdote, perhaps the actions of Smicythus 
and the hetairoi cannot be judged too harshly. The danger that slurs could lead swiftly to intrigues 
and violence in the Macedonian court was very real according to other anecdotal evidence. This is 
underscored by another possible version or extension to example 4.5. It is found in two versions 
                                               
604
 On euergetism and Plutarch – Roskam 2014: 516-28. There is also the contrast here between the private grumblings 
of an individual in the beginning, and the very public praises of the convert in the end.  
605
 N.b. Trajan and the delatores – Plin. Pan. 34.3-35.3. 
P a g e  124 | 270 
 
(examples 4.8 and 4.9), in two entirely different contexts and languages. Even so, the moral 
messages are again similar.606   
  
4.8.A 
 
Philippus, cum audisset Pythian quendam bonum pugnatorem alienatum sibi, quod tres 
filias inops vix aleret nec a rege adiuvaretur, monentibus quibusdam, uti eum caveret,‘quid? 
si,’ inquit, ‘partem aegram corporis haberem, absciderem potius quam curarem?’ deinde 
familiariter secreto elicitum Pythian, accepta difficultate necessitatium domesticarum, 
pecunia instruxit ac meliorem fidelioremque habuit, quam habuerat antequam offenderet 
(Frontin. Strat. 4.7.37).607  
 
 
 4.8.B 
 
Eij de; th;n pra/ovthta tauvthn tribwnivw/ mevn fhsiv ti" proshvkein aJlourgivdi de; mhv, ajll!     
ejgwv soi katariqmhvsw kai; tou;" ejndoxotavtou" tw'n basilevwn paraplhsivou" Swkravtei    
gegenhmevnou". Filivppw/ tw'/ !Amuvntou katei'pev ti" oJtoudh; tw'n taxiarcw'n wJ" ajpecqw'"  
diakeimevnou kai; rJadivw" kakovn ti bouleuvsanto", eij mh; tavcista ejkpodw;n gevnoito. tiv ou\n
 oJ Fivlippo"; oujk eujqu;" h\/xen ejpi; to;n sivdhron, ajlla; kai; par! hJma'", fhsiv, to; ai[tion th'"  
ajpecqeiva": oJ ga;r ajnh;r oujc oJ faulovtato" tw'n Makedovnwn. kai; tav te a[lla ejpimelei'tai 
eujqu;" tou' ajnqrwvpou, kai; proi'ka ejpidivdwsi deomevnw/ qugatro;" wJraiva". kai; meta; tau'ta  
oujdei;" h\n pistovtero" tw'/ basilei' tw'n pavlai kekrimevnwn ejpithdeivwn. $W" eujergesivh     
kakoergivh"  mevg! ajmeivnwn. ouj ga;r rJav/dion ou{tw tina; ejn ajnqrwvpoi" ajpavnqrwpon fu'nai   
w{ste par! ou| ta; e[scata peivsesqai prosedovkhse, touvtw/ crhstw'/ kai; prosneivmantiv ti   
timh'" oujk eujqu;" eu[noun genevsqai, ajll! oJ th;n timwrivan diafugw;n o{sw/ dikaiovteronw\fle, 
tosouvtw/ ma'llon uJpovcrew" givnetai tw'/ sugcwrhvsanti (Them. Or. vii. 95 B-C).608  
 
The first version is found in the Strategemata written under Domitian by the Roman author 
Frontinus (c. 30 – 103/4 CE).609 It is the second mention of Philip in Book four (cf. 4.5.12), and is a 
little unusual for its tenuous relationship to the surrounding martial material.610 It only has 
                                               
606
 The tale of course could be its own entirely separate anecdote. Nevertheless, the warning to Philip to be on his guard 
is explicit in both, though the source of such a warning is a little vague (monentibus quibusdam and katei'pev ti").  
607
 ‘Philip, having heard that a certain Pythias, an excellent warrior, had become estranged from him because he was too 
poor to support his three daughters, and was not assisted by the king, and having been warned by certain persons to be 
on his guard against the man, replied: ‘What! If part of my body was diseased, should I cut it off, rather than give it 
treatment?’ Then, quietly drawing Pythias aside for a confidential talk, and learning the seriousness of his domestic 
embarrassments, he supplied him with funds, and found in him a better and more devoted adherent than before the 
estrangement.’ 
608
 ‘But if someone says that this compassion is becoming for a [philosopher’s] cloak, but not for a purple robe, yet I 
shall give you a list of the most glorious of kings who were very similar to Socrates. Somebody informed Philip, son of 
Amyntas, that one of his taxiarchs bore him a grudge and might be ready to hatch a plot against him if he were not 
gotten out of the way at once. So what did Philip do? He did not immediately reach for his sword but said, ‘The cause 
of his enmity lies with us, too, for the man is not the least of the Macedonians.’ And he is right away solicitous of the 
fellow in other matters, and provides his lovely daughter’s dowry, without his asking for it. Afterwards, none of those 
who were considered his oldest and closest friends were more loyal to the king. ‘That fair dealing is better by far than 
evil dealing.’ There could not easily be a member of the human race so inhuman that, when he had expected to receive 
the ultimate punishment from someone, but that person was kind and accorded him some respect, he would not 
immediately be well-disposed to him; in fact, the more justly the one who escapes justice was convicted, the more 
indebted he becomes to the one who forgave him’ (trans. Sugars).        
609
 On Frontinus and his work – chap. six. 
610
 The authenticity of this book has not been above question on stylistic grounds, content, and the repetition of 
anecdotes from earlier books. However, modern opinion leans towards accepting it as genuine since Bendz 1938 (cf. 
Duff 1960: 339-41; Campbell 1987: 15 n. 10; and Turner 2007: 427-9, 431 n. 27, 432).   
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incidental relevance to military matters because of Pythias’ skill as a warrior (bonum pugnatorem), 
a description which serves to heighten the possible danger Philip faced from the man, and the 
importance of keeping such a man onside. Nonetheless, Frontinus has made use of the tale – and it 
is important to know why.  
The programmatic statements of the work’s introduction are important here. They detail the 
aims of Frontinus (himself an experienced commander)611 to produce a work full of convenient and 
inspirational sketches of the clever operations of generals which would be of practical value to 
others (Str. 1. Pr.). These can be supplemented by the introductory comments to the maxims of 
book four.  
...hoc exhibebo ea, quae parum apte discriptioni priorum ad speciem alligate subici 
videbantur et erant exempla potius strategicon quam strategemata (Frontin. Str. 4. Pr.).612 
 
Frontinus then gives seven categories for this material, which concern mostly moral qualities and 
strength of character. All of these were considered important attributes of a commander by the 
Romans. Therefore, in contrast to the previous books’ fairly even ratio of foreigners to Romans, 
many of the examples in book four are about Romans.613 Philip’s tale (recorded under the seventh 
heading – De variis consiliis) is one of the exceptions, and more so for its relatively non-military 
context.  
The tale is closely linked thematically to the preceding Roman example,614 which details 
how Quintus Maximus generously treats a potential deserter, thereby making him extremely loyal 
(Str. 4.7.36). The parallels with Philip’s tale are evident. So much so, this tale almost provides the 
opening that Philip’s anecdote needs to make it into the collection. This suggests their having been 
already collected together in a source of Frontinus.  
There are some important differences between this version and that already discussed. Here 
the man is named Pythias, a man too poor to support his three daughters. He was estranged from 
Philip because of Philip’s lack of assistance to him (nec a rege adiuvaretur). This is reminiscent of 
Philip’s neglect in the earlier version, and probably speaks on some level to the customary 
reciprocal relationship between king and hetairoi. This often saw financial assistance given in 
exchange for ongoing political support and loyalty (any ideas around patronage certainly spoke also 
to a core value of Roman society). Here also, the mere poverty of one version is given a more 
personable human aspect. Moreover, Philip’s initial reply is quite different with its rhetorical 
question in regards to diseased body parts. Different too are Philip’s actions in discovering the 
                                               
611
 Tac. Agr. 17.2; Gambash 2016: 264-65; cf. Dahm 1997. 
612
 ‘....in the present book I shall set forth those instances which seemed to fall less naturally under the former 
classification (which was limited to special types), and which are illustrations rather of military science in general than 
of stratagems.’ 
613
 Campbell 1987: 15. 
614
 Cf. other tales of moderation and kind treatment of enemies in book four (4.7.3, 4, 5, 7, and 25).      
P a g e  126 | 270 
 
man’s problem – which he does personally and discreetly. Macedonian pride and machismo could 
lie at the heart of this particular discretion of Philip’s.615 But the most important difference is the 
lack of any final comment (witty or otherwise) by Philip after he has addressed the man’s financial 
needs. The anecdote instead finishes with an observation regarding the man’s devotion, apparently 
much improved on even pre-estrangement levels. This is an important omission (if it is that), as it 
gives Philip’s rhetorical response to the initial warnings he receives added weight and interest. It 
has reorientated the focus of the anecdote to this phase of the tale.  
So what is it about these warnings, Philip’s response, and Philip’s overall actions which 
appealed to Frontinus? Firstly, the anecdote conforms well to the needs of the work as outlined in 
his programmatic statements. Secondly, Frontinus (like most Romans) believed that aside from the 
more obvious virtues like virtus, the qualities and skills required of a successful military 
commander were quite numerous.616 Philip’s tale is indicative of this stance. Despite not really 
being martial in context, it easily functions in a purely military context as a practical and moral 
guide to the character of a commander in regards to forgiveness, moderation and generosity within 
his own ranks. This simple message was applicable to any and all Roman generals and leaders. It 
even applied to the emperor himself – the highest of Roman commanders. Therefore, with the 
reader’s focus orientated to the central phases of the tale, reflection is concentrated on Philip’s 
actions as a king faced with discontent and possible danger, and done so in terms of more familiar 
Roman virtues such as clementia, moderatio, prudentia, and particularly liberalitas. One could even 
appreciate Philip’s actions in terms of patienta, indulgentia, abstinentia, and comitas. The 
interpretations were numerous. But the overall message was clear enough, and able to be grasped by 
anyone from legionary to general, and on upward to princeps. It was about the responsible and 
moderate use of power. 
It is difficult though to establish direct contemporary references. Instead, it is better to 
acknowledge that among other near contemporaries of Frontinus, conspiracies (real and imagined) 
and executions were one of the notable aspects of Domitian’s reign.617 As such, there is the real 
possibility that this tale (along with others), is an exemplum of indirect advice to the emperor and 
his supporters – embedded counsel which promoted the use of a more moderate and generous 
approach to reports of discontent and suspicion – but through the relative safety of a foreign 
paradigm. As Turner has argued – ‘the incontrovertible praise of Domitian’s specific actions in the 
Strategemata does not mean that Frontinus did not intend criticism of that princeps to be 
understood at some level, or that contemporaries may not have read such criticism into his text’ 
                                               
615
 Cf. Sugars 1997: 367-8. 
616
 Cf. Campbell 1987: 23. 
617
 On Domitian and the Senate, delatores, executions, banishments, and the sources etc. – Viscusi: 1973: 117-156; 
Jones1979;1992:180-192; and Southern 1997: 110-125.  
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(2007: 445). In summary, Philip’s anecdote in Frontinus is at odds with its surroundings, as its 
moral message (though fit for generals) is divorced from any real meaningful martial context. 
Therefore, its inclusion is best thought of in terms of its thematic connection to the preceding 
Roman anecdote. It is a relationship which draws attention (but not too forcefully) to possible 
contemporary concerns around the role of the delatores, the number of accusations, and the amount 
of executions and banishments among the empire’s elite under Domitian. It is subtle monarchic 
criticism and edification for an anxious period through the display of Philip’s more positive 
example.  
The other version (example 4.9) is found in the Seventh Oration of the pagan orator, 
statesman, and philosopher Themistius (c. 318-388 CE) which was delivered before the emperor 
Valens and the senate of Constantinople.618 Compared to the previous version, the context and the 
content of this oration make the identification with monarchic ideology more certain. In this oration 
Themistius thanks the emperor for his clemency regarding those individuals obliquely associated 
with Procopius and his attempted seizure of the throne of the eastern Roman Empire in 365 CE.619 
The themes of the speech are Procopius’ treachery, and Valens’ courage during, and clemency after 
the attempted revolt.620 However, the speech is really a long discourse on how Valens can only 
fulfil his real potential as a Roman leader if he showed mercy to those who were indirectly involved 
in the unsuccessful rebellion against him (specifically the Neoplatonist Maximus of Ephesus).621 
Themistius claims that while the troops of Valens shared his victory – the emperor alone was 
responsible for saving the lives of the conquered. This display of philanthropia meant that Valens’ 
reputation for mercy and justice was akin to the example set by celebrated kings, commanders, and 
philosophers of the past. Moreover, Themistius notes that this philanthropia was the most 
significant feature of a king’s character, and was held in common with God.622 It is praise and 
edification through correlation and identification with famous positive paradigms – one of whom is 
Philip.   
Philip’s anecdote is skilfully imbedded in the text and themes of the oration. It flows 
naturally on from preceding sections. These include a comparison between Pericles and Valens, and 
a discussion on correct Roman policies towards barbarians and Romans during strife. The latter 
ends by equating the damage done to the Empire (if Roman opponents are overly punished or 
destroyed) to the amputation of a diseased limb that could have been treated (Or. 7.94B-D) (this 
                                               
618
 On Themistius and selected orations - Penella 2000; Heather and Moncur 2001; and Kennedy 2008: 32-35. On the 
Seventh Oration – Sugars 1997: esp. pp. 361-371 for commentary on section 95B-C. 
619
 Sugars 1997: vi. 
620
 On philanthropia in fourth century CE religion and politics – Downey 1955: 199-208.  
621
 ‘Blunting the edge of Valens’ wrath against the citizens of Constantinople was the generic purpose of the speech. 
Saving Maximus was a specific purpose’ (Sugars 1997: 69).  
622
 Sugars 1997: vi-vii. 
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analogy has echoes of Philip’s reply to the accusations reported to him in Frontinus). Indeed, 
Themistius goes on to make a clear contrast, in that – ‘a man who receives a moderate sentence may 
then come to be of greater service to the one who dealt with him compassionately’ (Or. 7.94D). 
This leads on to the Romans’ treatment of the Libyan Massinissa, and finally onto Socrates’ 
correction of an ancient proverb that one must help one’s friends, but not harm one’s enemies, but 
instead, make them friends (Or. 7.95A-B).623 
 This Socratic correction immediately precedes Philip’s tale and is the perfect introduction. 
The theory or proverb of the philosopher is followed by the successful practical 
application/example of the statesman. The transition between the two is a rhetorical reply to 
sceptical views on the appropriateness of a philosopher’s compassion (pra/ovthta....tribwnivw/) in an 
emperor (aJlourgivdi).624 It is now that Philip (tw'/ !Amuvntou) is put forth as a suitable example of a 
statesman using his compassion (pra'ovth") for the emperor to imitate. The speech’s audience 
(including Valens himself) is meant to conflate Socrates (the philosopher), Philip (the king), and 
Valens (the emperor) into one apposite and compassionate whole. The core of this section (of which 
Philip’s tale is a key part) is imbued with the simple lesson of the universality of the virtue 
pra'ovth". The advocacy of Themistius clearly follows in the footsteps of the earlier philosopher 
Plutarch in this regard.  
Themistius’ version of Philip’s compassion also has some interesting particulars. For 
example, the man who is reported (again ‘someone’ = ti") to have a grudge against Philip, and was 
possibly ready to plot against him (explicitly reported like Frontinus), is referred to as one of 
Philip’s taxiarchs (tw'n taxiarcw'n). If true, the man was one of Philip’s senior military 
commanders, and as such, the threat may have been very real. Moreover, it would explain 
Frontinus’ comment regarding the man’s martial skill – he or his source substituting an easily 
understood comment of the man’s military skill for a specialized Macedonian military title.  
There is the added rhetoric embodied in Themistius’ question about (and explanation of) 
what Philip’s actions were not upon receiving the report 
(tiv ou\n oJ Fivlippo"; oujk eujqu;" h\/xen ejpi; to;n sivdhron).625 Themistius then gives Philip’s two part 
reply - similar to that found in Plutarch’s account. What is different to Plutarch’s version is the 
report of Themistius that apart from being immediately considerate to the fellow in other matters, 
Philip provided for his daughter’s dowry unasked (proi'ka ejpidivdwsi deomevnw/ qugatro;" wJraiva"). 
This particular detail accords with Frontinus’ version (though plural has become singular) and is 
                                               
623
 Cf. Sugars 1997: 358-361. 
624
 On the use of tribwnivw/ and aJlourgivdi - Sugars 1997: 361-2, where he notes the Greek technical term for 
Themistius’ refutation of a theoretical objection is uJpoforav or prokatavlhyi".    
625
 This could be an allusion to Philip’s contrasting actions during one of his marriage feasts (Plut. Al. 9.6-11), the 
results of which almost split the kingdom (the subtext of which could be the parallel outcome that could have resulted 
from Procopius’ actions). 
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not, as Sugars believes (1997: 367), a deliberate conflation by Themistius of Plutarch’s version and 
a tale concerning Alexander (Mor. 179F).626 It could have come from either Themistius’ knowledge 
of Frontinus’ version, or a version common to both Frontinus and Themistius. Either way, the idea 
of euergetism (or liberalitas) born of praotes is central to both versions. 
The tale’s ending is also similar to Frontinus’ version in that both note the new-found 
loyalty of the fellow.627 However, Frontinus ends here, whereas Themistius continues. He does so, 
not with a comment by Philip (as in Plutarch), but with an altered quote from Homer’s Odyssey 
(22.374) which introduces a final rhetorical section.628 It is a short section (with some literary 
allusions)629 in which Themistius sums up his ideas in relation to the themes introduced by 
Socrates, exemplified by Philip, and now, as he moves on, to be apparent in Alexander. The whole 
moves seamlessly – each tale a convincing layer of argument. Moreover, these Greek exempla 
(chronologically arranged, even looking back to Pericles) are the only ones which Themistius uses 
in this section before going onto Roman exempla. He thereby establishes a pantheon of sorts of 
Greek exempla for his current theme, which would be appealing to an emperor, but more 
importantly – worthy of his imitation. Certainly, there was an inclination in late Roman rhetoric to 
reference either classical, Hellenistic or republican models, rather than imperial forerunners. Indeed, 
the more ‘classical’ the reference the better its idealized value.  
Philip is not here the figure found in Demosthenes or Theopompus (like he is in other 
authors or rhetorical exercises from the period e.g. Aphthonius and Libanius – see Introduction). He 
is included by Themistius as a notable and praiseworthy statesman whose compassion, forgiveness 
and generosity were exemplary. Six hundred years after his passing, Philip’s actions have crossed 
the centuries (many of them now Roman) as a weighty paradigmatic lessons on autocratic 
statesmanship. They have become important avenues for the articulation of the wishes or voices of 
the governed – functioning in part as positive aspirational cultural mores of empire and government. 
Moreover, ‘Philip II’ per se does matter somewhat beyond merely his role as an ancient Greek 
monarch. If Philip’s name were replaced with an anonymous reference, the anecdotes would still 
function as detailed above. However, that role would be diminished significantly through the loss of 
a historical reference point (and any associated feelings of veracity), and any emotive sentiments of 
personal identification or empathy which named individuals evoke. The anecdote required any king, 
                                               
626
 Sugars makes reference to Frontinus’ version (1997: 368), but does not note this detail. 
627
 The ideas behind this had deep roots in Roman thinking e.g. during the early empire Seneca wrote of ‘how many 
have been made useful friends through forgiveness’ (De Ira 2.34.2), and equated this attitude to the success and security 
of the Roman Empire in general (e.g. De Ira 2.34.4). Cf. Sørensen 1984: 108. 
628
 $W" eujergesivh kakoergivh" mevg! ajmeivnwn instead of wJ" kakoergivh" eujergesivh mevg! ajmeivnwn (cf. Sugars 1997: 
368-369). Is this reference perhaps acknowledgment of a tradition linking Philip and Odysseus (chap. six.)?   
629
 Sugars 1997: 369-371 
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but it had to be a known king (preferably special) to have the necessary impact. It was an interesting 
paradox which also had to account for Philip’s historical and rhetorical baggage.630 
What all these tales of this cycle illustrate is the very real possibility of some kind of 
complex relationship between all the extant tales of Philip’s restraint, moderation and generosity in 
the face of public insults and slanders. It is a relationship which might extend back to either one or 
two tales, which have had various details and themes either selected, omitted or emphasised during 
transmission, so as to agree with authorial interests and context. Nevertheless, the utility of these 
tales as a tradition of moral conduits is clearly established by all the variants so far encountered. 
Philip’s behaviour as king and leader was on display, and the messages or lessons that went with 
this served many masters. In a Roman world which never ceased to negotiate the moral limitations 
of power, and the cultural, political, and social principles it valued – authors and auditors alike 
found Philip’s example of moderation, self-control and generosity in these texts important 
touchstones of considerable value. 
 
 
Philip’s Restraint and Seneca  
 
Seneca was one such master whom Philip’s tales served. The final anecdote of this section is 
found in De Ira ad Novatum (example 4.10).631 
 
 4.10 
 
Non habuit hoc avitum ille vitium, ne paternum quidem; nam si qua alia in Philippo virtus, 
fuit et contumeliarum patientia, ingens instrumentum ad tutelam regni. Demochares ad 
illum Parrhesiastes ob nimiam et procacem linguam appellatus inter alios Atheniensium 
legatos venerat. Audita benigne legatione Philippus: ‘Dicite,’ inquit, ‘mihi, facere quid 
possim, quod sit Atheniensibus gratum.’ Excepit Demochares et: ‘Te,’ inquit, ‘suspendere.’ 
                                               
630
 There is another version or very similar tale which Plutarch records in his On Lack of Anger (Mor. 457E-F = De 
Cohib. 9), and Athenaeus in his Deipnosophistae (6.249C-D = Theopompus FGrH 115 F 280; Duris of Samos FGrH 76 
F 3; and Phylarchus  FGrH 81 F 37). It is paired with example 4.1 in Plutarch in a sequence of examples which all 
relate to the absence of anger as per the treatise’s topic. The focus for Plutarch is Philip’s actions. These show affability, 
courtesy, moderation, liberality, and kindness (his overall filanqrwpiva). They also demonstrate an autocrat showing 
forgiveness in the face of provocation (i.e. his ability to bear free speech - parrhesia). The variant of Athenaeus comes 
in a section dedicated to the theme of kolakes (flatterers). Therefore after mentioning noted flatterers of Philip such as 
Cleisophus (6.248c-249a; cf. Ael. N.A. 9.7 and Plut. Mor. 632B) and Thrasydaeus (Theopompus FGrH 115 F 209), the 
tale is introduced by the contrasting description of Arcadion. He is a clever man who hated Philip so much that he 
voluntarily went into exile (ejk th'" patrivdo" fugh;n e[fugen). This account shows that the tale was popular in 
Hellenistic historians, and probably circulated during Philip’s own lifetime. On Athenaeus and his work – Braund and 
Wilkins (eds.) 2000; Paulas 2012: 403-39; and Jacob 2013. 
631
 For discussion – Molinier 1995: 76-79. On Seneca in general – Griffin 1976; Sørensen 1984; Abel 1985; Veyne 
2003; and Inwood 2005. On the sources for Seneca’s life – Rudich 1997: 17-18 and 263. On De Ira – Sørensen 1984: 
99-108; Abel 1985: 713-15; Mattern-Parkes 2001: 177-88 (as a source of social history); Harris 2001: 377-81; Vogt 
2006: 57-74; and van Hoof 2007: 59-86. On the virtue clementia and De Ira – Dowling 2006: 203-205. 
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Indignatio circumstantium ad tam inhumanum responsum exorta erat; quos Philippus 
conticiscere iussit et Thersitam illum salvum incolumemque dimittere. ‘At vos,’ inquit, 
‘ceteri legati, nuntiate Atheniensibus multo superbiores esse, qui ista dicunt, quam qui 
impune dicta audiunt (3.23.2-3).’632  
 
Dedicated to the practical moral concept/problem of ‘Anger’, De Ira is the first century CE prose 
dialogue of the philosopher Seneca.633 The principal theme of De Ira is the foolishness of being 
incited to anger, ‘the most hideous and frenzied of all the emotions’ (De Ira. 1.1.1), particularly in 
public life,634 and particularly for a leader.635 Though dating the work is problematic, it was 
probably brought on by the impact of the excesses of Caligula’s reign and completed sometime 
under Claudius.636  
 Seneca’s philosophy had an interest that was fundamentally ethical and therefore Philip’s 
example is again a moral tale. Seneca also had a background in rhetoric, which, combined with his 
personal inclinations, produced the characteristic style found in De Ira.637 It was a new style, not 
uncriticised, which combined pretentious affectations with ‘the short sentence, rhetoric, and 
declamation’ (Basore 1963: ix).638 All of these are present in Seneca’s Philippic exemplum. Despite 
this rhetoric (and its faulty arrangement e.g. 2.18.1; 3.5.2), De Ira is rich in illustrative material like 
all of Seneca’s works.639 This material includes many tales and portraits of historical individuals 
which suit the context (preference for Roman exempla).640 They are essentially ‘moral sketches’ 
used to warn, and on rare occasion (like Philip’s tale) – to serve as ideal models.641 Indeed, Seneca 
                                               
632
 ‘He (Alexander) did not get this weakness from his grandfather, nor from his father either; for if Philip possessed 
any virtues at all, among them was the ability to endure insults – a great help in the maintenance of a throne. 
Demochares, surnamed Parrhesiastes on account of his bold and impudent tongue, came to him once in the company 
with other envoys from the Athenians. Having granted the delegation a friendly hearing, Philip said, ‘Tell me what I can 
do that will please the Athenians.’ Demochares took him at his words and replied, ‘Hang yourself.’ All the bystanders 
flared up in indignation at such brutal words, but Philip bade them keep quiet and let that Thersites withdraw safe and 
unharmed. ‘But you,’ he said, ‘you other envoys, go tell the Athenians that those who speak such words show far more 
arrogance than those who listen to them without retaliation.’’ 
633
 Dialogue in the sense that it is addressed to someone whom Seneca permits to make objections, which he then 
repudiates (Sørensen 1984: 106). On Seneca’s fame and influence – Trillitzsch 1971 and Habine 2000: 264-303. 
634
 Cf. van Hoof 2007: 74, 79. 
635
 For a dated but still useful discussion on the art of ruling as gathered from Seneca’s De Clementia, De Ira and 
tragedies – Brooks 1921.   
636
 Sørensen 1984: 98 and Molinier 1995: 76. Nothing is known about when the works of Seneca were published or 
their reception (Griffin 1976: 1; Sørensen 1984: 98). Recent scholarship favours the early reign of Claudius, probably 
before his exile in 41 CE (Kuen 1994: 344; and Nussbaum 1994: 405); though some prefer a later date of around 49-50 
CE (Harris 2002: 3). The work though was surely finished by 52 CE (Dingal 2001: 414; and Griffin 1976: 62, 304-305, 
396-398). Cf. van Hoof 2007: 60. On the chronology of Seneca’s works in general – Giancotti 1957; and Abel 1985: 
703-11.   
637
 Setaioli 2007: 335. 
638
 On Seneca’s style – Suet. Calig. 53; Gellius xii.2; Fronto De fer. Als. 3, VdH2 pp. 227-33 = Haines II, pp. 4-18; De 
Orationibus, VdH2 pp.153-60 = Haines II: pp. 100-115; cf. Davenport and Manley 2014: 135-140; and esp. Quintillian 
who criticises his tastes, particularly for excessive rhetoric (10.1.25-31).   
639
 Basore 1963: xiii. On the influences and sources of De Ira – Pohlenz 1959: I, 311; Basore 1963 xiii; Griffin 1976: 
168; Cupaiuolo 1975; Fillion-Lahille 1984; Inwood 2005: 27-30; van Hoof 2007: 60. There is general consensus on 
Posidonius, Sotion, and the possibility use of a host of earlier authors.   
640
 Griffin 1976: 9, 210. 
641
 Sørensen 1984: 100. On exempla as a feature of Roman discourse – Habinek 1987, esp. 194-98. On Seneca’s 
exempla and efforts to be one himself – Mayer 1991.  
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noted how important exempla were in teaching for him, stating that, ‘it will be helpful not only to 
state what is the usual quality of good men, and to outline their figures and features, but also to 
relate and set forth what men there have been of this kind’ (Ep. 95.72ff.).642 Therefore, Philip is set 
forth (exponere) as just such an exemplum of this kind.      
   Philip’s tale comes late in Book Three, after Seneca has made the point that though it is 
expedient for subjects to control their passions, ‘it is even more expedient for kings’ (utilior est 
regibus), for whom it could be dangerous (3.16.2-3). Seneca then follows this with examples to be 
avoided (3.14.1-21.5), before coming to Philip’s tale. It is part of a selection of exempla ‘which are 
to be imitated, being instances of restrained and gentle men, who lacked neither the provocation to 
anger nor the power of requital’ (3.22.1). Therefore, it may surprise some that Philip is here 
presented by Seneca as part of a collection of men who exemplify moderatio and lenitas (or 
lenitudo).643 
The first positive exempla of this section are tales about Antigonus (3.22.2-5), which are 
followed by some details of his ‘grandson’ Alexander the Great’s anger (a reiteration of tales told at 
3.17.1-4).644 These unflattering points about Alexander’s anger and cruelty are then used to 
introduce the exemplum of his father as a contrast.645 Seneca’s selection of these three Macedonian 
kings also highlights some kind of hereditary or familial connection to his exempla. Even if not all 
strictly related, they were all men who wielded autocratic power theoretically over the same people. 
This was much like the Roman emperors Seneca was familiar with, men like Tiberius, Caligula, and 
Claudius.646 Indeed, in these tales one could almost equate the Macedonian kings with these leaders. 
The military contexts of the tales of Antigonus (the old soldier/general turned king), which end with 
his slightly morally ambiguous actions and wit (3.22.5), recall the early behaviour and dry wit of 
Tiberius (the old soldier/general turned princeps), in the face of abuse and slander.      
                                               
642
 N.b. Ep. 6.5; 83.13 and Griffin 1976: 176. Cf. ‘All philosophical study and reading should be directed to the object 
of attaining a happy life… looking for valuable precepts and lofty and inspiring utterances, which may in due course be 
translated into action (Sen. Ep.108.33-35).’ 
643
  Cf. Molinier in Intro. n.74. 
644
 This is a mistake. Antigonus (the one-eyed) was one of Alexander’s generals. Amyntas III was the grandfather of 
Alexander (cf. Molinier 1995: 61 n. 6). However, it cannot be entirely discounted that these tales are about Antigonus 
Gonatus, who was a noted Stoic (Ael. V.H. 12.25), and had once called kingship a ‘glorious servitude’ (endoxos douleia 
– Ael. V.H. 2.20). Contrast with Tiberius becoming emperor complaining that a wretched and burdensome slavery was 
being forced upon him – miseram et onerosam iniungi sibi servitutem (Suet. Tib. 24.2). 
645
 Cf. Molinier 1995: 77. 
646
 The Stoics sympathized on philosophical grounds with monarchy (though considered it inferior to a mixed 
constitution because of its degenerative tendency – Cic. Rep. 1.69; Sen. Ep. 90.6). However, there does not seem to 
have been a distinctive Stoic theory of kingship. Instead, the Stoics, like other philosophical schools, will have 
emphasised the need for the king to be of supreme virtue (Griffin 1976: 202-206). Indeed, Seneca’s interest was in the 
moral quality of the monarch (cf. De Clem.), it was the individuals that interested him, not so much the system. 
Therefore, Seneca is ambiguous towards the term rex outside De Clementia (which justifies monarchy philosophically – 
Griffin 1976: 194), and accepts the Principate as a necessary evil – though does not comment on it as a constitutional 
system, instead choosing to underline the moral characters of the emperors (Griffin 1976: 207, 389-90). Moreover, 
Seneca inherited many of his general maxims, precepts and examples of moral behaviour of monarchs from Greek 
philosophy (e.g. De Ira 2.23.3; 2.33.2; 3.14.6; 3.30.5; Brev. Vit. 17.1; De Ben. 4.37.2; Ep. 94.14), and naturally applied 
them to the emperor – the link being the restraint and responsible use of autocratic power (Griffin 1976: 207-208).  
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….he [Tiberius] was self-contained and patient (patiens) in the face of abuse and slander, 
and of lampoons on himself and his family, often asserting that in a free country there 
should be free speech and free thought….A most unassuming remark of his in the senate is 
also a matter of record: ‘If so and so criticizes me I shall take care to render an account of 
my acts and words… (Suet. Tib. 28.1).’ 
 
Seneca praised the early years of Tiberius’ reign, but like others was not impressed with his later 
years when once good qualities transformed and became tainted.647 The terrible behaviour of 
Alexander killing men at banquets and having others thrown to wild animals brings to mind the 
horrific acts of Caligula (some of which Seneca detailed at 3.173-19.5), who apparently wore 
Alexander’s breastplate at times (Suet. Calig. 52).648 Both men had been young rulers who were 
easily roused to anger after perceived insults and slanders.649  
Finally, Philip had become king either following or instead of his young nephew.650 
Whereas Claudius came to throne after the death of his nephew. Claudius had also had to endure 
with some restraint much abuse during his life e.g. contrast Philip’s treatment of Demochares and 
Claudius’ treatment of German envoys (Suet. Claud. 25.4), with Caligula’s treatment of Claudius 
when he came as an envoy (Suet. Claud. 9.1.). Moreover, like Philip, Claudius as emperor had 
much dealings with Greek envoys (Suet. Claud. 42.1).651  
So why these tales about three foreign kings who virtually recall to mind past and present 
Roman emperors? By using these Macedonian kings, Seneca offers both contrast and continuity to 
his preferred Augustan model which climaxes this section (3.23.4-8).652 We know Seneca equated 
in many ways the princeps with a rex.653 These Macedonian reges, unlike many other monarchs 
(but like Roman emperors), had ruled far flung heterogeneous empires, not just homogeneous 
kingdoms. Moreover, they were foreign reges of a different kind to the corrupt Persian or middle to 
late Hellenistic variety;654 even Alexander had only become corrupt in his later years (like 
Tiberius). These exempla foreshadow and highlight the Roman tales of the divus Augustus. He is 
                                               
647
 On Seneca’s opinions of the reign of Tiberius – De tr. an. 11.11; De ben. 3.26.1; De Clem. 1.1.6 (cf. Sørensen 1984: 
81-82).   
648
 On Caligula’s terrible behaviour towards people, friends and family, and particularly at banquets – Suet. Calig. 24-
27; 32; 36; 39. Caligula even had Seneca condemned, only to let him off because of illness (Suet. Calig. 53 and Cassius 
Dio 59.19). Cf. Alexander’s stories in De Clem. 1.25.1.  
649
 Sen. De Con. Sap.18.4; cf. Suet. Calig. 56; and Søresen 1984: 93. 
650
 Worthington 2008: 20-22. 
651
 The similarities between the two could be extended to include – their limps, their wit, falling asleep at inappropriate 
times, multiple marriages, and perhaps even being murdered by their wives. On Claudius – Levick 2015 and Osgood 
2011. 
652
 This entire section of positive exempla is brought to its final climax with a large section of rhetorical questions, one 
of which restates Philip’s role as a positive exemplar (Dicat itaque sibi quisque, quotiens lacessitur: ‘Numquid 
potentior sum Philippo? Illi tamen impune male dictum est - De Ira 3.24.1). This association between Philip and 
Augustus is curious as it is known that Amyntianus (who dedicated a History of Alexander to Marcus Aurelius) wrote 
imitation ‘Parallel Lives’ of Plutarch, and paired Augustus with Philip (Photius Bibl. Cod. No. 131 cf. FGrH 150). Cf. 
Molinier 1995: 78-79.  
653
 E.g. De Clem. 1.3.3-4; 1.4.3; 1.8.6; 1.11.4; 1.13.1; 1.19.3-6; cf. Griffin 1976: 194. 
654
 N.b. the use earlier of Persian kings as negative exempla at 3.15.1-2; 3.16.3-4. 
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for Seneca a sanctioned and more culturally appropriate paradigm for emperors and Roman elites to 
follow and aim for (though not faultless – De Clem. 1.11.1-2 and De ben. 6.32).655  
This particular work though was not addressed directly to an emperor. However, that did not 
limit its distribution and consumption at that level of society.656 Instead, it is dedicated to Seneca’s 
brother Novatus, apparently at his request (a well-known topos in ancient literature).657 This man 
was a significant public figure and politician, a senator and a provincial governor who had ‘virtually 
unlimited power over non-citizens’ in his province.658 Moreover, though addressed to an individual, 
it was surely intended for a wider audience.659 Seneca proffered ethical philosophy for statesmen 
and men engaged in public affairs, a form of moral education for the elite of Imperial Rome.660 
Philip as a model leader in moderation under provocation was to serve this philosophic 
enlightenment.  
Seneca’s approach in the majority of his writings was highly pedagogical and grounded 
deeply in Stoic philosophical principles (in De Ira).661 Through his council Seneca sought the moral 
improvement of his readers and himself, particularly in their behaviour and interactions with 
others.662 He saw himself as a teacher and healer of minds,663 a philosophical authority on what 
anger was and why it needed eliminating.664 This improvement was also a form of ‘self-shaping’, 
and De Ira is the most extensive reflection on this in Seneca’s corpus with its focus on self-
control.665 This self-shaping came from the ‘protrepic’ moralism of Seneca in which actions were 
prescribed for the reader, who must move beyond contemplation (contemplatio) to practical action 
(actio).666 Therefore, central to Seneca’s Stoicism was the promise that this practical actio would 
help adherents to lead better lives.667 Therefore, Seneca’s Philippic exemplum (like others) was to 
be read, contemplated – and then acted upon.668     
                                               
655
 De Clem. 1.9.1-11.4; 1.16; Cons. Polyb. 12.5; cf. 15.3; Cons. Marc. 2.3; 15.2; De Ira 3.40; De Ben. 1.15.5; 2.27.2; 
2.25.1; 3.27; 3.32; NQ 1.16.1; Ep. 83.14; Ep. 94.46. On Augustus as a model for Claudius and Nero – Griffin 1976: 65, 
104, 130, 211-13, 217, 403, 442. 
656
 Seneca would later write directly for the emperor Nero and demonstrate that Stoicism was a good source of counsel 
for principes and kings (Tact. Ann.13.42.4; and De Clem. 2.5.2 – Scio male audire apud imperitos sectam Stoicorum 
tamquam duram nimis et minime principibus regibusque bonum daturam consilium). Cf. Griffin 1976: 9. 
657
 Griffin 1976: 319; Lausberg 1990: 157-9; and van Hoof 2007: 61. 
658
 Inwood 2005: 153. 
659
 Habinek 2000: 279. 
660
 Griffin 1976: 9. On this idea in Cicero and Seneca – Griffin 1988: 133-150. 
661
 van Hoof 2007: 70. On moral improvement in Seneca – Cooper 2004: 309-34; and Wagoner 2014: 241-62. On 
Seneca as a Stoic – Veyne 2003: 31-155. On Seneca’s philosophical milieu - Inwood 1995: 63-76; and 2005: 7-22. On 
ethics and Stoicism in general – Annas 2007: 58-87.   
662
 Cf. Plutarch’s story on the value of Seneca’s moral instruction for Nero (Mor. 461Eff.). 
663
 Griffin 1976: 3, 8. 
664
 van Hoof 2007: 82. 
665
 Inwood 2005: 144-5. Cf. Edwards 1997: 23-38. 
666
 van Hoof 2007: 71. Cf. Pelling 1988: 15; Duff 1999: 68-70 and Setaioli 2007: 334. 
667
 Wagoner 2014: 261. 
668
 Cf. Isoc. 3.62 – ‘Be not satisfied with praising good men, but imitate them as well.’ 
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The text of Philip’s exemplum follows the transitional reiteration of Alexander’s bad 
behaviour, which apparently did not come from his grandfather or father. This transition between 
exempla sets up a positive contrast and introduction to Philip’s tale. However, as Seneca proceeds 
to elaborate on Philip, the atmosphere is a little mixed, colouring Philip’s initial impression in the 
text. Seneca’s opening comment that, ‘if Philip possessed any virtues at all, among them was the 
ability to endure insults’, introduces a Philip who comes with moral question marks. Seneca’s 
words betray some uncertainty over Philip as a good exemplar. As a result, Seneca’s praise contains 
a flaw or vitium of subtle invective which emphasises that his approval is here only for Philip’s 
contumeliarum patientia. This patientia (endurance, forbearance, or patience) to provocation is to 
be the true focus of the exemplum. Philip the king and statesman is to be praised for it – but he is 
not isolated from whatever baggage Seneca seems to believe he came with as a general moral 
paradigm.  
Seneca concludes his transition between exempla by noting that this patientia was a great 
help in the maintenance of a throne (ingens instrumentum ad tutelam regni). This observation 
commends Philip (judged in the following tale as having had this attribute). However, it also 
highlights (rather ironically) that it is not found in all men in light of the supposed circumstances 
surrounding Philip’s murder (which would be recalled by an educated audience). Philip was 
murdered by one of his bodyguards, who was unable to let insult and injury go unavenged. The 
comment highlights the value of this quality for security, and could pass as a veiled warning to the 
regime of Claudius to look back on Caligula. He had seen insult everywhere, and his murderer 
Chaerea (one of his bodyguards), had no longer been able endure it. Suetonius also made a 
connection between Philip’s and Caligula’s deaths when he noted among the omens to Caligula’s 
that – ‘Mnester the pantomime performed the same tragedy which the tragedian Neoptolemus had 
produced at the games during which King Philip of Macedon was killed’ (Cal. 57).669  
In keeping with Seneca’s preferences, Philip’s exemplum proper takes place in a public 
setting as he performs one of the duties of a statesman – the receiving of envoys. As befits the 
comitas and humanitas of a civilis princeps,670 Philip offers the envoys a friendly hearing (audita 
benigne), asking in direct speech what he can do to please the Athenians. For Seneca, Philip’s tale 
highlights the conflict between realpolitik and human ideals (a central theme in his work).671 It also 
reflects a union in Seneca made between Roman virtus and humanitas – an evolutionary morality 
                                               
669
 Cf. Ovid Metam. 10.298ff. 
670
 It was an emperor’s comitas which made relations with subjects relaxed and easy; humility replacing arrogance and 
aloofness (e.g. Suet. Aug. 53.2; 74; 98.1 and Plin. Pan. 71.6). Moreover, when combined with respect for the Senate, it 
was held to be civilitas – a grand term of praise for an emperor (Griffin 1976: 127; cf. Béranger 1953: 151-52; and 
Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 32-48).  
671
 Sørensen 1984: 9. 
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for Roman politics.672 Therefore, Philip’s patient and moderate political behaviour is seen to be rich 
in humane qualities. Certainly, Seneca represented political activity in ethical terms – as was 
indicative of his stoicism.673 Indeed, Stoicism offered a discourse on virtue that was difficult to 
separate from political analysis.674 Therefore, no matter how orientated towards pure ethics 
Seneca’s writings appear, or how much they humanize stoicism675 – they have a strong political 
aspect.    
The reply to Philip’s comitas and humanitas from one envoy (Demochares) is for Philip to 
hang himself (Te…suspendere).676 What follows is the indignatio of bystanders to this reply – 
described as tam inhumanum responsum. This is the opposite of the proffered humanitas of Philip, 
his affability or courtesy towards the delegation.677 It is this ingratitude to Philip’s receptiveness 
(his audita benigne) which damns the man in Seneca’s eyes (cf. De ben. 1.10.14). It is an insult 
(contumelia), and in his work dedicated to showing how a wise man or sapiens was immune to 
insults and injury (De Constantia Sapientis), Seneca defines it as – 
 
…a slighter offence than injury, something to be complained of rather than avenged, 
something which even the laws have not deemed worthy of punishment…’ (De Const. sap. 
10.1). 
 
He thought insults were the ‘shadows and suggestions of injuries’ (iniuriarum umbras ac suspicions 
– De Const. sap. 16.3; cf. 11.1), which were ‘serious only to the thin-skinned, for men are not 
harmed, but angered by it. Yet such is the weakness and vanity of some men’s minds, there are 
those who think that nothing is more bitter’ (De Const. sap. 5.1; cf. 17.4).  
This insult was a moral challenge to Philip, who was surrounded by individuals whose 
indignatio shows that they had already failed it in the face of provocation. This challenge was 
necessary for the Stoics though. They believed in a ‘life in harmony’ with reason and with nature, 
and human nature arose only from the humanitas that came from meeting of this challenge.678 The 
wise man was to welcome this kind of challenge, for he put himself to the proof and tested his 
virtue (per quam experimentum sui capit et virtutem temptat – De Const. sap. 9.3). In this 
exemplum Philip rises to the challenge like a true sapiens and avoids the temporary madness 
(brevem insanum – De Ira 1.1.2) of anger,679 for a wise man will have no anger towards sinners 
                                               
672
 On this idea – Sørensen 1984: 52ff.    
673
 Habinek 2000: 284. 
674
 Habinek 2000: 288-89. 
675
 Basore 1963: ix. 
676
 His surname Parrhesiastes – ‘the Outspoken’, immediately informs the reader here we are dealing once more with a 
tale of Philip and parrhesia.  
677
 Cf. Isoc. To Dem. 20, 30-31; To Nic. 34. 
678
 Sørensen 1984: 53. 
679
 Like Plutarch, Seneca links anger to madness – Gill 1997: 215-28; on Plutarch – van der stockt 1999: 517-26. Cf. 
Harris 2001: 63-64; and van Hoof 2007: 74. The Stoic principal was also that any passion was a mistaken judgement of 
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(non irascetur sapiens peccantibus – De Ira 2.10.6).680 He is immune to injury and insult (e.g. De 
Const. sap. 2.1, 2.3, 3.2, 3.3), so much so that, ‘every wanton, insolent, or haughty act directed 
against the wise man is essayed in vain’ (De Const. sap. 4.2). Therefore, Philip’s actions are 
presented as an example of Stoic apatheia.681 Therefore, in reported speech Philip has the man, 
whom he refers to as Thersites (countering wit with wit), withdraw safe and unharmed (salvum 
incolumemque).682 By not allowing himself to become mad or emotional (to give over to pathos or 
orge), Philip shows proof of his almost Stoic recta ratio (upright reason) and greatness, for ‘there is 
no surer proof of greatness than to be in a state where nothing can possibly happen to disturb you’ 
(De Ira 3.6.1; cf. Isoc. To Dem. 21).  
The goodness in Philip does not seek to take any real revenge on the man. This retaliatory 
behaviour could be worse than that of Demochares, for ‘virtue will never be guilty of simulating 
vice in the act of repressing it; anger in itself she considers reprehensible, for it is in no way better, 
often even worse, than those shortcomings which provide anger’ (De Ira 2.6.2). Moreover, any 
punishment given by Philip whilst angry would have been wrong, for Seneca believed that 
correction given in anger to the erring and wicked meant only correcting wrong-doing by doing 
wrong (peccata corrigere peccantem - De Ira 1.16.1). Only leniency, kindness and self-control of 
pride, arrogance and anger should govern our relations with others.683 
Philip’s decision in the end to let the man go unharmed was still an act of revenge in a sense, 
and one particularly in keeping with Seneca’s belief that ‘only a great soul can be superior to injury; 
the most humiliating kind of revenge is to have it appear that the man was not worth taking revenge 
upon’ (De Ira 2.32.3).684 Nor should the public aspect of this action and exempla be forgotten. 
Philip’s reaction to the man’s provocation was under public scrutiny. However, Philip’s actions 
show that he was cognizant of his position as a king, and of the opprobrium possible if he were seen 
to lower himself to the level of Demochares – a mere envoy. Seneca believed that, ‘the more 
                                                                                                                                                            
the hegemonikon (the ‘ruling element’), which would lead to something against reason when seized by impulse (North 
1966: 219).   
680
 On the psychology of De Ira book 2 – Inwood 2005: 41-64. 
681
 Stoic apatheia (‘absence of passion’) demanded that the appetites and passions be extirpated (cf. Epicurean ataraxia 
– ‘tranquillity’). This was in line with Hellenistic philosophy which believed in the need to protect oneself from the 
blows of the ever more influential tyche (fortune). This differed from Aristotle’s and the Peripatetic requirement that 
they only be moderated (metriopatheia) (North 1966: 213-215). N.b. Sen. Ep. 85.114 – where the shortness of life and 
the capriciousness of fortune are thought incentives to exercise temperantia. Interestingly, Cicero had seen a need to 
control (cohibere) the passions rather than eliminating them (De Off. 2.5.18).  
682
 As Thersites was known for his impudent tongue and abuse of Agamemnon (Il. 2.211-23), Philip implicitly casts 
himself in the role of the more prudent Odysseus (Molinier 1995: 77). Philip’s use of wit here is also indicative of the 
value Romans placed on wit spoken in defence of abuse – a technique which the rhetoricians called humour in 
respondendo (Corbeill 1996: 194). Elsewhere, Seneca has even higher praise for those who avoid this type of response 
(Dial. 2.17.3).   
683
  E.g. Ep. 88.30; 81.26; NQ 4. pref. 18. 
684
 Elsewhere, Seneca goes further advocating that the sapiens not even acknowledge that the insult has been offered 
(De Const. sap. 13.5), or if need be – return only a smile (De Const. sap. 10.4). 
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honourable a man is by birth, reputation, and patrimony, the more heroically he should bear himself 
(De Const. sap. 19.4)’, and that we must –  
 
‘...refrain from anger, whether he be equal or a superior or an inferior who provokes its 
power. A contest with one’s equal is hazardous, with a superior mad, with an inferior 
degrading (cum inferior sordidum). It is a petty and sorry person (pusilli hominis et miseri) 
who will bite back when he is bitten’ (De Ira 2.34.1).  
 
Therefore, in revenging his insult, Philip risked demeaning himself publically and appearing 
petty and vindictive. Let his poignant appellation be enough for that man. Instead, Philip acts in 
accordance with the advice given by Isocrates to the young king Nicocles that – 
  
ejn pa'si toi'" ergoi" mevmnhso th'" basileiva", kai; frovntize o{pw" mhde;n ajnavxion th'"     
timh'" tauvth" pravxei" (Isoc. Ad Nic. 37).685 
 
Philip’s actions suggest a view towards gaining a positive reputation which Seneca saw as a 
beneficial by-product of forbearance (De Ira 2.34.2). However, it should not be the intended 
purpose of such action according to Seneca (e.g. ‘let us satisfy our conscience; for reputation let us 
strive not at all’ - De Ira 3.41.1).686    
In the climax of the exemplum, Philip addresses himself to the other envoys. His use of ‘At 
vos’ (followed by inquit) is a rhetorical parody of the ‘Te’ (followed by inquit) of Demochares’ 
address, and it draws in the reader in the expectation of some witty verbal invective of Philip to 
follow the break in direct speech in response/retaliation to Demochares’ ‘suspendare’. In a sense, 
Philip almost feigns the anger that is expected of him by those present.687 However, instead Philip is 
measured and respectfully addresses the envoys as ‘ceteri legati’. He merely proceeds to point out 
for their benefit (and the Athenians back in Athens), that those who spoke such things show more 
arrogance (superbiores) than those who listen without retaliation (impune). This aligns with 
Seneca’s thoughts elsewhere (e.g. De Const. sap. 11.1). Here he believed that insults came from the 
proud and arrogant (superbi insolentesque), but what enabled men like Philip to scorn their puffed 
up attitude (affectum inflatum) with impune was what Seneca called, ‘the noblest of all the virtues, 
magnanimity’ (pulcherriman virtutem omnium, magnanimitatem). Seneca believed that a statesman 
or a leader was unable to truly rule well without this particular virtue. Philip’s impune (reiterated at 
De Ira 3.24.1), along with the moderatio and lenitas of this section’s introduction, were 
                                               
685
 ‘In all your actions remember that you are a king, and take care never to do anything which is beneath the dignity of 
your station.’ 
686
 Seneca also thought that severitas did not discourage crime and bad behaviour; a mild ruler was a more secure ruler 
(De Clem. 1.22-24).  
687
 Seneca does note that sometimes feigning anger may be necessary (De Ira 2.14.1). Philip seems to use it here to get 
the envoys’ attention and emphasise his next words. In Philip’s period, Isocrates had also believed in mild punishment 
and a king feigning anger during punishment when necessary (Isoc. Ad Nic. 23).    
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manifestations of magnanimitas, and Seneca’s exemplum was a useful illustration and teaching aid 
for those in search of it.  
Philip’s address to the other envoys highlighted his actions, and illustrated the moral point 
of the entire episode for the explicit benefit of others. It is a lesson and an admonishment, and one 
which Seneca would have appreciated, for the sapiens ‘will sometimes, just as if they were children, 
admonish them and inflict suffering and punishment, not because he has received an injury, but 
because they have committed one’ (De Const. sap. 12.3). Indeed, it was permissible according to 
Seneca, ‘for he is not avenging himself, but correcting them’ (De Const. sap. 12.3). The sapiens is a 
physician of a sort, healing the moral ills of those around him.688 Philip took the arrogance of an 
individual and turns it into a lesson or benefit for many. It is an action which Seneca seeks to 
replicate and multiply exponentially in his own use of the exemplum.     
    In conclusion, Seneca’s use of this exemplum of Philip II is a vivid and memorable 
illustration of Seneca’s argument in De Ira. It offers insight into imperial Roman society and 
culture, revealing something of the preoccupations and challenges facing Seneca and his readers.689 
Like the Greeks and Macedonians, the Romans too lived with anger as a destructive quality. They 
also now lived under autocrats (some anxiously), whose supreme power dramatically increased 
general interest in their moral standards. Seneca’s historical exempla (like Philip’s) explored these 
standards. They also helped to mediate between the abstract discourse of Seneca’s specialised work, 
and the reality of a lived experience in the Roman world under autocrats.690  
Philip’s exemplum in De Ira was a measure and a guide from the ancient past for individuals 
(particularly statesmen) to meditate on anger – and on the nature of power and its use. It clearly 
glances back to the recent past (to Caligula), roots itself in the present (under Claudius and his 
regime), but looks with one eye to the future – a future which found Seneca still useful to 
contemplate such things (if his enduring fame is any indication).691 Seneca’s legacy offers insight 
into those aspects of Roman culture which political narratives easily overlook. It shows a prevailing 
need by the Romans for a broader range of significant social behaviours and virtues (many tied to 
humanitas) beyond more traditional aristocratic ones like gloria.692 Seneca had believed that some 
of those qualities and behaviours were embodied in Philip’s exemplum.  
 
 
 
                                               
688
 On the physician analogy – De Const. sap. 31.1-2; De Clem. 1.17.2 and De Ira 1.6.3; 2.10.7; cf. Cons. Polyb. 13.1.  
689
 Griffin 1976: 26; and Habine 2000: 265. 
690
 Cf. Habinek 2000: 265. 
691
 Cf. Habinek 2000: 265. 
692
 Habinek 2000: 284. 
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Conclusion    
 
The above ‘Bosworthian string’ of tales in which Philip is criticised or slandered has 
revealed some remarkable themes. For example, there is the dominating role played by self-control 
(sophrosune or enkrateia) and other associated virtues; the difficulty of competing traditions and 
protagonists; the universality of limiting detail; the general versatility of apophthegmata (to speak 
to a variety of meanings, dedicatees, and audiences); the role of Philip’s companions and advisors; 
Philip’s political shrewdness, wit, kindness and personality; the reorientation of the focus of an 
anecdote; implicit and explicit messages to statesmen and leaders on desirable and undesirable 
behaviour; and the role of rhetoric and intertextual references. There were also many elements 
present which appealed to Plutarch (our main author) more specifically, such as the idea of a 
statesman’s immunity to criticism or parrhesia, the control of emotions (especially anger) through 
logos, the role of advisors, the disparity between friends and flatterers, and especially the virtues of 
pra/ovth" and filanqrwpiva. All of these elements were clearly present during the examination of 
the ‘anecdote cycle’ above.   
Aside from confirming the difficulty of working with this kind of evidence, these aspects 
help show that Philip was a famous statesman and autocrat from the past, who became something of 
a positive symbol or standard for later periods when it came to taking abuse or dealing with free-
speech (perhaps in deliberate contrast with his son – whose famous indiscretions cost lives). Philip 
was what could be explained as a ‘large-screen projection of those human possibilities a culture 
believes are the most fascinating and perhaps useful for its survival’ (Braudy 1986: 587-88).693 He 
was a behavioural paradigm whose tales were promulgated throughout the Roman Empire by 
popular authors (like Plutarch and Seneca) to form beneficial currents in the deep cultural reservoir 
of Graeco-Roman values (particularly regarding leadership). This allowed Philip’s examples to help 
with the transmission of ethics and the morality of leadership, and the replication of ethos among 
the elites of imperial Rome – all of which contributed to the ideological cohesion of the empire 
under the Principate.694 Philip’s tales of criticism and self-control were small building blocks in a 
huge ideological edifice which held up and perpetuated monarchy, morality and culture in the 
Imperial Roman world.   
 
 
                                               
693
 Cf. Habinek 2000: 266. 
694
 Habinek 2000: 289, 299. On the construction of autocracy in the Roman world, and the relationship between the 
aristocracy and emperors – Roller 2001.  
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5 
 
Philip - Friendship and Politics 
 
The Legacy of the Wisdom, Wit and Generosity of Philip II in 
the Roman World   
 
Protrevpete tou;" newtevrou" ejp! ajreth;n mh; movnon parainou'nte", ajlla; kai; peri;   ta;" p
ravxei" uJpodeiknuvonte", aujtoi'" oi{ou" ei\nai crh; tou;" a[ndra" tou;" ajgaqouv"  (Isoc. Nic. 
57).695 
 
 
This chapter examines those tales which concern Philip II as a statesman negotiating the 
important spheres of friendship and politics. It considers the legacy of Philip’s wisdom, wit and 
generosity as found in those tales and sayings which survived into the Roman period. To analyses 
this aspect of Philip’s memory, a range of themes are discussed. General topics include wisdom 
(phronesis), judging character, trust, praise, rewards and benefactions, greed, bribery, 
industriousness, wit, and humour. The chapter further reveals the role of Philip’s legacy as a moral 
(monarchic) paradigm with which to consider a range of diverse aspects of leadership, politics and 
society, particularly in relation to a monarch and his friends. It also grounds these tales in the 
ideologies of the two most influential writers in monarchic ideology of the fourth century BCE – 
Isocrates and Xenophon. This demonstrates that tales concerning Philip align generally with the 
spirit of his age in regard to an (idealized) leader’s or king’s behaviour. It demonstrates the 
continuity of many ideas regarding monarchy and statesmanship between Philip’s period and that of 
Roman domination of the Mediterranean world.696  
There is little doubt that Philip was a supreme statesman and diplomat. Intelligent and 
charismatic, Philip used his persuasive diplomatic talents on an expansive scale to secure and 
extend his power in the Balkans and Greece.697 Indeed, it has been argued that Philip’s first 
objective was always to use diplomacy, and more often than not successfully.698 This kind of talent 
was of course a reflection of Philip’s personal interactions with individuals. This chapter shows that 
                                               
695
 ‘Exhort the young to virtue not only by your precepts but by exemplifying in your conduct what good men ought to 
be.’  
696
 There is less effort to dissect and scrutinize each anecdote’s minutiae in this chapter. Instead, the focus is on 
exposing the general themes and ideas outlined above.  
697
 Even when Philip controlled Greece after Chaeronea – ‘Philip wanted to show himself an amiable person to the 
Greeks (ejfilotimei'to filofronei'sqai pro;" tou;" $Ellhna" - Diod. 16.91.6).’ 
698
 Ryder 1994: 228-57; cf. Cawkwell 1996: 98-121. 
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those interactions were based largely on Philip’s use of wisdom, wit, courtesy and generosity, 
which cultivated positive political relationships and personal friendships.699 Philip may have left 
something of a different impression on some individuals,700 but these tales and sayings all 
demonstrate that Philip was an influential exemplar with whom Roman period authors and readers 
considered contemporary concerns around these aspects of leadership. 
To understand Philip as a Macedonian statesman, diplomat, and friend, a general 
understanding of Macedonia itself, its political structure, and some of its social and cultural aspects 
is important. Firstly, Macedonia was a large territorial state, which grew considerably under 
Philip.701 Its centralized royal power made it distinct from the self-governing city-states of many of 
the Greeks.702 It had more in common with the later Hellenistic kingdoms and Rome under the 
emperors than any contemporary Greek poleis.703 This is important as it allowed for cultural 
correlation between the role of the king or basileus and the role of later autocrats from different 
periods by theorists and authors alike.704 
Power and practical administration was in the hands of the king and his entourage.705 
However, it seems that powerful barons and families could exert influence on more significant state 
affairs e.g. succession or war and peace.706 Indeed, the leading families of the state were intimately 
associated with the royal court through several influential institutions e.g. the basilikoi paides and 
somatophylakes.707 A king would need to make decisions that were in the interests of his most 
important companions and backers, as well as his own. Therefore, the most powerful of these men 
must have formed an informal but influential council of state.708 However, its influence would have 
                                               
699
 E.g. ‘He [Philip] was courteous in his intercourse with men… sought to win over the multitude by gifts and promises 
(Diod. 16.3.3)’; and ‘Philip showed a kindly face to all in private and in public (filofronouvmeno" - Diod. 16.89.2).’ On 
the public use of private relationships in the Greek world – Mitchell 1997: esp. 148-166 (on Philip).  
700
 Contrast many of the general remarks of Demosthenes and Theopompus with those of Aeschines e.g. ‘Philip showed 
both memory and eloquence when he spoke (Aesch. 2.48).’  
701
 Errington 1990: 7 n. 8. On the prehistory and historical geography of the Macedonia area – HM 1 and 2; (n.b. Zahrnt 
1983: 36f.); Geyer 1930. On the early development of the state – Rosen 1978: 1f.; Borza 1982; 1982b; 1990; 1999; 
Zahrnt 1984: 325f.; and Thomas 2010: 65-80. 
702
 Errington 1990: 4. On the Greeks and the Macedonians – Engels 2010: 81-98 and Worthington 2014: 7-24. For 
Greek views on the Macedonians and their monarchy – Hammond 1992: 19-21. For Greek (and Roman views) on the 
Macedonians in general – Asirvatham 2010: 99-124. 
703
 The Argead kings in theory enjoyed an absolute power the Greeks would only have recognized in tyrants and non-
Greek peoples e.g. the Illyrians, the Thracians, and the Persians. Sparta still had a hereditary monarchy – but its powers 
were officially restricted (Errington 1990: 4-5; cf. Cartledge 2001: 55-67). For a general overview of Macedonian 
kingship – Aymard 1967: 100-122; King 2010: 373-391; Greenwalt 2010: 152-54; and Lane Fox 2011: 359-366. 
704
 On the use of the term basileus – Errington 1974: 20–37. 
705
 The social and political structure (including kingship) of the Macedonian state is much discussed. However, scholars 
fall into two basic camps – ‘constitutionalists’ (e.g. Granier 1931 and Aymard 1948: 232–63; 1950: 61–97; 1950B: 
115–37; and 1955: 215–34; Briant 1973; Goukowsky 1975: 263-77; and Hammond 1980: 455-76) and ‘monarchic 
autocrats’ (e.g. de Francisci in 1948; Lock 1977: 91-107; Lévy 1978: 201-25; Anson 1985: 303-16, 1991: 230-47) 
(King 2010: 374-5 - with bibliography pp. 390-391). The view followed here is essentially the autocratic one as found 
in Errington 1978: 77-133; 1983: 89-101; and 1990.  
706
 Errington 1990: 5, 7. On Philip and Macedonian royal succession – Anson 2009: 276-286.  
707
 King 2010: 380-82. 
708
 Perhaps called in the Archaic period the paredroi (Hdt. 8.138.1), and under Alexander – ho syllogos ton hetairon 
(Arr. 2.25.2), and consilium amicorum (Curt. 6.8.1) – Errington 1990: 5 and King 2010: 282-284. 
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been proportionate and dependant on its own composition and the personality of the reigning 
monarch. The stronger the king, the less it could have leveraged its weight in matters of state.709 
Indeed, a king like Philip had a dynamic relationship with his entourage which sheds some light on 
his personality and Macedonian court life if many of his anecdotes are to be even half accepted. 
Nonetheless, Macedonia’s monarchy dominated almost everything. It was the defining 
characteristic of the Macedonian state as a whole, and like the later principate, was never seriously 
questioned as an institution.710 This allowed for meaningful comparative judgements and 
considerations to be made between Philip’s tales and sayings and the behaviour of later autocrats.  
 
 
Judging Character, Trust and Praise  
  
In chapter three, Philip’s ability to judge character was observed (e.g. example 3.3 – the 
judge who dyed his hair). The initial anecdotes of this chapter return to this idea. Assessing others 
was an important skill for a king or leader to possess (e.g. Xen. Hell. 6.2.39; Anab. 1.9.28-29). His 
immediate safety, the welfare of the state, and his popularity among the general populace were 
intimately linked to those who surrounded him or performed duties in his name. Isocrates was well 
aware of this during Philip’s period. 
 
Fivlou" ktw' mh; pavnta" tou;" boulomevnou", ajlla; tou;" th'" sh'" fuvsew" ajxivou" o[nta", mh
de; meq! w|n h{dista sundiatrivyei", ajlla; meq! w|n a[rista th;n povlin dioikhvsei". ajkribei'" 
poiou' ta;" dokimasiva" tw'n sunovntwn, eijdw;" o{ti pavnte" oiJ mhv soi plhsiavsante" o{moiovn 
se toi'" crwmevnoi" ei\nai nomiou'sin (Isoc. Ad Nic. 27).711 
 
mhdemivan sunousivan eijkh'/ prosdevcou mhd! ajlogivstw", ajll! ejp! ejkeivnai" tai'" diatribai'"
 e[qize sauto;n caivrein, ejx w|n aujtov" t! ejpidwvsei" kai; toi'" a[lloi" beltivwn ei\nai dovxei"  
(Isoc. Ad Nic. 2.29).712 
 
 
However, gauging individuals was not really considered a virtue per se. Instead, judging character 
was associated with a monarch’s wisdom (which was a virtue), both in his personal relationships 
and in the wider political sphere as a good ruler relies on good friends, governors, and generals. 
                                               
709
 There is no real evidence of any formal assembly of the people. However, it seems that those eligible for military 
service could express group opinions and exert some kind of pressure (Errington 1990: 5; for succinct discussion of the 
problem – King 2010: 383-388). 
710
 Cf. Errington 1990: 218. 
711
 ‘Do not give your friendship to everyone who desires it, but only to those who are worthy of you; not to those whose 
society you will most enjoy, but to those with whose help you will best govern the state. Subject your associates to the 
most searching tests, knowing that all who are not in close touch with you will think that you are like those with whom 
you live.’ 
712
 ‘Do not contract any intimacy heedlessly or without reflection, but accustom yourself to take pleasure in that society 
which will contribute to your advancement and heighten your fame in the eyes of the world.’ 
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This skill was of course part of the monarch’s sophia (sofiva), and the more practical or prudent 
phronesis (frovnhsi" - sometimes gnwvmh).713 It was thought to be especially crucial to rulers who 
had power over many important affairs (e.g. Isoc. Evag. 80).714 In the Roman world this quality was 
easily identified with a ruler’s sapientia or prudentia,715 qualities which were certainly noted when 
present in emperors (e.g. Dio 68.6 on Trajan). In the fourth century BCE this wisdom, rather than 
any fortune, could be a true source of admiration, security, and longevity – 
 
fulakh;n ajsfalestavthn hJgou' tou' swvmato" ei\nai thvn te tw'n fivlwn ajreth;n kai; th'n tw'n 
politw'n eu[noian kai; th'n sautou' frovnhsin: dia; ga;r touvtwn kai; kta'sqai kai; swvzein ta;"
turannivda" mavlist! a[n ti" duvnaito (Isoc. Ad Nic. 21; cf. 30).716 
 
Therefore, the ability of a king to evaluate the characters’ of others, especially those around 
him, was very important. So too was the way a monarch treated these individuals and behaved 
around them. Hence, our first anecdote (example 5.1) comes unsurprisingly from Plutarch’s 
Trajanic dedicated collection of apophthegmata. It involves Philip and his most important general 
Parmenion.717  
 
5.1 
 
!Aqhnaivou" me;n ou\n makarivzein e[legen, eij kaq! e{kaston ejniauto;n aiJrei'sqai devka         
strathgou;" euJrivskousin: aujto;" ga;r ejn polloi'" e[tesin e{na movnon strathgo;n euJrhkevnai
, Parmenivwna (Mor. 177C = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 2).718  
 
This straightforward apophthegma contains several ideas aside from the obvious message of 
Philip’s heavy reliance on Parmenion.719 Philip himself emphasizes this through his willingness to 
verbally express his trust, praise and honouring of others – admirable attributes themselves for a 
king and statesman (e.g. Xen. Cyrop. 2.4.10).720 It also reflects Philip’s crhstovth" (honesty) in 
regard to his success for Plutarch (cf. Plin. Pan. 36.4). However, most importantly, Philip’s trust 
and high praise demonstrates his ability to judge the character and skills of Parmenion, whose role 
                                               
713
 It was a central theme in many early reflections on the good autocrat that power should be wielded by those who 
were wise enough to use it (e.g. Plato’s Statesman; cf. Luraghi 2013: 20).  
714
 N.b. Philip’s reported love of knowledge – Isoc. Ad Phil. 29; cf. Aeschines’ report that Demosthenes called Philip 
the ‘cleverest man under the sun’ (2.41). For other acknowledgements and praise of wisdom in a leader or ruler in the 
fourth century BCE e.g. Isoc. Evag. 23, 41, 65, 74; Ep. 1. 4; Ep. 5.2, 5; Ep. 7.1, 3, 8; Ep. 9.4, 7; Ad Dem. 19, 40; Ad Nic. 
10, 51; Ad Phil. 110; Bus. 21; Xen. Ages. 6.4; 10.1, 11.9; and Cyrop. 1.6.23, 3.1.41. Cf. Gray 2011: 19-20.      
715
 Perhaps following Demosthenes’ example, Cicero (De Orat. 3.35) refers to Philip at one stage as sapientissimum 
regem Philippum (extremely sagacious king Philip). Cf. De Offic. 2.14. 
716
 ‘Believe that your staunchest body lies in the virtue of your friends, the loyalty of your citizens and your own 
wisdom for it is through these that one can best acquire as well as keep the powers of royalty.’  
717
 On Parmenion – Heckel 1992: 13-23; 2009: 190-192; and Berve ii.298-306 no. 606.  
718
 ‘He said that he must congratulate the Athenians on their happy fortune if they could find ten men every year to elect 
as generals; for he himself in many years had found only one general, Parmenion.’ Cf. Ars. 469 and Fuhrmann 1998: 
259 n. 4. 
719
 The main point of the boastful words of Philotas in Plutarch’s De Alexandri Magni Fortuna aut Virtute (Mor. 339E).  
720
 Cf. Isoc. Hel. 43, 67; Xen. Hiero 9.2-3; Ages. 7.3; and Cyrop. 1.6.20, 2.1.12, 2.1.30, 4.1.3-4, 4.4.3, 5.3.55, 6.2.4, 
7.5.85, 8.1.29, 8.7.13. For Demosthenes opposite appraisal of Philip in this regard – Dem. 2.16-18.  
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as his most senior military leader was crucial.721 Indeed, a loyal and successful army was the true 
basis of Philip’s power. Philip’s judgement of Parmenion, based here largely on the man’s 
usefulness as a general,722 reflects well that he held the most important position under Philip within 
the regime. Like those who commanded Rome’s legions or held any real power under the emperor, 
such a position demanded complete trust. Philip only verbalizes what actions have already made 
apparent.    
 Philip’s trust and praise also goes against the traditional fear and mistrust that bad rulers 
were meant to have of men of talent and virtue.723 For example, Xenophon’s tyrant ruler Hiero feels 
he must fear the brave, the wise and the just (Hiero 5.1-2).724 It is an animosity towards a ruler’s 
gifted subjects found in Herodotus’ constitutional debate, where tyrants are said to envy the best 
men while they live, delight in the worst men, and listen happily to slander (Hdt. 3.80.4). Moreover, 
Plato has the tyrant ruler feel compelled to eliminate such talented men (Rep. 566d-568a), thereby 
becoming a man incapable of trust or true friendship (Rep. 576a and 580). These ideas appear to be 
more topoi of tyranny than anything, as a ‘king’ in the Greek world was always only ever one ‘bad’ 
action away from being labelled a tyrant. The solution to the problem of such talented men, 
according to Simonides’ advice to Hiero, is to turn these men into friends and further develop their 
skills, thereby co-opting their virtues for the good of the ruler and the state (Hiero 9.6-10, 9.9-10). 
In another of Xenophon’s images of good rule, the problem of how to incorporate such men of 
talent into one’s administration also faced Cyrus. He rejected the idea of disarmament and 
banishment from his person, instead intuitively adopting the policy of friend making and sound 
utilization (Cyrop. 8.1.47-8.2).725 Therefore, Philip’s ability to utilize and praise men like 
Parmenion enabled him to make use of talented men, secure and promote his regime, and provide 
an example to others of confident and trusting leadership (cf. Isoc. Ad Dem. 10).726 This tale was the 
embodiment of the first half of a simple lesson regarding leadership – a good monarch has and 
                                               
721
 It is worth remembering Aristotle’s famous remark that the tyrant does not trust his friends, unlike the king (Pol. 
1313b29-31). 
722
 Cf. Isocrates message to king Nicocles that, ‘you ought not to judge what things are worthy or what men are wise by 
the standard of pleasure, but to appraise them in light of conduct that is useful’ (Isoc. Ad Nic. 50). Philip’s comments 
could also be viewed as a little disparaging towards his other generals. However, such praise and honouring may have 
had wider benefits for Philip – i.e. ‘where the most deserving is seen to receive the most preferment, there all are seen to 
contend most eagerly for the first place’ (Xen. Cyrop. 8.4.4; cf. 8.4.5 and 8.3.49 – ‘when people are praised by any one 
they are glad to praise him in turn’).  
723
 Cf. Gray 2011: 164-65. 
724
 The essence of Xenophon’s counsel in his Hiero is for the tyrant to try and govern like a good king (cf. Arist. Pol. 
1313A). On the Hiero as one of Xenophon’s chief testimonies on leadership – Gray 1986: 115-23; 2007: 31-3; 2011: 
158-62; Gelenczey-Mihalcz 2000: 113-21; Sevieri 2004: 277-287; and Leppin 2010. 
725
 Gray 2011: 165 
726
 Tales elsewhere show Alexander’s faith in his father’s ability to judge the characters of others e.g. Ael. V.H. 13.7 
and Plut. Phoc. 17.4-5. 
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utilizes good men, whereas the bad ruler or tyrant mistrusts and fears such men (e.g. Plin. Pan. 68.3 
and Cass. Dio 68.6).727 
The apophthegma also implicitly highlights criticisms which were often levelled against the 
more democratic Athenian system of appointing military leaders. This indicates something of a 
boast in Philip’s words, and suggests that this criticism of Athens was not altogether distasteful to 
Plutarch, who willingly recorded the tale. As an intelligent man, Plutarch realized that he lived in a 
world where loyal and strongly centralized military structures were imperative to the stability and 
defence of the Empire. Therefore, this short apophthegma would have its audience contrast the 
simple and successful appointment of Parmenion with the often messy and sometimes disastrous 
appointments made by Athens. As mentioned earlier, the unsavoury aspects of monarchy were used 
to highlight the good aspects of democracy; here that seems to have been reversed – the advantages 
of authoritarianism are used to underscore the more disorganized features of democracy or 
democratic institutions. Here that criticism is specific to appointments, but it had broader 
connotations which took in all aspects of administration and war. Plutarch’s willingness to record 
this apophthegma with its implicit criticism aligns his thinking with the explicit statements of the 
more contemporary Isocrates and Demosthenes.728  
However, the most important elements of this tale remain its emphasis on the ability to 
calculate a man’s character, and to acknowledge that character and its achievements publicly. 
Indeed, the tale draws attention to the relationship between rulers and their more talented and 
powerful friends and supporters (cf. Xen Cyrop. 5.3.47). The friends of a ruler were also a 
reflection on the ruler himself. This meant that a leader’s ability to surround himself with good 
individuals (generals, administrators and friends) and keep them, reflected their type of rule, and 
was a key attribute of monarchic ideology. Philip’s tale shows that it was a quality to aspire to and 
trait to praise in others under the Roman Empire, particularly in relation to monarchs, whose 
position almost obliged them to honour few, and to trust even less.   
This again seems to be the case in the next Philippic anecdote (example 5.2). Here Philip 
shows trust and good judgement regarding his selection of those whom he advances or adds to his 
retinue.  
 
 5.2 
  
e[ti de; paido;" o[nto" aujtou' Fivlippon parepidhmou'nta kai; scolh;n a[gonta ta; tw'n        
Kardianw'n qeavsasqai pagkravtia meirakivwn kai; palaivsmata paivdwn, ejn oi|"                
eujnmerhvsanta to;n Eujmevnh kai; fanevnta suneto;n kai; ajndrei'on ajrevsai tw'/ Filivppw/kai;   
ajnalhfqh'nai. dokou'si de; eijkovta levgein ma'llon oiJ dia; xenivan kai; filivan patrwv/an to;n  
                                               
727
 Tacitus does make the point though in regard to Agricola that there could be good men under bad emperors (Agr. 
42). 
728
 E.g. Isoc. Nic. 22; Dem. Or. 1.4, Cf. 2.23, 27-30; 4.26, 36-37, 44, 47; and 18.235. 
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Eujmevnh levgonte" uJpo; tou' Filivppou proacqh'nai (Plut. Eum.1.1-2 = Duris FGrH 76 
F53).729  
 
Eumenes impresses Philip here whilst exercising with his intelligence and bravery 
(suneto;n kai; ajndrei'on). By doing so, the anecdote establishes two qualities which leaders should 
value in others (probably to reflect their own similar attributes), and particularly in those of their 
entourage.730 Other Roman sources show clearly that Philip developed and utilized the young man’s 
talents during his reign (Nep. Eum. 18.1.4-6).731 Moreover, Plutarch himself details how the 
talented Eumenes would later also become influential under Alexander and during the wars of the 
Diadochoi in the rest of the man’s biography. These facts alone seem to validate Plutarch’s initial 
tale by demonstrating that Philip’s assessment of the young man’s qualities was proven correct 
during his lifetime and long after his death. 
 However, Plutarch is inclined to agree with unnamed sources which assigned Philip’s 
preferential treatment and advancement of Eumenes to ties of guest-friendship with the man’s father 
(Hieronymus). Moreover, one should also be wary of tales of youth in ancient biography which pre-
empt qualities shown later in life.732 Nevertheless, the point of this tale, and its most useful aspect in 
terms of model behaviour to any perspective audience, is that the talented young man’s qualities are 
noticed by Philip who then takes him into his service to utilize them. Philip’s accurate evaluation of 
another individual’s positive qualities for his (and his kingdom’s) benefit, reflects positively on him 
as a king, and as a statesman.733 His selection of men, whose talents and achievements were known 
through hindsight to a later audience, reveals Philip’s acute judgement of character – and elevates 
this quality to a quasi-virtue of monarchic ideology (cf. Isoc. Nic. 16). The tale uses the historical 
knowledge of Plutarch’ auditors to demonstrate Philip’s ability and responsibility as a monarch to 
make correct judgements of character, and to utilize capable individuals (cf. Xen. Cyrop. 2.2.26 and 
8.1.10-12).    
 Contextually, these two tales of Plutarch tap into contemporary currents of imperial 
ideology. Indeed, during this period there was some emphasis on Trajan’s friendships, his choice in 
subordinates, and his willingness to reward good administration and behaviour. For example, Dio 
                                               
729
 ‘While he was still a boy, Duris says further, Philip, who was sojourning in the place and had an hour of leisure, 
came to see the young men and boys of Cardia exercising in the pancratium and in wrestling, among whom Eumenes 
had such success and gave such proofs of intelligence and bravery that he pleased Philip and was taken into his 
following. But in my opinion those historians tell a more probable story who say that a tie of guest-friendship with his 
father led Philip to give advancement to Eumenes.’ 
730
 On Eumenes – Berve ii 156-8 no. 317; Bosworth 1992; and Heckel 2009: 120-121. Nepos Eum. 1.6, 13.1 for Philip’s 
esteem of the young man’s intelligence. 
731
 On Cornelius Nepos – Geiger 1985; Dionisotti 1988: 35–49; Millar 1988: 40–55; Tuplin 2000: 124–61; Titchener 
2003: 85–99; and Beneker 2009: 109-121. 
732
 On childhood and youth in Plutarch – Soares 2014: 373-90. 
733
 There are no anecdotes showing Philip actively jealous of individuals of talent and excellence (like a tyrant). 
Authentic political opponents like his step-brothers or pretenders to the throne such as he faced when he became king 
are not counted.    
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Cassius argues that Trajan ‘did not envy nor kill anyone, but honoured and exalted all without 
exception that were men of worth, and hence he neither feared nor hated one of them’ (68.6). Pliny 
notes Trajan’s gift for friendship in his Panegyricus (85) and that, ‘you [Trajan] choose your friends 
from the best of your subjects’ (45.3), and that, ‘these then are the men you promote and show as a 
typical example of the way of life and the kind of man you prefer’ (45.4-6).734 Moreover, ‘good 
deeds win more solid recognition than the mere consciousness of having performed them… it 
brings them honours, priesthoods, provinces from your hands, and they flourish in your friendship 
and favour. This payment for application and integrity spurs on others like them’ (44.5-6). 
Plutarch’s choice of apophthegmata and anecdotes here and elsewhere harmonize well with the 
spirit of the age of Trajan. They offer up Philip’s image as an exemplar, comparative, and 
endorsement.       
 In another tale (example 5.3) Philip demonstrates his trust in another of his top generals and 
friends.   
 
 5.3 
 
Koimhqei;" de; pleivona crovnon ejpi; strateiva" ei\ta dianastav", “ajsfalw'",” ei\pen,  
“ejkavqeudon: !Antivpatro" ga;r ejgrhgovrei (Plut. Mor. 179B = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 
27).”735  
 
The sentiment is straight forward. Philip sleeps easy because he knows that Antipater, a man he 
obviously places great trust in, is awake and taking care of business.736 To be a good leader one had 
to delegate effectively.737 To delegate was to trust. Even though his witty remark does deflect focus 
away from the fact that he has perhaps over slept whilst on campaign, it shows the deep respect 
Philip held for Antipater as a capable officer – and shows Philip voicing it publicly (cf. Xen. Cyrop. 
6.2.5; 8.1.39). Again, Plutarch could easily relate it to his own period in which those in responsible 
positions could ‘rest assured that incorruptibility and application on their part can expect the highest 
reward in the Emperor’s judgment and support…[as] the field of promotion and fame lies open to 
all’ (Plin. Pan. 70.5, 8). Philip’s tale of trust and confidence easily fulfils the objective of his 
collections’ introduction. It allows Philip to transcend the confines of his own saying and history – 
and become a meaningful exemplar of good autocratic government.     
                                               
734
 Noreña (2011A: 32) argues that friendship had not been a prominent theme in Greek and Roman literature on 
monarchy, emerging in the discourse on good kingship only in the early second century CE, and that Pliny is innovating 
here in his Panegyricus (cf. Dio Or. 3.86-116; M. Aur. Med. 1.16.10, 6.30.13). This timing fits well with Plutarch from 
whom most of the Philippic material on friendship comes. However, whilst this appears true in terms of explicit praise, 
these stories of Philip and his friends (and the countless other anecdotes concerning rulers and their friends), had been 
around for centuries – their very survival linked to their implicit value in monarchic ideology.      
735
 Once on campaign he (Philip) slept for an unusually long time, and later, when he arose, he said, ‘I slept safely, for 
Antipater was awake.’ 
736
 On Antipater – Heckel 2006: 35-38. 
737
 Philip’s role as supreme military commander would have often forced him appoint deputies to take charge of his 
other affairs (King 2010: 379; cf. Thuc. 1.62).  
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Example 5.3 also has close affiliations to two other tales. The first (example 5.4) is found in 
Athenaeus in a small section detailing (unsurprisingly) some of the drinking habits of Philip.      
 
5.4 
Karuvstio" de; ejn toi'" @Istorikoi'" @Upomnhvmasin, o{te, fhsiv, mequvein proh/rei'to           
Fivlippo", tou't! e[lege: “crh; pivnein: !Antivpatro" ga;r iJkanov" ejsti nhvfwn” (Athen. Deip. 
10.435D = fr. 3, FHG iv.357).738 
 
Philip’s amusing remark gives the impression that if Antipater is sober, then there is at least one 
sober general left in charge of things while the others indulged in merriment. Therefore, all was 
well and they could all relax. It is high praise for Antipater, whose willingness to disapprove openly 
with some of Philip’s antics might have had something to do with Philip’s trust in Antipater’s 
competence (cf. Athen. 10.435D).739 Either way, Philip publicly acknowledges his faith in, and 
reliance on Antipater’s abilities to handle Philip’s business. The broadcasting of such an opinion 
was one way in which Philip could overtly show respect and reward merit among his top 
commanders (other than gifts).740 It was a simple, but powerful gesture which highlighted the man’s 
worth to the king, and his relative position at court. Indeed, the delegation of command and 
responsibility was powerful praise at Philip’s court or any other court, even in jest (cf. Xen. Cyrop. 
7.4.1). Moreover, as the stability of a monarch’s power base necessitated such treatment, it is 
unsurprising that it emerges as a strong theme in Philip’s tales. Ultimately, it displays the monarch’s 
political phronesis both in the maintenance relationships (with friends and subordinates), and his 
preservation power through these actions. Together with the other tales above, it shows that the 
virtue of wisdom (in leadership) was critical in all periods, and was a strong link binding Philip II to 
the contemporary world of emperors, legates, governors and senators. All these individuals also had 
to navigate difficult and uneven relationships determined primarily by the dynamics of power. 
Philip’s humour on these occasions offered an amusing model by which this concession to the 
talents and competence of others could be made more palatable to an autocrat’s ego. Praise and 
respect are forced to share the stage with the leader’s wit. 
The second related tale (example 5.5) is again from Plutarch’s apophthegmata collection 
(following example 5.3 in the text), and shows Philip once more oversleeping. 
 
 
 
                                               
738
 Carystius says in his Historical Commentaries: When Philip decided to get drunk, he used to say the following: ‘We 
need to start drinking; because if Antipater’s sober, that’s enough.’ 
739
 It is interesting that Isocrates praises outspokenness under a monarchy in a letter to Antipater (Ep. 4.4-6; cf. Ad Dem. 
45; Ad Nic. 28). Cf. Xen. Ages. 11.5 
740
 On leaders rewarding merit – Xen. Cyrop. 2.2.20, 2.2.21, 2.2.28, 2.3.16, 2.4.9, 3.1.43, 3.3.6, 3.3.8, 4.1.2, 6.2.6; 
Anab. 5.8.25-6; Oec. 13.11-12; Isoc. Evag. 42; Ad Nic. 16. Cf. Gray 2011: 283-88.  
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5.5. 
 
Pavlin de; hJmevra" kaqeuvdonto" aujtou' kai; tw'n hjqroismevnwn ejpi; quvrai" @Ellhvnwn   ajgana
ktouvntwn kai; ejgkalouvntwn, oJ Parmenivwn, “mh; qaumavshte,” ei\pen, “eij kaqeuvdei nu'n  
Fivlippo": o{te gajr ejkaqeuvdete uJmei'", ou|to" ejgrhgovrei (Plut. Mor. 179B = Reg. et imp. 
apoph. Phil. 28).”741  
 
However, this time the witticism comes from Philip’s trusted general Parmenion. Though it is not 
clear where this anecdote takes place, it clearly implies that while these Greeks were sleeping – 
Philip was awake.742 In light of Plutarch’s inclination for recording positive apophthegmata in his 
collection, it suggests that Philip was up late doing something industrious, that is planning or 
working.743 However, there is no clear account of Philip’s activities. Therefore, Parmenion’s witty 
(but ambiguous) comment could be interpreted as meaning that Philip was working and planning 
either on their behalf, or if they were opponents – for their detriment. Either of these options reflects 
well on Philip’s energy and industriousness.744 Therefore, this apophthegma contains a simple 
lesson of leadership or of monarchic ideology. Leaders must be willing to work hard and long 
hours, even late into the night - forgoing normal sleep. It highlights Philip’s endurance as a 
statesman – his karteria.745 The ingenuity of this apophthegma lies in its ambiguity. This allows the 
sentiment to be applied by leaders to either life in the field against opponents, or at home on behalf 
of those being governed. Either way, Philip’s night time industry becomes a universal message 
about a ruler’s obligation to work outside the confines of normal parameters which continued to 
find relevance centuries after his death (e.g. Plin. Pan. 13.3).  
  
 
Friends, Kindness and Generosity  
 
The example above hinted at a Philip whose industry was for the sake of those he ruled and 
his friends. This work ethic, along with the gift of public acknowledgement (above) would align 
with other examples of Philip’s regard for his friends and supporters. As already seen, a ruler’s 
kindness and generosity towards his friends was critical element in admirable paradigms of 
                                               
741
 On another occasion when he (Philip) was asleep in the daytime, and the Greeks who had gathered at his doors were 
indignant and complaining, Parmenion said, ‘Do not be astonished that Philip is asleep now; for while you were asleep 
he was awake.’ Cf. the similar tale of Alexander’s – Plut. Al. 32; Curt. 4.13.17-22; Diod. 17.56.  
742
 The disgruntled Greeks could be anyone from hired mercenaries in Philip’s employ on campaign or Greek envoys 
trying to gain audience with him. 
743
 Cf. Xen. Cyrop. 1.6.42; Ages. 5.3, 11.6. 
744
 Elsewhere, Plutarch argues that leaders must realize that it was part of their duty to watch over their people and 
remain at their post when all others are feasting or sleeping (Mor. 781CD). Philip’s great enemy Demosthenes was also 
noted for working hard through the night as part of his traditional portrait e.g. Plut. Dem. 8.3; ps. Lucian Dem. enc. 
11.14-15; Libanius Progy. 3.31. 
745
 Cf.  Xen. Ages. 5.2; Lac. Pol. 15.4; and Cyrop. 8.2.4.  
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monarchic ideology.746 It could be thought of in terms of virtues like eujergesiva, ejleuqeriovth", 
liberalitas, and indulgentia. In general, these all added up to the cheerful giving of favours, gifts 
and benefactions to those who deserved them. It seems to have been an essential virtue for Philip as 
well as for later monarchs.747 Good examples of this during Plutarch’s period are found throughout 
Pliny’s Panegyricus and letters to Trajan. They are full of references to the emperor’s kindness and 
generosity towards friends (normally termed indulgentia, benignitas, bonitatas, beneficium and 
liberalitas).748 Indeed, just being a friend and having friends was considered extremely important as 
they were essential to maintaining a ruler’s position (e.g. Plin. Pan. 85; cf. n.33). 
It was a good ruler’s responsibility to extend kindness and benefactions towards his friends 
and those he ruled. Example 5.6 comes from Diodorus Siculus, and shows Philip as a benefactor to 
his friends.749 
 
 5.6.A 
Kai; dhvpot! ejn tw'/ sumposivw/ katanohvsa" Savturon to;n uJpokrith;n skuqrwpo;n o[nt! h[reto 
dia; tiv movno" oujde;n ajxioi' metalabei'n par! aujtou' filanqrwpiva": tou' d! eijpovnto" o{ti     
bouvletai par! aujtou' tucei'n tino" dwrea'" dedoikevnai de; mhvpote dhlwvsa" th;n             
prokeceirismevnhn e[nteuxin ajpotuvch/, oJ me;n basileu;" pericarh;" genovmeno"                 
diebebaiwvsato pa'n o{ ti a[n aijthvsh/ carivsasqai: oJ d! ei\pen o{ti xevnou tino;" eJautou' duvo  
parqevnoi th;n hJlikivan e[cousai gavmou tugcavnousin ejn tai'" aijcmalwvtoi" ou\sai: tauvta" 
ou\n bouvlesqai labei'n, oujk i{na lusitevleiavn tina peripoihvshtai tucw;n th'" dwrea'", ajll! 
i{na proikivsa" ajmfotevra" sunoikivsh/ kai;  mh; periivdh/ mhde;n paqouvsa" ajnavxion th'" hJlikiv
a". meta; de; tau'q! oJ Fivlippo" ajsmevnw" th;n ai[thsin prosdexavmeno" paracrh'ma ta;"    
parqevnou" ejdwrhvsato tw'/  Satuvrw/ (Diod. 16.55.3-4).750  
 
It is a lengthier anecdote with no witty apophthegma for its climax like the examples above – 
probably because of its context in a narrative history and not a collection. Instead, it is devoted to 
highlighting Philip’s care and concern for his guests and friends, and his willingness to be generous 
towards them (Philip’s eujergesiva and ejleuqeriovth").751 Even though Diodorus uses the anecdote 
to introduce some general comments regarding Philip’s use of gifts and benefactions as agents of 
corruption (16.55.4), the granting of the apparently honourable request of Satyrus still allows Philip 
                                               
746
 More examples include Xen. Anab. 1.9.28-29; 9.24; Cyrop. 1.2.1, 3.2.28, 5.3.2, 8.2.2, 8.2.13, 8.4.31. 
747
 Some think Philip’s bountiful gift giving much like that of Homer’s kings (Lane Fox 2011: 358).  
748
 Ep. 2.3, 4.1, 5.1, 6.2, 8.5, 8.6, 10.2, 11.1, 12.1, 12.2, 13, 26.1, 51, 86, 92, 94.2-3, 104, and 120; Pan. 3.4., 21.4, 25.1-
5, 27.3, 28.2-3, 32.3, 33.2, 34.3, 38.3-4, 43.4 (Nerva and Trajan), 43.5, 51.5, 58.5, 60.7, 69.5-6, 86.5, and 90.4. 
Liberalitas marked a good emperor also in Suetonius e.g. Aug. 41.1; Vesp. 17; cf. Nero 10.1; Dom. 9.1. On liberalitas 
and indulgentia and emperors like Hadrian, Trajan, and Caracalla – Noreña 2011B: 258-260, and 276-82.   
749
 On the sources of book sixteen – Hammond 1937-8: 79-91; on Diodorus – Sacks 1990, and 1994: 213-32.  
750
 ‘At one time in the course of the drinking bout, noticing Satyrus, the actor, with a gloomy look on his face, Philip 
asked him why he alone disdained to partake of the friendly courtesy he offered; and when Satyrus said that he wished 
to obtain a boon from him but he feared lest, if he disclosed the request he had decided upon, he should be refused, the 
king, exceedingly pleased, affirmed that he granted forthwith any favour he might ask. He replied that there were two 
virgin daughters of a friend of his who were of marriageable age among the captive women these girls he wished to 
obtain, not in order to derive any profit if he was granted the gift, but to give them both a dowry and husbands and not 
permit them to suffer any indignity unworthy of their years. Thereupon Philip gladly acceded to his request and 
immediately made a present of the girls to Satyrus.’  
751
 For acknowledgment and praise of Philip’s benefactions (eujergesivai") by Isocrates – Ad Phil. 20 and 41.    
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to demonstrate his magnanimity and benevolence towards the captured girls. It also shows his 
concern for proper Greek social mores. Philip does not play the barbarian role of his detractors.752 
Even though it is Satyrus who will ultimately carry out a father’s role for the girls regarding their 
futures – it is only with Philip’s blessing that it is possible. Philip is really their true benefactor. 
Moreover, Philip grants the man’s request before it is even made known to him what it will involve. 
Indeed, Philip does this despite being warned that he might not like the request. Philip’s kindness 
and generosity and will to do right by his friends and supporters appears almost unconditional. The 
ideals and lessons here are easily directed towards those who had the power to bestow benefactions 
on their friends.753 Furthermore, unlike a gift of money or riches to an individual friend for their 
own personal benefit, Philip’s example demonstrates an act or gift which had the power to benefit 
multiple individuals – even society at large. Therefore, Satyrus is to play the father of the two girls, 
but Philip’s generous actions have cast him as a paternal figure on a much larger scale.754 It is his 
kindness which ultimately dominates any evaluations of the anecdote. This makes it an interesting 
tale, and perhaps timely message of the fourth century BCE to revive in the last years of the Roman 
Republic. 
These ideas are made even clearer in another more sophisticated version of this anecdote. 
Found in Demosthenes’ On the False Embassy, this version is surely one of earliest (if not the first) 
of the written accounts of this episode.   
 
 5.6.B 
eJstiw'n d! aujtou;" kai; stefanw'n tou;" nenikhkovta" h[reto Savturon toutoni; to;n kwmiko;n 
uJpokrithvn, tiv dh; movno" oujde;n ejpaggevlletai; h[ tin! ejn aujtw' mikroyucivan h] pro;" auJto;n  
ajhdivan ejneorakwv"; eijpei'n dhv fasi to;n Savturon o{ti, w|n me;n oiJ a[lloi devontai, oujdeno;"  
w]n ejn creiva/ tugcavnei, a} d! a]n aujto;" ejpaggeivlaiq! hJdevw", rJa'/sta mevn ejstin Filivppw/     
dou'nai kai; carivsasqai pavntwn, devdoike de; mh; diamavrth/. keleuvsanto" d! ejkeivnou levgein
kaiv ti kai; neanieusamevnou toiou'ton, wJ"oujde;n o{ ti ouj poihvsei, eijpei'n fasin aujto;n o{ti  
h\n aujtw'/ !Apollofavnh" oJ Pudnai'o"xevno" kai; fivlo", ejpeidh; de; dolofonhqei;"                
ejteleuvthsen ejkei'no", fobhqevnte" oiJ suggenei'" aujtou' uJpexevqento ta;" qugatevra" paidiv
! o[nt!  eij" #Olunqon. au|tai toivnun th'" povlew" aJlouvsh" aijcmavlwtoi gegovnasi kai; eijsi;n 
para; soiv, hJlikivan e[cousai gavmou.tauvta", aijtw' se kai; devomai, dov" moi. bouvlomai dev s!  
ajkou'sai kai; maqei'n oi{an moi dwvsei" dwreiavn, a[n a[ra dw'/":ajf! h|" ejgw; kerdanw' me;n oujdevn
, a]n lavbw, proi'ka de; prosqei;" ejkdwvsw, kai; ouj periovyomai paqouvsa" oujde;n ajnavxion ou[q! 
hJmw'n ou[te tou' patrov". wJ" d! ajkou'sai tou;" parovnta" ejn tw'/ sumposivw/, tosou'ton krovton
kai; qovrubon kai; e[painon para; pavntwn genevsqai w{ste to;n Fivlippon paqei'n ti kai;        
                                               
752
 The Greeks often thought of the Macedonians as barbarians – Thuc. 2.80.5; Isoc. Pan. 3; Dem. 15.15; and Dinarchus 
1.24.  
753
 According to Xenophon, Agesilaus was ‘very gentle with friends’ (pra/ovth"), and ‘yielded most readily to a 
comrade’ (Ages. 11.10). Moreover, he was ‘very compliant to friends’ (Ages. 11.12), and was, ‘best pleased when he 
could dismiss his suitors quickly with their request granted’ (Ages. 9.2). Among the countless sections dedicated to 
Cyrus’ benefits to his friends – one sums it up best simply calling him a ‘blessing to his friends’ (Cyrop. 5.3.20). cf. 
Mem. 2.4-10 and Hiero 11.13. 
754
 Cf. Xen. Ages. 8.1; 7.3; Hiero 11.14; Cyrop. 8.1.1; Hdt. 3.89 and Gray 2011: 325-327. 
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dou'nai. kaivtoi tw'n ajpokteinavntwn h\n to;n !Alevxandron to;n ajdelfo;n to;n Filivppou        
ou|to" oJ !Apollofavnh" (Dem. De Fal. Leg. 193-95).755 
 
Its proximity in time to the historical events it purports to tell is well represented by the extra details 
it gives. However, the two main differences from the other account lies in the boisterous public 
endorsement of Satyrus’ request, and Philip’s knowledge that the true father of the girls (this time 
identified) had been one of the assassins of his older brother. Philip’s concession to the request is 
also now an act of forgiveness. Even so, in a seemingly calculated act of misdirection, Demosthenes 
wishes to focus here on Satyrus and the unselfishness of his request in contrast to those of Philip’s 
other envoys, guests and friends. However, not even the rhetoric of Demosthenes can redirect all the 
tale’s moral approbation away from Philip’s decision to grant this extraordinary request. Philip’s 
capacity for kindness and generosity (and forgiveness) is all the more indelible on the auditor in this 
version with its extra detail. Philip assists the daughters of his brother’s killer. In trying to illustrate 
the altruistic (and brave) behaviour of Satyrus around the powerful autocrat Philip, Demosthenes 
cannot escape the munificent reciprocity shown by the king. Auditors and readers of Demosthenes’ 
work from all periods, who were accustomed to hearing of the tyrannical failings of Philip, are 
confronted implicitly by a more generous image of freedom’s arch enemy. It was a contradictory 
image which could have exacerbated the state of negative and positive traditions surrounding Philip. 
It also shows how the story changed focus from Satyrus to Philip with some editing and 
reformulating in later versions (e.g. example 5.6.A), and entered the canon of exemplar stories 
focused on Philip’s kingship.  
Example 5.7 is again from Plutarch’s collection. It once more shows Philip’s care for his 
friends, and his fervent willingness to bestow favours upon them. 
 
5.7 
 
@Ippavrcou tou' Eujboevw" ajpoqanovnto", dh'lo" h\n barevw" fevrwn: eijpovnto" dev tino",        
“ajlla; mh;n wJrai'o" w[n ejkei'no" ajpotevqnhken,” “eJautw'/ ge,” ei\pen, “ejmoi; de; tacevw": 
  e[fqh ga;r teleuth'sai pri;n h[ par! ejmou' cavrin ajxivan th'" filiva" ajpolabei'n  (Mor. 178E 
= Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 21).”756  
                                               
755
 ‘At the entertainment at which he crowned the successful competitors, he asked Satyrus, the comedian of our city, 
why he was the only guest who had not asked any favor; had he observed in him any illiberality or discourtesy towards 
himself? Satyrus, as the story goes, replied that he did not want any such gift as the others were asking; what he would 
like to ask was a favor which Philip could grant quite easily, and yet he feared that his request would be unsuccessful. 
Philip bade him speak out, declaring with the easy generosity of youth that there was nothing he would not do for him. 
Thereupon Satyrus told him that Apollophanes of Pydna had been a friend of his, and that after his death by 
assassination his kinsmen in alarm had secretly removed his daughters, who were then children, to Olynthus. These 
girls had been made captive when the town was taken, and were now in Philip's hands, and of marriageable age. “I 
earnestly beg you,” he went on, “to bestow them on me. At the same time I wish you to understand what sort of gift you 
will be giving me, if you do give it. It will bring me no gain, for I shall provide them with dowries and give them in 
marriage; and I shall not permit them to suffer any treatment unworthy of myself or of their father.” It is said that, when 
the other guests heard this speech, there was such an outburst of applause and approval that Philip was strongly moved, 
and granted the boon. And yet Apollophanes was one of the men who had slain Philip's own brother Alexander.’ 
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Philip even goes so far as to mourn the fact that Hipparchus has died too soon for him to bestow 
upon him the favours or gratitude (h[ cavrin) that their friendship warranted.757 Philip’s devotion to 
his friend seems genuine and underscores the value he placed in his friendships. This care and 
attention accorded well with the values of Plutarch himself, who also placed great importance on 
friendship (philia or amicitia).758 It was a significant topic in Greek and Roman ethics – and could 
denote a close association or a relationship of duties and obligations.759 Aside from numerous 
references to friendships throughout Plutarch’s Lives,760 it even prompted works from Plutarch like 
How to tell a Friend from a Flatterer and On Having Many Friends.761 For Plutarch, friendship 
came from the offering of goodwill and graciousness with virtue (eu[noia kai; cavri" met! ajreth'" - 
Mor. 93F = De Amic. 2), and true friendship required three things – virtue, intimacy, and usefulness 
(ajrethn, sunhvqeian, creivan -Mor. 94B = De Amic. 3). Moreover, friendship consisted of continual 
association and mutual acts of kindness (tai'" oJmilivai" kai; filofrosuvnai" - Mor. 95A = De Amic. 
4), much like those performed by Philip in tales already discussed, and in keeping with the spirit of 
Pliny’s material in relation to Plutarch’s addressee Trajan.  
Plutarch thought of friendships also in terms of kindness and harmony between statesmen. 
Discord could lead to rivalry within a state and with other states (cf. Duff 1999: 89). At the heart of 
many inter-state relationships were traditions of guest-friendship. Example 5.8 shows Philip 
acknowledging this tradition in another overt display of his kindness and generosity towards 
friends. It is also the first of a group of apophthegmata (numbers 18-21 in the Loeb) which deal 
thematically with Philip and friendship. This of course could be enlarged to include two other tales 
which introduce the group. They detail Philip’s advice to Alexander regarding who he should 
associate with. This suggests again that the tales are arranged by the author and do not appear 
randomly. 
5.8. 
Pro;" de; Fivlwna to;n Qhbai'on eujergevthn aujtou' genovmenon kai; xevnon, oJphnivka  dih'gen  
ejn Qhvbai" oJmhreuvwn, u{steron de; mhdemivan par! aujtou' dwrea;n prosdecovmenon, “mhv me,” 
ei\pen, “ajfairou' to; ajnivkhton, eujergesiva" kai; cavrito" hJttwvmenon (Mor. 178C = Reg. et 
imp. apoph. Phil.18).”762  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
756
 When Hipparchus of Euboea died, it was plain that Philip took it much to heart; and when somebody remarked, ‘But, 
as a matter of fact, his death has come in fullness of time,’ Philip said, ‘Yes, in fullness of time for him, it is true, but 
swiftly for me, for he came to his end too soon to receive from me, as he ought, favours worthy of our friendship.’ 
757
 Hipparchus was one of the three men Philip set up to rule Eretria in 343 BCE (Dem. Or. 9.58; 18.295). 
758
 Beck 2000: 29. 
759
 On friendship in the classical world – Konstan 1997 and Fitzgerald 1997 (ed.). 
760
 Cf. Duff 1999: 418. 
761
 Russell 1973: 93-95; and Gianakaris 1970: 88-89. 
762
 Philon the Theban had been his (Philip’s) benefactor and host during the time he spent as a hostage in Thebes, but 
later would not accept any gift from him; whereupon Philip said to him, ‘Do not deprive me of my invincibility by 
letting me be outdone in benefactions and favours.’ Cf. Dem. 19.140.  
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This tale makes reference to Philip’s time as a hostage at Thebes (371-368 BCE) and is clearly set 
sometime afterwards.763 It does contradict other accounts of this period, one of which is found 
elsewhere in Plutarch and has Philip staying with the Theban general Pammenes (Plut. Pel. 26).764 
However, nothing here (or elsewhere), rules out the possibility that Philip spent time with various 
households. 
What is important here is that Philip’s actions speak not only to the idea of a fivlo" - 
xevno" relationship,765 but clearly demonstrate Philip’s willingness to repay a debt of gratitude to a 
man he considered a former host and benefactor (eujergevthn).766 It also underscores Philip’s 
competitive nature, and Macedon’s agonistic culture. Perhaps concerned with reputation here, 
Philip is reluctant to be defeated at anything – even the giving of benefactions and favours 
(eujergesiva" kai; cavrito").767 Philon’s refusal was not unique though. It was also politic or prudent 
for the Theban statesman in light of accusations levelled against men like Aeschines who apparently 
accepted Philip’s largesse.768 Indeed, a pragmatic view would see Philip’s kindness/largesse as 
being key to many of the relationships he cultivated - relationships which were crucial to his power 
and influence at home and abroad.769 However, any judgements on the matter should also take 
account of other anecdotes which reveal that Philip’s kindness and friendship for men like 
Aeschines was ostensibly genuine in nature.  
 
5.9 
 
Paravdoxovn ge, ouj gavr, <ajll!> ajlhqev". ejkpesovnto" Dhmosqevnou" ejn Makedoniva/,   
Aijscivnh" [de;] oJ !Atromhvtou oJ Koqwkivdh" kai; ejneudokivmei toi'" Makedovsi kai;  
pavmpolu perih'n tw'n prevsbewn tw'/ fronhvmati. aijtiva de; h\n a[pa touvtou tw'/ Aijscivnh/ h{ te 
pro;" Fivlippon Filiva kai; ta; ejx aujtou' dw'ra kai; o{ti pravw" kai; hJdevw" h[kouen aujtou' oJ   
Fivlippo", meilicivw/ tw'/ Blevmmati prosblevpwn kai; uJpofaivnwn th;n ejx auJtou' eu[noian.  
a{per ou\n pavnta ejfolka; h\n eij" th;n parrhsivan tw'/ Aijscivnh/ kai; th;n tw'n lovgwn eu[roian...
(V.H.8.12).770  
                                               
763
 On Philip’s time as a hostage at Thebes – Diod. 15.61, 15.67.4, 16.2.2-3; Plut. Pel. 26.4-5; Justin 6.9.7, 7.5.1-3. For 
discussion – Aymard 1954: 15-30 and Worthington 2008:17-19.    
764
 Justin and Diodorus would have Philip staying with Epaminondas. 
765
 Cf. Fuhrmann 1998: 260-61. On reciprocity in ancient Greece – Gill, Postlewaite and Seaford (eds.) 1998. 
766
 On just how serious Philip took these kinds of relationships – Sen. Ben. 4.37-38. Cf. Xen. Ages. 4.2, 3, and 11.3. 
767
 Cf. Xen. Cyrop. 5.4.32. Philip’s slightly arrogant but charming apophthegma, which seeks to justify acceptance of 
his benefactions, is similar to that attributed to Alexander in his dealings with the Indian King Taxiles (Plut. Mor. 181C 
= Reg. et imp. apoph. Al. 24; cf. Plut. Al. 59). 
768
 On Aeschines – Harris 1995. Cf. Phokian’s refusal to accept a gift of money from Philip (Nep. Phok. 1.3-4; cf. Plut. 
Phok. 18.1-5). According to Duff, it was to demonstrate the ‘proper attitude to wealth, and the correct way to be a 
‘friend’ of a king’ (1999: 135), and reflects the concerns of Greek political and moral discourse with behaviour around 
kings and powerful individuals. This may well be the case here and elsewhere when gifts from Philip are refused.  
769
 N.b. the favours of Cyrus in the Cyropaedia are part of his strategy to gain useful friends and to deprive his rivals of 
support. Moreover, support and defections could be invitations for others to do likewise (Ambler 2001: 14; cf. Xen. 
Cyrop. 4.2.3, 8; 4.6.1-10; 5.2.24-29; 6.1.46-49).   
770
 ‘Strange, is it not, but true. When Demosthenes lost his voice in Macedonia, Aeschines son of Atrometus, of the 
deme Cothocidae, was well regarded by the Macedonians and displayed far more confidence than the other members of 
the delegation. The reason for this was his friendship with Philip, the gifts he received from him, Philip’s kind and 
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This tale (example 5.9) is from the Varia Historia of the Roman author Aelian. Written in 
the early third-century CE, the work is a collection of miscellaneous anecdotes and historical 
material.771 The account concerns the events of the ‘first embassy’ (mid-March 346 BCE) of the 
‘Peace of Philocrates’ during which Demosthenes was supposed to have lost his nerve and frozen 
whilst giving his speech before Philip (Aesch. 2.34; cf. 2.38).772 Here, the opposite performance of 
Aeschines and its causes are recorded – all of which relate to the friendship and goodwill of Philip.  
Philip’s appearance in the Varia Historia of Aelian appears at first glance to be of mere 
capricious antiquarian interest. However, patterns do emerge in the text of the Varia Historia as a 
whole which point to a deeper meaning for most of its material.773 Indeed, Aelian’s choice of 
subject matter and genre were simultaneously safe and subversive.774 He exploited a genre, whose 
programme of collecting large quantities of diverse and non-related material was not known 
generally for its agenda of overt invective, to fuel reflections regarding contemporary realities and 
mores. Moreover, the decision to use Classical and Hellenistic history as a resource allowed Aelian 
a certain semblance of removal from his subject matter which Roman history could not provide. It 
was easier and less overbearing to be critical of, or instructive to autocracy and elite culture through 
the use of foreign examples than through indigenous Roman ones.775  
Aelian’s work was never intended to be explicitly seditious either in tone or manner. 
Instead, it was something more nuanced. Indeed, Aelian’s indictment elsewhere of the emperor 
Elagabalus shows Aelian to have some interest in the political life of Rome and the plight of his 
fellow Roman elite (despite his withdrawal from this traditionally Roman sphere of competition and 
fame seeking). It also shows him not to have been foolish. Indeed, his Varia Historia seems a rather 
opaque and subversive attack on certain emperors and aspects of the institution of the principate (all 
couched in the classicising language of a Philhellene). It critiques and even rebukes contemporary 
autocracy and elements of elite Roman culture through the medium of an idealised Hellenic past. 
But it also sought to educate through positive and negative models of behaviour and values.776 
                                                                                                                                                            
patient willingness to listen to him; Philip’s glance was sympathetic and displayed his good will. All these facts led 
Aeschines to speak freely and fluently...’ 
771
 On Claudius Aelianus and the Varia Historia – Wilson 1997: 1-23, Johnson 1997; Campanile 2006: 420-430; 
Morgan 2007: 156-57; and Smith 2014, esp. chapters 4, 5, and 9.  
772
 Worthington 2008: 90-3; 2014: 71. 
773
 Johnson’s 1997 study of paideia in Aelian concludes that, ‘Aelian has provided …[his] reader with material that 
conveys a moral message at the same time that it provides models of the correct way to respond to traditional literature 
(1997: iii).’ 
774
 It is a similar situation to Aelian’s other major text – de Natura Animalium. For example, Smith argues that Aelian 
had a deep interest in monarchy, but his ‘literary stylization of the traditional themes of the discourse is more radically 
indirect than those of Cassius Dio and Philostratus’ (2014: 217).       
775
 Despite this approach, Aelian still took pride in being Roman (e.g. V.H. – 2.38, 12.25, 14.45). Wilson 1997: 3. 
776
 Aelian offers no coherent picture of Philip as being either a good or bad king e.g. Philip’s first two anecdotes show 
that he could be either a slightly negative (3.45) or wholly positive model (4.19). This shows that any assumptions built 
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Moreover, aside from representing Aelian’s interests, and his views on many aspects of life, 
religion, food, virtues and vices, the Varia Historia could also be seen as a manifesto of how to live 
and not live under autocracy for his fellow nobles.777 Remember too, that it was from among their 
number that future leaders and emperors would come. Viewed from this angle, Aelian’s work has a 
clear purpose – cultural, political, and social edification that ultimately sought to influence future 
elite and imperial behaviour.778 This particular example’s focus on sincere friendship and kindness 
between monarch and envoy was in itself a part of this process. 
In example 5.10 Philip is himself the recipient of an unexpected favour in the name of 
friendship. His actions in response are in keeping with the kindness and generosity Philip has so far 
shown in other examples. Therefore, Philip grants freedom to a prisoner when he performs Philip an 
unusual ‘face saving’ service.   
 
5.10 
 
Lhfqevntwn de; pollw'n aijcmalwvtwn, ejpivprasken aujtou;" ajnestalmevnw/ tw'/ citw'ni          
kaqhvmeno" oujk eujprepw'": ei|" ou\n tw'n pwloumevnwn ajnebovhse, “fei'saiv mou, Fivlippe,    
patriko;" gavr eijmiv sou fivlo"”: ejrwthvsanto" de; tou' Filivppou, “povqen, w\a[nqrwpe, genovm
eno" kai; pw'";” “ejgguv",” e[fh, “fravsai soi bouvlomai proselqwvn:” wJ" ou\n proshvcqh,  
“mikrovn,” e[fh, “katwtevrw th;n clamuvda poivhson, ajschmonei'" ga;r ou{tw kaqhvmeno":”  
kai; oJ Fivlippo", “a[fete aujtovn,” ei\pen, “ajlhqw'" ga;r eu[nou" w[n kai; fivlo" ejlavnqanen  
(Mor. 178C-D = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 19).”779 
 
Again from Plutarch’s collection, it shows Philip’s ability to reciprocate an act of discreet kindness 
from an anonymous man. Philip’s dignity as a king overseeing his prisoners is salvaged, and the 
man receives his freedom from Philip who publically recognizes him as a loyal friend in return. The 
anecdote speaks to clemency, friendship, benefactions and good will between men of power and 
those less fortunate. Plutarch’s interest in this anecdote surely relates to these overt themes and their 
relationship to contemporary concerns around power relationships within the governing 
mechanisms of the empire – from the local provincial magistrate, all the way up to the princeps 
himself. Furthermore, though it was an archaic tale of extraordinary reciprocal favours which 
                                                                                                                                                            
up about the characters of any individuals in Aelian are only ever one anecdote away from being toppled (not so much 
the philosophers). 
777
 The epilogue of De Natura Animalian shows that Aelian chose not to stay at court and live a public life full of 
opportunities for money making. However, his role as a priest (according to the Suda) kept him busy and kept him in 
circulation outside what might be called strictly ‘scholarly circles’ (cf. V.H. 3.17; Wilson 1997: 5-6).  
778
 Aelian might have read his work to his friends (recitatio had been common in previous times). There are three places 
in which Aelian addresses his readers in the plural (V.H. 1.28, 2.4, 3.16), which suggests a listening public. V.H. 13.4 
also suggests that he envisioned a wide public audience (Wilson 1997: 7). 
779
 ‘On a time when many prisoners had been taken, Philip was overseeing their sale, sitting with his tunic pulled up in 
an unseemly way. So one of the men who were being sold cried out, ‘Spare me, Philip, for I am a friend of your 
father’s’ And when Philip asked, ‘Where, fellow, and how came you to be such?’ the man said, ‘I wish to tell you 
privately, if I may come near you.’ And when he was brought forward, he said, ‘Put you cloak a little lower, for you are 
exposing too much of yourself as you are sitting now.’ And Philip said, ‘Let him go free, for it had escaped me that he 
is a truly loyal friend.’’ Cf. Ars. 469; Zenob. 5, 26. The apophthegm has given birth to the proverb - 
#Elqoi xevno" o{sti" ojnhvsei (Fuhrmann 1998: 261 – with refs.). 
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Plutarch revived for contemporary consumption, it was deeply grounded in ancient ideals. For 
example, Philip’s actions are reminiscent of Xenophon’s king Cyrus who had a policy to ‘do large 
favours in return for small ones’ (Cyrop. 8.2.12; cf.7.1.42), and proves the statement that ‘when any 
one does [someone] a favour, they try to do him one in return’ (Cyrop. 8.3.49).  
In fact, it is important to show here that Philip’s actions regarding friendships, kindness and 
generosity are in line with ancient monarchic ideology as expressed in his period by authors such as 
Xenophon and Isocrates. For example, in Xenophon’s Cyropaedia, it is the king’s kindness and 
generosity (particularly towards friends) which are front and centre throughout.780 It is by being the 
benefactor of his friends that he receives their affection (1.6.24; cf. 3.3.4). Indeed, Cyrus exceeded 
‘all others in thoughtful attention to his friends and in care for them’, and ‘it is said to have been no 
secret that there was nothing wherein he would have been so much ashamed of being outdone as in 
attention to his friends’ (8.2.13). Moreover, (and reminding us of Philip) Cyrus ‘far exceeded all 
other men in the amount of the revenues he received, yet he excelled still more in the quantity of 
presents he made’ (8.2.7). Cyrus even justifies his need for his wealth by stating that he uses it to 
satisfy his friends, for by ‘enriching men and doing them kindness I win with my superfluous 
wealth their friendship and loyalty, and from that I reap as my reward security and good fame’ 
(8.2.22).781  
Xenophon believed that the role of a friend was to increase the eudaimonia of another 
through various benefits,782 this in turn could lead to fame, power, and security.783 In Xenophon’s 
Hiero, the tyrant is advised –‘enrich your friends, for so you will enrich yourself (11.13),’ and by 
surpassing them in deeds of kindness, ‘it is certain that your enemies will not be able to resist you’ 
(11.14).784 In his Agesilaus, Xenophon’s prime paradigm of kingship shrewdly enriched his friends 
(1.17-19). Indeed, Agesilaus showed ‘true comradeship’ (filetairiva - 2.21), and ‘many 
acknowledged that they had received many benefits from him’ (4.1). Agesilaus ‘delighted in giving 
away his own for the good of others’ (4.1), and was an ‘unfailing friend’ (11.13; cf. Hell. 5.5.45), 
who was in the use of money ‘not only just but generous….thinking that the generous man is 
required also to spend his own in the service of others’ (11.8). Finally, Xenophon argues that, ‘it is 
the recipient of unbought, gratuitous benefits who is always glad to oblige his benefactor in return 
for the kindness he has received’ (Ages. 4.4; cf. Symp. 8.36). 
                                               
780
 E.g. Cyrop. 1.3.7, 1.3.12, 1.4.1, 1.4.4, 1.4.10-11, 1.4.26, 1.5.1, 1.5.13, 1.6.3, 2.3.12, 3.1.37, 5.1.1, 5.1.2, 5.2.8-12, 
5.3.4, 5.5.12, 8.2.1, 8.2.3, 8.4.6-7, 8.4.24, 28, 29, 8.5.21, 8.6.5. 8.7.1.  
781
 Cf. 8.1.48, 8.2.10, 8.4.36. 
782
 Gray 2011: 233. 
783
 Cyrop. 8.2.22; Gray 2011: 315-318, 323. On the dynamics of friendship in Xenophon – Gray 2011: 289-329; in the 
Cyropaedia – Due 1989: 221-5. 
784
 Cf. Cyrop. 8.7.7, 8.7.28; and Gray 2011: 34-35. 
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Isocrates believed that it was ‘disgraceful… to be surpassed by your friends in doing 
kindness (Ad Dem. 26).785 Moreover, just as Demonicus was ‘generous to his friends’ (Ad Dem. 10), 
as a leader you must, ‘bestow your favours on the good; for a goodly treasury is a store of gratitude 
laid up in the heart of an honest man’ (Ad Dem. 29). Indeed, ‘display magnificence… in the benefits 
which you bestow upon your friends; for such expenditures will not be lost to you while you live’ 
(Ad Nic. 19). Certainly, king Evagoras made his friends ‘subject to himself by his benefactions’ 
(Evag. 45). Isocrates goes so far as to write in a letter to Antipater that ‘the most agreeable and 
profitable of all things is to win by one’s kind deeds friends who are at the same time both loyal and 
useful…’ (Ep. 4.9).786  
From the examples above it seems certain that Philip’s example as a leader and statesman 
maintaining friends through praise, kindness and generosity corresponded with ancient principles. It 
was a powerful exemplar in the contemporary Roman world, which was kept very much alive and 
relevant through these tales and sayings.   
 
Greed and Bribery  
 
Philip’s wealth was famous – superseded only by his expenditure of that wealth and tales of 
extravagance.787 However, there are divergent interpretations of Philip’s expenditure and 
largesse.788 We saw the positive above regarding Philip’s kindness and generosity, particularly 
towards his friends.789 However, more negative tales associate Philip’s wealth with greed 
(pleonexia/avaritia), and his use of wealth to fund his rise to power by paying mercenaries and 
providing ‘gifts’ for goodwill and services.790 However, even if gifts were a normal part of 
                                               
785
 Cf. Theognis 869-72; Xen. Mem. 2.6.35; Hiero 11.14; Cyrop. 5.3.32; and contra Pl. Rep. 335A. 
786
 These favours though should not be bestowed ungraciously (Ad Dem. 31). For other pronouncements regarding 
friendship - Isoc. Ad Dem. 16; Ad Nic. 22; 28; Nic. 58 and Hel. 37. 
787
 E.g. Diod. 16.55.1-2; Just. 9.8; Plut. Mor. 327D; and Plin. N.H. 33.14.50. The kings of Macedonia owned and 
disposed of the natural resources of Macedonian territory like timber, royal land, silver and gold as they wished (Borza 
1990: 56; and Errington 1990: 7-8, 222-23). Therefore, the king could give large gifts of money and land or offer bribes 
for domestic and foreign support. Philip was not the first Macedonian king to utilize Macedonian resources this way 
(e.g. Alexander I – Xen. Hell. 5.2.38; Diod. 14.92.3, 15.19.2; Plut. Pelop. 27; Hdt. 8.121; Dem. 12.21; King 2010: 379-
380). The tale of Philip keeping a gold cup under his pillow in Pliny’s Natural History (33.14.50) is used as part of an 
attack on the extravagance of the triumvir Antony.    
788
 Being wealthy was part of an ideal king’s powers to do good for his friends and subjects, and a means to fund the 
army (or mercenaries) for security. However, this wealth was also a moral challenge as the king had to overcome the 
temptations it offered like luxury, sloth, and sensual pleasures (Eckstein 2009: 6). Demosthenes and Theopompus 
argued that Philip spectacularly failed this test – descending into wantonness (akolasia) (e.g. Dem. 2.18-19; 
Theopompus FGrH 115 F 224 = Athen 4.167a-c and 259f-261a). Isocrates (Ad Dem. 27-28) advocated moderate 
enjoyment of wealth. 
789
 Xenophon advocated spending as opposed to hoarding (especially on friends e.g. Cyrop. 3.3.3, 8.3.35-50), and using 
the hope of material gain against people (Cyrop. 1.5.8-10; 2.3.4,16; 4.2.10). 
790
 The Greek term pleonexiva (‘desire for more’), was often associated with the activities of kings (Gehrke 2013: 91-
92). N.b. Agesilaus, Xenophon’s benchmark king, was said to beyond greed – enriching his army and not himself (Ages. 
4.5-6; cf. 11.9).  
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friendships and diplomatic manoeuvring – there was always a fine line between diplomatic gift and 
shameless bribe (Theopompus FGrH 115 F 237 = Athen. 77d-e).791 It was a line which both Philip 
and Demosthenes were happy to exploit for their own ends.792 Either way, money attracted 
individuals to Philip, and like diplomacy, marriage and war, was a valuable instrument with which 
he increased his power at home and abroad.793 Philip’s wealth was an intoxicating symbol of power 
– little wonder it divided opinion. 
Seneca, who also thought of Philip’s success in terms of robbery (latrocinia - Q. Nat. 2. 
Pref. 5) and bribery (Ep. 94.62-63), uses one extraordinary tale of Philip’s need for mining revenue 
(example 5.11) to make some blatant comments on greed (avaritia).  
 
5.11 
 
Asclepiodotus auctor est demissos quam plurimos a Philippo in metallum antiquum olim 
destitutum, ut explorarent quae ubertas eius esset, quis status, an aliquid futuris reliquisset 
vetus avaritia; descendisse illos cum multo lumine et multos duraturo dies, deinde longa via 
fatigatos vidisse flumina ingentia et conceptus aquarum inertium vastos, pares nostris nec 
compressos quidem terra supereminente sed liberae laxitatis, non sine horrore visos (Q. 
Nat. 5.15.1-3).794  
 
These miners’ adventure is used by Seneca not only to highlight the avaritia of Philip and those 
who came before him (cf. Q. Nat. 2. Pref. 5), but to comment on the avaritia of his own age – and 
more pointedly, that of the Romans’ own ancestors.   
 
Cum magna hoc legi voluptate. Intellexi enim saeculum nostrum non novis vitiis sed iam 
inde antiquitus traditis laborare, nec nostra aetate primum avaritiam venas terrarum 
lapidumque rimatam in tenebris male abstrusa quaesisse: illi maiores nostri, quos 
celebramus laudibus, quibus dissimiles esse nos querimur, spe ducti montes ceciderunt et 
supra lucrum sub ruina steterunt (Sen. Q. Nat. 5.15.1-3).795  
 
                                               
791
 ‘…because from these mines he [Philip] had soon amassed a fortune, with the abundance of money he raised the 
Macedonian kingdom higher and higher to a greatly superior position, for with the gold coins which he struck… he 
organized a large force of mercenaries, and by using these coins for bribes induced many Greeks to become betrayers of 
their native lands’ (Diod. 16.8.6-7; cf. 16.3.4, 3.5; Strabo 7.7.4; and Just. 9.8). For Philip’s use of diplomacy and gift 
giving/bribery and Demosthenes invective against it – Ryder 1994: 228-257; on bribery in Greek politics – Harvey 
1985: 76-117; cf. Adcock and Mosley 1974: 164-65.   
792
 E.g. Dem. 18.19, 61, 295-296. Cf. Ryder 1994: 230-32.   
793
 Trundle 2006: 71-72. 
794
 ‘Asclepiodotus is my authority that many men were sent down by Philip into an old mine, long since abandoned, to 
find out what riches it might have, what its condition was, whether ancient  avarice had left anything for future 
generations. They descended with a large supply of torches, enough to last for many days. After a while, when they 
were exhausted by the long journey, they saw a sight that made them shudder: huge rivers and vast reservoirs of 
motionless water, equal to ours above ground and yet not pressed down by the earth stretching above, but with a vast 
free space overhead.’ 
795
 ‘I read this story with great enjoyment. For I realized that our age suffers not from new vices but from vices that 
have been handed down all the way from antiquity, and it is not in our age that avarice first pried into the veins of earth 
and rock searching for treasure poorly hidden in the darkness. Those famous ancestors of ours, whom we are always 
heaping with praises, whom we complain that we do not resemble, cut down mountains, lured as they were by hope, 
and stood there over their profit – but under a mass of rubble.’  
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This tale of the enduring vice of avaritia is aimed at men of influence within the Roman state, and 
goes so far as to criticise those whom others had previously praised as paradigms of good 
behaviour. The destruction of mountains may even symbolize the final destruction of the Republic 
itself at the hands of men ruled by this vice. Philip’s role is to provide the negative vice of greed as 
a catalyst to set in motion the tale’s events. Any associations between Philip’s need for wealth and 
bribery this brought to mind in an audience conversant with their Demosthenes was not an 
unwelcomed bonus. As a whole the tale serves Seneca’s need to comment on the morality of his 
own day.796  
Philip’s reputation for bribery seems to have been quite famous in antiquity. There are three 
accounts of one incident in which Philip uttered what would become a rather notorious statement of 
the power of gold (example 5.12).       
 
 5.12.A 
 
dio; kai; fasi to;n Fivlippon boulovmenon eJlei'n tina povlin ojcurovthti diafevrousan,         
eijpovnto" tino;" aujtw'/ tw'n ejgcwrivwn ajnavlwton aujth;n ejk biva" uJpavrcein, ejperwth'sai eij  
oujd! oJ cruso;" to; tei'co" uJperbh'nai dunatov" ejstin (Diod. 16.54.3).797  
 
 5.12.B 
 
Nunc est exspectatio comitiorum; in quae omnibus invitis trudit noster Magnus Auli filium, 
atque in eo neque auctoritate neque gratia pugnat sed quibus Philippus omnia castella 
expugnari posse dicebat in quae modo asellus onustus auro posset ascendere (Cic. Ep. ad. 
Att. 16. 12).798  
 
 5.12.C 
 
Frouvrion dev ti boulovmeno" labei'n ojcurovn, wJ" ajphvggeilan oiJ katavskopoi calepo;n ei\nai
pantavpasi kai; ajnavlwton, hjrwvthsen eij calepo;n ou{tw" ejstivn, w{ste mhde; o[non             
proselqei'n crusivon komivzonta (Mor. 178A-B = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 14).799  
 
The two earliest versions are from the first century BCE, and can be complemented with what seems 
to be another allusion to it in Horace from the same period (Hor. Ode 3.16.9-16). There are some 
obvious differences between these accounts. For example, Diodorus has one of the inhabitants of 
                                               
796
 This moralizing comes from a man who was no stranger himself to the benefits of wealth though (Tac. Ann. 13.42.6; 
Juv. 10.16; and Dio. 61.10.2). 
797
 ‘Hence the anecdote that when Philip wished to take a certain city with unusually strong fortifications and one of the 
inhabitants remarked that it was impregnable, he asked if even gold could not scale its walls.’ 
798
 ‘Now we are waiting for the elections, into which, to everybody’s disgust, our Great Man has pushed Aulus’ son, 
using neither prestige nor personal influence to get him in, but those engines with which Philip said any fortress could 
be stormed provided there was a way up for a donkey with a load of gold on its back.’ 
799
 ‘When he (Philip) was desirous of capturing a certain stronghold, his scouts reported that it was altogether difficult 
and quite impregnable, whereupon he asked if it were so difficult that not even an ass laden with money could approach 
it.’ 
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some unnamed city (tina povlin) report the city’s impregnability,800 whereas Plutarch has Philip’s 
scouts report on the impregnability of a certain stronghold (ojcurovn). This then leads to Philip’s 
apophthegma (in the form of a rhetorical question) in both Diodorus and Plutarch. However, 
Diodorus mentions only gold scaling its walls (perhaps as a direct offer to the ‘inhabitant’ from 
whom Philip received the report), whereas Plutarch has an ass (o[non) laden with gold (cf. Cicero’s 
donkey – asellus). Cicero has no lead up report, recording only Philip’s apophthegma to support his 
comments on election bribes. Moreover, Philip’s statement becomes a more universal comment, 
applicable to any fortress (omnia castella) – even those metaphorically protecting the dignity of 
elections. No matter who had the more correct details, they all show that it was a well know tale for 
it to be appropriated by such divergent writers.   
It is Philip’s pragmatism (his phronesis), his guile, and his ever-present wit which are on 
display in these examples. However, whether these examples are seen as negative or positive is 
completely contextual. The act of outwitting or even deceiving your opponents was a generally 
positive thing in war (see chap. six), but to do so in a way that involved an act of solicited betrayal 
within the enemy’s camp could be problematic and difficult to praise. Indeed, the glorification of 
victories in the military sciences generally demanded deeds and achievements that contained rather 
more ‘upright’ elements like valour and fortitude (particularly for the Romans). Though the rise in 
the popularity of stratagems modified this somewhat (chap. six), Philip’s prizes of war are tainted 
by the means in which he gains them when they are intimately associated with acts of paid for 
disloyalty by collaborators.  
Philip certainly had a skill for taking cities by siege, but it is hard to determine for sure how 
often success was due to ‘fifth columnists’. Nonetheless, Diodorus’ version comes in a section of 
his narrative devoted to proving his introductory comments at 16.8.6-7 (see above) by focusing on 
such acts of treachery. It begins with Mecyberna and Torone being acquired by treasonable 
surrender (prodosiva" parevlaben), as is Olynthus afterwards when Philip’s bribes their infamous 
chief officials – Euthycrates and Lasthenes (16.53.2 – see below).801 Afterwards, Diodorus states 
that Philip,  
 
‘distributed a sum of money to men of influence in the cities, [and] gained many tools ready 
to betray their countries. Indeed he was wont to declare that it was far more by the use of 
gold than of arms that he had enlarged his kingdom’ (Diod. 16.53.3).  
 
                                               
800
 The positioning of this anecdote near the fall of Olynthus in the text of Diodorus has led some to believe that the city 
referred to here is Olynthus (e.g. Walsh 2008: 282).  
801
 Cf. Juv. Sat. 12.46-7.  
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This leads on to our anecdote. Introduced by reiteration of some of Demosthenes famous comments 
on traitors in Greece (16.54.2; cf. Dem. 18.61), and concluded by the loaded comments of 
Diodorus, it clearly indicates his (or his source’s) views on the issue. 
 
‘He [Philip] had learned from experience that what could not be subdued by force of arms 
could easily be vanquished by gold. So, organizing bands of traitors in the several cities by 
means of bribes and calling those who accepted his gold ‘‘guests’’ and ‘‘friends,’’ by his 
evil communications he corrupted the morals of the people (Diod. 16.54.4; cf. 55.4).’          
 
According to this view, Philip’s largesse was negative, self-serving, and ultimately corrupting 
(dievfqeire). This stance reflects well the Demosthenic introduction, and casts Philip in this 
particular instance as a rather negative or underhanded paradigm of conquest. It would seem that 
bribery was a stratagem too far at this time or a persuasive means by which to belittle Philip’s 
successes. As if to intensify this last point, in Diodorus it is an entire city’s fate which hangs in the 
balance – not merely some military stronghold. The account is intentionally tinted by the potentially 
gloomy fate of any civilian population if and when the city fell to Philip’s gold - and ultimately to 
Philip’s army.  
 Cicero’s use of Philip’s apophthegma is used to criticise Pompey’s use of bribes on behalf 
of L. Afranius (consul 60 BCE). It is direct negative association between Pompey’s deeds and 
Philip’s words. Moreover, Philip’s status as the father of Pompey’s hero would seem to add another 
dimension. The association cleverly disparages the exemplar tradition Pompey had invested in 
publically, and subtly brings to mind Pompey’s own paternity. His father Pompeius Strabo had been 
an unscrupulous individual who had had something of a reputation for avarice and treachery.802 
Cicero’s use of Philip is finely chosen for its layers of associative invective. However, this negative 
and symbolic function of Philip is unlike Cicero’s use of him elsewhere. 
Examination of example 5.13 shows that there is a marked difference in Philip’s application 
and character, especially in regard to the role of money. This time Philip appears a statesman not 
only of intelligence and pragmatism (phronesis), but also of some integrity, who criticises 
largitio.803 
  
 5.13 
Praeclare in epistula quadam Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat, quod largitione 
benivolentiam Macedonum consectetur: ‘Quae te, malum!’ inquit, ‘ratio in istam spem 
induxit, ut eos tibi fideles putares fore, quos pecunia corrupisses? An tu id agis, ut 
                                               
802
 Licin. 22-23; Vell.2.21.3; Plut. Pomp. 1. Cf. Plut. Crass. 6, Mor. 203B, 553C; and Sen. Contr. 1.6.4. On Pompeius 
Strabo – Seager 2002: 20-24. 
803
 Cicero foreshadows this particular exemplum with his earlier comments on having letters from some of the ‘wisest 
men in history’ to their sons (Cic. De Off. 2.14). Discussion in Molinier 1995: 69-70. 
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Macedones non te regem suum, sed ministrum et praebitorem sperent fore? (Cic. De Off. 
53).804 
 
Cicero takes Philip’s lesson to his son,805 and explicitly uses it to provide a positive and more 
universal lesson for himself and his own audience in statesmanship.806 This tale is not an off-hand 
comment in a letter like example 5.12 (suggesting a common proverbial story of wide circulation). 
This tale is paced within the well thought out argument of the De Officiis, and was meant for 
reflecting on contemporary behaviours among Rome’s most elite.807  
‘‘Steward and purveyor’ was well said, because it was degrading for a prince; better still, 
when he called the gift of money ‘corruption.’ For the recipient goes from bad to worse and 
is made all the more ready to be constantly looking for one bribe after another. It was to his 
son that Philip gave this lesson; but let us all take it diligently to heart (Cic. De Off. 53-54).’ 
 
Plutarch’s version of example 5.12.C, devoid of any real context in the collection, is unable 
to carry quite the same negative connotations as the other two accounts. Indeed, Philip’s rhetorical 
quip is said in response to his own men, and in the pursuit of a military target. No authorial 
comment leaves the reader free to interpret the text for themselves. It was either a tale of Philip’s 
corrupting wiles and subornment, or of Philip’ intelligence and pragmatism (possibly even his 
determination and wit).808 Plutarch’s comments elsewhere are contradictory and help little.809 What 
this account does do is shift the moral burden onto Philip’s enemies. It is their moral integrity which 
                                               
804
 ‘In one of his letters Philip takes his son Alexander sharply to task for trying by gifts of money to secure the good-
will of the Macedonians: ‘What in the mischief induced you to entertain such a hope,’ he says, ‘as that those men would 
be loyal subjects to you whom you had corrupted with money? Or are you trying to do what you can to lead the 
Macedonians to expect that you will be not their king but their steward and purveyor?’  
805
 Philip’s advice to Alexander in statesmanship, as well as his concern for his education, seem to have been popular 
topics in Philip’s anecdotes, and no doubt stem from the great success of the two kings. Discussion and speculation on 
what Alexander learnt from his father is equalled only by that concerning what he learnt from Aristotle. Space does not 
permit full discussion, though Spencer notes that epistolary advice and Alexander was something of a topos (2010: 183; 
cf. 2006: 79-104). Examples include – Plut. Mor. 178B = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 16 (cf. Mor. 806B); and Mor. 178C 
= Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 17.  
806
 That audience ranged from Cicero’s son (addressee of the De Officiis) to Octavius and the entire Roman aristocracy 
(cf. Molinier 1995: 65). Valerius Maximus also commends this letter of Philip’s under the heading of intelligence. 
However, he still has a barb at the end of the tale with his own editorial comment, which somewhat denigrates Philip’s 
achievements (Val. Max. 7.2.ext.10). Cf. Spencer 2010: 185-86; and Morgan 2007: 147-48. 
807
 Cf. Molinier 1995: 71-73. 
808
 This tale appears to be related to two other texts. Isocrates letter to Philip argues that there was more glory in 
capturing the goodwill of cities than their walls, as winning friendships would mean praise for Philip’s wisdom alone as 
opposed to credit for the entire army (Ep. 2.20-21). Whereas, Diodorus states that Philip was prouder of his grasp of 
strategy and his diplomatic successes which meant credit for him alone – as every member of the army shared in the 
successes which were won on the field (Diod. 16.95.3-4). 
809
 In Plutarch’s life Aemilius Paulus, both Philip and Alexander are described as ‘men who mastered the world through 
their belief that empire was to be bought with money, not money with empire’, and that, ‘it was a common saying that 
the cities of Greece were taken, not by Philip, but Philip’s money (12.5-6).’ However, in Plutarch’s famous criticism of 
Herodotus, he states that, ‘with respect to the way in which a deed is accomplished, a historian’s narrative is open to the 
charge of malice if it asserts that the success was won not by valour but by money, as some say of Philip’ (Plut. De 
Herod. 7 = Mor. 856B). 
P a g e  165 | 270 
 
is being challenged. Moreover, it is significant that in Plutarch’s collection this apophthegma is 
coupled with the following tale of the stigmatism of betrayal (example 5.14). 
 
5.14  
 
Tw'n de; peri; Lasqevnhn to;n !Oluvnqion ejgkalouvntwn kai; ajganaktouvntwn, o{ti prodovta"   
aujtou;" e[nioi tw'n peri; to;n Fivlippon ajpokalou'si, skaiou;" e[fh fuvsei kai; ajgroivkou"      
ei\nai Makedovna" kai; th;n skavfhn skavfhn levgonta" (Mor. 178B = Reg. et imp. apoph. 
Phil. 15).810  
 
Philip’s bribery of Lasthenes is not the focus here. In fact, with no background knowledge of 
Lasthenes or events surrounding the fall of Olynthus, the reader would be at a loss as to know why 
these ‘associates’ of Lasthenes were traitors, and what it had to do with Philip.811 The real focus 
here is on Philip’s witty apophthegma about the Macedonians.812 Moreover, if one approaches the 
tale with background knowledge, Philip’s comments on these unnamed ‘associates’ somewhat 
divorces him from the moral unsavoriness of his actions in regard to Lasthenes and these 
‘associates’. Philip’s witty comment on the Macedonians’ candour is clearly meant to align him 
with his fellow Macedonians. Consequently, the apophthegma as a whole comments on the 
Macedonians’ frankness (a trait already encountered). But more importantly, it also gives the reader 
some insight into Philip’s own contempt for those who ‘allowed themselves’ to be corrupted by his 
largesse. As it is written, the anecdote does not call for, nor make any moral judgement on the act of 
bribing, only upon those men and actions associated with the taking (their greed?). Therefore, both 
of Plutarch’s apophthegmata involving Philip and bribery do not paint such a dark picture of Philip. 
They subtly shift the emphasis from Philip’s actual bribery (his actions), to his words, so as to 
showcase the king’s sharp wit more than anything. Ultimately, what is being remembered and 
circulated is the witticism about the Macedonians, which came at the expense of the Philip’s 
enemies (as they often did e.g. Diod. 18.10.1). Plutarch’s brevity or ambiguity masks the more 
unsavoury aspects of both tales - allowing Philip to remain a somewhat worthy exemplar for his 
auditors.  
                                               
810
 ‘When the men associated with Lasthenes, the Olynthian, complained with indignation because some of Philip’s 
associates called them traitors, he said that the Macedonians are by nature a rough and rustic people who call a spade a 
spade.’  
811
 Lasthenes along with Euthycrates became synonymous with ‘fifth columnists’ (e.g. Dem. Or. 18. 296, 19.265, 342; 
esp. 8.40 – where they are described as meeting ‘the most ignominious fate of all’). Indeed, elsewhere Plutarch groups 
these two together with Philocrates, who also took money from Philip - ‘Was it the result of chance and because of 
chance that Philocrates, having received money from Philip, ‘proceeded to spend it on trulls and trout,’ and was it due 
to chance that Lasthenes and Euthycrates lost Olynthus, ‘measuring happiness by their bellies and the most shameless 
deeds (Plut. De fort. 1 = Mor. 97D)?’’ The moral burden in these examples squarely falls on the receivers of Philip’s 
money. On Philocrates – Dem. Or. 19.229.  
812
 This apophthegma which became proverbial, is a paraphrase of an unknown comic author 
(a[groicov" eijmi th;n scavfhn scavfhn levgwn - Lucian, J. Tr. 32; H. conscr. 41; Julien Or. 7.208A; cf. Fuhrmann 1998: 
260). 
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If Philip truly had contempt for some of those who took his money to betray their own, 
might there not be instances whereby Philip showed some respect for those who refused his 
‘bribes’? Surprisingly, this seems to be the case in an anecdote (example 5.15) found in Diogenes 
Laertius (c. early third-century CE).813 
 
5.15 
lovgo" de; aujto;n meta; kai; a[llwn pemfqh'nai presbeuth;n pro;" Fivlippon: kai; tou;" me;n   
dwvroi" malqassomevnou" kai; eij" ta;" klhvsei" sunievnai kai; tw'/ Filivppw/ lalei'n: to;n de;  
mhdevteron touvtwn poiei'n. ou[te ga;r oJ Fivlippo" aujto;n prosiveto dia; tou'to. o{qen           
ejlqovnta" tou;" prevsbei" eij" ta;" !Aqhvna" favskein wJ" mavthn aujtoi'"  Xenokravth"         
sunelhluvqoi: kai; tou;" eJtoivmou" ei\nai zhmiou'n aujtovn. maqovnta" de;   par! aujtou' wJ" nu'n 
kai; ma'llon frontistevon ei[h th'" povlew" aujtoi'" (tou;" me;n ga;r h[/dei dwrodokhvsanta" oJ 
Fivlippo", ejme; de; mhdeni; lovgw/ uJpaxovmeno") fasi; diplasivw" aujto;n timh'sai. kai; to;n  
Fivlippon de; levgein u{steron wJ" movno" ei[h Xenokravth" tw'n pro;" aujto;n ajfigmevnwn       
ajdwrodovkhto" (4.8-9).814  
 
It is given ostensibly by Diogenes to show the incorruptibility of the Platonic philosopher 
Xenocrates. This it does by highlighting Philip’s attempts to corrupt him and the others of his 
delegation – though the difference between Philip’s hospitality and bribes was probably often in the 
eye of the beholder. Either way, Xenocrates proves himself immune to Philip’s ‘bribery’ even when 
others fail. This leaves Xenocrates to be honoured at home, and Philip to state with something 
approaching begrudging respect that Xenocrates was incorruptible (ajdwrodovkhto"). Philip’s 
portrayal is fairly negative. His attempts to bribe Xenocrates represent some ultimate temptation 
over which Xenocrates’ virtue is to triumph. However, Philip’s recognition of that virtue in the end 
does read more in his favour.815  
This tale represents something of the classic temptation of the philosopher or wise man by 
the rich and powerful. It also seems to be a manifestation (historical or not) of discussions which 
reflected on what was thought to be correct behaviour by individuals around autocrats and other 
powerful men. Though it is difficult to tie Diogenes to any distinct period, let alone events, the 
messages above were universally relevant to prevailing conditions under the principate in all 
periods. This clearly demonstrates Philip’s ongoing relevance in the Roman world in relation to 
negotiating relationships with powerful men (particularly within philosophical traditions). It also 
                                               
813
 On Diogenes Laertius – Jørgen 1978, 1992: 3556–3662, 2007: 431-442; Gaines 2010: 113-125; Warren 2007: 133-
149; Kindstrand 1986: 217-243; and Mansfeld 1986: 295-382. 
814
 ‘There is a story that, when he (Xenocrates) was sent, along with others also, on an embassy to Philip, his colleagues, 
being bribed, accepted Philip’s invitations to feasts and talked with him. Xenocrates did neither the one nor the other. 
Indeed on this account Philip declined to see him. Hence, when the envoys returned to Athens, they complained that 
Xenocrates had accompanied them without rendering service. Thereupon the people were ready to fine him. But when 
he told them that now more than ever they ought to consider the interests of the state – ‘for,’ said he, ‘Philip knew that 
the others had accepted his bribes, but that he would never win me over’ – then the people paid him double honours. 
And afterwards Philip said that, of all who arrived at his court, Xenocrates was the only man whom he could not bribe.’ 
815
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shows (along with other tales already seen) that a number of tales surrounding Philip involved 
embassies. This probably reflects Philip’s inclination for diplomacy and his reputation and fame for 
this aspect of statesmanship. This also offers clues as to how tales about Philip began to circulate in 
his own time.  
 Xenocrates is ultimately successful against Philip’s favours, but many were not – 
particularly when it came to military operations. Though chapter six deals in detail with Philip’s 
military material, one tale in Frontinus suits well the discussion here regarding bribery. Philip was 
prepared to take cities and strongholds anyway he could, especially through using stratagems 
involving bribery and treachery (e.g. Olynthus). This often worked out quicker and cheaper in terms 
of men and money when faced with the possibility of prolonged siege operations (e.g. Perinthus and 
Byzantium – Diod. 16.74.2-76.4). Frontinus records just such a case in his chapter on siege 
operations, whereby the town of the Sanians fell to Philip after he bribed one of its generals 
(example 5.16). 
  
 5.16 
Philippus, oppido Saniorum exclusus, Apollonidi praefecto eorum ad proditionem corrupto 
persuasit, ut plaustrum lapide quadrato oneratum in ipso aditu portae poneret. Confestim 
deinde signo dato insecutus oppidanos circa impedita claustra trepidantis oppressit (Front. 
Strat. 3.3.5).816  
 
It is located in a section which has unsurprisingly a greater number of foreigners – On Inducing 
Treachery. Philip’s tale is one of four foreign examples, and falls between Cyrus the Great and 
Hannibal (both barbarians and one a bitter enemy of Rome). Lacking any authorial comment, it 
shows one example of successful inducement of treachery, though exactly what is going on in 
relation to actual events is somewhat obscrure.817 Frontinus’ interest is almost exclusively on that 
achievement – which could sit anywhere on the moral spectrum from bad to good depending on 
interpretations and interests. For Frontinus, it was still a legitimate stratagem in war (and deserving 
of inclusion in his work). However, it was never going to compete either in terms of approval or 
even numerically with other more spectacular strategic and tactical schemes (e.g. Escaping From 
Difficult Situations – 28 entries). Ultimately, Philip’s example is meant as a simple model for 
similar actions by contemporaries of Frontinus. It is not meant as a moral benchmark, or a means to 
colour ethical perceptions of either Philip or his office. Philip was shown to be (successfully) 
                                               
816
 ‘Philip, when prevented from gaining possession of the town of the Sanians, bribed one of their generals, 
Apollonides, to turn traitor, inducing him to plant a cart laden with dressed stone at the very entrance to the gate. Then 
straightway giving the signal, he followed after the townspeople, who were huddled in panic around the blocked 
entrance of the gate, and succeeded in overwhelming them.’ 
817
 Perhaps Apollonidas was bribed to block the town gate with a disabled cart of dressed stone, so that upon Philip’s 
approach the gate was prevented from being shut.  
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cunning and ruthless – but war in all periods necessitated these particular traits – often elevating 
them almost into virtues.  
The examination of those tales mainly concerning Philip’s greed and his practice of gifts or 
bribes has shown clearly more areas in which Philip’s image and legacy were utilized to engage 
with more contemporary matters – be they cultural, social, political, or even martial. Whilst in 
general they raised more negative themes (as was to be expected), they also remind the auditor from 
any period of Philip’s more positive qualities like his ever present pragmatism and wit.     
     
 
Wit and humour  
 
As already noted, Philip was proud of his diplomacy and persuasive communication skills 
(cf. Xen. Cyrop. 5.5.46). Two aspects linked to these (consistently noticeable during the tales of this 
chapter, and entire thesis) were Philip’s humour and wit.818 Plutarch’s collection of Philippic 
apophthegmata has naturally made this particularly clear, and it is unsurprising that elsewhere 
Plutarch states that Philip ‘plumed himself like a sophist on the power of his oratory’ (Plut. Al. 
4.5).819 It was an important aspect of any statesman’s character. However, with power and influence 
in Macedonia, and later much of Greece, concentrated in Philip’s person – it really mattered what 
he said, and often how he said it (as it did also for leading Romans of the Republic and Roman 
emperors).820 Indeed, witticisms and jokes to friends (often in public) were one way for a leader to 
construct his persona and express his character. The Philip of anecdotes seems to also play this 
game, and well. They could also express a shared culture and bridge the gap between elite and 
peasant by the popularization of elite and monarchic principles (cf. Arist. Rhet. 2.21.9, 15). 
Moreover, humour and wit could also cross temporal and cultural boundaries, and demonstrate 
clearly that the presence or absence of these qualities were important measurements to monarchic 
ideology (cf. Xen. Ages. 8.2). 
                                               
818
 On ancient humour and wit – Segal 1968; Laurence and Paterson 1999: 183-197; Speier 1998: 1352-1401; Corbeill 
1996; and Haliwell 2008. The two main ancient sources for laughter inducing acts or utterances (ridicula) are Cicero’s 
De Oratore Book 2 and Quintilian’s Institutio oratoria Book 6. N.b. the important study of Reekmans which compares 
the humour of Suetonius and Plutarch using Cicero and Quintilian as guides (1992: 189-232). He concluded that there 
was little difference between Greek and Roman humour (1992: 232).  
819
 Cf. Dem. 16.2 and Aul. Gell. N.A. 9.3. Appealing to the known hilaritas of Trajan (Plin. Pan. 4.6)? Isocrates 
advocated avoiding presumption of speech or being too fond of mirth (Ad Dem. 15), thinking it better not to be serious 
when you should be jovial, and not be jovial when you should be serious (Ad Dem. 31; cf. Xen. Ages. 8.3). For the 
humour and good cheer of Cyrus – Xen. Cyrop. 4.5.54-5, 5.2.18, 6.1.16, 8.4.12, and 8.4.20-23.  
820
 E.g. Pompeius and Caesar (Corbeill 1996: 178-199); Vespasian (Suet. Vesp. 13, 23.3, and Dom. 1.3; Murphy 1991: 
3782-84; and Milns 2010: 117-23); Septimius (Cass. Dio 75.1). Cf. Suet. Aug. 86-8; and Ner. 33 (Laurence and 
Paterson 1999: 183-6). On Philip’s eloquence both in serious conversation and jesting - Just. 9.8. Cf. Quint. Inst. Or. 
6.3.1ff.; Suet. Claud. 40; and Plut. Al. 1.2-3. Philip’s ridicula (verbal humour) was of both the cavillatio and dicacitas 
varieties (cf. Cic. De or. 2.218). 
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Belonging to the ‘rich treasury of the instruments of politics’ (Speier 1998: 1354), humour, 
jokes and witticisms are common among Philip’s anecdotes, and reveal well this king’s connection 
between his political skill and charisma.821 Humour ‘forged ties between people, binding those who 
laugh together’ (Speier 1998: 1357), and seems to have been an important aspect of Philip’s 
leadership and legacy. Demosthenes noted Philip’s great interest in jokes (2.19), and elsewhere it is 
stated that Philip even sent money away to famous comedians to send him jokes (Athen. 14.614d-
e). Philip’s humour and jokes sometimes came at the expense of other individuals,822 or even whole 
foundations which could be named in jest. 
 
w{sper hJ povli", h{n ejk tw'n kakivstwn kai; ajnagwgotavtwn ktivsa" oJ Fivlippo"                 
Ponhrovpolin proshgovreusen (Mor. 520B = De Cur. 10).823  
 
The Philip of anecdotal tradition certainly took advantage of almost any situation to bring 
forth some impromptu witticism or joke. Indeed, it seems Philip had a real talent for spontaneous 
retorts and affirmations. For example, even after a serious defeat in battle Philip was able to 
retaliate with his wit in some kind of face saving and morale lifting retort (example 5.17).   
  
 5.17 
!Onovmarco" Makedovsi paratassovmeno" o[ro" mhnoeide;" kata; nwvtou labw;n kai; tai'" eJk
atevrwqen korufai'" ejgkatakruvya" pevtrou" kai; petrobovlou" proh'ge th;n  duvnamin ej" to;
 uJpokeivmenon pedivon. wJ" de; oiJ Makedovne" ajntepiovnte" hjkrobolivsanto, oiJ Fwkei'"        
prosepoihvsanto feuvgein ej" ta; mevsa tou' o[rou". oiJ me;n dh; Makedovne" qumw'/ kai; rJuvmh/   
diwvkonte" ejpevkeinto, oiJ de; ajpo; tw'n korufw'n tou;" pevtrou" bavllonte" sunevtribon th;n 
Makedonikh;n favlagga. tovte dh; !Onovmarco" ejshvmhnen toi'" Fwkeu'sin ejpistrevfein kai; 
toi'" polemivoi" embavllein. oiJ de; Makedovne", tw'n me;n o[pisqen ejmballovntwn, tw'n de; a[nw
qen tou;" pevtrou" ballovntwn, su;n pollw'/ povnw/ fugovnte" ajnecwvrhsan. ejn tauvth/ th'/ fugh'/
to;n basileva tw'n Makedovnwn Fivlippon fasi;n eijpei'n @oujk e[fugon, ajll! ajnecwvrhsa       
w{sper oiJ krioi;, i{n! au\qi" poihvswmai sfodrotevran th;n ejmbolhvn! (Strat. 2.38.2; cf. Diod. 
16.35.2).824  
 
Found in Polyaenus, Philip’s apophthegma serves the role of a being a positive stratagem for 
reacting to a serious defeat.825 Though the focus is on the generalship and stratagems of 
Onomarchus for the majority of the tale - its ending belongs entirely to Philip. Philip’s remark gets 
                                               
821
 E.g. Plut. Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 3, cf. Mor. 105A, 666A. 
822
 E.g. making fun of Cleisophus publically – Athen. 6.248d-f. cf. 6.250c-d. 
823
 ‘It is like the city populated by the vilest and most intractable of men which Philip founded and called 
Roguesborough.’ cf. Theopompus F.110. 
824
 ‘When Onomarchus was deploying against the Macedonians, he put a crescent-shaped mountain in his rear, 
concealed men on the peaks at both ends with rocks and rock-throwing engines, and led his forces forward into the plain 
below. When the Macedonians came out against them and threw their javelins, the Phocians pretended to flee into the 
hollow middle of the mountain. As the Macedonians, pursuing with an eager rush, pressed them, the men on the peaks 
threw rocks and crushed the Macedonians phalanx. Then indeed Onomarchus signalled the Phocians to turn and attack 
the enemy. The Macedonians, under attack from behind while those up above continued to throw rocks, retreated 
rapidly in great distress. They say that during this flight the king of Macedonians, Philip, said, ‘I do not flee, but retreat 
like rams do, in order to attack again more violently.’’ 
825
 On Polyaenus, stratagems and Philip’s generalship, see chap. six. 
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the last laugh and instantly forces the auditor’s attention forward in time to when Philip also has the 
last laugh. Philip predicts his decisive victory at the Crocus field (Diod. 16.35.4-5; Just. 8.2.1-4), 
and knowledge of this in the auditor intensifies Philip’s comment - validating and magnifying its 
humour with the reality of truth. Onomarchus’ stratagem is a good one, victory here substantiates 
and justifies its use by both writer and reader. However, inclusion of Philip’s comment by 
Polyaenus also highlights that its success was ultimately limited – Onomarchus never followed it 
up.826 Whereas, Philip’s confidence in future success after such a demoralizing defeat is exemplary 
(cf. Xen. Cyrop. 1.4.5). Philip was true to his word in the end, and this was worth recording for 
Frontinus. 
Example 5.18 is again a clear example of Philip’s ability to call forth witty remarks almost 
at will.     
5.18 
 
... ajlla; ma'llon to; tou' Filivppou logizovmeno": pesw;n ga;r ejn palaivstra/ kai;                
metastrafeiv", wJ" ei\de tou' swvmato" to;n tuvpon, “w\ @Hravklei",” ei\pen, “wJ"  
mikrou' mevrou" th'" gh'" fuvsei metevconte" o{lh" ejfievmeqa th'"  oijkoumevnh" (Plut. De 
exilio 8 = Mor. 602D).”827  
 
Like example 5.17, this tale shows Philip saving face and diverting attention away from his defeat 
and embarrassment. It is a humorous, beneficial, and somewhat moralistic statement from a famous 
monarch. It is one of a number of anecdotes used to console Plutarch’s reader on being exiled. More 
specifically, the tale counsels on being satisfied with where one ends up, and not to covert more or 
other places. The slight irony of Philip making the statement is not lost on Plutarch, who uses it 
specifically for that reason. If Philip, who supposedly wanted all of Greece in his possession (and 
fathered that world conqueror Alexander), can come to such a humbling conclusion – then surely 
Plutarch’s ‘exile’ can accept his lot with equal humility. Like a physician of the soul, Plutarch 
exploits Philip’s wisdom, humour and wit as balms for a friend’s distress. Philip’s tale is an ancient 
solace for a present-day ill.    
In Plutarch’s collection, the word-play humour of example 3.4 is followed by yet more 
Philippic wit (example 5.19). 
5.19.A 
 
Mevllwn de; katastratopedeuvein ejn cwrivw/ kalw'/ kai; puqovmeno" o{ti covrto" oujk e[sti      
toi'" uJpozugivoi", “oi|o",” ei\pen, “oJ bivo" hJmw'n ejstin, eij kai; pro;" to;n tw'n o[nwn  
kairo;n ojfeivlomen zh'n (Mor. 178A = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 13);”828  
                                               
826
 Worthington 2008: 59. 
827
 ‘... but he will rather reason as Philip did, who said, on being thrown in wrestling, as he turned about and saw the 
imprint of his body: ‘Good God! How small a portion of the earth we hold by nature, yet we covert the whole earth!’’ 
828
 ‘When he (Philip) was about to pitch his camp in an excellent place, he learned that there was no grass for the pack-
animals. ‘What a life is ours,’ he said, ‘if we must live to suit the convenience of the asses!’’ (cf. Eunapius Frag. 56). 
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Another version is found in Plutarch’s Whether an Old Man Should Engage in Public Affairs (11). 
It is the less serious of two anecdotes which follow Plutarch’s comments that kingship, ‘the most 
perfect and greatest of all political offices, has the most cares, labours and occupations (Mor. 
790B).’ 
 5.19.B 
 
to;n de; Fivlippon ejn kalw'/ cwrivw/ mevllonta katastratopedeuvein, wJ" h[kousen o{ti covrto"
oujk e[sti toi'" uJpozugivoi" “w\ @Hravklei",” eijpei'n, “oi|o" hJmw'n oJ bivo", eij kai;  pro;" to;n  
tw'n o[nwn kairo;n ojfeivlomen zh'n (Mor. 790B = An Seni. 11).”829  
 
It proves Plutarch’s point – almost to absurdity. It also gives some insight (like example 5.12) into 
Philip’s quick thinking humour which pokes fun at what may have been quite a frustrating, if not 
awkward moment (which was obviously well remembered given its popularity). Indeed, it is known 
that humour could diffuse difficult situations as it does here (Laurence and Paterson 1999: 185, 
189). It could also dilute the resentment often directed at a leader who faced difficult decisions 
almost daily (cf. Suet. Vesp. 23). The following examples show Philip using humour to great effect 
to achieve both of these things.  
  
 5.20 
Fivlippo" ejn palaivstra/ kai; Mhnhgevth" oJ pagkratiasth;" ejkulivonto: oiJ stratiw'tai    
kuvklw/ peristavnte" katebovwn th;n misqofora;n ajpaitou'nte". oujk e[cwnoJ Fivlippo"         
prosh'lqen iJdrw'ti rJeovmeno", kekonimevno", prosmeidiavsa" aujtoi'"  ‘divkaia’, e[fh,  
‘levgete, w\ sustratiw'tai, ajllav toi kajgw; dia; tou'ta nu'n ejpi; to;n bavrbaron ajleivfomai,  
o{pw" uJmi'n pollaplasivw" ajpotivsaimi ta;" cavrita"’. tau'ta eijpw;n kai; tai'n ceroi'n        
krotw'n, dia; mevswn dramw;n, ej" kolumbhvqran ejpevrriyen eJauto;n, kai; oiJ Makedovne"         
ejgevlasan. oJ Fivlippo" mevcri tosouvtou diabaptixovmeno" pro;" to;n pagkratiasth;n kai;  
kata; tou' proswvpou rJainovmeno" oujk ajnh'ken, e[st! a[n oiJ stratiw'tai kamovnte"              
ajperruvhsan. tou' strathghvmato" touvtou kai; aujto;" Fivlippo" para; tou;" povtou"          
ejmevmnhto pollavki", wJ" ajsteivw" diakrousavmeno" tou;" ajpaitou'nta"   
(Poly. Strat. 4.2.6).830  
 
This humorous stratagem of Philip’s (example 5.20) is found in the work of Polyaenus, and 
clearly shows Philip using humour to deflect the legitimate claims of his soldiers for pay.831 Whilst 
                                               
829
 ‘And Philip, we are told, when he heard, as he was on the point of encamping in a suitable place, that there was no 
fodder for the beasts of draught, exclaimed: ‘O Heracles, what a life is mine, if I must needs live to suit the convenience 
even of my asses!’’ 
830
 ‘Philip and Menegetes the pancratiast were wrestling in the palaestra. The soldiers were standing around in a circle 
shouting demands for their pay. Not having the money, Philip came forward dripping with sweat and covered with dust, 
smiled, and said to them, ‘You speak the truth, fellow soldiers, but for these very reasons I am rubbing myself with oil 
now against the barbarian, so I can repay your favours many times over.’ After saying this and clapping his hands, he 
ran through the middle of the soldiers and threw himself into a swimming pool, and the Macedonians laughed. Philip 
continued to dive in competition with the pankratiast, and did not stop sprinkling his face until the soldiers grew tired 
and departed. When drinking Philip himself often recalled this stratagem, how he politely evaded the soldiers asking for 
their pay.’ 
831
 Though a martial themed stratagem, it is included here for its strong focus on Philip’s humour and its lack of a direct 
relationship to battle. On paying the Macedonian army – Sekunda 2010: 465-66; and Milns 1987: 233-56.  
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it was probably never meant as an example for direct imitation, it does show what was possible in 
terms of distraction by a quick witted king or commander when faced by difficult demands from 
their soldiers or army.832 Supplying and paying ones’ men was a perennial problem for many 
commanders in the ancient world, and Philip’s tale offered something of an unusual and amusing 
solution. This humour also had the power to create bonds between the men and himself.833 
Certainly, Philip’s funny ruse displays an almost endearing roguish quality which pervades many of 
the other anecdotes about him. It is this particular attribute which may account for some elements of 
Philip’s disputed reputation.834 Here, this quality underpins Philip’s devious humour, and creates a 
paradigm that must have been of some interest to the ancients.  
 Plutarch gives three accounts of the next tale (example 5.21). It sees Philip use what is 
described in one instance as a ‘polite joke’ (to; paicqe;n ajsteivw") to deftly see off a potentially 
embarrassing situation for his host.  
 
5.21.A 
i{n! ou\n mh; pu'r ejpi; puriv, w{" fasi, plhsmonhv ti" ejpi; plhsmonh'/ kai; a[krato" ejp!  ajkravtw/
gevnhtai, to; paicqe;n ajsteivw" uJpo; Filivppou meta; spoudh'" mimhtevon: h\n de; toiou'ton.   
a[nqrwpo" aujto;n ejpi; cwvra" wJ" su;n ojlivgoi" o[nta deipnh'sai parekavlesen, ei\q! oJrw'n      
pollou;" a[gonta pareskeuasmevnwn ouj pollw'n ejtaravtteto. sunaisqovmeno" ou\n oJ         
Fivlippo" uJpevpempe tw'n fivlwn eJkavstw/ keleuvwn plakou'nti katalipei'n cwvran, oiJ de;     
peiqovmenoi kai; prosdokw'nte" ejfeivdonto tw'n parkeimevnwn. h[rkesen ou\n a{pasi to;        
dei'pnon (Mor. 123E-124A = De Tuenda 4).835 
 
 5.21.B 
 
!Epei; de; uJpov tino" xevnou klhqei;" ejpi; dei'pnon ejn oJdw'/ pollou;" ejphvgeto kai; to;n xevnon   
eJwvra qorubouvmenon, h\n ga;r oujk iJkana; ta; pareskeuasmevna, propevmpwn tw'nfivlwn         
eJkavstw, plakou'nti cwvran ejkevleuen ajpoleivpein: oiJ de; peiqovmenoi kai; prosdokw'nte" oujk
h[sqion pollav, kai; pa'sin ou{tw" h[rkesen (Mor. 178D-E = Reg. et imp. apoph. Phil. 20).836  
 
 
 
 
                                               
832
 Though is is unclear just exactly what the humour was in this tale. Either way, the Macedonian soldiers clearly found 
Philip’s actions amusing. 
833
 A fact well understood by Julius Caesar who often showed off his wit as a general (e.g. Suet. Iul. 34.2, 59, 66; Poly. 
Strat. 8.23.15; cf. Front. Strat. 1.12.2; Dio 42.58.2-3). 
834
 Griffith (1980: 66) labels Philip’s action in this tale a ‘piece of buffoonery’, and notes that Philip’s ally here was his 
great wealth – the soldiers knew that they would eventually be paid. 
835
 ‘Therefore, to avoid adding fire to fire (as the proverb has it), and gorging to gorging, and strong drink to strong 
drink, we ought with all seriousness to imitate the polite joke of Philip. It was in this wise: A man had invited Philip to 
dinner in the country, assuming that he had but a few with him, but when later the host saw Philip bringing a great 
company, no great preparations having been made, he was much perturbed. Philip, becoming aware of the situation, 
sent word privately to each of his friends to ‘leave room for cake.’ They, following the advice, and looking for more to 
come, ate sparingly of what was before them, and so the dinner was ample for all.’ Cf. Pl. Laws 666A. 
836
 ‘Once when he was on the march, and was invited to dinner by a man of the land, he took a good many persons with 
him; and when he saw that his host was much perturbed, since the preparations that had been made were inadequate, he 
sent word in advance to each of his friends, and told them to ‘leave room for cake.’ They took his advice and, expecting 
more to follow, did not eat much, and thus there was enough for all.’ 
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 5.21.C 
 
...ajriqmo;n d! oJrivzein, o{pw" mh; pavqwsin o{ paqei'n sunevpese tw'/ decomevnw/ to;n basileva   
Fivlippon ejpi; th'" cwvra": h|ke ga;r a[gwn pollouv", to; de; dei'pnon ouj polloi'" h\n             
pareskeuasmevnon: ijdw;n ou\n qorubouvmenon to;n xevnon perievpempe pro;" tou;" fivlou"      
ajtrevma, cwvran plakou'nti katalipei'n keleuvwn: oiJ de; prosdokw'nte" uJpefeivdonto tw'n   
parakeimevnwn kai; pa'sin ou{tw" ejxhvrkese to; dei'pnon (Mor. 707B = Quaes. Conv. 
7.6.1).837  
 
There is little between these versions of the anecdote in terms of details. What is important is that 
the tale is a great example of Philip’s practical intelligence (phronesis) and humour. Showing great 
awareness Philip discreetly saves a friend and host from embarrassment by playing a small tactful 
joke upon his fellow guests. Plutarch was obviously fond of the tale and utilized it three times to 
great effect. One version comes in a section of Advice About Keeping Well which advises 
moderation in eating and drinking. The anecdote, and in particular Philip’s advice to his men, melds 
effortlessly into the narrative as an illustration of good guidance on the subject. Even though the 
point of the tale is not strictly on controlling appetites for moral or physical benefit,838 but to avoid a 
socially awkward situation. It is food for thought that Philip’s ‘jest advice’ becomes the stuff of diet 
self-help affirmations in the hands of an experienced writer like Plutarch centuries after the events 
themselves.     
Another version comes from Plutarch’s apophthegmata collection. This version obviously 
lacks any real context other than being meant as an illustration of those points made above 
regarding any lessons concerning Philip’s talents (especially his phronesis, humour, and 
friendliness) as a leader. However, the setting of the tale may have led to its inclusion in this work 
for its associations with banquets and the work’s dedicatee. Pliny makes much of Trajan’s dining 
habits in contrast to those of Domitian (Pan. 49.4-8), particularly as dining habits and banquets 
were seen as good indicators of status, tastes, and above all – character.839 Pliny’s focus is 
particularly on Trajan’s suavitas and iucunditas (49.7).840 Philip’s anecdote makes much of the 
induced restraint of his fellow diners, and its appeal may have been in its validation of Trajan’s 
known hospitality and moderation in banqueting – which may have had the same effect in his 
period.    
                                               
837
 ‘...the host had to specify a number, however, so as not to get into the position of the man who entertained Philip in 
the country. He came with a large number, but dinner had not been prepared for so many; so, seeing that his host was 
embarrassed, he passed the word quietly to his friends to ‘save room for cake.’ Looking forward to this, they ate 
sparingly of what lay before them, and in this way there was enough for everyone.’  
838
 Cf. Xen. Ages. 5.1; Cyrop. 1.6.17, 5.2.17. 
839
 Noreña 2011A: 31. That extravagant feasting (and partying) was a manifestation of moral decadence had been a 
stock element of Roman invective since Republican times (Corbeill 1996: 128-135).  
840
 Cf. Dio 68.7 and Roche 2011: 52. It was a key commonplace of the civilis princeps (cf. Corsen 2003: 237-8). 
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The final version is found in Plutarch’s Table Talk (Quaestiones Convivales), a work deeply 
rooted in sympotic texts, problemata texts, and miscellany.841 It is a work which reflects or 
dramatizes the dinner gatherings at Plutarch’s house, with their debates and conversations on 
myriads of topics.842 The anecdote itself comes in a section which discusses ‘shadows’ (skia;"), or 
men who are invited to dinners by other than the host, particularly those who were the associates of 
great men (tw'n hJgemonikw'n). Philip’s anecdote is given as a warning of what could happen to a 
host who did not set a limit on these men. However, like the other versions, the situation is saved by 
Philip’s awareness and quick thinking, rendering the king a witty and perceptive leader. He reveals 
himself to be a man highly cognizant of the concerns of those around him. Philip plays a guest 
whose responsibilities both as a king and friend leave him eager to share the worries of his host. 
The only true victims of Philip’s word perfect humour are the unsated appetites of his fellow diners 
– upon whom the joke was perhaps lost by meal’s end.  
With these three versions Plutarch manipulates the focus of the tale ever so slightly (mainly 
through the use of surrounding contextual material) so as to make differing arguments. Despite this, 
Philip’s image does not change in any meaningful way away from that of a sagacious and caring 
leader who was able to apply his wit to his host’s potentially humiliating problem. The messages 
are different – but Philip remains the same.  
Unlike the above tale, Philip’s wit or humour could also have its real victims. Indeed, 
laughter has long been known to have ‘an unavowed intention to humiliate’ (Bergson 1956: 148), 
and was a powerful mechanism for public humiliation, political denigration, and social exclusion in 
the ancient world.843 Inherent in humour also are beliefs and prejudices that helped to define 
individuals in relation to their communities. Therefore, jokes could establish and articulate social 
values and a community’s ethical standards, and by exposing transgressors of those norms, humour 
could act as a disciplinary mechanism, enforcing positive ideals and communal self-definition.844 
As Cicero argues, ‘No type of joke is such that stern and serious principles may not be drawn from 
the same source (De Orat. 2.251).’ Philip’s humour too could operate on all these levels as the 
following tale clearly demonstrates.  
Found in two authors, the story (example 5.22) is again set at a banquet. It involves the man 
Menecrates, who thought himself the god Zeus in some sense.845     
                                               
841
 Klotz 2011: 12-24; and 2014: 207-222. 
842
 On Plutarch’s self-presentation in this work – Klotz 2007: 650-667; cf. Klotz (ed.) 2011: 170-179. 
843
 Corbeill 1996: 4; Saint-Denis 1965.  
844
 Corbeill 1996: 5-6, 9. 
845
 Each of the two accounts is introduced by another tale (with some differences) of an exchange of letters between 
both Philip and Menecrates in which he refers to himself as Zeus. A very similar tale is told by Plutarch on three other 
occasions about king Agesilaus and Menecrates (Plut. Ages. 21.5; Mor. 191a = Reg. et Imp. Apop. Ages. 5; Mor. 213A 
= Lac. Apoph. 59). Athenaeus also mentions similar letters being sent to king Archidamus in his Philippic version 
(289D).  
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 5.22.A 
 
EiJstiva pote; megaloprepw'" oJ Fivlippo", kai; dh; kai; tou'ton ejpi; qoivnhn ejkavlese, kai; ijdiva/
klivnhn aujtw'/ ejkevleuse pareskeuavsqai, kai; katakliqevnti qumiathvrion parevqhke, kai;      
ejqumia'to aujtw'/: oiJ de; loipoi; eiJstiw'nto, kai; h\n megaloprepe;" to;   dei'pnon. oJ toivnun    
Menekravth" ta; me;n prw'ta ejnekartevrei kai; e[caire th'/ timh'/: ejpei; de; kata; mikro;n oJ      
limo;" perih'lqen aujto;n kai; hjlevgceto o{ti h\n a[nqrwpo" kai; tau'ta eujhvqh", ejxanasta;"    
ajpiw;n w[/ceto kai; e[legen uJbrivsqai, ejmmelw'" pavnu tou'  Filivppou th;n a[noian aujtou'        
ejkkaluvyanto" (Ael. V.H.12.51).846 
 
 
 5.22.B 
 
kalevsa" d! aujtovn pote ejpi; dei'pnon oJ Fivlippo" meta; tw'n ijdivwn qew'n sugkatevkline      
pavnta" ejpi; th'" mevsh" klivnh" uJyhlovtata kai; iJeroprepevstata kekosmhmevnh", kai;        
travpezan paraqeiv", ejf! h|" bwmo;" e[keito kai; tw'n ajpo gh'" pantodapw'n ajparcaiv. kai;    
oJpovte toi'" a[lloi" parefevreto ta; ejdwvdima, toi'" ajmfi; Menekravthn ejqumivwn í kai; 
e[spendon oiJ pai'de": kai; tevlo" oJ kaino;" Zeu;" meta; tw'nuJphkovwn gelwvmeno" qew'n          
e[fugen ejk tou' sumposivou, wJ" @Hghvsandro" iJstorei' (Athen. 7.289c-f).847 
 
There are some minor differences in details, one of the most notable being the so called ‘personal 
deities’ (tw'n ijdivwn qew'n) who attend the banquet with Menecrates in Athenaeus. However, 
essentially the tale comes down to Philip ‘very artfully’ (ejmmelw'" pavnu) and, for those present, 
rather humorously bringing the man’s arrogance or insanity into the open. Menecrates is denied the 
treats of the feast because of his diviness. Philip’s debunking of Menecrates’ pretensions to some 
kind of divinity is an example of two types of humour.848 Firstly, for Menecrates it is of the type 
discussed above, whereby a violator of social norms is exposed and suffers social exclusion and 
ridicule as a result of Philip’s prank. The second type involves the audience, who, by laughing with 
their superior at Menecrates, engage in what has been called the ‘laughter of the mighty’ (Speier 
1998: 1388). This comes about as Philip suspends his authority and superiority with his 
subordinates through the equalizing power of laughter – forming a coalition between joker and his 
laughing audience which dissolves hierarchy.849 However, though some of Philip’s audience must 
have relished the opportunity to laugh with the king, others must have feared that refusal to laugh 
                                               
846
 ‘Philip was giving a grand banquet, and he invited this man to the feast. He ordered a separate couch for him, and 
when Menecrates had settled in his place Philip put an incense burner close to him, and lit the incense for him. 
Everyone else was feasting, and it was a splendid occasion. At first Menecrates was able to hold out and he enjoyed the 
honour paid to him; but when hunger gradually overcame him and he was shown up to be the mortal he was, and a 
naive one at that, he got up and walked away, saying he had been insulted. Philip had very artfully brought his insanity 
into the open.’   
847
 ‘Once when Philip invited Menecrates to dinner along with his personal deities, he had them all lie down on the 
central couch, which was very high and elaborately decorated in a style appropriate for gods, and set a table beside them 
with an altar of first-fruits of all the earth’s products on top of it. Whenever food was brought to the other guests, the 
slaves burned incense and poured libations for Menecrates’ group; and in the end the new Zeus fled the party with 
everyone laughing at him and his subject deities, according to Hegesander.’  
848
 This tale is at odds with evidence elsewhere for Philip’s own divine pretentions (evidence in Worthington 2008: 228-
33).   
849
 Cf. Speier 1998: 1355, 1388. Humour could also come from the ‘bottom to the top’, victimizing prominent 
individuals of power (Speier 1998: 1353; e.g. Plut. Mor. 67F; 179B; 334D; 634D; cf. Ael. V.H. 9.36).    
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was close to insubordination or defiance. Therefore, as this humour could reinforce the supremacy 
or domination of the joking leader, it has also been label ‘paternalistic humour’ (Speier 1998: 
1388).  
 Philip’s joke also exposes Menecrates’ madness without the use of overt confrontation or 
violence. Philip deescalates and influences what was an anomalous situation, disciplining the man’s 
inappropriate behaviour with the community’s full collaboration. The boundaries of normality for 
the elite are in sense being set from the king down,850 and being corroborated by those in 
attendance. Philip’s joke establishes his role publically in setting and enforcing some of the values 
of his retinue and court, and even beyond. Therefore, not only was a king and leader able to set the 
standard as a paradigm for imitation, but was able to draw attention to those who violated what he 
and others held to be community agreed values or standards. Here monarchic ideology works from 
the top down – but does so endorsed and aligned with the community’s values and expectations. 
Philip’s humour masks what are more serious aspects. It was these qualities that gave the tale 
deeper meaning, greater appeal and utility.851 It spoke to past, current and future concerns around a 
variety of themes, and suited various purposes from entertainment to implicit didactic moralizing on 
contemporary politics and mores.  
In the end, Philip’s humour and wit were powerful attributes which he used to great effect as 
a statesman. They are ubiquitous throughout his tales and sayings, and they help to define Philip’s 
leadership. They were also a means by which the social, political, and cultural values of Philip’s 
period were accessed and utilized to address the more immediate interests and issues of a later 
author’s own society.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Tales concerning Philip’s trust and praise; generosity and bribery; greed and wisdom 
(phronesis); and industriousness and humour were all of special significance to later authors when it 
came to articulating Philip the king, statesman, leader, and exemplar. They were accepted channels 
by which to ponder Philip, his legacy, and contemporary values and issues in the Roman world 
(particularly around the role of the civilis Princeps). Indeed, though each author and generation 
dictated the script and lighting, Philip’s image never completely left antiquity’s stage. Instead, it 
                                               
850
 Cf. Corbeill 1996: 12. 
851
 It was also to Philip’s benefit e.g. ‘…the more vigorously you condemn folly in others, the more diligently will you 
train your own understanding (Isoc. Ad Nic. 14).’ 
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played on to an audience primed to understand all the moral and literary cues – allowing for its easy 
incorporation into ongoing cultural and political debates.  
When it came to friendship and politics, Philip’s tales were well grounded in contemporary 
fourth-century BCE ideologies (exemplified by Xenophon and Isocrates), and the political, social, 
and cultural structures of Macedonia. In particular, the centrality of its monarchy allowed for 
meaningful comparative reflections with later autocrats. This was possible because of certain 
enduring ‘truths’. For example, a ruler’s popularity and safety (and that of his state), were closely 
linked to those who surrounded him and acted in his name; good rulers trusted, praised, rewarded 
and utilized individuals of talent rather than fearing and eliminating them; good leaders were 
industrious on behalf of their friends and the state; they were also intelligent, witty, kind, generous, 
affable, and believed in reciprocity and gracious. Moreover, Philip’s tales allowed authors like 
Aelian to make safe critiques and commentary on contemporary Roman rulers and elite culture – as 
they did also for authors like Cicero and Seneca in terms of latrocinia, avaritia and largitio. Finally, 
these tales of Philip demonstrated the power of humour and wit in a statesmen – its power to 
neutralize or even resolve difficult situations, its capacity to construct persona and express 
character, and its ability to share, construct, and enforce cultural and behavioural norms.     
The anecdotal Philip’s impressive power to make and keep friends, bribe his enemies, and 
make others laugh, transcended his own life time and engaged the Roman world as much as it does 
our own.  Therefore, when it came to friendship and politics – Philip II offered a popular and 
powerful exemplar upon which to ruminate.  
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6 
 
Philip the Warrior and General 
 
Reflecting on War in the Roman World with the Example of 
Philip II 
  
 
!Enqumou' d! o{ti mavlista touvtou" timw'sin a{pante" kai; qaumavzousin, oi{tine" ajmfovtera          
duvnantai, kai; politeuvesqai kai; strathgein (Isoc. Ad Phil. 140).852 
 
 
‘The ability to lead armies was what made Philip a great king’ (Billows 1995: 21). 
 
  
Philip II was a great statesman and politician, but he was also a great military leader.853 Therefore, 
unsurprisingly, various tales of Philip’s exploits as a warrior and general were recorded, handed 
down, and widely disseminated. Moreover, for a Macedonian king like Philip, whose position 
depended on his military authority (internally and often externally), it was inevitable that military 
anecdotes would form a significant part of his legacy. This chapter examines many of these tales 
and highlights various recurrent themes and ideas. Therefore, after introducing important topics 
such as morality and strategemata, and Philip’s Macedonian martial heritage, this chapter looks at 
areas such as Philip’s stratagems, tactics and cunning – including in battle, sieges, naval matters, 
diplomacy, truce negotiations and withdrawals, training and discipline; discipline in battle; the 
battle of Chaeronea and events directly after Philip’s victory; Philip and oaths; and Philip on the 
receiving end of Spartan apophthegmata and wit. These tales clearly demonstrate Philip’s value as a 
military paradigm long after his death by showing the versatility and usefulness of this martial 
aspect of Philip’s legacy and image. Through an examination of this kind of anecdotal material, 
Philip is shown to be a popular and useful exemplar of military achievement and creativity. 
Moreover, like other famous foreign and domestic generals from the past such as Hannibal, 
                                               
852
 ‘Bear in mind that the men whom the world most admires and honours are those who unite in themselves the 
abilities of the statesman and the general.’  
853
 On Philip as general - Griffith 1980: 48-57; Cawkwell 1996: 108-112, 1978: 150-65; Billows 1990: 30-33, 1995: 11-
20; and Moore 2013: 463-64. For an evaluation of Philip - including his generalship - Worthington 2008: 194-203. For 
a comprehensive study of warfare in the classical world - Campbell and Tritle (eds.) 2013, including a chapter on 
generalship by Moore (2013: 457-73).   
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Alexander, Pompey and Julius Caesar – Philip was a functional and mostly positive presence with 
whom interested parties meditated on the practice of war in the Roman world.854    
There are two distinct ways in which ‘Philip the warrior and general’ is used in the examples 
given in this chapter. There is his presentation (particularly in battle) as a talented general of some 
genius and cunning, whose image and legacy were meant to inspire other military commanders to 
similar accomplishments. There is also a Philip whose actions before, during and after battle are 
employed for moral purposes with no real strategic content whatsoever.855 Many of these types of 
tales unify the king’s role as both general and statesmen for the purpose of making more moral 
judgements. Certainly, evolving complex attitudes towards the role of the Roman emperor in the 
field and at home in times of conflict affected the survival and popularity of this kind of material.  
 
 
Morality and Strategemata  
 
 
Martial proficiency was often subordinated in value to the highly considered moral or 
ethical facets of a monarch’s character (this could change – particularly during periods of 
instability). However, the majority of those martial anecdotes which show Philip actively engaged 
in warfare and battle are not given to make individuals who read and digested them into morally 
better generals or monarchs. Therefore, ‘moral monarchic ideology’ is not the focal message of 
these types of tales. Instead, they appear focused on good martial prowess and/or being a good 
military leader, which were at different times and to varying degrees considered important aspects 
of any leader’s abilities.856 As this chapter demonstrates, Philip’s tales are mostly positive when 
judged by the criteria of martial practicality and success. However, when morality is drawn into the 
equation, more negative elements are found (though true of a great many other individuals whose 
tales were selected for this type of material). In the end, martial considerations normally trump 
morality in this genre when actual strategy, tactics, or fighting are involved. However, these 
anecdotes are still easily linked to, and reflective of many other virtues in their application. Like 
those tales which were more concerned with Philip’s moral behaviour, particularly before and after 
battle, connections could be made with a number of important values, such as the cardinal virtues of 
                                               
854
 On Philip’s comparative status with these and other individuals regarding numbers of stratagems, especially in both 
Polyaenus and Frontinus – see Introduction. On Roman attitudes towards Greek military achievement – Petrochilos 
1974: 93-104.  
855
 There are other odd tales e.g. Caracalla’s advancement of a Macedonian through all the grades of a military career, 
eventually appointing him as a senator, because his father’s name had been Philip (Cass. Dio 78.8). On Caracalla and 
Alexander the Great – Baharal 1994 and 2003.      
856
 They are present in the classical literature of both Xenophon and Isocrates e.g. Xen. Ages. 1.16-17, 20-29; 2.1, 8, 12, 
18, 24-27; 3.5; 4.6; 5.3; 6.3, 4; 11.11-12; Cyrop. Passim and Isoc. Ad Nic. 24. They were still present at the height of 
the Roman Empire e.g. Plin. Pan. 6, 10, 12-13, 15-16, 18.  
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frovnhsi"/sofiva (prudentia/sapientia), and ajndreiva (virtus); and others such as 
provnoia (providentia), megaloyuciva (magnanimitas) and ejpieivkeia (clementia).  
The majority of those types of tales which feature Philip actively engaged in warfare come 
from the collections of Polyaenus and Frontinus, and are classed as stra'th;ghmatav or 
stratagems.857 Therefore, the focus, rather than being on historical accuracy and virtues, is on 
technical details, tricks, and traits or abilities. These include resourcefulness, innovation, 
adaptability, vision, deception, cunning, cleverness, seizing the right moment, astute diplomacy, 
manipulation, bribery, or more generally – on the invention of stratagems or indirect means to 
achieve goals or victory (often without battle).858 This was an ancient doctrine of intelligent or rusé 
generalship whereby brains overcame brawn.859 It held up wily Odysseus as the ideal commander 
(cf. Od. 9.406 ‘by trickery or force’), particularly by the Roman period under Stoic influence, 
whereby its principles argued away the moral reservations about deceit and trickery in war.860 It was 
these successful stratagems and military deeds of Philip which were offered to would be 
commanders, along with their principles and theories, as loose templates for imitation and 
wellsprings for further martial innovation.861  
This is exactly what Polyaenus intended with his collection of stratagems, which he 
dedicated to the emperors Lucius Verus and Marcus Aurelius when war broke out with the 
Parthians in 161-166 CE.862 The latter was of course deeply stoical and highly receptive to this kind 
of work and any tales of Philip’s military exploits within.863 As for Frontinus, to understand his 
aims for the Strategemata, the programmatic statements of the work’s introduction are vital.864 
Frontinus states that he wanted to summarize in convenient sketches the clever operations of 
                                               
857
 On the author and his work – Lammert 1952: 1432-1436; Phillips 1970; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: vi – xvi; 
Buraselis 1995: 121-140; Campbell 1996: 1209; Meister 2001: 40-41; and Wheeler 2010: 7-54. On strategemata – 
Lammert 1932: 174-181. 
858
 Cf. Xen. Cyrop. 1.6.27, 35-41; 2.4.16ff.; 5.3.12-17; 6.3.30; Ages. 1.16-17, 2.18-19. 
859
 Moore 2013: 462. 
860
 Krentz and Wheeler 1994: vi-vii, xix; Wheeler 2010: 24-29. On Stoic themes in the Strategika – Wheeler 2010: 24-
27. Polyaenus reflects Stoic doctrine from the very beginning when he uses the authority of Homer (held to be a sage by 
the Stoics) to start with an excursus on the stratagems of Odysseus (1 praef. 4-13; Wheeler 2010: 25; Bolling 1929: 
330-334). N.b that the Historia Augusta advocates the worth of past experience (Roman and foreign) to strategic 
thinking (Sev. Alex. 16.3). 
861
 Cf. Wheeler 2010: 38. Roman propaganda sold the ‘Romans as the people of fides who disdained stratagems’ 
(Wheeler 2010: 26), however, authors like Fontinus and Polyaenus easily compiled stratagems from the Republican era. 
Cf. Wheeler 1988c: 166-95.  
862
 Xenophontov 2002: 212-15. Polyaenus also dedicated it to those sent by the emperors (seemingly for use in further 
educating the troops under them) – ‘to those sent by you, polemarchs, generals, legates of legions, tribunes, prefects of 
cohorts, and other officers, teaching the merits and skills of ancient victories to their troops’ (Poly. Strat. 1. Praef. 1-2; 
cf. 5 praef.).  
863
 On Marcus Aurelius – Birley 1987. 
864
 Cf. Campbell 1987: 14-15. On Frontinus and his work – Kappelmacher 1919: 591-606; Duff 1964: 338-342; Perkins 
1937: 102-105; Eck 1983: 47-62; Campbell 1987: 13-29; Wheeler 1988a: 7-29; Sallmann 1998: 678; Dahm 1999; Eck 
and Pangerl 2003: 205-211; Turner 2007: 423-449. On technical writing – Goodyear 1982b: 667-673, and on military 
manuals more specifically – Campbell 1987: 13-29. 
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generals.865 ‘For in this way commanders will be furnished with specimens of wisdom and 
foresight, which will serve to foster their own power of conceiving and executing like deeds... (Str. 
1. Pr.).’ Philip’s tales were more than just models - but a catalysts for similar actions. Others had 
narrated the tales Frontinus was to set forth, but his work was to have a more practical purpose as a 
handbook for Roman commanders.866 Therefore, Philip’s tales had a more acute purpose and 
audience in Frontinus, who believed that the ‘art of generalship was a straightforward, common-
sense activity for which a man could prepare himself... by copying previous exempla and by using 
handbooks’ (Campbell 1987: 14). Taking material about individuals like Philip from various 
nationalities and from a variety of sources,867 Frontinus’ work was undertaken directly for the 
benefit of others. The collecting and exhibiting of Philip’s tales was no exercise in antiquarian 
erudition. Its purpose was to educate and inspire - but always with a focus on clarity, brevity, and 
arrangement (Frontin. Str. 1. Pr.).   
 
 
Philip’s Macedonian Martial Heritage  
 
Foregoing the Macedonian heritage of such a writer as Polyaenus, which garnished the 
author’s credibility to offer advice on fighting in the East,868 it is unsurprising that Philip’s martial 
exploits feature in his collection. Philip rejuvenated an army and kingdom on the verge of 
dissolution, leading the Macedonians on to victories and unprecedented expansion.869 Often in the 
van, Philip fought and suffered the same risks as his men (Diod. 16.4.5; 16.34.5; 16.86.4), and 
ultimately won their loyalty and respect with this style of kingship and his generous rewards (e.g. 
Diod. 16.53.2-3).870 Often Philip’s success was seen as the product of both his political guile and 
military prowess.871 As Diodorus states early in his account of Philip’s period, ‘this king excelled in 
shrewdness in the art of war, courage and brilliance of personality’ (16.1.6), and ‘won great acclaim 
among the Macedonians for his successes due to his courage’ (16.8.1), ‘excellence’ (ajrethv - 16.1.4, 
                                               
865
 This was in order to complete the task Frontinus had begun with his now lost work on Greek and Roman military 
science (Frontin. Str. 1. prooem; cf. Vegetius 1.8; 11.3). It was this work and the Strategemata which seem to have led 
to Trajan’s high opinion of Frontinus (Idem fecerunt alii complures, sed praecipue Frontinus, diuo Traiano ab eiusmodi 
comprobatus industria - Veg. 2.3.7). 
866
 Turner 2007: 430. 
867 
 On Frontinus’ use of sources – Bendz 1938: 54-100. Frontinus used collections of exempla, and literary sources such 
as Sallust, Livy, and Caesar (Turner 2007: 427 n. 13). His relationship with Valerius Maximus is complicated by their 
access to the same types of collections of exempla. 
868
 Krentz and Wheeler 1994: ix and xii. 
869
 A quick survey of Diodorus alone confirms Philip’s good generalship – 16.3.6; 16.4.2-3; 16.4.4-7; 16.8.2; 16.8.3; 
16.8.5; 16.14.2; 16.22.3; 16.31.6; 16.34.4-5; 16.35.1; 16.35.5; 16.52.9; 16.53.2; 16.69.7; 16.71.2; 16.84.2; 16.85.6-7; 
and 16.86.4. According to Xenophon a good leader’s function was to make those he led successful (eujdaimoniva - Mem. 
3.2.4 – Gray 2011: 11, 26-27).  
870
 Cf. King 2010: 380 and Xen. Ages. 5.3. 
871
 Polyaenus gives an excellent example (Strat. 4.2.19). 
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6), and ‘piety and excellent generalship’ (16.60.4; cf. 16.38.2, and 64.3). Moreover, according to 
Didodorus, Philip’s success at Chaeronea was due to his advantage in numbers and good 
generalship (th;n strathgivan) – which came from his extensive experience (16.85.6-7). But in 
keeping with many of the examples of this chapter, it was at strategy that Philip excelled, so much 
so, that ‘Philip himself is said to have been prouder of his grasp of strategy and his diplomatic 
successes than of his valour in actual battle’ (Diod. 16.95.3-4).872  
During Philip’s lifetime Macedonia had a form of kingship which fostered all these abilities. 
It was ostensibly heroic or quasi-Homeric in nature.873 The king was preeminent amongst aristocrats 
because of his wealth and power, which rested on his own ajrethv and his ability to lead men in 
war.874 Moreover, the Homeric nature of the elite is exemplified by the practice of advancement due 
to personal merit - and the national pastimes of hunting, feasting, drinking, and war.875 Being brave 
in the latter of these was especially esteemed,876 as the heroes of epic, with their violent warrior 
principles, were inspirational figures for most Macedonians.877 Holt writes –   
 
Macedonia was a tough place that bred a tough population. To survive in the midst of so 
many enemies… the Macedonians held fast to the heroic warrior code of Homer’s Iliad and 
Odyssey.... In battles, brawls, and drinking bouts, the Macedonians measured a man from 
king to commoner by the implacable standards of Achilles and Agamemnon (Holt 2003: 7). 
 
                                               
872
 Cf. 16.95.4.1, 8.3, 95.2. It is a sentiment reiterated in Polyaenus – ‘Philip achieved no less through conversation than 
through battle. And, by Zeus, he prided himself more on what he acquired through words than on what he acquired 
through arms, for the soldiers shared the credit for the latter, while the former were due to him alone’ (Poly. Strat. 
4.2.9). Cf. Xen. Cyrop. 8.4.7-8. Philip’s diplomacy also included a strategy of marriage alliances. Indeed, Philip was 
said to gain a new wife with each new campaign (Satyrus in Athenaeus 13.557b-e; Ellis 1976 212-14; Hammond and 
Griffith 1979: 214-15, 220-30; Tronson 1984: 116-26; Errington 1990: 221; and Worthington 2008:172-74; cf. Ogden 
1999: 17-27.     
873
 On Macedonian and Homeric kingship – Carlier 2000: 259-268.  
874
 Edmunds 1971: 370. On Macedonian background in general – Thomas 2006; Griffith 1965: 125-39; and 
Worthington 2003: 69-98. Hammond (1979: 164) puts it best arguing that, ‘in Macedonian society the male element 
was dominant to an unusual degree. War, hunting, and administration were respected above all other activities.’  
875
 Note Theopompus’ criticism of Philip’s drinking habits (FGrH 115 FF 27, 162, 236, 282). On Macedonian drinking 
– FGrH 126 F 1 = Athenaeus 3.120e; and Demosthenes 2.18-19. On Macedonian symposia and drinking – Tomlinson 
1970: 308-15; Borza 1983: 45-55; Carney 2007: 129-180; Worthington 2008b: 9-11; Pownall 2010: 55-65; and Sawada 
2010: 393-399. On drinking in the ancient world – Davidson 1997: 36-69. On the important role of hunting among the 
Macedonian elite – Carney 2002: 59-80; Sawada 2010: 399-403, 408; Briant 1991: 211-55; 1993: 267-77; and on 
hunting in general – Anderson 1985; and Barringer 2001. It is also of note that when Aristotle gives his list of non-
Hellenic nations (or tribal nations – ethne) in the Politics (1324b 10-23) that are strong enough to expand at the expense 
of others, where military strength is held in honour, and where there are even laws stimulating military valour, he gives 
among other examples a law in Macedonia that a man who had never killed an enemy must wear his halter instead of a 
belt.   
876
 Cawkwell 1978: 50. The pebble mosaic images found in the houses of the elite in Pella around the late fourth and 
early third-century certainly testify to the deep interest in Homeric/heroic values of the Macedonian elite of this time 
(Robertson 1982: 246; Ginouvès 1994: 117; Cohen 1995: 491-8; Carney 2003: 61; cf. Themeles and Touratsoglou 
1997: 223-4. There was also the imitation of Homeric burial habits by the elite (Carney 2003: 62; cf. Themeles and 
Touratsoglou 1997: 202). On Homeric values being retained or recreated by the Macedonian elite of the fourth-century 
BCE in archaeology – Ameling 1988: 657-92; and Cohen 1995: 487-91; cf. Carney 2000: 276. 
877
 Lendon 2005: 37; and 124 – ‘Any Greek soldier recalled Homer when he thought about fighting: Homer was the 
mirror into which Greek warriors looked to see themselves.’  
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Philip, like most of his class, regularly adhered to the aristocratic-heroic values of Homer on 
innumerable occasions.878 One value in particular was that of philotimia, the competitive seeking of 
honour, fame and glory that motivated figures in the public eye.879 His son may have consciously 
emulated Achilles pursuing this public acknowledgement, whereas Philip perhaps subconsciously 
emulated that other great Homeric figure – Odysseus. Indeed, honour and fame could be gained in 
this agonistic society by wise words and intelligent schemes and plans as well as by heroic deeds.880  
This veneration of Homer and the heroes would probably have begun early in any 
Macedonian prince’s life.881 Therefore, with almost all activities in Homer being a competition for 
kleos and time (the most important being combat), the highly agonistic values of the Macedonian 
elite were confirmed and perpetuated. However, heroes must uphold their reputations by constant 
displays of merit in battle and planning for battle.882 They must also continually display virtues 
(aretai) such as strength, skill, courage, cunning, wisdom, and persuasiveness in their pursuit of 
glory.883 Macedonian kingship can be thought of in similar terms. It based its power and position 
upon success in these areas, and the ability to lead armies successfully, providing them with a field 
of action and a source of booty and wealth.884 As is attested from Alexander I to Perseus, 
Macedonian monarchs had to fight in person in battle to command the respect and obedience of 
their soldiers.885 It was a public and powerful display of ajndreiva,886 in which military defeats, 
weakness or incompetence could negatively affect the stability of a king’s regime.887 The number 
and type of Philip’s wounds from battle provide ample testimony for Philip’s knowledge of these 
facts.888 Indeed, Philip’s need to be first into battle had a Homeric flair,889 and he remained ‘the 
                                               
878
 On the strong ‘Homeric resonance’ of Philip’s Macedon – Lane Fox 2011: 358-59.  
879
 Cartledge 2004: 226. 
880
 Cf. Diod. 16.95.3-4; Isoc. Pan. 49; and Xen. Cyrop. 1.6.26ff., 7.5.15-30. Aelian states that ‘Philip of Macedon was 
said to be not merely a good soldier and powerful speaker, but to have the highest respect for education (V.H.4.19).’ 
881
 Worthington 2008: 18. On the great importance of Homer in Macedonian education – Cohen 1995: 487-8. On 
Macedonian education – Carney 2003: 47-63; On Homer’s important role in Greek education – Marrou 1956: 29-34; 
Cohen 1995: 487; Robb 1994: esp. pp. 159-82. 
882
 Lendon 2005: 24. 
883
 Many of the epithets of the poem reflect these virtues (e.g. Il.10.109-10 etc.). 
884
 Cf. Billows 1995: 19-20. 
885
 Errington 1990: 221; and King 2010: 379. Xenophon thought that the best way to get soldiers to obey was to better 
them in martial accomplishments (e.g. An. 7.3.45; Cyrop. 5.5.33-34). It was the oldest type of legitimate authority 
known to the Greeks (cf. Il. 12.318-21). Note the defection of Macedonian troops to Pyrrhus from Demetrius because 
‘their traditions had accustomed them to believe that the man who proved himself the best fighter was also the best 
ruler’ (Plut. Demetr. 44.5; cf. 49.4 and Polyb. 10.40.1ff.).  
886
 Cf. Xen. Ages. 2.12, 6.1-2; and Cyrop. 1.4.20. 
887
 Gehrke 2013: 79; cf. Diod. 16.35.2-3. Courage (ajndreiva, virtus and fortitudo) was a generic royal quality that 
required little explanation for most authors of antiquity despite its prominence e.g. Xen. Ages. 10.1, 11.9; Isoc. Evag. 
23, 65; Plin. Pan. 3.4 and 16.3 (Noreña 2009: 8). It is seldom explicitly mentioned in Philip’s anecdotes and stratagems 
- but is almost a given in many cases in view of the military contexts. Theopompus put Philip’s courage in battle down 
to being drunk (Athen. 10.435a-d). Cf. Dem. 11.22; 18.67 – seeking glory. 
888
 The wounding of Philip II also generated many accounts, stories, and anecdotes e.g. Plut. Mor. 177F, 307D, 331B; 
Dem. Or. 18 (De Cor.) 67; Aul. Gell. 2.27; Diod. 16.34.5; Stob. 7.67; and Ael. N.A. 9.7. Riginos (1994: 103-119) 
argues that these and other tales of Philip’s wounds were embellished or exaggerated by later authors for dramatic and 
sometimes comic effect. On wounds as proof of a king’s fighting qualities and his general character – Xen. Ages. 6.2.  
889
 Lane Fox 2011: 358. 
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traditional Macedonian warrior king to the end’ (Worthington 2008: 199).890 Therefore, many tales 
probably come from the fact that under Philip the king’s power was probably far more personal than 
institutional.891 Philip was the head of an archaizing heroic monarchy functioning primarily as an 
efficient military regime.  
 
Noble birth needed to be buttressed by solid achievement. No rights or constitution 
protected the king; his government was personal, his authority as absolute as he could make 
it... success and achievement were the means to authority, and the restless ideal of a 
Homeric hero was a very real claim to them both (Lane Fox 1973: 64-5). 
 
After Philip, military ability was by far the most critical aspect of his son’s reign and that of 
the Hellenistic monarchs.892 Evident in other sources and propaganda from the period, this fact is 
also clearly shown by the oft quoted passage on the nature of kingship in the Suda (based on early 
Hellenistic source).  
 
Basileia: kingship does not derive from nature or legitimacy; it comes from the ability to 
lead armies and to manage affairs successfully this was the case with Philip and with the 
Successors of Alexander. 
 
This suggests a strong reason in part for the survival through the Hellenistic period of such a large 
amount of the tales concerning Philip and military stratagems. Though almost untraceable now – 
their popularity can hardly be doubted in a world in which military nous was paramount.893  
 There was also the role played by the overall status of Philip’s achievements and reputation 
in war, both of which were well known and respected in his own day (Isoc. Ad Phil. 105). 
Moreover, both of these aspects of Philip’s legacy endured later into antiquity (e.g. Polyb. 16.60.40 
and Just. 9.8) and beyond.894 Philip’s reputation was built on his ability to skilfully co-ordinate 
                                               
890
 Philip’s hands-on-generalship in battle (along with his son’s) was a royal forerunner (and exemplar) to the long list 
of Hellenistic kings wounded or killed in battle in the following centuries (Moore 2013: 464-5). Cf. Gehrke 2013: 78-79 
and Préaux 1978: 196ff. For criticism of Philip’s courage in battle as reckless and unnecessary – Isoc. Ep. 2. Ad Phil. 3, 
9.   
891
 Cf. Sawada 2010: 406. 
892
 Billows 1995: 20-21, 28; cf. Luraghi 2013: 21-22 and Eckstein 2009: 6. Haake (2013: 99-127), who shows how 
certain tyrannoi became basiloi by adopting Hellenistic monarchic ideology, including the foundational role of success 
on the battlefield. On Hellenistic military leadership – Beston 2000: 315-335.   
893
 Many of these exempla survive in the stratagem collections of Polyaenus, and to a lesser extent Frontinus, both of 
which stem from the genre of written military theory which emerged in the fourth century BCE. With stratagems as a 
major theme, it combined historical examples with the sophists’ idea that warfare was a teachable art. It found a new 
expression in the Hellenistic period in the ‘stratagem collection’ which probably reflected peripatetic fondness for data 
collection (Krentz and Wheeler 1994: vii; Wheeler 2010: 20-21). For example, the two volume Strategika of Demetrius 
of Phalerum may have contained exempla that the author thought of some interest to Ptolemy I. Philip’s status and 
catalogue of military successes would have made him a prime candidate for inclusion in such a work, and others like it. 
But it is unlikely that Philip’s material was invented wholesale during this period because of the conspicuous absence of 
tyche (popular in Hellenistic times) which could diminished the importance of personal qualities (cf. Spencer 2006: 32). 
894
 Griffith 1980: 58, 62. There is an epitaph in the Greek Anthology which highlights Philip’s deeds as a general and 
king, and also pre-empts pro-Alexander arguments regarding his even greater deeds – ‘I, Philip, who first set the steps 
of Macedonia in the path of war, lie here clothed in the earth of Aegae. No king before me did such deeds, and if any 
have greater to boast of, it is because he is of my blood’ (7.238). 
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different parts of his forces in operations which he conducted in all terrains and in all seasons. 
Philip also stressed speed and surprise and the ‘vigorous pursuit of the defeated to make victory 
decisive’ (Billows 1995: 15; cf. Diod. 16.22.3).895 Moreover, though Philip may have been 
influenced by Theban ways in matters such as harsh training routines, inclined infantry lines, 
effective speeches to the troops, and personal leadership at the army’s front,896 as a strategist – 
Philip was patient, could accept a reverse, understood how to prioritise without panicking over the 
immediate and urgent, preferred political solutions, and often used his army as a threat rather than 
as a weapon to great effect.897 All of this is why ‘throughout his reign he [Philip] proved to be a 
master of war and a clever politician’ (Müller 2010: 167). These ancient and modern judgements 
illustrate clearly why Philip never ceased to function under Rome as a creditable and constructive 
exemplar of a warrior, general, and ruler.898 
 
  
Philip’s Stratagems in Battle  
 
Turning to the anecdotes themselves, this section examines collectively a selection of the 
numerous tales of Philip’s stratagems on the field of battle (Appendix A). Mostly found in 
Polyaenus and Frontinus, these tales show Philip as a shrewd general who had no fear of novelty, 
innovation, and deception when it came to strategy and tactics.899 Certainly, the focus of these tales 
is on Philip’s invention of stratagems or some indirect means to achieve his goals or victory. It was 
these successful military stratagems of Philip which offered principles and theories as templates for 
imitation and further martial innovation. They also prove that Philip was one of the most dangerous 
and imaginative generals of all Greek history – and this is why they were chosen by later authors for 
their collections. These stratagems of Philip allowed him to transcend time and ethnicity to become 
a ‘good non-Roman leader’ worthy of emulation by Roman generals in the field. 
These stratagems cover a multitude of different situations and conditions. They also could 
be classified under various subheadings from general warfare and combat, to siege warfare, naval 
operations, diplomacy, truce negotiations and withdrawals. However, the strong thread running 
through all these tales is Philip’s extraordinary acumen as a strategist and tactician. It is this quality 
                                               
895
 On the importance of a general’s speed – Xen. Ages. 2.1; Cyrop. 3.1.2-3, 19; 3.2.6, 3.3.9-10, 4.2.22, 6.2.23, 8.5.7; 
Hell. 6.2.27ff. Hammond (1978: 136-140) also emphasises Philip’s pursuit of the defeated in warfare (cf. Lane Fox 
2011: 343). 
896
 Hammond 1997: 355-372. 
897
 Griffith 1980: 73. 
898
 The parallels between Philip’s style of generalship and that of the later Trajan are telling (e.g. Plin. Pan. 12.4, 13.1, 
15.3, 15.5).  
899
 Xenophon thought that all generals should be inventors of stratagems (Cyrop. 1.6.38). This quality epitomised by 
being mhcanikov" (cf. Hell. 3.1.8 and Mem. 3.1.6).  
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which binds the tales to each other and to the genre of stratagem collections. It is the reason why 
Polyaenus and Frontinus chose to use Philip as an exemplar for those facing contemporary and 
future military challenges in the Roman world. Therefore, Philip’s tremendous skill in rusé 
generalship is the central theme of all these tales. But it is the various details themselves of each tale 
which best qualify just how versatile and valuable this skill really was to those Romans hoping to 
encourage it in themselves through contact and familiarity with examples like Philip’s.  
Each tale highlights positive aspects of Philip’s generalship. For example, Polyaenus Strat. 
4.2.17 (example 6.1) shows that Philip was patient enough to play the long game against the 
Athenians. Waiting for the right time after having realistically assessed his own circumstances, 
Philip out manoeuvred the Athenians and defeated their aspirations for Amphipolis through means 
other than combat (cf. ‘bloodless victory’ in Xen. Ages. 2.26-27). Therefore, Philip succeeds 
without fighting. Whereas in Frontinus Strat. 2.3.2 (example 6.2), though Philip must fight – 
victory is made possible before the actual combat.900 This successful stratagem of Philip’s is 
recorded under a section entitled On the Disposition of Troops for Battle. It is the first of a 
prestigious collection of ten recorded for foreign leaders (out of twenty-one entries) which included 
Rome’s greatest enemy, three Spartans - famed for their military prowess, and his own son 
Alexander.901 Here, Philip’s awareness of the enemy’s weakness before battle is the true source of 
his victory. It is his forethought (provnoia or providentia), which all but guarantees the enemy’s 
defeat.      
In Polyaenus Strat. 4.2.16 (example 6.3), Philip has a novel but natural response to finding 
the Orbelians hiding from him (cf. Xen. Cyrop. 1.6.39-40). Hunting was a national pastime in 
Macedonia, and his use of hunting dogs shows his impressive ability to adapt to the situation. Philip 
transfers and utilizes skills and assets to successfully achieve his goals. Moreover, he does it so easy 
that war has become almost a sport – the danger of the Orbelians is replaced by the thrill of the 
chase. It is Philip’s ‘instant analysis’ (ajgcivnoia) of the situation which is his superior quality,902 a 
quality which constantly emerges throughout Philip’s stratagems. However, when an enemy had no 
place left to run, siege operations normally ensued, and there were few more experienced or 
successful in this type of warfare than Philip.903  
Much of Philip’s success was the result of both his engineers and his own guile. Polyaenus 
Strat. 4.2.18 (example 6.4) demonstrates well the latter with Philip’s excellent use of misdirection 
                                               
900
 Philip’s cunning became all too familiar to the Athenians in their dealings with him – Ryder 1994: 251-57. 
901
 Philip shares the honour of successful dispositions with Pammenes (the Theban); Artaxerxes (the Persian king who 
defeated his brother at Cunuxa); Hannibal (x3); three Spartans (Xanthippus, Cleandridas, and Gastron); Alexander, and 
Pyrrhus (though victory costs him half his army).  
902
 Wheeler 2010: 29. 
903
 On ancient siege warfare – Marsden 1969; and Campbell 2005. On Philip’s siege train – Garlan 1974: 202-44; 
Marsden 1977: 211-23; Hammond and Griffith 1979: 444-449; Keyser 1994: 27-49; Worthington 2008: 31-32.    
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to fool the defenders of Pharcedon. However, it is true that Philip was not always successful at siege 
operations (e.g. Diod. 16.74.2-76.4). Even so, Polyaenus Strat. 4.2.20 (example 6.5) shows that 
Philip was able to turn a negative situation into a more positive outcome than was to be expected. 
Again Philip uses deception to fool his enemy, and because of it manages to withdraw his siege 
machines safely from operations against Carae. A potential disaster was avoided by Philip as he and 
his siege engines disappeared. Philip’s actions here show him to be pragmatic and cunning (the 
latter particularly associated with the Roman quality of vafritia).  
It was a dangerous combination of qualities in an adversary and must have caused some in 
Byzantium to have serious reservations when Philip began siege operations against their city in 340 
BCE.904 Philip’s Machiavellian actions in Polyaenus Strat. 4.2.21 (example 6.7) show a clever and 
manipulative general, who tricks the allies of Byzantium so as to effectively take them out of the 
fight. By using their allies’ own interests as leverage, Philip wins a small victory over Byzantium 
without the cost of having to fight. Moreover, this particular stratagem of seeding the enemy with 
false information was one which the resourceful Philip seems to have used on several occasions 
with great success (e.g. Polyaenus Strat. 4.2.8 and Frontinus Strat. 1.4.13 – examples 6.8-9). By 
deliberately allowing fabricated intelligence too good to pass up fall into enemy hands, Philip 
allows their own naïveté and hopes to distract and deceive them.905 
It was again clever misdirection on Philip’s part, which he also employed in his siege 
operations against some unnamed coastal city in Frontinus (3.9.8 - example 6.10). Appropriately 
recorded under the heading On Attack from an Unexpected Quarter, it reveals Philip’s ability to be 
imaginative, resourceful and dynamic.906 It also shows Philip’s ability to utilize the surrounding 
environment – the water in this instance. Indeed, adaptability to the environment or landscape was 
necessary for any successful general. Philip certainly proved he was just as cunning on the water as 
he was on the land in example 6.11 (Poly. Strat. 4.2.22). Here Philip’s genius for subterfuge is 
clearly demonstrated at the expense of Chares who, like many others, is guilty of taking Philip’s 
bait. Philip again gains his objective without confrontation or loss of any kind. His generalship (or 
admiralship) has negated the strength of the enemy and decided the issue without the necessity of 
fighting. These kinds of stratagems of Philip are exceptional in that the enemy must either take the 
bait entirely (such as on this occasion), or at the very least weaken their forces to account for them.   
                                               
904
 On the siege of Byzantium – Diod. 16.76.3-4; Just. 9.1.2-4 and Worthington 2008: 132-33, who argues that Philip 
had no real intention of taking the city. Instead, it was a means of further provoking the Athenians. Cf. Front. Strat. 
1.3.4 (example 6.6), where Philip withdraws from the siege because ‘he could not endure the delay of a siege.’ 
Recorded under – On determining the Character of the War, this tale shows the Byzantines admitting that they were no 
match for Philip in the field. Their decision to endure a siege was the correct one in the end.           
905
 Cf. Themistocles’ ruse at Salamis - Hdt. 8.75-76 and Plut. Them. 12. 
906
 Philip’s solution to the problem presented by the coastal element of this siege has similar elements to that employed 
by Alexander at Tyre (332 BCE). On this operation and Alexander’s tactics – Diod. 17.40.2-46.6; Curt. 4.2.1-4.18; Just. 
11.10.10-14; Plut. Al. 24.2-25.2; and Arr. 2.16-24.   
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Another naval tale from Frontinus (Strat. 1.4.13a = example 6.12) shows just how 
intelligent and crafty Philip could be in the pursuit of his goals.907 Philip uses diplomacy to distract 
and manipulate his enemies – engineering circumstances to his favour until the right moment 
arrives for his decisive action. Philip’s combination of negotiation, guile, threat and force enable 
him to remain the proverbial ‘step ahead of his enemies’, who appear unable to compete with his 
talent for deception (cf. Diod. 16.59.2-4). Philip certainly did not let traditional rules of diplomacy 
or courtesy impede him if he saw any opportunity for achieving a meaningful advantage as 
example 6.13 (Poly. Strat. 4.2.4) well shows. Here Philip uses diplomacy itself to great effect as a 
misdirection. Philip once more distracts the enemy to bring about the right circumstances and 
moment for his decisive move or attack, only this time it is not actions or even words – but the 
promise of words!  
This kind of diversion seems to have been something of a favourite ploy of Philip’s.908 
Indeed, example 6.14 (Poly. Strat. 4.2.12) illustrates another occasion in which Philip performs a 
similar action, only this time Philip himself is to speak and not ambassadors. Also, going one better 
than our last example, Philip achieves the capture of ten thousand Sarnusians without fighting – or 
even weapons apparently.909 It shows that Philip was willing to use any advantage he could 
manufacture to his benefit. This fact is no more obvious than in example 6.15 (Poly. Strat. 4.2.5) 
where Philip even violates the unwritten rules of combat regarding the calling of a truce to retrieve 
the dead.910 Philip does not stand on ceremony like the generals of old and do battles by half – 
Philip’s war is total war.   
Example 6.16 (Poly. Strat. 4.2.13) is interesting in that it is not an instance of Philip 
involved in some great piece of attacking trickery. Instead, Philip is engaged in a defensive 
withdrawal from some Thracians.911 It is a simple, and not so devious stratagem, which is designed 
to see his men ultimately to safety. Therefore, with their salvation the crucial goal of the 
manoeuvre, Philip shows that stratagems were just as good for defensive actions as they were for 
attacking ones. However, this is completely in contrast to example 6.17 (Poly. Strat. 4.2.14). Here 
destruction and terror are used by Philip to lure the enemy from their strong position. Aware of the 
folly and danger of attacking such a position, Philip actively weakens the defence of the mountain 
pass without a single blow against it. Philip successfully facilitates the enemy’s taking away of their 
own advantageous positioning.  
                                               
907
 It is paired with example 6.9 (Strat. 1.4.13) in a section entitled – On Leading an Army through Places Infested by 
the Enemy.   
908
 Cf. Just. 8.3, 8.4-5, and 9.2.  
909
 Cf. Ellis 1969: 16. 
910
 Vaughn 1993: 46-48. 
911
 It echoes elements of Alexander’s withdrawal during his campaign against the Thracians (Arr. 1.1-6). 
P a g e  189 | 270 
 
In addition, this stratagem, like many of the preceding tales, puts the focus clearly on Philip. 
The military successes of the Macedonians remain in the background. Their achievements are 
Philip’s, and clearly reflects the political system, and a (literary) adoration and canonization of their 
king as a general and warrior. Philip is presented as being a larger than life king – almost a hero in a 
truly Greek sense.912 This is not surprising when a strong belief in Philip’s personal qualities and 
military expertise were important factors in the continuance of his regime.913 As Gehrke argues, ‘a 
ruler by birth was on probation until he had been tested in battle’ (2013: 86). Philip was a legitimate 
king, but in Macedonia it always added some assurance and insurance to clearly emphasise one’s 
agonistic qualities and successes. Therefore, Philip’s victories in war legitimized him as a king. His 
constant successes enhanced his reputation among his subjects, reinforced his power, and 
strengthened his reign.914 Through his proven abilities in warfare and his overall ajreth, Philip 
justified the confidence and eu[noia of the Macedonian people and army – which were amalgamated 
as few societies have ever been.915   
Not all of Philip’s stratagems were so successful. Example 6.18 (Poly. Strat. 4.2.11) shows 
Philip up to his old tricks - only this time he is unsuccessful when his intended victims are alerted to 
the deception. However, success was not the crucial factor for a good stratagem for either 
Polyaenus or Frontinus. What really mattered was the attempt itself, and the devious or innovative 
thinking and planning behind it. Unsuccessful stratagems could inspire potentially effective 
stratagems just as well as successful ones (though they are not as commonly recorded). Philip’s 
attempt to seize some of the Aleuadae failed, but his plan meant that he risked nothing in the 
attempt. Moreover, success would have meant the attainment of his goal without any real danger or 
confrontation. This was the key objective of any good stratagem, and Philip’s stratagems certainly 
exemplify this kind of approach.  
The stratagems of Philip, like those above and those of other great individuals, were 
collected to form substantial and perpetual pools of creative experience in which Polyaenus and 
Frontinus expected others to wade for inspiration. From these tales alone it is clear that the 
anecdotal Philip was not only one of the craftiest generals of the ancient world, but almost certainly 
one of the more dynamic and creative presences the field of war-craft has ever known. Roman 
commanders and individuals engaged with war at any level could have done much worse than look 
to Philip’s example when they contemplated their next strategy or tactic. Therefore, Philip 
commanded respect as an exemplar in war. The survival of all these examples a testament to the 
level of that regard in later periods.  
                                               
912
 On one occasion, Diodorus states explicitly that Philip fought heroically (hJrwikw'" -16.4.6).   
913
 Cf. similar comments about Hieron in Mann 2013: 44-45. 
914
 Cf. Gehrke 2013: 85-86, 92. 
915
 Cf. Gehrke 2013: 78. 
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Reform and Discipline  
 
It is true to say that the Macedonian state ‘was in large degree the creation of the 
Macedonian army invented and trained by Philip’ (Billows 1995: 17).916 Philip revitalised and 
professionalised the Macedonian army by ‘reorganizing the troops, reforming training and style of 
fighting, improving discipline, and introducing new strategies and technological advances’ (Müller 
2010: 168; cf. Diod. 16.3.1-3).917 Often these tales highlight the Macedonians’ role as (positive) 
foils for Philip in the use of their discipline as a means to emphasise the expertise of their 
commander – Philip is a superior general through his superior leadership of them.918 There are 
several anecdotes among Philip’s tales which reflect some of these elements, all of which would 
have been of some interest to a Roman audience which regularly saw the effects of stagnation and 
ill-discipline in the legions.919 For example, in terms of training and discipline there are these tales 
recorded in the second-century CE writer Polyaenus (examples 6.19-21).920  
 
 6.19 
 
Fivlippo" h[skei tou;" Makedovna" pro; tw'n kinduvnwn, ajnalabovnta" ta; o{pla triakovsia   
stavdia pollavki" oJdeuvein fevronta" oJmou' kravnh, pevlta", knhmivda", sarivsa" kai; meta;   
tw'n o{plwn ejpisitismo;n kai; o{sa skeuvh kaqhmerinh'" diaivth" (Poly. Strat. 4.2.10).921  
 
 6.20 
 
Fivlippo" ejpi; stratopevdou Dovkimon Taranti'non loutrw'/ qermw'/ crhsavmenon th;n           
hJgemonivan ajfeivleto, fhvsa" ‘ajgnoei'n moi dokei'" ta; tw'n Makedovnwn, par! oi|" oujde; gunh;
tekoi'sa qermw'/ louvetai (Poly. Strat. 4.2.1).922  
 
                                               
916
 On the Macedonian army – Milns 1976: 87-136; Sekunda 1984; 1998; English 2009; and Sekunda 2010: 446-471 
(includes bibliographic essay). On the Argeads and the Phalanx – Bosworth 2010: 91-102. 
917
 On these reforms – Hammond and Griffith 1979: 405-449; Thomas 2006: 141-158; Gabriel 2010: 62-92; Sekunda 
2010: 449-452; and Worthington 2008: 26-32; 2014: 32-38. Lane Fox argues that the hallmarks of this new army of 
Philip’s were ‘balance and variety’ (2011: 374). For examples of Philip lifting the morale of his troops – Diod. 16.3.1, 
4.3, and 35.3. On discipline in the classical world – Chrissanthos 2013: 312-329. On reorganizing, morale, training and 
discipline in Xenophon e.g. Hell. 3.4.16-19, 6.2.27ff.; Hip. 1.7, 17, 24, 26; Anab. 1.9.13, 5.8.13, 16, 18 (necessarily 
harsh); Mem. 3.3.2, 5; Cyrop. 1.6.13, 19, 2.1.9-14, 6.1.24 etc.; Hutchinson 2000: 51-62, 130-136, 189-191, and 227.  
918
 Asirvantham 2000: 182. 
919
 Note Pliny’s lauding of Trajan’s reinstitution of discipline in the legions during his reign (Pan. 6.2; 18.1; cf. Ep. 
8.14.7, 10.29.1).  
920
 Published in instalments, Polyaenus’ work was a universal collection of over nine hundred exempla from mythical 
times to Augustus arranged ethnographically/prosopographically into eight books (in contrast to the topical headings 
found in Frontinus’ Strategemata).  
921
 ‘Philip used to train the Macedonians before battle, making them take their arms and march for 300 stades carrying 
their helmets, shields, greaves, sarissas, plus – in addition to their arms – a stock of provisions and all the utensils 
necessary for daily life.’ 
922
 ‘At his camp Philip stripped Docimus the Tarentine in the army because he used warm bath water, saying, ‘You 
seem to me ignorant of the ways of the Macedonians, among whom not even a woman who has given birth bathes with 
warm water.’ 
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 6.21 
 
Fivlippo" ejpi; Qhbaivou" ejstravteuen. !Aevropo" kai; Damavsippo" hJgemovne" ajpo;            
pandokeivou misqwsavmenoi yavltrian ej" to; stratovpedon eijshvgagon. ouj mh;n e[laqon      
Fivlippon, ajlla; katamaqw;n a[mfw tw; hJgemovne tw'n o{rwn th'" auJtoi' basileiva"               
ejxechvruxen (Poly. Strat. 4.2.3).923 
 
These exempla are from the fourth book of Polyaenus, and are given as positive exempla 
regarding Philip’s attitude towards training and disciplining his army.924 They show something of 
Philip’s reforms and his will to turn his army into a well-organized professional and disciplined 
military force.925 They highlight the measures Philip took to realize the impressive successes he 
enjoyed with his army (well known to the collection’s audience). They specifically demonstrate 
Philip’s training regime, his belief in the toughness of Macedonian soldiers (and women),926 his 
close attention to goings-on within his own army, and his willingness to enforce harsh punishment – 
including exile. Overall, going by Philip’s later triumphs, they are amongst the most successful and 
efficacious tales of this type in Polyaenus, testimonials to Philip’s intelligent and farsighted 
generalship. Philip’s example proves that fit and highly disciplined soldiers, carrying their own 
equipment and food, make for quick, confident, and ultimately successful armies (cf. Poly. 4.2.7 
below). It was a simple lesson for contemporary commanders to understand, process – and perhaps 
implement on some level. 
 Aside from fulfilling the overall practical and didactic aim of Polyaenus’ universal 
collection,927 Polyaenus’ interest in these exempla of Philip also had a more specific historical 
importance when read in light of eastern events under Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus (161-166 
BCE). Indeed, Polyaenus made much of the motifs of training and discipline in his collection, 
something which is also emphasised in other contemporary sources.928 With the setbacks which had 
happened to Roman interests and forces in the east, which popular opinion and literary topoi 
ascribed to poor discipline, training and morale,929 it seems that ‘exempla on discipline, training, 
and boosting morale correspond to the order of the day’ (Wheeler 2010: 47).930 This suggests that 
simple exempla showing Philip’s great success at reforming, reviving, and sustaining his kingdom’s 
                                               
923
 ‘Philip campaigned against the Thebans. Two officers, Aeropus and Damasippus, hired a female harpist from an 
innkeeper and brought her into camp. They did not, however, escape Philip’s notice. When he discovered what they had 
done, he expelled them both from his kingdom.’ 
924
 On discipline in Philip’s army – Carney 1996: 24-28. 
925
 Cf. Xen. Ages. 1.24-25, 27; Cyrop. 1.6.18; 2.1.20-22, 29, 2.3.13-14, 23-24; 3.3.9, 50, 53, 57; 6.4.13; 7.2.4, 7-8; 
8.1.1-4; and Isoc. Ad Nic. 17. 
926
 This role is similar to that given to Spartans and Spartan women – particularly in the later Roman period. Therefore, 
in accordance with the argument that from the period of Philip’s rise, Macedon was positively associated ‘primarily 
with their military expertise’ (Asirvantham 2000: 81), it seems that both Spartans and Macedonians could serve as 
shorthand for tough warrior societies in Roman thought and literature.   
927
 These aims were emphasised in almost all the prefaces (Krentz and Wheeler 1994: viii), and reflect the strong belief 
in the Second Sophistic that practical matters could be learned from books (Wheeler 2010: 30).  
928
 Wheeler 2010: 44-48. 
929
 Wheeler 1996: 229-276. 
930
 On Rome’s eastern frontier and the army – French and Lightfoot (eds.) 1989 and Isaac 1990.  
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military power, were probably included as useful material to muse over in light of war efforts in the 
east.931 Indeed, these tales were well selected for addressing the contemporary concerns of 
Polyaenus’ (imperial) readership, or those connected with Rome’s new eastern campaign.932 
Therefore, Polyaenus was not a historian focused on minor details. Instead, his emphasis is on the 
principles of clever generalship and concise and lively presentations,933 which could draw in his 
readers and edify them. This meant that Philip’s exempla of skilled generalship regarding 
innovative training and tough discipline were not strictly meant as how-to-manuals. They were 
instead to be aspirational archetypes – sources of beneficial inspiration for a Roman readership who 
were seemingly in some need of them.                
 The next two examples also feature Philip organizing, training and disciplining his army 
(examples 6.22-23).  
 
 6.22 
 
Philippus, cum primum exercitum constitueret, vehiculorumusum omnibus interdixit, 
equitibus non amplius quam singulos calones habere permisit, peditibus autem denis 
singulos, qui molas et funes ferrent; in aestiva exeuntibus triginta dierum farinam collo 
portari imperavit (Front. Strat. 4.1.6).934  
 
 6.23 
 
$Oti Filippo" tw'n ejn Makedoniva/ dokimwtavtwn tou;" uiJei'" paralambavnwn peri; th;n      
eJautou' qerapeivan ei\cen, ou[ti pou, fasivn, ejnubrivzwn aujtoi'" oujde; dieutelivzwn, ajll! ejk  
tw'n ejnantivwn karterikou;" aujtou;" ejkponw'n kai; eJtoivmou" pro;" to; ta; devonta pravttein  
ajpofaivnwn. pro;" de; tou;" trufw'nta" aujtw'n kai; eij" ta; ejpitattovmena rJa/quvmw" e[conta"
dievkeito, fasiv, polemivw". !Afqovnhton gou'n  ejmastivgwsen, o{ti th;n tavxin ejklipw;n        
ejxetravpeto th'" oJdou' wJ" diyhvsa" kai; parh'lqen eij" pandokevw". kai; !Arcevdamon           
ajpevkteinen, o{ti prostavxanto" aujtou'   ejn toi'" o{ploi" sunevcein eJautovn, oJ de;               
ajpeduvsato: h[lpise ga;r dia; th'" kolakeiva" kai; uJpodromh'" ceirwvsasqai to;n basileva,    
a{te ajnh;r h{ttwn tou' kerdaivnein w[n (Ael. V.H.14.48).935  
 
                                               
931
 Though their practical effects were always clearly going to be limited in light of tales concerning Lucius Verus’ 
behaviour in the East (e.g. HA Verus 4.4.-6.6). 
932
 It seems that the emperors were reading the work of Polyaenus, who makes such a claim in the work itself (praef. 5). 
Some argue that there is evidence that Marcus Aurelius had Polyaenus with him during the Marcomannic wars (Krentz 
and Wheeler 1994: xiii-xiv; Wheeler 2010: 12). 
933
 Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xvi. 
934
 ‘When Philip was organizing his first army, he forbade anyone to use a carriage. The cavalrymen he permitted to 
have but one attendant apiece. In the infantry he allowed for every ten men only one servant, who was detailed to carry 
the mills and ropes. When the troops marched out to summer quarters, he commanded each man to carry on his 
shoulders flour for thirty days.’ 
935
 ‘Note that Philip took the sons of the leading Macedonian families into his personal service, not intending (so they 
say) to insult or demean them, but on the contrary training them to be fit and ensuring that they would be ready for 
action. He took a hostile view (they say) of any who were self-indulgent and slack in obeying orders. So he whipped 
Aphthonetus for breaking ranks, leaving the road because he was thirsty, and entering an inn. And he executed 
Archedamus because when he personally ordered the man to stay in his armour, he took it off. Archedamus was unable 
to resist thoughts of gain and had hoped to win over the king by flattery and wheedling.’ 
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The first comes from a section of Frontinus’ Strategemata entitled On Discipline. Philip is only one 
of five foreign exempla under this title out of the forty-six exempla given.936 It is a significant 
statistic and goes some way to demonstrating Philip’s regard in terms of organizing and disciplining 
his army in the Roman psyche. The notoriety and ultimate success of Philip’s actions at the outset 
of his extraordinary career as a general allow him to transcend his foreign heritage as progenitor of 
a conquered nation, and stand as a worthy exemplar for potential commanders of Roman legions. 
Despite more rhetorical literature which established a parallel tradition that wanted to assign 
Philip’s success to bribery and luck,937 there were still those who understood the fundamental 
importance of Philip’s military reforms to his prodigious achievements (and those also enjoyed by 
his son). 
 
‘Alexander of Macedon conquered the world, in the face of innumerable forces of enemies, 
by means of forty thousand men long accustomed to discipline under his father Philip’ 
(Front. Strat. 4.2.4).938  
 
Frontinus gives the details of the exemplum hoping that they will be of some practical 
benefit to his audience (though any advantages gained could only ever be limited because of the 
multiplicity of complex circumstances). He side steps the hostility of Classical Greek oratorical and 
narrative views, in favour of Philip’s image and legacy as a reforming general and gifted military 
leader. It is these more functional aspects which should be viewed through Roman interests and 
concerns. They were attributes of Philip’s legend that could be appraised, and wholly appropriated 
if necessary to further Roman military interests. This was part of ongoing Roman efforts at self-
fashioning which could incorporate Macedonian military might and ability ever since Macedonia 
fell under the dominion of the Roman Empire.939 In these circumstances, Macedonian martial 
capacity passed easily to Rome in both literature and spirit, becoming an assimilated touchstone for 
military prowess in Rome’s evolving cultural aspirations. These types of tales also tap into notions 
of the archetypal Roman soldier, whose incredible self-discipline and physical endurance were 
proudly entrenched in Roman national consciousness.940 In the end, Frontinus was in the business 
of utilitarian military advice and inspiration. Accessing and further disseminating Philip’s 
recognizable military image and legacy (particularly in the areas of discipline and reorganization) 
naturally flowed from this motivation. Therefore, the contemporary intentions of Frontinus in terms 
of elevating the Roman military machine were well nourished by the tales of generals of old like 
Philip.   
                                               
936
 All had been generals of some repute – Pyrrhus, Theagenes, Lysander, and Antigonus.  
937
 E.g. Demosthenes 1.5; 8.40; 19.265, 342; 18.48, and his derivatives. 
938
 Cf. Just. 11.6; and Plut. Al. 15. 
939
 N.b. that when news reached Rome of the defeat of Perseus by Paullus, the Romans celebrated as if they had also 
defeated Philip and Alexander (Dio. Zon. 9.24).  
940
 Spencer 2002: 47-8. 
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 Aelian’s account also seeks to articulate Philip’s legacy in these areas. However, the 
motivations are quite different, and like Polyaenus, more contextually based in contemporary 
events. Aelian begins with the introduction of the institution of the basilikoi paides (royal pages) by 
Philip.941 This is turn leads to Philip’s positive reasons for doing so (to train them to be fit and ready 
for action). However, not before Aelian has rhetorically dismissed some possible negative reasons 
for its creation (to insult and demean them) – though not overly convincingly with his use of fasivn 
(‘they say’). This suspicious approach of Aelian towards Philip again surfaces when Aelian goes on 
to detail Philip’s hostile attitude towards the self-indulgent and slack in obeying orders. He once 
more qualifies Philip’s laudable attitude with fasiv. Finally, Aelian concludes with more anecdotal 
material by giving the details of instances whereby Philip severely disciplines two paides (cf. Xen. 
Cyrop. 2.2.23, 27).942    
 Despite Aelian’s reservations about Philip, he still presents Philip’s military discipline as a 
positive quality.943 This is particularly true in the second instance where Archedamus incorrectly 
thinks that flattery and wheedling (kolakeiva" kai; uJpodromh'") will excuse him from disobeying the 
king’s personal order. All of these details reflect Aelian’s known distrust and withdrawal from 
Roman politics, and also tie in with contemporary concerns about the corruption of sycophancy and 
insidious flattery within Rome’s imperial court. A general anxiety which was born of the shadowy 
influence of courtiers, freedmen, and family in Roman imperial politics.944 However, examining 
Aelian’s material as a whole, the focus is squarely on Philip’s innovation and discipline. The latter 
was particularly topical during Aelian’s period when the military was once more playing a decisive 
role in imperial succession in the third-century CE (note the deaths of Caracalla, Macrinus, 
Elegabalus, Severus Alexander, and Maximinus ‘Thrax’ at the hands of their own guards or 
soldiers). It suggests something of a critique on imperial attitudes or facilities towards military 
discipline. Though noting Aelian’s reservations about Philip, there is something of a slight 
suggestion that the military might have had some justifications for decisively entering the political 
sphere when it did. Therefore, Aelian is able to offer implicit commentary in two directions by 
utilizing Philippic material. This commentary could reflect his discontent, or at least exasperation, 
with both contemporary leadership and discipline (both within the military and the elite class at 
Rome as a whole). Aelian’s didactic purpose is dictated by his audience who could govern and be 
governed. Philip as exemplar is able to speak to Roman anxieties across a broad and powerful 
spectrum.  
                                               
941
 On the royal pages – Sawada 2010: 403-406; Hammond 1990: 261-90; Heckel 1992: 237-44; and Carney 2008: 145-
64.  
942
 They are the only two paides known by name from Philip’s reign because of this material (Sawada 2010: 404).  
943
 This is in contrast to the negative portrayal of his son Alexander, just mentioned at 14.47a as only fearing Atarrius’ 
insubordination and Pithon’s revolutionary instinct.   
944
 Cf. Spencer 2002: 81. 
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 Philip’s military discipline also naturally extended beyond the camp or the march, right onto 
the field of battle itself (examples 6.24-25).   
 
 6.24 
 
Philippus veritus, ne impetum Scytharum sui non sustinerent, fidelissimos equitum a tergo 
posuit praecepitque, ne quem commilitonum ex acie fugere paterentur, perseverantius 
abeuntes trucidarent. Qua denuntiatione cum effecisset, ut etiam timidissimi malent ab 
hostibus quam ab suis interfici, victoriam adquisivit (Front. Strat. 2.8.14).945  
 
 6.25 
 
Fivlippo" toi'" Meqwnaivwn teivcesi klivmaka" proshvgagen kai; di! aujtw'n pollou;"         
Makedovna" ajnebivbase poliorkhtav". ejpei; de; ajnevbhsan ejpi; ta; teivch, ajfei'le ta;"          
klivmaka", o{pw" ejlpivda tou' katabh'nai mh; e[conte" proqumovteron tw'n teicw'n               
krathvseian (Poly. Strat. 4.2.15).946 
 
However, these stratagems of Philip were less about instilling discipline, and more about inducing it 
in battle by cutting off the option of retreat. Philip’s Scythian fight is the only foreign exemplum 
Frontinus gives in a section entitled On Restoring Morale by Firmness.947 This again demonstrates 
Philip’s high regard in Frontinus as a general of successful stratagems, but particularly in that most 
legendary and quintessential quality of a Roman soldier – discipline.948 It is notable that Philip’s 
stratagem is placed last in this section, which may speak to Philip’s heritage, but this is unlikely as 
Philip seems to function here almost as a Roman example. Placed last, the stratagem instead forms 
an impressive climax with its harsh strategy. Its message of actively killing one’s own men in the 
pursuit of discipline and courage a measure of final resort in any battle.949 It was a ‘break glass in 
case of emergency’ option which Frontinus included, secure in the belief that it would hardly be 
needed by any Roman commander of ‘brave and disciplined Roman soldiers’ – but then again, just 
in case… Therefore, Philip’s extreme stratagem is included to address the needs of Frontinus’ 
Roman audience by encouraging and inspiring other likeminded solutions that corresponded with 
this section’s title.   
                                               
945
 ‘Philip, on one occasion, fearing that his troops would not withstand the onset of the Scythians, stationed the trustiest 
of his cavalry in the rear, and commanded them to permit no one of their comrades to quit the battle, but to kill them if 
they persisted in retreating. This proclamation induced even the most timid to prefer to be killed by the enemy rather 
than by their own comrades, and enabled Philip to win the day.’ 
946
 ‘Philip brought many ladders up to the walls of Methone and had many Macedonian besiegers climb them. When 
they reached the top of the wall, he took away the ladders, so that with no hope of descending they would fight more 
fiercely for control of the wall.’ 
947
 Cf. Just. 1.6.10-13 for a similar stratagem by Astyages. On Philip’s campaign in Scythia – Just. 9.2 and Worthington 
2008: 138-140. Philip’s dealings with Scythia, and in particular king Atheas, seem to have given rise to a tradition of 
sayings showing the Scythian king matching wits with Philip (Plut. Mor. 174E-F; and Theopompus FGrH 115 F 162; 
cf. Just. 9.2.12-13).  
948
 On Roman discipline during the late republic and early principate – Phang 2008. 
949
 Though it had been done before by the Romans during the Republic e.g. Manlius Torquartus (Livy 8.7.1-22).  
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This stratagem goes beyond that found in Polyaenus. However, by including Philip’s severe 
approach to the long siege of Methone, Polyaenus sanctions Philip’s tough method to coerce 
discipline and courage out of his men in the face of the enemy.950 This takes the author’s notions on 
discipline to another level, well beyond the ‘training montage’ of Philip’s previous entries around 
discipline. It also raises the stakes and the dramatic interest for his Roman world audience. This 
suggests that Polyaenus (like his audience) also recognized that the true value of discipline and 
training to an army was always going to be in battle. In fact, turning to those tales surrounding 
Philip’s defeat of the Greeks at Chaeronea in 338 BCE, discipline and training (along with 
experience) are among the decisive factors for victory.951    
 
 
Chaeronea  
 
Philip’s crowning achievement as a general was his victory over the Greeks at Chaeronea. 
For Polyaenus and Frontinus it was straightforward proof of Philip’s remarkable skill as a leader of 
men in war and combat – and his value as an exemplar. Moreover, the successful army Philip led 
had been of his own design. This is clearly acknowledged by the stratagems of our authors about the 
organizing, training and discipline of Philip’s army. Philip’s successful example at Chaeronea 
stemmed from the actions of these tales. This fact, along with Philip’s generalship, were sure proof 
of the rewards of stratagems. They testified to the value of each author’s work to their respective 
audience. Each author wrote in the full knowledge of history’s assent to their estimations of Philip’s 
talent and paradigmatic worthiness as a general. Therefore, Philip remained a potent model and 
image of military leadership in the Roman world, one which encouraged comparison, emulation, 
and competition.   
Philip’s generalship along with his army’s discipline, training, and experience were the 
critical factors at Chaeronea (cf. Just. 9.3). Both Polyaenus and Frontinus record tales which bear 
this out (examples 6.26-28). 
 
6.26 
Fivlippo" ejn Cairwneiva/ paratassovmeno" !Aqhnaivoi" ei[xa" ejnevklinen. strathgo;"         
!Aqhnaivwn Stratoklh'" ejkbohvsa" ‘ouj crh; ajposth'nai proskeimevnou", e{w" a[n tou;"        
polemivou" katakleivswmen ej" Makedonivan’ oujk ajnh'ke diwvkwn. Fivlippo" eijpw;n ‘oujk 
ejpivstantai nika'n !Aqhnai'oi’ ejpi; povda ajnecwvrei sunespasmevnhn  e[cwn th;n favlagga  
                                               
950
 On the siege of Methone – Diod. 16.31.4, 16.35.5-6; Just. 7.6.13-14; and Worthington 2008: 47-49. 
951
 On the battle of Chaeronea – Diod. 16.84-87.2; Just. 9.3-4; Worthington 2008: 147-51 and 2014: 85-90; Griffith and 
Hammond 1979: 596-603; and Hammond 1989: 115-19. On the fighting capabilities of both sides – Hammond 1994: 
149-51. On the importance of the battle in Greek history – Cawkwell 1996: 98-121. 
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kai; ejnto;" o{plwn pefulagmevno". met! ojlivgon uJperdexivwn tovpwn labovmeno",                 
paraqarruvna" to plh'qo", ajnastrevya" eujrwvstw" ejmbavllei toi'" !Aqhnaivoi" kai;            
lamprw'" ajgwnisavmeno" ejnivkhsen (Poly. Strat. 4.2.2; cf. 8.40).952  
 
6.27 
 
Fivlippo" ejn Cairwneiva/ gignwvskwn tou;" me;n !Aqhnaivou" ojxei'" kai; ajgumnavstou", t ou;" 
de; Makedovna" hjskhkovta" kai; gegumnasmevnou", ejpi; polu; th;n paravtaxin ejkteivna"       
tacevw" parevluse tou;" !Aqhnaivou" kai; eujceirwvtou" ejpoivhse  (Poly. Strat. 4.2.7).953  
 
6.28 
 
Philippus ad Chaeroneam memor, sibi esse militem longo usu duratum, Atheniensibus 
acrem quidem, sed inexercitatum et in impetu tantum violentum, ex industria proelium 
traxit, moxque languentibus iam Atheniensibus concitatius intulit signa et ipsos cecidit 
(Front. Strat. 2.1.9).954  
 
Experience, discipline, superior training and physical conditioning are the keys to Philip’s victory in 
Polyaenus. They are the clear lessons the author wishes any auditor to recognize. They are also the 
reasons found in the exemplum of Frontinus. Recorded in a section entitled On Choosing the Time 
for Battle, its details are very similar to Polyaenus (Strat. 4.2.7) and suggest a common tradition. 
Frontinus also again highlights Philip for his superior generalship among foreign leaders – he is 
only one of three foreign leaders mentioned out of eighteen entries. Certainly, Philip’s generalship 
is seen as the foremost cause of Macedonian success at Chaeronea in both authors. Philip’s own 
disparaging comments in Polyaenus on Athenian inability to understand how to win clearly, mark 
how early on Philip believes that the battle has already been won and lost. It demonstrates Philip’s 
professional martial aptitude having already grasped the situation around him and foreseen victory 
through his own strategy.  
Victory ultimately comes from Philip’s intelligence (sofia or frovnhsi") as a general (cf. 
Xen. Ages. 6.4). It also stems from Philip’s ability to predict the outcome of events if a certain 
strategy was adopted (provnoia) (cf. Xen. Ages. 8.5), and his courage and personal fighting ability in 
battle (ajndreiva). Having displayed these qualities, all that was needed was some form of 
ejpieivkeia on Philip’s behalf (which Philip does in fact perform for the Athenians – see below) to 
round out a collection of attributes that was emerging in the fourth-century BCE. It was a canon of 
                                               
952
 ‘After drawing up his formations against the Athenians at Chaeronea, Philip yielded and gave way. An Athenian 
general, Stratocles, shouted, ‘We must not stop pressing them until we shut the enemy in Macedonia,’ and he did not 
give up the pursuit. Philip, saying, ‘The Athenians do not understand how to win,’ retreated gradually, keeping his 
phalanx drawn together and protected by shields. A little later, gaining some high ground, encouraging his troops, and 
turning around, he attacked the Athenians vigorously and, fighting brilliantly, he conquered.’ Cf. Xen. Cyrop. 3.2.8; 
3.3.69-70. 
953
 ‘At Chaeronea Philip recognized that the Athenians were passionate and in poor physical condition, while the 
Macedonians were trained and in top physical condition, so by prolonging the engagement he quickly exhausted the 
Athenians and made them easy to defeat.’ 
954
 ‘At Chaeronea, Philip purposely prolonged the engagement, mindful that his own soldiers were seasoned by long 
experience, while the Athenians were ardent but untrained, and impetuous only in the charge. Then, as the Athenians 
began to grow weary, Philip attacked more furiously and cut them down.’ 
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virtues which advocated perceptive, intelligent, devious, and even ruthless generalship – as long as 
some measure of moderation or civilised gestures followed victory (i.e. war for the pursuit of peace) 
(cf. Xen. Cyrop. 4.1.15). It clearly influenced Alexander, and would be influential for centuries to 
come.955 It was these qualities which helped to rationalise and explain Philip’s success and 
achievements, and justify his inclusion in these later collections. Furthermore, this type of approach 
towards generalship also helped to propagate Philip’s more positive tradition in these works. Philip 
the warrior and general in battle was a moral absolute and an unquestionable force of war towards 
which even Romans, so proud of their own martial prowess and history, could look for 
encouragement and inspiration. However, this moral certainty in war could change significantly 
when actual fighting was not occurring. 
One such time is directly after Philip’s decisive victory at Chaeronea. As already seen in 
chapter four (e.g. 4.2 and 4.3), it is unsurprising that there were a plethora of tales surrounding this 
period. It probably reflects not only the enormity of the event itself and the impact it had on Greek 
history, but also the great interest the Greek world must have had in Philip immediately followed 
such an astonishing achievement. Who was Philip? What sort of a man or king was he? What did it 
all mean for Greece? Some of our Roman period sources exploited material that answered these 
questions in general terms with historical hindsight. Moreover, Philip’s victory at Chaeronea 
mattered for centuries to come, and left many mixed feelings among later generations of Greeks. 
Some views are accommodating, but others are hostile. Therefore, in some senses the battle never 
really ended. 
This is reflected by one hostile entry found in Aelian (example 6.29). Philip forms part of a 
list of entries concerning Greek peoples (the Athenians – twice, Spartans, and Sicyonianians) who 
after a victory show some form of excess or lack of restraint. Being the king and sole arbiter of 
Macedonian policy, Philip is the only named individual mentioned. It seems Aelian will not let 
Philip hide behind the national descriptor of ‘Macedonians’. Philip is equated with the state, his 
name made interchangeable with ‘Macedon’. It is a message that would have resonated during 
Aelian’s period.   
 
 6.29 
...!Epei; th;n ejn cairwneiva/ mavchn ejnivkhsen oJ Fivlippo", ejpi; tw'/ pracqevnti aujtov"   te     
h\rto kai; oiJ Makedovne" pavnte". oiJ de; $Ellhne" deinw'" aujto;n katevpthxan kai; eJautou;"  
kata; povlei" ejneceivrisan aujtw'/ fevronte". kai; tou'tov ge e[drasan qhbai'oi kai; Megarei'" 
kai; Korivnqioi kai; !Acaioi; kai; !Hlei'oi kai; Eujboei'" <kai;> oiJ ejn th'/ !Akth'/ pavnte". ouj  
                                               
955
 Moore 2013: 464-65. N.b. ‘But nurtured though you were on the glories of war, you have remained a lover of peace, 
and for this your moderation (moderatio) commands our greater praise (Plin. Pan. 16.1).’ 
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mh;n ejfuvlaxe ta;" pro;" aujtou;" oJmologiva" oJ Fivlippo", ajll!  ejdoulwvsato pavnta", e[kdika
kai; paravnoma drw'n (V.H. 6.1).956  
 
This more unfavourable view of Philip condemns his inability to abide by agreements after 
Chaeronea and his enslavement of the Greeks (n.b. the subordinate placement of Philip’s name at 
the end of phrases to emphasise his behaviour and diminish his name). The good work of the 
general is undone by the perfidy of the statesman.957 This view taps into a popularised, almost 
Demosthenic, view of Philip as untrustworthy, deceitful and opportunistic. A view also found in the 
later author Justin who wrote some time shortly after Aelian. For example, ‘conducting his wars 
with equal perfidy’; ‘character for dishonesty, for which he was now deemed remarkable above 
other men’; and ‘as if everything that he meditated was lawful for him to do… to leave no law or 
right unviolated, proceeded to engage in piracy’ (Just. 8.3). Philip is presented as a king willing to 
break oaths without hesitation for further gain and power (e.g. Just. 9.8; Dio Chrys. Or. 74.14).958 
Aelian’s judgements here show that Philip’s display of faithlessness, dishonesty, and lack of 
moderation after final victory is to be rejected as a model and discarded. It is an outright moral view 
which ties in with another saying recorded in Aelian (example 6.30).   
 6.30 
Dei' tou'" pai'da" toi'" ajstragavloi" ejxapata'n, tou;" de; a[ndra" toi'" o{rkoi". oiJ             
me;nLusavndrou ei\nai levgousi to;n lovgon, oiJ de; Filivppou tou' Makedovno". oJpotevron d!    
a]n h\/, oujk ojrqw'" levgetai katav ge th;n ejmh;n krivsin. kai; i[sw" ouj paravdoxon eij mh;  ta;     
aujta; ajrevskei ejmoi; kai; Lusavndrw/: oJ me;n ga;r ejturavnnei, ejgw; de; wJ" fronw' dh'lon ejx w|n   
mh; to; lecqe;n ajrevskei me (V.H. 7.12).959 
 
Aelian’s confusion over attribution (though he favours Lysander) is in stark contrast to his clear 
distaste for the comment and behaviour.960 To break oaths was to transgress against the gods (often 
invoked to guarantee such oaths), which must have greatly offended a man who held priestly office. 
However, remembering that Philip’s image could be used to epitomize a range of political, social 
and cultural associations, this material of Aelian’s might suggest something of the Roman world’s 
                                               
956
 ‘When Philip won the battle of Chaeronea he was buoyed up by his achievement, as were all the Macedonians. The 
Greeks were frightened of him, and their cities surrendered individually; this was the decision of Thebes, Megara, 
Corinth, the Achaeans, Elis, Euboea, and the whole of Acte. But Philip did not respect the agreements he had made with 
them, and enslaved them all unjustly and illegally.’   
957
 Pausanias explicitly attacks Philip’s reputation as a general on account of dishonouring of oaths and treaties (Arcadia 
7.4-8). He even goes so far as to hold it responsible for the Philip’s downfall and the ultimate destruction of his family 
from the wrath of heaven. ‘Philip may be supposed to have accomplished exploits greater than those of any Macedonian 
king who reigned either before or after. But nobody of sound mind would call him a good general, for no man has 
sinned by continually trampling on oaths to heaven, and by breaking treaties and dishonouring his word on every 
occasion. The wrath of heaven was not late in visiting him; never in fact have we known it more speedy.’ 
958
 It goes somewhat against the model established and praised in Xenophon’s Agesilaus (1.10-12, 3.2, 3.5; cf. Cyrop. 
5.1.22-23, 5.2.8-10; and Isoc. Evag. 44 and Ad Dem. 1.13).   
959
 ‘Children have to be deceived with knucklebones, men with oaths. Some attribute this saying to Lysander, others to 
Philip of Macedon. Whoever it belongs to, it is wrong in my opinion. Perhaps it is not surprising if my views differ 
from Lysander’s. He was a tyrant, and as to my views, it is obvious why the remark does not appeal to me.’ 
960
 Cf. Plut. Lys. 8.4 and Mor. 177E-F = Example 4.3; and Dio Chrys. Or. 74.15, where attribution to Lysander follows 
comments on Philip. Aelian’s distaste reflects rhetorical thinking in which the character of the speaker is judged by their 
praise or blame of virtue and vice (Arist. Rhet. 1.9, 1366a 23-6). 
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ongoing discourse on political and cultural values. Therefore, it could also reflect more broadly 
contemporary anxieties among Rome’s elite in terms of trusting those actively engaged in Rome’s 
political upheavals of the early third-century CE. Moreover, when example 6.29 is read with its 
surrounding material, it also strongly suggests general concerns over the illegal and unjust excesses 
or lack of limits shown by victors, particularly in relation to the vanquished in Rome’s power 
struggles. Philip’s image and legend offered a historical avenue with which to symbolically appraise 
and comment on Rome’s contemporary mores – especially in regard to power and responsibility (cf. 
Spencer 2002: 95).   
However, in a perfect example of the fluid interpretative possibilities of Philip’s image, 
another tale of Aelian’s set after Chaeronea portrays Philip’s behaviour as being almost the opposite 
to that above (example 6.31).961 Philip’s name and his image comprised a flexibility and distance 
which allowed it to swing between negative and positive estimations (again like his son). It also 
argues that Aelian had no real coherent approach to character portrayals in his work (philosophers 
fair better than the statesmen though). Instead, lacking the programmatic arguments of a Valerius 
Maximus, Aelian expected each entry to be read and judged on its own merit or internal message. 
This anecdote’s value to Aelian arises from its ability to play a role in conversations centred on the 
Roman world’s engagement with supreme autocratic power. Philip as model is one way in which 
the Roman world could think about, explore, and ultimately negotiate the nature and institution of 
monarchy (cf. Spencer 2002: 83).   
 6.31 
!En Cairwneiva/ tou;" !Aqhnaivou" hJnivka ejnivknsen <oJ> Fivlippo", eparqei;" [de;] th'/  
eujpragiva/ o{mw" logismou' ejkravthse kai; oujk u{brise: kai; dia; tau'ta w[/eto dei'n aujto;n uJpo
mimnhvskesqai uJpov tino" tw'n paivdwn e{wqen o{ti a[nqrwpov" ejsti, kai; prosevtaze tw'/        
paidi; tou'to e[cein e[rgon. kai; ouj provteron, fasivn, ou[te aujto;" prohv/ei, ou[te ti" tw'n      
deomevnwn aujtou' par! aujto;n eijshv/ei, pri;n tou'to aujtw'/ to;n pai'da eJkavsth" hJmevra"          
ejkboh'sai triv". e[lege de; aujtw'/: “Fivlippe, a[nqrwpo" ei\” (V.H. 8.15).962  
 
This anecdote shows Philip after his victory at Chaeronea directly addressing the corrupting 
influence of absolute power with a rather novel solution. The slave’s role does echo protocols found 
in Roman triumphs, in which a companion or public slave reminded the individual from time to 
time of their mortality.963 This may have appealed to Roman elites nostalgic for the reality checks 
and controls placed on unrestrained arrogance and power offered by such an example. These 
circumstances suggest that this tale might be better examined with other civilitas material. 
                                               
961
 Aelian has one other mention of Chaeronea at V.H. 12.53. 
962
 ‘Philip had defeated the Athenians at Chaeronea. Encouraged by his success he nevertheless kept control of his 
faculties and did not become arrogant. So he thought it necessary to be reminded by one of his slaves early in the 
morning that he was a human being, and he assigned this task to the slave. He would not go out himself, they say, or let 
any petitioner in to see him, until the slave had called out this daily message to him three times. The slave said, ‘Philip, 
you are a human being.’’ 
963
 Beard 2007: 272-75. 
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However, it is crucial to remember that it is only as a direct result of Philip’s military prowess and 
victory that he is forced to address these less martial concerns of human limitations. The concerns 
of Philip the king and statesman are in many ways the result of the successes (or setbacks) of Philip 
the warrior and general. Therefore, this daily reminder before Philip addressed his more civic 
responsibilities stemmed directly from Philip’s accomplishments in war. 
 Aelian’s willingness to record the anecdote demonstrates Philip’s importance as a 
peripheral figure in the ongoing meditation occurring throughout the empire on supreme power and 
autocratic government. The nature of Philip’s power, success, and personality permitted many 
meaningful comparisons and associations between him and many of Rome’s emperors.964 In this 
instance, Philip’s anecdote speaks to the idea that only a ruler’s ability to check their own behaviour 
and arrogance (sophrosune/moderatio) could be hoped for by his subjects when no external checks 
were possible.965 By causing himself to be reminded daily of his true nature and place by a mere 
slave – Philip appears to succeed where many others failed.   
Many of the tales recorded directly after Philip’s victory at Chaeronea are found in Plutarch. 
The two positive examples found in the apophthegmata collection have already been discussed 
(chap. four). The rest below offer striking images of Philip, whose actions at this specific time were 
particularly important to someone like Plutarch, who felt that real character often revealed itself in 
times of great success or disaster (examples 6.32-34).  
 6.32 
levgetai de; diamei'nai mevcri th'" ejn Cairwneiva/ mavch" ajhvtthton: wJ" de; meta; th;n  mavchn
 ejforw'n tou;" nekrou;" oJ Fivlippo" e[sth kata; tou'to to; cwrivon ejn w|/ sunetuvgcane         
kei'sqai tou'" triakosivou", ejnantivou" ajphnthkota" tai'" sarisai"  a{panta" ejn toi'"     
o{ploi" kai; met! ajllhvlwn ajnamemigmevnou", qaumavsanta kai; puqovmenon wJ" oJ tw'n           
ejrastw'n kai; tw'n ejrwmevnwn ou|to" ei[h lovco", dakru'sai kai;    eijpei'n: “!Apovlointo kakw'"
oiJ touvtou" ti poiei'n h[ pavscein aijscro;n uJponoou'nte" (Plut. Pelop. 18.5).”966  
  
 6.33 
 
w{sper oJ Fivlippo" ejn Cairwneiva/, polla; lhrw'n uJpo; mevqh" kai; katagevlasto" w[n, a{ma tw'/
prospesei'n aujtw'/ peri; spondw'n kai; eijrhvnh" lovgon e[sthse to; provswpon kai; sunhvgage 
ta;" ojfru'" kai; to; rJembw'de" kai; ajkovlaston ejksobhvsa" eu\ mavla bebouleumevnhn kai;       
nhvfousan e[dwke toi'" !Aqnhaivoi" ajpovkrisin (Plut. Quaes. Conv. 7.10.2 = Mor. 715C).967  
  
                                               
964
 Cf. Spencer 2002: 100. 
965
 Cf. Spencer 2002: 111. Though this is Aelian and not Plutarch, this tale does recall elite aspirations of all periods for 
the civilis Princeps (Wallace-Hadrill 1982: 32-48).    
966
 ‘It is said, moreover, that the band was never beaten, until the battle of Chaeronea; and when, after the battle, Philip 
was surveying the dead, and stopped at the place where the three hundred were lying, all where they had faced the long 
spears of his phalanx, with their armour, and mingled one with another, he was amazed, and on learning that this was 
the band of lovers and beloved, burst into tears and said: ‘Perish miserably they who think that these men did or 
suffered aught disgraceful.’ 
967
 ‘Remember Philip at Chaeronea: he talked a lot of nonsense, in his drunkenness, and made a fool of himself, but the 
moment he was approached with a proposal for an armistice and peace, he set his face firmly, knitted his brows, and, 
brushing aside his casual and careless air, gave the Athenians a deliberate and sober answer.’ 
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 6.34 
 
Parautivka me;n ou\n oJ Fivlippo" ejpi; th'/ nivkh/ dia; th;n cara;n ejxubrivsa", kai; kwmavsa" ejpi; 
tou;" nekrou;" mequvwn, h\/de th;n ajrch;n tou' Dhmosqevnou" yhfivsmato" pro;" povda diairw'n 
kai; uJpokrouvwn: Dhmosqevnh" Dhmosqevnou" Paianieu;" tavd! ei\pen: ejknhvya" de; kai; to; mev
geqo" tou' peristavnto" aujto;n ajgw'no" ejn nw'/ labw;n e[fritte th;n deinovthta kai; th;n       
duvnamin tou' rJhvtoro", ejn mevrei mikrw'/ mia'" hJmevra" to;n uJpe;r th'" hJgemoniva" kai; tou'     
swvmato" ajnarri'yai kivndunon ajnagkasqei;" uJp! aujtou' (Plut. Dem. 20.3).968  
 
 
Plutarch again manipulates his material well to fit both genre and context. This causes 
Philip’s image to once more appear fairly fluid, even within the single author (though in different 
works). Like Alexander, Philip’s image and its manipulative potential are central to his animation in 
the Roman world. He can be many things. However, his inconsistent portrayal in political and social 
Roman dialogues informs no completely stable character who can be identified as the true Philip of 
Roman world reception.969 That said, the above tales of Plutarch do ultimately present a slightly 
more positive Philippic image than not – but only after he comes in for some early criticism in two 
of the tales. 
 The first anecdote, in which Philip emotionally acknowledges the courage of the dead 
Theban sacred band after the battle of Chaeronea, comes during an excursus on the sacred band by 
Plutarch in his Pelopidas (18.1-19.4).970 Philip shows his ability at the moment of his greatest 
triumph as a general to admire and sympathise with the death and sacrifice of fellow warriors (cf. 
Xen. Cyrop. 7.1.41).971 It is respectful behaviour by Philip, but is only used by Plutarch to highlight 
the extraordinary esteem in which the sacred band were held by even their enemies and conquerors. 
For Plutarch, Philip’s deferential behaviour is commendable, but not really presented in a model 
way – though it could serve that function easily. Plutarch’s concern here is to underscore the 
Theban ‘sacred band’ as an elite and distinguished fighting force (once led by the Theban hero of 
this biography), and to publicise their dramatic and honourable end.  
Philip’s respectful behaviour is in contrast to that which he is initial said to have shown in 
Plutarch’s Demosthenes when going among the dead. This drunken and disrespectful behaviour of 
Philip’s aligns well with the rest of the biography’s pan-Hellenic and Demosthenic views of 
Philip.972 Philip’s mockery of Demosthenes is also juxtaposed with the tale’s ending in which Philip 
regains himself. However, Philip’s sobering up and reflection on the battle only serve to 
                                               
968
 ‘Immediately after his victory, then, Philip waxed insolent for joy, and going forth in revel rout to see the bodies of 
the slain, and being in his cups, recited the beginning of the decree introduced by Demosthenes, dividing it into feet and 
marking off the time – ‘Demosthenes, son of Demosthenes, of Paeania, thus move.’ But when he got sober and realized 
the magnitude of the struggle in which he had been involved, he shuddered at the power and the ability of the orator 
who had forced him to hazard his empire and his life in the brief span of a single day.’  
969
 Cf. Spencer 2002: 119. 
970
 Worthington argues that the lion Philip had set up to the sacred band’s bravery at Chaeronea ‘lends credence’ to this 
tale (2014: 89). 
971
 On Philip’s possible connections with the sacred band – Worthington 2008: 17 and 2014: 28. 
972
 On Cyrus and temperance – Xen. Cyrop. 1.3.10-11, 4.5.7-8, 7.5.75. 
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acknowledge and promote the abilities of the orator Demosthenes, fitting a larger pattern whereby 
Philip is commonly portrayed negatively in Second Sophistic material deriving from and related to 
Demosthenes. It was his skills that had forced Philip to risk it all. Philip’s generalship may have 
won the day, but this anecdote highlights that Demosthenes statesmanship had defeated Philip’s 
with having to fight the battle at all (it was also lacking in Philip’s initial behaviour after the battle). 
That Demosthenes’ abilities as an orator and statesman are the true focus is also made clear by the 
section immediate following Philip’s anecdote. Here it states that Demosthenes’ fame even reached 
the Persian king, who told others to offer him attention and money because he was able to distract 
Philip from his Asian plans (Dem. 20.4). 
For Plutarch, Philip’s behaviour and his entire appearance on the stage of Chaeronea is 
channelled through Philip’s reactions to the exploits of the protagonist of his biography as an orator 
and statesman. Philip is the antagonist, he fights (well), is then drunk and silly, then sober and 
rational – but ultimately because of Demosthenes. Philip is not really the focus or the hero. 
However, his anecdote is still part of Plutarch’s biography, and as such adheres to Plutarch’s overall 
goals for his biographical work. Therefore, it is still able to be seen as paradigmatic to some extent. 
However, any potential role for Philip as an exemplar is really on the periphery of the main threads 
of the work – all of which are intimately linked to Demosthenes.  
In Plutarch’s other account, Philip appears in a section of his Quaestiones Convivales (Table 
Talk), under question 10 – Whether it was a good custom to deliberate over wine. Philip’s anecdote 
is used by one interlocutor (Plutarch’s brother) as evidence for his argument that considering things 
such as practical matters (pragmatika;" skevyei") or practical politics (pragmatikh;n politikh;n) 
under the influence of wine were different from considering things such as the subtleties of 
philosophy (Mor. 715B-C). The inclusion of Philip’s anecdote allows Plutarch’s brother to also 
argue that drinking is not the same as being drunk, and that there is no reason to be afraid that men 
who can take a lot of drink, and are men of some sense otherwise (e.g. Mor. 715D). Philip is used as 
a persuasive exemplar of this type of individual. Though Philip had been drinking and celebrating 
his victory, he is able to cast aside this behaviour and take up the sobering burden of statesmanship 
when approached by the Athenians for peace.973 The jubilation, pride, and relief of the general are 
quickly forgotten when the practical politics of the situation once more call forth the reasoning of 
the statesman.974 Philip’s easy transition between the two spheres is of special note, and make him 
                                               
973
 Elsewhere, Plutarch records that after Chaeronea Hypereides proposed a decree, which granted citizenship to 
resident aliens, set free the slaves, and suggested moving children, women and sacred objects to the Peiraeus. This 
apparently frightened Philip who then granted permission to remove the bodies of the dead (Mor. 848F-849A). It is 
unlikely though that Philip had any knowledge of such a decree before making his decision regarding the bodies of the 
slain.     
974
 N.b. the difficulty for a king of bearing good fortune and success with moderation as opposed to bearing misfortune 
well (Xen. Cyrop. 8.4.14). 
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an exemplar worthy of arguing even the finer points of philosophical-didactic literature. Plutarch(’s 
brother) has used Philip’s anecdote to address an assertion made in relation to a question of some 
contemporary relevance.975 Though the extent of that relevance was subjective, Philip’s appeal as a 
known model and image with which to debate was concrete – even if that legacy visibly dances 
here to the philosopher’s tune.             
 Returning to Philip’s reflection on having to risk it all on the outcome of a single day, other 
tales of Plutarch show that these thoughts were not of Philip’s own conception, but seemingly the 
result of another’s address to him before the battle (example 6.35). Moreover, like Philip’s use of 
the slave after the battle of Chaeronea (above), these comments are the direct result of Philip’s 
previous military successes. Indeed, despite a strong focus on free speech in the tale (and others like 
it), these remarks are brought on by Philip’s past martial achievements, which have bought him to 
this critical juncture. But they also question the durability of that success - and Philip’s potential for 
more.  
 6.35.A 
 
eu\ de; kai; Diogevnh", o{" ejpei; parelqw;n eij" to; tou' Filivppou stratovpedon, o{te toi'"       
$Ellhsin ejbavdize macouvmeno", ajnhvcqh pro;" aujtovn, oJ d! ajgnow'n hjrwvthsen eij                
katavskopo", ejsti, “pavnu me;n ou\n,” e[fh, “katavskopo" w\ Fivlippe, th'" ajbouliva"  
sou kai; th'" ajnoiva", di! h{n oujdeno;" ajnagkavzonto" e[rch/ peri; basileiva" kai; tou'            
swvmato" w{ra/ mia'/ diakubeuvswn. Tou'to me;n ou\n i[sw" sfodrovteron:  (Plut. Adulator 30 = 
Mor. 70C-D).976  
 
 6.35.B 
 
tiv dev; Diogevnh" oujk ei\ce parrhsivan, o{" eij" to; Filivppou stratovpedon parelqw;n  
oJphnivka macouvmeno" ejcwvrei toi'" $Ellhsi, kai; pro;" aujto;n ajnacqei;" wJ" katavskopo",    
“naiv,” katavskopo" e[fh ajfi'cqai th'" ajplhstiva" aujtou' kai; th'" ajfrosuvnh", h{konto"  
ejn bracei' kairw'/ diakubeu'sai peri; th'" hJgemoniva" a{ma kai; tou' swvmato" (Plut. De Exilio 
16 = Mor. 606C; cf. Diog. Laert. 6.43).977  
 
Therefore, it was the cynic philosopher Diogenes who seems to have caused Philip to ponder what 
he risked by his actions.978 There is little difference in the details of the two accounts, aside from the 
language used to describe Philip’s reasons or motivations for risking his life (swvmato") and 
                                               
975
 It also aligns with the comment in Cassius Dio that Trajan ‘drank all the wine he wanted, yet remained sober’ (68.7). 
It recalls also comments made regarding Alexander (Plut. Al. 23.1).  
976
 ‘Excellent, too, was the retort of Diogenes on the occasion when he had entered Philip’s camp and was brought 
before Philip himself, at the time when Philip was on his way to fight the Greeks. Not knowing who Diogenes was, 
Philip asked him if he were a spy. ‘‘Yes indeed, Philip,’ he replied, ‘I am here to spy upon your ill-advised folly, 
because of which you, without any compelling reason, are on your way to hazard a kingdom and your life on the 
outcome of a single hour.’’ This perhaps was rather severe.’ 
977
 ‘And did Diogenes lack freedom of speech – Diogenes who appeared at the camp of Philip as the king was 
advancing to join battle with the Greeks, was brought before him as a spy, and answered that he had come to spy indeed 
– on Philip’s insatiable greed and folly in coming to stake on the cast of the dice in a few decisive moments both his 
empire and his person?’ 
978
 This is not the only tale linking these two famous individuals. Lucian records an interesting anecdote which was 
typical of Diogenes (Hist. conscr. 3). 
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kingdom/empire (basileiva" or hJgemoniva"). In the first account, Philip’s ill-advised folly 
(ajbouliva"...th'" ajnoiva") leaves him with no real compelling reason (oujdeno;" ajnagkavzonto") for 
taking the risk. In the second, it is Philip’s insatiable greed and folly (ajplhsiva"... ajfrosuvnh") 
which compel him to take the risk.979  
The first account is found in Plutarch’s How to tell a Flatterer from a Friend, in a section 
which asks when should a friend be severe and emphatic in using frank speech (hJ parrhsiva).980 
Plutarch thinks that it should be used to check pleasure, anger or arrogance, and to ‘abate avarice or 
curb inconsiderate heedlessness’ (Mor. 69E-F). Moreover, a ‘friend who is concerned for his friends 
must not let slip the occasions which they themselves often present’ (Mor. 70B). This is followed 
by two anecdotes of Philip. Firstly, the famous tale of Demaratus speaking candidly to Philip after 
his falling out with Olympias and Alexander (cf. Mor. 179C; and Al. 9), and the above tale of 
Diogenes’ equally frank observation.981 Demaratus was a known friend of Philip’s (e.g. Mor. 
329D), and his frank speech accords well with Plutarch’s arguments. However, the relationship 
between Diogenes and Philip was not the same, and as such the cynic philosopher’s parrhsiva is of 
a different magnitude (see below).982 Indeed, Diogenes comes before Philip as a stranger and an 
accused spy (katavskopo").983     
The second version is in Plutarch’s On Exile, and is used in a list of anecdotes to argue 
against statements of Euripides, in particular that ‘banishment should deprive the exile of free 
speech’ (Mor. 606B). Diogenes’ tale, along with those about Theodorus and Hannibal, show exiles 
performing parrhsiva before kings. Therefore, the unifying theme for Plutarch between these two 
accounts of Diogenes and Philip is free-speech. It is Diogenes who is the model and exemplar here 
of this quality. Philip is here the model of power and folly which the cynic philosopher is to 
chastise. They are clearly anecdotes of the chreia type. Diogenes’ clever and perhaps insightful 
retort is a putdown which has something of a utilitarian objective. Diogenes, the ultimate stateless 
man of little possessions, chastises Philip - the king who would have it all. The contrast is striking, 
                                               
979
 Other evidence from the second and third-century CE Greek Philostratus suggests that Diogenes was there on behalf 
of the Athenians, and that arriving when he did, Diogenes only succeeded in insulting Philip; ‘…Diogenes went straight 
to Chaeronea and reproached Philip on the Athenians’ behalf, saying that Philip claimed to be descended from Heracles, 
and yet his arms were destroying the people who took up arms to defend the children of Heracles (Phil. Apollonius of 
Tyana 7.2.3).’ ‘If Diogenes had said what he did to Philip before Chaeronea, he might have kept that hero guiltless of 
taking up arms against Athens, but by arriving only after the event he merely insulted him without any salutary effect 
(Phil. Apollonius of Tyana 7.3.2.).’ On Philostratus – Bowie and Elsner (eds.) 2009.  
980
 On philosophers, parrhesia, and kings – Haake 2013B: 182-84. 
981
 Famously, Diogenes also supposedly chastised Alexander – though in a rather less serious manner - Diog. Laert. 
6.38; Cic. Tusc. 5.32; Plut. Al. 14; Mor. 331E-F, 605D, 782A; Dio Chrys. Or. 4.14; and Val. Max. 4.3 ext. 4a. 
982
 On Diogenes and cynic philosophy – Desmond 2008; Navia 1996, 1998, 2005; Cutler 2005; and Shea 2010.  
983
 That Diogenes was brought before Philip suspected of being a spy or scout when he spoke his mind is taken up by 
Epictetus in his teachings to help describe the role of the cynic philosopher in general – ‘… and partly, in the words of 
Diogenes, when he was taken off to Philip, after the battle of Chaeronea, as a scout. For the Cynic is truly a scout, to 
find out what things are friendly to men and what hostile; and he must first do his scouting accurately, and on returning 
must tell the truth… (Disc. 3.22.23-25).’ Cf. Disc. 2.13.4. 
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and shows too the courage of Diogenes. He gambles with the only thing he has for the sake of 
parrhsiva – his life.984  
Plutarch’s focus on free speech is unsurprising given its centrality to classical Athenian 
culture and his second sophistic leanings. However, it was also very Macedonian - perhaps 
conceptualised as a traditional check on arrogance in monarchic power (cf. isegoria - chap. three). 
Therefore, Diogenes speaks not only as a philosopher before a king, but almost as a Macedonian, 
and therefore – almost as a friend. This realization allows Plutarch to make the implicit argument 
that to speak frankly for the betterment of another was to cross boundaries in a higher cause. 
Philip’s reaction to this rebuke is not recorded in Plutarch, and this fact allows Plutarch’s idea to 
stand, whereas anger and punishment from Philip would have undermined it. Diogenes and Philip 
allow Plutarch to clearly articulate something of his thinking on monarchy, power and free-speech 
in a time when parrhsiva was a quality best cultivated in private. These versions of this Philippic 
anecdote nurture a central theme which advocates a challenge to unrestrained power and folly, or at 
least seeks some kind of reconciliation between autocracy and free-speech. Nevertheless, all these 
tales are the direct consequences of Philip’s military skill and successes, and cannot be fully 
appreciated when detached from them.       
 Two other accounts of Philip actions after the battle of Chaeronea are of interest here also, 
as they are based on anecdotal material and again involve parrhesia. The first is from Diodorus, 
who structures this section of his narrative around an anecdote (example 6.36). 
 6.36 
Levgousi dev tine" o{ti kai; para; to;n povton polu;n ejmforhsavmeno" a[kraton kai; meta; tw'n
fivlwn to;n ejpinivkion a[gwn kw'mon dia; mevswn tw'n aijcmalwvtwn ejbavduzen uJbrivzwn dia;       
lovgwn ta;" twn ajklhrouvntwn dustuciva". Dhmavdhn de; to;n rJhvtora kat!ejkei'non to;n kairo;n
ejn toi'" aijcmalwvtoi" o[nta crhvsasqai parrhsiva/ kai; lovgon ajpofqevgxasqai dunavmenon   
ajnastei'lai th;n tou' basilevw" ajsevlgeian. fasi; ga;r eijpei'n aujtovn, Basileu', th'" tuvch"  
soi periqeivsh" provswpon !Agamevmnono" aujto;"oujk aijscuvnh/ prattwn e[rga Qersivtou; 
to;n de; Fivlippon th'/ th'" ejpiplhvxew" eujstociva/ kinhqevnta tosou'to metabalei'n th;n o{lhn
diavqesin w{ste tou;" me;n stefavnou" ajporri'yai, ta; de; sunakolouqou'nta kata; to;n kw'mon 
suvmbola th'" u{brew" ajpotrivyasqai, to;n d! a[ndra to;n crhsavmenon th'/ parrhsiva/            
qaumavsai kai;  th'" aijcmalwsiva" ajpoluvsanta pro;" eJauto;n ajnalabei'n ejntivmw". tevlo"    
d! uJpo; tou' Dhmavdou kaqomilhqevnta tai'" !Attikai'" cavrisi pavnta" ajpolu'sai tou;"         
aijcmalwvtou" a[neu luvtrwn, kaqovlou d! ajpoqevmenon th;n ejk th'" nivkh" uJperhfanivan        
prevsbei" ajpostei'lai pro;" to;n dh'mon tw'n !Aqhnaivwn kai; sunqevsqai pro;" aujtou;" filivan
te kai; summacivan... (Diod. 16.87.1-3).985  
                                               
984
 On Diogenes and the tolerance given to his particularly brusque parrhesia in ancient times – Baltussen 2015: pp. 74-
93. 
985
 ‘The story is told that in the drinking after dinner Philip downed a large amount of unmixed wine and forming with 
his friends a comus in celebration of the victory paraded through the midst of his captives, jeering all the time at the 
misfortunes of the luckless men. Now Demades, the orator, who was then one of the captives, spoke out boldly and 
made a remark able to curb the king’s disgusting exhibition. He is said to have remarked: ‘O King, when Fortune has 
cast you in the role of Agamemnon, are you not ashamed to act the part of Thersites?’ Stung by this well-aimed shaft of 
the rebuke, Philip altered his whole demeanour completely. He cast off his garland, brushed aside the symbols of pride 
that marked the comus, expressed admiration for the man who dared to speak so plainly, freed him from captivity and 
gave him a place in his own company with every mark of honour. Addressed by Demades with Attic charm, he ended 
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This time Philip is drunk and parading through his captives before having his disgusting behaviour 
(th;n tou' basilevw" ajsevlgeian) rebuked by yet another daring act of parrhsiva.986 This causes 
Philip to cast off his garland (typical symbol of victory) and other symbols of pride 
(suvmbola th'" u{brew"), and in an act of epieikeia he explicitly expresses his admiration for 
Demades and his frankness (to;n d! a[ndra to;n crhsavmenon th'/ parrhsiva/ qaumavsai) and frees him 
with full honours. This leads to an abandonment of the arrogance of victory 
(th;n ejk th'" nivkh" uJperhfanivan) and a more general act of epieikeia towards all the Athenian 
captives as a whole.987 Encouraged by the Attic charm (tai'" !Attikai'" cavrisi) of Demades, Philip 
changes from the drunk and arrogant general celebrating before the defeated – to clearheaded 
statesman sending envoys and concluding treaties of friendship and alliance.988 
This tale is similar to other tales already discussed in which Philip’s arrogance and the like 
are chastised by free-speech and leads to some kind of acceptance of responsibility or offering of 
forgiveness. Philip is again the foil for another’s parrhsiva. It is the boldness of Demades that is to 
be admired. Philip is relegated to the model of a drunk autocrat proudly revelling in his own power 
and victory over enemies.989 Moreover, the free-speech and later charm of Demades provide the 
impetus for Philip’s later act of epieikeia – a sign of his overall filanqrwpiva.990 Therefore, these 
virtues of Demades transform Philip from an unwanted paradigm of autocratic conceit to that of a 
forgiving statesman, who is himself also able to be redeemed through an act of epieikeia from the 
tale’s auditors.991  
                                                                                                                                                            
by releasing all of the Athenian prisoners without ransom and, altogether abandoning the arrogance of victory, sent 
envoys to the people of Athens and concluded with them a treaty of friendship and alliance...’ 
986
 Agesilaus though drunkenness to be avoided like madness (Xen. Ages. 5.1). 
987
 That the actions of Demades were ultimately responsible for the release of his fellow Athenian’s might be found in 
Sextus Empiricus (c. 160 – 210 CE) (Bailey 2002) –‘For the art of conversation is not usually gained from grammar but 
from a general quickness of wit, -unless, indeed, Demades, the orator, was a Grammarian, who (when he was captured 
along with many Athenians after the defeat at Chaeronea) said to Philip who was forcing him to join in a feast - 
 Was there ever a man with a feeling for justice 
Who in his heart could endure to share in eating and drinking 
Ere he had freed his companions and seen them standing before him? (Against the Professors 1.294-5).’ 
988
 On the fate of Greek captives after battle – Pritchett 1991: 203-312. 
989
 This behaviour contrasts sharply with that of Agesilaus, who was said to have prided himself on ruling himself and 
being humble in success (Xen. Ages. 10.2, 11.2, and 11.11). However, by the end of the tale Philip can be said to 
somewhat embody Agesilaus who was the ‘bitterest of adversaries, but mildest of conquerors’ (Xen. Ages. 11.12). N.b. 
Isocrates’ advice to Philip in a letter before Chaeronea regarding friendly acts in times of trouble building good will and 
helping to forget wrongs committed in the past (To Phil. 37).  
990
 According to Justin, in Philip’s first conflict with the Athenians (apparently won when Philip surprised them by a 
stratagem), ‘though he might have put them all to the sword, he yet, from dread of a more formidable war allowed them 
to depart uninjured and without ransom (Just. 7.6.; cf. Diod. 16.8.5).’ It seems that events around Chaeronea were that 
‘more formidable war’, and yet Philip continued to act as he had done in the past. Cf. Philip’s forgiveness and 
courteousness towards Methone despite his wound (Just. 7.6.), the Phocians after their defeat (Diod. 16.60.4), and 
Amphipolis e.g. ‘[Philip] exiled those disaffected toward him, but treated the rest considerately’ (Diod. 16.8.2). Philip’s 
behaviour is similar to that of Agesilaus towards his defeated enemies (Xen. Ages. 1.20 and 1.22; cf. Cyrop. 3.2.12-16; 
4.4.5-13; 7.1.42-43; 7.2.26, 29).  
991
 On clementia in warfare – Dowling 2006: 16-18. 
P a g e  208 | 270 
 
O’Sullivan has recently argued that the exchange between the two men, apocryphal or not, 
works around different ‘conceptualizations of parrhesia’ (2015: 54).992 On one hand, ‘Demades 
functions as its democratic embodiment’ (2015: 54), whilst Philip’s parrhesia is a frankness bought 
on by sympotic associations which exhibit a lack of restraint and only helps to demean and disgrace 
the speaker (2015: 54).993 This seems true enough, though it is also true that the Greeks rhetorically 
used Macedonian symposia to reveal ‘Greek virtue and Macedonian vice’ (Carney 2010: xxi). What 
is most important here is that the inclusion of this tale allowed Diodorus to unwittingly (or 
wittingly) emphasise free-speech and forgiveness during the Republic’s twilight for those engaged 
in, or meditating on war, politics and power (his preface does set out something of an exemplary 
narrative – 1.1.1-5.3).994 This not only complemented other famous examples which were also 
available in contemporary events, but enable past and present to bond in collective aspirations for 
the future. Therefore, as the Roman world turned towards more autocratic governance, following 
battles that began to echo the political significance of Chaeronea, the example of Philip and 
Demades was still remembered – and still able to function as an ideal of sorts. Their example was a 
composite exemplar which was formed from the behaviour of both the conquered and conqueror. 
Through this tale the actions of Demades and Philip had an importance that resonated well beyond 
events and Hellenic interests of the fourth-century BCE.  
The second story is found in Athenaeus and is unsurprisingly mostly concerned with 
banqueting and drinking (example 6.37).  
 6.37 
  
kai; Fivlippo" d! oJ tou' !Alexavndrou path;r filopovth" h\n, wJ" iJstorei' Qeovpompo"  ejn th'/ 
e{kth/ kai; eijkosth'/ tw'n @Istoriw'n. kajn a[llw/ de; mevrei th'" @Istoriva" í gravfei: Fivlippo" h\n
ta; me;n fuvsei maniko;" kai; propeth;" ejpi; tw'n kinduvnwn, ta; de; dia; mevqhn: h\n gajr polupov
th" kai; pollavki" mequvwn ejxebohvqei. ejn de; tw'/ trivth/ kai; penthkosth'/ peri; tw'n ejn         
Cairwneiva/ genomevnwn eijpw;n kai; wJ" ejpi; dei'pnon ejkavlesetou'" paragenomevnou" tw'n       
!Aqhnaivwn prevsbei" fhsivn: oJ de; Fivlippo" ajpocwrhsavntwn ejkeivnwn eujqevw"                 
metepevmpetov tina" tw'n eJtaivrwn, kalei'n d! ejkevleue ta;" aujlhtrivda" kai; !Aristovnikon   
to;n kiqarw/do;n kai; Dwrivwna to;n aujlhth;n í kai; tou;" a[llou" tou;" eijqismevnou" aujtw'/        
sumpivnein: perihvgeto ga;r pantacou' tou;" toiouvtou" oJ Fivlippo" kai;                          
kataskeuasavmeno" h\n o[rgana polla; sumposivou kai; sunousiva". w[n ga;r filopovth" kai; 
to;n trovpon ajkovlasto" kai; bwmolovcou" ei\ce peri; auJto;n sucnou;" kai; tw'n peri; th;n       
mousikh;n o[ntwn kai; tw'n  ta; gevloia legovntwn. piw;n de; th;n nuvkta pa'san kai; mequsqei;" 
polu; kai; ajfei;" a{panta" tou;" a[llou" ajpallavttesqai h[dh pro;" hJmevran ejkwvmazen wJ"    
tou;" prevsbei" í tou;" tw'n !Aqhnaivwn. Karuvstio" de; ejn toi'" @Istorikoi'" @Upomnhvmasin,  
o{te, fhsiv, mequvein proh/rei'to Fivlippo", tou't! e[lege: “crh; pivnein: !Antivpatro" ga;r iJka
nov" ejsti nhvfwn.” kubeuvonto" dev pote aujtou' kaiv tino" ajggeivlanto" wJ"  !Antivpatro"  
pavresti, diaporhvsa" w\sen uJpo; th;n klivnhn to;n a[baka (10.435a-d).995  
                                               
992
 Theopompus’ critical history may be the source of this tale (Worthington 2014: 89). 
993
 Philip’s jibe reported in Plutarch (Dem. 20.3) accords with iambic witticisms of drinking parties (O’Sullivan 2015: 
54 n. 53).  
994
 Burton 1972: 16-44. 
995
 ‘Alexander’s father Philip also liked to drink, according to Theopompus in Book XXVI of his History. So too in 
another part of his History he writes: Philip was manic and prone to rushing head-long into danger, in part because this 
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This material is given after a section which details the drinking of Philip’s son Alexander. It comes 
from Theopompus, and there is a good case to be made that it is more quotes than anecdote. Even 
so, the later material given from book 53 does give some indications of once being anecdotal 
material. Either way, as a model or exemplar of monarchic behaviour Philip is not presented here in 
a very positive light.996 Drinking makes Philip a reckless warrior and a drunk general. Drinking also 
impairs Philip’s statesmanship. This is not helped by Philip’s general presentation - almost certainly 
altered by the selection process of Athenaeus. His interests strongly dictated this kind of undignified 
material. Furthermore, he has excluded other material for maximum effect. For example, the 
implication of the tale’s ending with Philip left to wander off drunk and unrested to meet with the 
Athenian ambassadors is that he will discuss matters quite compromised. For those that knew their 
history, this implied that Philip’s meaningful acts of respect and forgiveness towards the Athenians 
after the battle of Chaeronea (well-known from other sources), were little more than the confused 
apologetic acts of a drunk and tired man. The Philip of Athenaeus exemplifies something of the 
drunken king/tyrant trope. However, given the themes and motivations of this work – any real 
serious reflection of Philip’s generalship was unlikely.   
This presentation of Philip and the use of his legacy is in complete contrast to the reception 
of these events found elsewhere in the earlier author and historian Polybius (example 6.38).997 
Although these are not anecdotes, Polybius does focus on events after Chaeronea to make some 
positive observations about Philip as a general and a statesman (cf. Asirvatham 2010: 105-6). Gone 
are any references to drinking, instead, there are only references to Philip’s ability to defeat and 
subjugate his enemies on the field of battle 
(periegevneto kai; kuvrio"katevsth tw'n ajntitaxamevnwn), his gentleness and moderation 
(eujgnwmosuvnh/ kai; metriovthti), his clemency and goodness (pra/ovthto" kai; kalokagaqiva"), his 
                                                                                                                                                            
was his nature, but in part because of his heavy drinking; for he consumed large amounts of wine and often went into 
battle drunk. And in Book LIII, after describing what happened at Chaeronea and how Philip invited the Athenian 
ambassadors who came to see him to dinner, he says: As soon as they were gone, Philip summoned some of the 
members of his inner circle, and told them to fetch the pipe-girls, Aristonicus the citharode, Dorion the pipe-player, and 
others who routinely drank with him; for Philip took people like this around with him everywhere, and had plenty of 
equipment ready for drinking parties and festivities. Because since he liked to drink and was personally undisciplined, 
he was surrounded by large numbers of smart-asses, musicians, and comedians. After he drank all night and became 
extremely intoxicated, he let everyone else leave and now, as day was breaking, wandered off drunk to visit the 
Athenian ambassadors.’  
996
 Cf. Worthington 2008: 153-54. 
997
 Of note here are the comments of the normally hostile Justin. He praises Philip for his restraint after his victory at 
Chaeronea – ‘(Philip)... concealed his joy at this victory. He did not offer the customary sacrifices that day nor did he 
laugh at dinner; he permitted no games during the feasting, used no garlands or perfume. As far as he could, he 
conquered without making anyone feel that he was a conqueror. He issued orders that he be addressed not as ‘king of 
Greece’ but as ‘general’. He showed such restraint, concealing his joy and respecting his enemies’ distress, that he 
avoided the impression of either gloating amongst his own countrymen or of being insulting toward the vanquished’ 
(Just. 9.4.1-3; trans. Worthington 2008: 154).    
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leniency and humanity of character (ejpieikeiva" kai; filanqrwpiva"), and his sagacity 
(th;n ajgcivnoian).998 These are all qualities met elsewhere in this thesis in relation to Philip II. 
6.38.A 
 
kai; mh;n oJ prw'to" aujtw'n aujxhvsa" th;n basileivan kai; genovmeno" ajrchgo;" tou'              
proschvmato" th'" oijkiva", Fivlippo" nikhvsa" !Aqhnaivou" th;n ejn Cairwneiva/ mavchnouj to
sou'ton h[nuse dia; tw'n o{plwn o{son dia; th'" ejpieikeiva" kai; filanqrwpiva" tw'ntrovpwn: tw'/
me;n ga;r polevmw/ kai; toi'" o{ploi" aujtw'n movnwn periegevneto kai; kuvrio"katevsth tw'n      
ajntitaxamevnwn, th'/ d! eujgnwmosuvnh/ kai; metriovthti pavnta" !Aqhnaivou" a{ma kai; th;n     
povlin aujtw'n e[scen uJpoceivrion, oujk ejpimetrw'n tw'/ qumw'/ toi'" prattomevnoi", ajlla;         
mevcri touvtou polemw'n kai; filoneikw'n, e{w" tou' labei'n  ajforma;" pro;" ajpovdeixin th'"   
auJtou' pra/ovthto" kai; kalokagaqiva". toigarou'n cwri;" luvtrwn ajposteivla" tou;"           
aijcmalwvtou" kai; khdeuvsa" !Aqhnaivwn tou;" teteleuthkovta", e[ti de; sunqei;"                 
!Antipavtrw/ ta; touvtwn ojsta' kai; tw'n ajpallattomevnwn tou;" pleivstou" ajmfievsa",        
mikra'/ dapavnh/ dia; th;n ajgcivnoian th;nmegivsthn pra'xin kateirgavsato: to; ga;r !Aqhnaivwn
frovnhma kataplhxavmeno" th'/ megaloyuciva/ pro;" pa'n eJtoivmou" aujtou;" e[sce                
sunagwnista;" ajnti; polemivwn...  (Polyb. 5.10.1-6).999 
 
 6.38.B 
 
. . . "v qaumavzousi me;n pavnte" Fivlippon dia; th;n or . . . "v megaloyucivan o{ti kakw'" ouj  
movnon ajkouvwn, ajlla; kai; pavscwn uJp! !Aqhnaivwn, nikhvsa" aujtou;" th;n  peri; Cairwvneian  
mavchn tosou'ton ajpevsce tou' crhvsasqai tw'/ kairw'/ pro;" th;n kata; tw'n ejcqrw'n blavbhn   
w{ste tou;" me;n teqnew'ta" tw'n !Aqhnaivwn khdeuvsa" e[qaye, tou;" d! aijcmalwvtou" cwri;" 
luvtrwn prosamfievsa" ejxapevsteile toi'" ajnagkaivoi": mimou'ntai d! h{kista th;n toiauvthn
proaivresin, aJmillw'ntai de; toi'" qumoi'" kai; tai'" timwrivai" pro;" touvtou", oi|"              
polemou'si touvtwn aujtw'n e{neka. . . .(Polyb. 22.16).1000 
 
In the second passage, Polybius mentions Philip’s overall greatness of soul, his magnanimity 
(megaloyucivan), in relation to events after Chaeronea. He then uses this image of Philip as a 
yardstick with which to measure later individuals. Therefore, Philip is used here explicitly as an 
exemplar against which to evaluate later men of power – particularly Hellenistic kings and 
generals.1001 In the end, they not only fall short of Philip’s example, but actively seek to supress 
these types of qualities. Therefore, Polybius links Hellenistic failures, and ultimately that world’s 
                                               
998
 Cf. ‘Clemency and perfidy were equally valued by him [Philip]; and no road to victory was, in his opinion, 
dishonourable (Just. 9.8).’  
999
 ‘Again Philip, who first raised their kingdom to the rank of a great power and the royal house to a position of 
splendour, did not, when he conquered the Athenians in the battle of Chaeronea, obtain so much success by his arms as 
by the leniency and humanity of his character. For by war and arms he only defeated and subjugated those who met him 
in the field, but by his gentleness and moderation he brought all the Athenians and their city under his domination, not 
letting passion push him on to further achievement, but pursuing the war and striving for victory only until he found a 
fair occasion for exhibiting his clemency and goodness. So he dismissed the prisoners without ransom, paid the last 
honours to the Athenian dead, entrusting their bones to Antipater to convey to their homes, gave clothes to most of 
those who were released, and thus at a small expense achieved by this sagacious policy a result of the greatest 
importance. For having daunted the haughty spirit of the Athenians by his magnanimity, he gained their hearty co-
operation in all his schemes instead of their hostility.’ 
1000
 ‘All admire King Philip for his magnanimity, in that although the Athenians had injured him both by word and 
deed, when he overcame them at the battle of Chaeronea, he was so far from availing himself of his success to injure his 
enemies, that he buried with due rites the Athenian dead, and sent the prisoners back to their relations without ransom 
and clad in new raiment. But now far from imitating such conduct men vie in anger and thirst for vengeance with those 
on whom they are making war to suppress these very sentiments....’      
1001
 E.g. the massacre at Maronea - Polyb. 22.13. 
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subjugation to Rome, to the loss of these types of qualities in its men of power. Philip’s example 
provides the critical point of reference for a historian looking for reasons on the Greek side also as 
to why Rome attained extraordinary success. Hence, Philip was there for the rise and domination of 
Rome as the Macedonian empire he initially started (now separate kingdoms) faulted and fell. 
However, Philip’s exploitation as an exemplar lived on past these contrasts and comparisons with 
Hellenistic leadership. His image was reborn in Rome’s new world where it continued its 
paradigmatic role (much like it had after his death) as a touchstone of political and military 
leadership.  
 
 
Philip and Sparta  
 
Events directly after Philip’s victory at Chaeronea also gave rise to a rich vein of 
apophthegmata from Sparta, the only city-state of note to remain neutral to Philip (Plut. Mor. 239F-
240B).1002 There are a multitude of apophthegmata which are set either just before or during 
Philip’s move into the Peloponnese (some are impossible to date for certain).1003 As is to be 
expected, in most cases the apophthegmata use Philip as a foil with which to highlight laconic wit 
and courage. Philip is not the principal focus and his role is limited in these sayings to representing 
either authority, foreign other, or dangerous enemy. A fair selection of this material is collected in 
Appendix B (examples 6.39-52), the majority of which come from Plutarch who openly admired 
laconic speech.1004  
In general these apophthegmata glorify the resistance of the Spartans to Philip, and the large 
number of them show that this defiance must have made some impression at the time.1005 However, 
this stance was not widely supported as Sparta’s interests ran counter to that of many of its 
neighbours who benefited from Philip’s policies and support after Chaeronea. Philip’s policy 
towards Sparta after Chaeronea ‘demonstrates his appreciation of the complexities of Greek 
interstate relations’ (Hamilton 1982: 82). That said, besides showing the level of antagonism 
between Philip and Sparta, these particular apophthegmata do not reveal much about Philip either 
as a general or a statesman. They are mostly concerned with venerating and articulating what 
Spartans were believed to have been (by others and themselves), and as such, are valuable sources 
for the ‘history of the Spartan legend’ (Tigerstedt 1974: 18).  
                                               
1002
 On Laconian apophthegmata – Tigerstedt 1974: 16-30 and Beck 1998: 119-127. 
1003
 On Philip, Sparta, and the Peloponnesian settlement – Worthington 2008: 159-60; Roebuck 1948: 83-89; Hamilton 
1982: 81-83; and Ryder 1994: 241-42. On Philip and Archidamus – Hamilton 1982: 61-83.  
1004
 E.g. De Garr. 510E-571A; cf. Beck 1998: 126. 
1005
 Tigerstedt 1974: 24. 
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These tales show Laconic wits confronting and matching it with one of the most famous and 
sagacious statesman of the period. Philip is an enemy of the state against whom the patriotic, law-
abiding, moral, austere, and witty Sparta of legend clashes.1006 They are verbal challenges to 
Philip’s power and propaganda. One example even goes so far as to compare Philip to Dionysius 
(II), a Sicilian tyrant whose exile in Corinth was well publicised (Plut. De. Garr. 17 = Mor. 511A). 
It highlights and equates Philip’s foreign presence in Corinth with that of an ineffectual tyrant, and 
is in complete contrast to the Hellenic leadership role Philip’s propaganda actively disseminated for 
him as head of the new ‘League of Corinth’.1007     
Similar themes are also present in another Spartan apophthegma which concerns Philip and 
the destruction of Olynthus in 348 BCE (example 6.53).1008 Here Spartan wit attacks Philip for his 
destructive abilities as a general, and his failings as a statesman, not only to preserve Olynthus - but 
to build again a city comparable to that which he has destroyed.1009 It suggests also a swipe at any 
known aspirations Philip may have had to turn Pella into the dominant city of the north in terms of 
both culture and power with the loss of Olynthus.  
6.53.A 
 
w{sper oJ Lakedaimovnio" ajkouvsa" o{ti Fivlippo" #Olunqon kateskayen “ajll! oujk           
ajnasth'saiv ge toiauvthn” e[fh “povlin ejkei'no" a[n dunhqeivh (Plut. De Recta. 6 = Mor. 
40E).”1010  
 
 6.53.B 
 
!Aghsivpoli" oJ Kleombrovtou, eijpovnto" tino;" o{ti Fivlippo" ejn ojlivgai" hJmevrai"             
#Olunqon katevskaye, “ma; tou;" qeouv",” ei\pen, “a[llhn toiauvthn ejn pollaplasivoni  
crovnw/ oujk oijkodomhvsei (Plut. Apophth. Lac. Ages. 1 = Mor. 215B).”1011  
 
 6.53.C 
 
$Wsper ou\n ejpi; tou' Filivppou ti" ei\pe kataskavyanto" #Olunqon, “ajll! oujk a[n             
ajnoikivsai ge povlin ejkei'no" duvnaito thlikauvthn,” ou{tw" e[stin eijpei'n pro;" to;n  
qumovn, “ajnatrevyai me;n duvnasai kai; diafqei'rai kai; katabalei'n, ajnasth'sai de;  
                                               
1006
 Cf. Tigerstedt 1974: 23. Sparta was not the only state to record these kind of patriotic responses towards Philip e.g. 
the reply of the Athenian Hegesippus to criticism that he was bringing down war with Philip on Athens (Plut. Reg. et 
imp. apoph. Heges. = Mor. 187E), and those of Atheas the Scythian king, who seems to have had something of a 
reputation for being blunt (Theopompus FGrH 115 F 162; cf. Just. 9.2.12-13; Plut. Reg. et imp. apoph. Ateas = Mor. 
174E-F).  
1007
 Cf. Demetrius On Style 9 and 108; Lane Fox 2011: 357. Anecdotes survive in Aelian and Plutarch which suggest 
that the two leaders actually met. The tales are mostly concerned with statesmanship – which was to be expected for a 
meeting between two famous rulers (Ael. V.H.12.60; Plut. Timol. 15.4). 
1008
 On Philip’s campaign in the Chalcidice and the fall of Olynthus – Worthington 2008: 77-82; Ellis 1976: 98-99; 
Hammond and Griffith 1979: 321-28; and Cawkwell 1962: 122-40.   
1009
 This apophthegma demonstrates well the way in which attribution can be troublesome. Here we have three different 
provenances – Agesipolis, the Spartan, and someone. 
1010
 ‘As the Spartan (Agesipolis) said, on hearing that Philip had razed the city of Olynthus to the ground, ‘Yes, but even 
he could not possibly set up such another.’’ 
1011
 ‘Agesipolis, son of Cleombrotus, when somebody said that Philip in a few days had razed Olynthus to the ground, 
said, ‘By Heaven, he will not build another like it in many years!’’ 
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kai; sw'sai kai; feivsasqai kai; karterh'sai praovthtov" ejsti kai; suggnwvmh" kai;              
metriopaqeiva"...(Plut. De Cohib. 10 = Mor. 458C; cf. Pind. Pyth. Od. 4.484).”1012  
 
One version comes from Plutarch’s On Listening to Lectures. It is used as a comparative 
example for the sentiment that it is easy to offer objections to a discourse, but not so easy to 
produce a better one without great labour. It is not a positive presentation of Philip, who is aligned 
in the text with those who are presumptive and full of themselves. However, the most interesting 
version comes in Plutarch’s On the Control of Anger. Here the apophthegma is used to introduce 
some of Plutarch’s own thoughts which clearly disassociate Philip from the qualities he wishes to 
emphasise such as ‘mildness and forgiveness and moderation in passion’ 
(praovthtov", suggnwvmh", metriopaqeiva"). Philip is implicitly linked to anger which is able to 
overturn, to destroy, and to throwdown (ajnatrevyai, diafqei'rai, katabalei'n), and contrasted with 
a list of individuals Plutarch later mentions. These men, such as Camillus, Metellus, Aristeides, and 
Socrates, are the exemplars of this particular section. It is their examples which Plutarch wishes to 
be followed. Whereas Philip’s capture of Olynthus clearly made him a good general – but its 
destruction made him a cautionary model for the absence of moderation and forgiveness. Plutarch is 
not giving any real strategic advice here, his concern is instead on moral examples. Moreover, this 
image of Philip is somewhat at odds with previous accounts of Philip’s behaviour seen elsewhere in 
Plutarch’s writings. This once more emphasises Philip’s flexibility as an exemplar for both positive 
and negative attributes in the Roman world.   
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Philip as a warrior and general was one of the great exemplars from the past with whom 
Greeks and Romans could meditate upon warfare. For those who utilized Philip and his legacy for 
stratagems and the like, there was a clear understanding that in making war, Philip II of Macedon 
stood well apart from the buffoon who stumbled drunk and reckless through the pages of 
Demosthenes or Theopompus. This Philip was a dangerous adversary – a cunning foe who 
demanded respect and admiration on the battlefield. Indeed, the stratagems recorded by Frontinus 
and Polyaenus exemplify just how important a figure Philip was in Roman military thinking when it 
came to innovative generalship that still got the basics right (like discipline, organization, and 
                                               
1012
 ‘Just as, then, someone said of Philip when he had razed Olynthus to the ground, ‘But he could not possibly 
repeople a city so large,’ so one may address Anger and say, ‘You are able to overturn and destroy and throw down, but 
to raise up and preserve and spare and forbear is the work of mildness and forgiveness and moderation in passion...’’ 
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morale). Philip was a professional general who often made his enemies look like mere amateurs. 
This never ceased to be worthy of remembrance or emulation through the centuries.     
However, away from the actual fighting itself, there seems to have been an ample stock of 
tales with which to make more moral arguments and judgements. This Philip was a little foolish, 
proud, and open to chastisement, insults and mockery. Of special significance here was Philip’s 
behaviour after his victory over the Greeks at Chaeronea. This period raised some important themes 
such as parrhesia, forgiveness, respect, moderation, relations with Athens, and Philip’s policies 
regarding an obstinate (and ironically vocal) Sparta. In these tales Philip often found himself on the 
receiving end of a lesson or witty comment which often transcended martial activity.    
It was these two main traditions which together constituted Philip’s image and legacy in war 
in the Roman world. Therefore, Philip the ingenious commander and brave warrior in the field was 
paired with Philip the general/statesman confronting the realities of victories gained by that acumen 
and courage. They were the means by which Philip was judged and remembered by posterity. It 
remains the case today.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P a g e  215 | 270 
 
Conclusion 
 
The tales of Philip II which survive from the end of the Republic to height of the Roman 
Empire are used by many authors to present Philip as a largely positive exemplar of words and 
deeds – particularly regarding monarchy, statesmanship, generalship, and leadership. They reflect a 
tradition or practice of measured engagement with Philip’s legacy and image, whereby each tale 
was adapted and styled to suit the broader prevailing political, social and cultural conditions of 
successive generations. Moreover, despite the often ambivalent attitude of Rome toward Greek and 
Macedonian figures of authority and power, Philip’s reception under Rome in these anecdotes is a 
story of some success. He was a pervasive and persuasive figure and model of a set of values deeply 
entrenched in the culture of the Mediterranean world (so often epitomised in the cardinal virtues). 
Indeed, his tales were not only rich in the ideals of his own period (as shown by authors like 
Isocrates and Xenophon),1013 but were easily relatable to the values of later epochs. As such, it is 
impossible to talk of clear distinctions between the principles of Philip’s period and those of any 
period in which his tales were rejuvenated and valued. This shows some continuity of widespread 
beliefs – especially within elite circles. Prominent in collections and other works which were so 
often explicitly dedicated to the powerful – Philip’s conduct functioned as a potent behavioural 
regulator and validator. It helped to establish and publicise correct and incorrect ways in which to 
hold and wield power. 
The ‘Introduction’ to this thesis outlined and rationalised this investigation. It advanced a 
methodology and approach, and discussed several areas of importance. This included monarchic 
ideology, Macedonian receptions, kingship in the Greek, Hellenistic and Roman worlds, Philip and 
Alexander, and Philip as a Macedonian. Chapter one established definitions, the contextual and 
scholarly background, and a working methodology for the thesis by determining boundaries within 
which it was to operate. The most important tenets were the decisions to limit the investigation to a 
selection of the available material, to forego the search for historicity, and to examine the material 
under the guidance of themes and values in a ‘Bosworthian’ manner. Chapter two examined two 
authors who were to be emblematic of all the authors of the thesis. Therefore, Valerius Maximus 
and Plutarch were critically examined so as to demonstrate the type of approach applied to all 
authors cited, and illustrate points which had larger more universal relevance. Areas of interest 
                                               
1013
 It is of note also that the anecdotes of Philip contain virtues which matched the parts of virtue (mevrh ajreth'") as 
listed by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (1366b I.9.4-6. Cf. Nic. Eth. 2.7 and 3.9-4.15) e.g. dikaiosuvnh (just), 
ajndreiva (manliness), swfrosuvnh (self-control or moderation), megaloprevpeia (magnificence), megaloyuciva  
(greatness of soul), ejleuqeriovth" (liberality), praovth" (mildness or gentleness), frovnhsi" (thoughtfulness or 
prudence), and sofiva (wisdom). 
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included monarchic ideology in literature, collections of exempla, collections of apophthegmata, 
Roman/Latin authors, Greek authors, the role of rhetoric, the use of anecdotes in treatises, the 
Second Sophistic, intended audiences, ethics and morals, the selection and reworking of material, 
agendas, contextual issues, and works dedicated to specific individuals. 
Chapter three examined the judicial anecdotes of Philip II. It revealed much regarding 
Philip’s role as a paradigm of monarchy, leadership and ‘justice’ in the Roman world. It also 
showed that Philip’s character was often tied to the moral of the tale. This was particularly evident 
in the presentation of example 3.1 by both Valerius Maximus and Plutarch. Valerius portrayed 
Philip in negative terms to emphasise aspects of free speech, and Plutarch offered a different Philip, 
whose wise concern for justice and exhibition of other various virtues underscored much of his own 
values. The chapter also revealed something of the role of the Macedonian king in these tales, the 
perception of isegoria or parrhesia within the Macedonian justice system, and suggested that 
according to tales, Philip’s powers regarding fines and judgments were unregulated by anything 
other than the power of his own personality. Therefore, the judicial tales of Philip in chapter three 
largely demonstrated positive examples of a monarch performing ‘justice’.  
Chapter four examined those tales concerning criticism or slander of Philip II. This revealed 
two very important details. There was the dominating role played by self-control (sophrosune or 
enkrateia), and other associated virtues like praotes or philanthropia (particularly in Plutarch). 
There was also the fact that Roman period authors used Philip as an exemplar because he was an 
identifiable figure from the past, who could serve as a positive symbol or standard for later periods 
in terms of taking abuse or dealing with free-speech. It was a role which put him in direct conflict 
and competition with the example of Alexander (and almost certainly deliberately so). This chapter 
also exposed the difficulty of competing traditions and protagonists; the universality of limiting 
detail; the general versatility of apophthegmata (to speak to a variety of meanings, dedicatees, and 
audiences). It also revealed the role of Philip’s companions and advisors; Philip’s political 
shrewdness, wit, kindness and personality; the reorientation of the focus of an anecdote; and the 
role of rhetoric and intertextual references. Aside from confirming the difficulty of working with 
this type of evidence – these tales of slandering and criticising Philip II were for the most part 
recorded and disseminated for their value as positive examples of Philip’s formidable self-control 
and moderation.    
Chapter five examined those anecdotes relating to Philip II and friendship and politics. This 
revealed that there was a perception in the Roman world that Philip had a remarkable capacity to 
make and keep friends, bribe his enemies, and amuse others. It also showed that they were a means 
by which to contemplate Philip, his legacy, and contemporary values and issues in the Roman world 
– particularly around the role of the civilis Princeps. The chapter also demonstrated several key 
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ideas. These included the fact that these tales were grounded in contemporary fourth-century BCE 
ideologies, and the political, social, and cultural structures of Macedonia. It also showed that a 
ruler’s popularity and safety (and that of the state), were linked to those who surrounded him and 
acted in his name. Indeed, good rulers trusted, praised, rewarded and utilized individuals of talent 
rather than fearing and eliminating them. Moreover, worthy leaders were also industrious on behalf 
of their friends and the state; as well as being intelligent, witty, kind, generous, affable, and 
believers in reciprocity. Another point shown was that critiques and commentary on contemporary 
Roman rulers and elite culture were possible – especially in terms of latrocinia, avaritia and 
largitio. Finally, chapter five demonstrated that humour and wit in a statesmen had the power to 
neutralize or even resolve difficult situations, construct persona and express character – and share, 
construct, and enforce cultural and behavioural norms. Therefore, those tales of Philip II that 
concerned friendship and politics were remembered and exploited for their generally positive 
contribution to ongoing debates on the nature ideal rule. 
Chapter six examined those tales concerning Philip as a warrior and general. It showed that 
Philip was one of the great models from the past with whom Greeks and Romans could contemplate 
warfare. This was particularly true in regards to those stratagems recorded by Polyaenus and 
Frontinus, which clearly detailed just how dangerous and successful Philip was as an opponent on 
the field of battlefield. Philip exemplified innovative generalship that still focused on areas like 
discipline, organization, and morale. Chapter six also revealed that away from the actual fighting, 
there seems to have been an ample stock of tales with which to make more moral judgements – 
especially relating to Philip’s behaviour after victory at Chaeronea. These tales often showed Philip 
enduring lessons and witty comments which transcended purely martial interest. Together, these 
two main traditions in Philip’s military tales contributed to shaping his generally positive image in 
war as a general and warrior in the Roman world.  
This thesis has shown that in their role as exemplary material, Philip’s tales were important 
parts of a complex whole. Philip, like his son (and like many other leaders from the past), was a 
critical element in the ceaseless discussions of the Graeco-Roman world around all facets of ruling 
and command. Even if Philip’s image (unlike Alexander’s) was not to our knowledge overtly 
exploited by individual Romans as a role model – it seems assured that Philip was still used as a 
powerful example of monarchic ideology and leadership qualities by influential Romans of the 
Republic and Empire. These anecdotes were also entertaining tales of moral edification that 
promoted Philip (or at least the virtues or vices inherent in his actions) to interested segments of the 
population beyond the ruling class. This was done particularly through the universally appealing 
nature of positive virtues and behaviours like justice, self-control, moderation, intelligence, 
generosity, kindness, approachability, cunningness and innovation in war, humour, and wit. 
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However, tales of more negative qualities like greediness, faithlessness and bribery were present – 
but less popular. Nevertheless, they had their role too in establishing and perpetuating behavioural 
norms.  
Philip’s tales were an inheritance controlled by the authors of this thesis who approached it 
for the most part on their own terms.1014 It was they who dictated Philip’s memory and meaning.1015 
They chose the material, they ordered its presentation, they set the boundaries within which it 
operated, they controlled the context – and they dictated its significance. This left Philip (away from 
historical narratives) a wrought figure filtered through differing layers of interest, agendas, 
capabilities, cultural values and needs. Therefore, Philip’s reception through anecdotes, 
apophthegmata and exempla in the Roman world was always going to be in the ‘eye of the 
beholder’ – but only ever after passing through the distortion of the ‘pen of the holder’.  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1014
 E.g. Valerius Maximus, Plutarch, Seneca, Cicero, Frontinus, and Polyaenus. 
1015
 Cf. Spencer 2010: 181. 
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Appendix A 
Philip’s Stratagems in Battle  
 
Ex. 6.1 
Fivlippo" !Amfivpolin ajpaitouvmeno" uJpo; !Aqhnaivwn, oJmou' de; kai; !Illurioi'" polemw'n oujk
ajpevdwken, ajll! ajfh'ken ejleuqevran: !Aqhnai'oi de; hjgavphsan to; ejleuqevran ajfei'sqai.      
Fivlippo", oJpovte tw'n !Illuriw'n krathvsa" meivzw duvnamin ejkthvsato, thnikau'ta pavlin    
 !Amfivpolin katevscen !Aqhnaivwn katafronhvsa" (Poly. Strat. 4.2.17).1016  
 
Ex. 6.2 
Philippus Macedonum rex adversus Hyllios gerens bellum, ut animadvertit frontem hostium 
stipatam electis de toto exercitu viris, latera autem infirmiora, fortissimis suorum in dextro 
cornu conlocatis, sinistrum latus hostium invasit turbataque tota acie victoriam profligavit 
(Front. Strat. 2.3.2).1017  
 
Ex. 6.3 
Fivlippo" ejnevbalen eij" th;n !Orbhlivwn cwvran: dev ejsti faraggwvdh" kai; dasei'a.            
kataduomevnwn tw'n barbavrwn ej" ta; a[lsh kai; tou;" qavmnou", qhreutika;" kuvna" polla;"  
ejxhvgagen, ai{ tou;" polemivou" ejxicneuvousai tou;" pleivstou" aujtw'n ejqhvreuon (Poly. Strat. 
4.2.16).1018  
 
Ex. 6.4 
Fivlippo" ejpoliovrkei Farkhdovna povlin Qessalikhvn: Farkhdovnioi parevdwkan th;npovlin.
wJ" de; eijsh'lqon oiJ Filivppeioi misqofovroi, periptaivousin ejnevdra/: polloi; ga;r ajpo; tw'n  
stegw'n kai; tw'n puvrgwn e[ballon kai; hjkovntizon. Fivlippo" pro" th;n ejnevdran ojxevw"      
ajntestrathvghsen.  \Hn ta; o[pisqen th'" povlew" e[rhma tw'n politw'nsundramovntwn ejpi;   
th;n ejnevdran. kata; tau'ta tou;" Makedovna" prosbavllein ejkevleuse kai; prostiqevnai       
klivmaka". ajnabavntwn de; uJpe;r to; tei'co", oiJ Farkhdovnioi tou' bavllein tou;" misqofovrou"
ajposcovmenoi spoudh'/ e[qeon ajmunouvmenoi tou;" teicokratou'nta". oiJ de;, pri;n h{kein eij"   
cei'ra", h[dh th'" povlew" ejkravtoun (Poly. Strat. 4.2.18).1019  
 
 
Ex. 6.5 
Fivlippo" poliorkw'n crovnw/ makrw'/ Kavra" ejcuro;n cwrivon, eJlei'n oujc oi|ov" te w[n,            
ajpocwrh'sai boulovmeno" ajsfalw'" kai; ta; o[rgana th'" poliorciva" periswvsasqai,  nuvkta
skoteinh;n parafulavxa" ejkevleuse toi'" mhcanopoioi'" dialuvein me;n ta; o[rgana,            
                                               
1016
 ‘When the Athenians demanded the return of Amphipolis while Philip was at war with the Illyrians, he did not give 
it back, but let it be independent. The Athenians were pleased that he let it be independent. When Philip became more 
powerful by defeating the Illyrians, then he occupied Amphipolis again, disregarding the Athenians.’ 
1017
 ‘When Philip, king of the Macedonians, was waging war against the Hyllians, he noticed that the front of the enemy 
consisted entirely of men picked from the whole army, while their flanks were weaker. According he placed the stoutest 
of his own men on the right wing, attacked the enemy’s left and by throwing their whole line into confusion won a 
complete victory.’ 
1018
 ‘Philip invaded the territory of the Orbelians. It is full of ravines and bushy. When the barbarians went down into 
the groves and shrubs to hide, he brought out numerous hunting dogs, who tracked down and hunted down most of the 
enemy.’ 
1019
 ‘Philip was besieging Pharcedon, a Thessalian city. The Pharcedonians surrendered the city. As Philip’s 
mercenaries entered, they fell into an ambush, for many men threw stones and javelins from roofs and towers. Philip 
quickly devised a plan against the ambush. The rear part of the city was deserted, since the citizens assembled for the 
ambush. He ordered the Macedonians to make an assault there and place ladders against the wall. When they reached 
the top of the wall, the Pharcedonians stopped throwing at the mercenaries and ran hurriedly to ward off the men who 
seized the wall. But before they closed to hand-to-hand combat, the Macedonians had already mastered the city.’ 
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mimei'sqai de; ktuvpon oi|o" a[n gevnoito sumphgnuvntwn. oiJ de; ejn tai'" Kavrai" ajkouvsante" 
tou' ktuvpou ta;" puvla" e[ndoqen ajsfalevsteron ajpevkleion kai; toi'" mhcanhvmasin ajntimh
canhvmata hujtrevpizon. Fivlippo" de; peri; tau'ta ajscoloumevnwn dia; nukto;" aujtoi'"        
mhcanhvmasin ajfanh;" h\n (Poly. Strat. 4.2.20).1020  
  
 Ex. 6.6 
Byzantii adversus Philippum omne proeliandi discrimen evitantes, omissa etiam finium 
tutela, intra munitiones oppidi se receperunt adsecutique sunt, ut Philippus obsidionalis 
morae impatiens recederet (Front. Strat. 1.3.4).1021  
 
Ex. 6.7 
Fivlippo" ejpoliovrkei Buzantivou" e[conta" oujk ojlivghn cei'ra summavcwn. touvtou"          
ajpolipei'n th;n summacivan ejtecnavsato pevmya" aujtomovlou" ajggevllonta", wJ" aiJ  povlei"
aujtw'n uJpo; Filivppou poliorcoi'nto pevmyanto" a[lla" dunavmei" ejkei', kai; ouj makra;n      
aJlwvsew" aiJ povlei". oiJ me;n tau'ta h[ggellon: Fivlippo" de; fanero;" h\n  diapevmpwn        
mevrh th'" stratia'" a[llo ajllacou' eij" dovkhsin, oujk ejpi; pra'xin. oiJ suvmmacoi tau'ta       
oJrw'nte" kai; ajkouvonte" ajpolipovnte" Buzantivou" ejpi; ta;" auJtw'n patrivda" ejstevllonto  
(Poly. Strat. 4.2.21).1022  
 
Ex. 6.8 
Fivlippo" ejpi; th;n !Amfissevwn ejstravteuen: !Aqhnai'oi kai; Qhbai'oi ta; stena;               
prokatelavbonto, kai; h\n hJ divodo" ajmhvcano". ejxapata'/ tou;" polemivou" Fivlippo"          
ejpistolh;n peplasmevnhn !Antipavtrw/ pevmya" ej" Makedonivan, wJ" th;n me;n strateivan    
th;n ejp! !Amfissei'" ajnabavloito, speuvdoi de; ej" Qravkhn pepusmevno" tou;" ejkei'             
newterivxein. oJ grammatofovro" [dihv/ei] dia; tw'n stenw'n. oiJ strathgoi;, Cavrh" kai;  
Provxeno", aiJrou'sin aujto;n kai; th;n ejpistolh;n ajnagnovnte" pisteuvousi  toi'"                 
gegrammevnoi" kai; th;n fulakh;n tw'n stenw'n ajpoleivpousi. Fivlippo" de; labovmeno"         
ejrhmiva" ajfulavktw" diexepaivsato kai; tou;" strathgou;"  ajnastrevyanta" ejnivkhse kai;  
th'" !Amfivssh" ejkravthsen (Poly. Strat. 4.2.8).1023  
  
 Ex. 6.9 
Philippus, cum angustias maris, quae Ctena; appellantur, transnavigare propter 
Atheniensium classem, quae opportunitatem loci custodiebat, non posset, scripsit Antipatro 
Thraciam rebellare, praesidiis quae ibi reliquerat interceptis; sequeretur omnibus omissis. 
Quae ut epistulae interciperentur ab hoste, curavit. Athenienses, arcana Macedonum 
                                               
1020
 ‘When Philip was unable to take Carae, a strong place, after a long siege, he wanted to retreat safely and save his 
siege machines. Waiting for a dark night, he told the engineers to take the machines apart, but to make noise as if they 
were constructing new ones. The men in Carae, hearing the noise, strengthened the interior gate defences and got 
machines ready to oppose Philip’s machines. While they were busy all night with these preparations, Philip disappeared 
with his machines.’ 
1021
 ‘The Byzantines in their war with Philip, avoiding all risks of battle, and abandoning even the defence of their 
territory, retired within the walls of their city and succeeded in causing Philip to withdraw, since he could not endure 
the delay of a siege.’ 
1022
 ‘Philip was besieging the Byzantines, who had a large force of allies. He contrived that these abandon the alliance 
by sending deserters who reported that their own cities were besieged by Philip, who had sent other forces there, and 
that the cities were not far from being captured. The deserters gave this report. Philip sent parts of his army in different 
directions in plain sight, for show but not for action. When the allies saw and heard this, they abandoned the Byzantines 
and set out for their own countries.’ 
1023
 ‘Philip made an expedition against Amphissa. The Athenians and Thebans seized the narrow passes first, and made 
it impossible for him to get through. Philip tricked the enemy by sending a fake letter to Antipater in Macedonia, saying 
that he was postponing the campaign against Amphissa but was hurrying to Thrace, since he had learned a revolt had 
begun there. The letter-carrier went through the narrow passes. The generals, Chares and Proxenus, caught him and, 
when they read the letter, believed it and abandoned their guard over the passes. Philip found the passes deserted and 
unguarded, burst through, defeated the generals when they turned around, and captured Amphissa.’  
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excepisse visi, classem abduxerunt; Philippus nullo prohibente angustias freti liberavit 
(Front. Strat. 1.4.13).1024  
 
Ex. 6.10 
Philippus in obsidione cuiusdam maritimae urbis binas naves procul a conspectu 
contabulavit superstruxitque eis turres; aliis deinde turribus adortus a terra, dum urbis 
propugnatores distringit, turritas naves a mari applicuit et, qua non resistebatur, subiit 
muros (Front. Strat. 3.9.8).1025  
 
 Ex. 6.11 
Fivlippo" th;n !Abdhritw'n kai; Marwnitw'n katadramw;n ejpanhv/ei kai; nau'" e[cwn polla;"  
kai; stratia;n pezh;n a[gwn: Cavrh" peri; Nevan povlin ejnaulovcei trihvrei" e[cwn ei[kosi.     
Fivlippo" ejpilexavmeno" tw'n new'n tevssara" ta;" a[rista pleouvsa"  ejplhvrwsen            
ejretw'n ajkmh'/ kai; tevcnh/ kai; rJwvmh/ ajrivstwn, kai; paravggelma e[dwke, proanacqh'nai tou'  
stovlou panto;" kai; paraplei'n th;n Nevan povlin ouj polu; th'" gh'" ajpevconta". oiJ me;n parev
pleon: oJ de; Cavrh" wJ" ajnarpasovmeno" ta;" tevssara"nau'" ejpanhvcqh tai'" ei[kosin. aiJ de;
tevssare", ejlafrai; kai; ajrivstou" ejrevta" e[cousai, tacevw" ej" to; pevlago"                    
metewrivzontai. tw'n de; ajmfi; to;n Cavrhta suntetamevnw" diwkovntwn e[laqen oJ Fivlippo" 
Nevan povlin ajsfalw'" parapleuvsa": Cavrh" de; oujde; ta;" tessara" nau'" katevlaben (Pol
y. Strat. 4.2.22).1026  
 
 Ex. 6.12 
Idem, quia Cherronessum, quae iuris Atheniensium erat, occupare prohibebatur, tenentibus 
transitum non Byzantiorum tantum, sed Rhodiorum quoque et Chiorum navibus, conciliavit 
animos eorum reddendo naves, quas ceperat, quasi sequestres futuras ordinandae pacis 
inter se ac Byzantios, qui causa belli erant. Tractaque per magnum tempus postulatione, 
cum de industria subinde aliquid in condicionibus retexeret, classem per id tempus 
praeparavit eaque in angustias freti imparato hoste subitus evasit (Front. Strat. 1.4.13a).1027  
 
Ex. 6.13 
Fivlippo" prevsbei" e[pemyen ej" polemivwn Qra/kw'n povlin. oiJ me;n ejkklhsivan sunhvgagon  
kai; tou;" presbeuta;" ejkevleuon ajgoreuvein, kai; h\n aJpavntwn spoudh; peri; th;n ajkrovasin  
                                               
1024
 ‘When Philip was unable to sail through the straits called Stena, because the Athenian fleet kept guard at a strategic 
point, he wrote to Antipater that Thrace was in revolt, and that the garrisons which he had left there had been cut off, 
directing Antipater to leave all other matters and follow him. This letter Philip arranged to have fall into the hands of 
the enemy. The Athenians, imagining they had secured secret intelligence of the Macedonians, withdrew their fleet, 
while Philip now passed through the straits with no one to hinder him.’ 
1025
 ‘Philip, while besieging a certain coast town, secretly lashed ships together in pairs, with a common deck over all, 
and erected towers on them. Then launching an attack with other towers by land, he distracted the attention of the 
defenders of the city, till he brought up by sea the ships provided with towers, and advanced against the walls at the 
point were no resistance was offered.’ 
1026
 ‘After ravaging the territory of the Abderitae and Maronitae, Philip was returning with many ships and a land army. 
Chares set an ambush with twenty triremes near Neapolis. After selecting the four fastest ships, Philip manned them 
with his best rowers in terms of age, skill, and strength, and gave orders to put out to sea before the rest of the fleet and 
to sail past Neapolis, keeping close to the shore. They sailed past. Chares put out to sea with his twenty in order to 
capture the four ships. Since the four were light and had the best rowers, however, they quickly gained the high sea. 
While Chares’ ships pursued vigorously, Philip sailed safely past Neapolis without being noticed, and Chares did not 
catch the four ships.’ 
1027
 ‘The Chersonese happened at one time to be controlled by the Athenians, and Philip was prevented from capturing 
it, owing to the fact that the strait was commanded by vessels not only of the Byzantines but also of the Rhodians and 
Chians; but Philip won the confidence of these peoples by returning their captured ships, as pledges of the peace to be 
arranged between himself and the Byzantines, who were the cause of the war. While the negotiations dragged on for 
some time and Philip purposely kept changing the details of the terms, in the interval he got ready a fleet, and eluding 
the enemy while they were off their guard, he suddenly sailed into the straits.’ 
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w|n ajggelou'si. Fivlippo" ejn tw'/ kairw'/ touvtw/ mh; prosdokw'sin  ejpiqevmeno" th'" povlew"   
ejkravthsen (Poly. Strat. 4.2.4).1028  
 
 Ex. 6.14 
Fivlippo" hjxivwse Sarnousivoi" ejkklhsiavzousi dialecqh'nai. oiJ me;n sunhv/esan: toi'" de;    
stratiwvtai" parhvggelto iJmavnta" uJpo; mavlh" komivzein. ejpei; de; oJ Fivlippo" ajnevteine   
th;n dexia;n wJ" dhmhgorhvswn, tou'to h\n a[ra shmei'on toi'" stratiwvtai" tou' dh'sai         
pavnta" tou;" parovnta". ou{tw Sarnouvsioi deqevnte" ej" Makedonivan  h[cqhsan pleivou"    
murivwn (Poly. Strat. 4.2.12).1029  
 
 Ex. 6.15 
Fivlippo" h[/thse para; tw'n polemivwn !Illuriw'n nekrou;" uJpospovndou". tw'n de; dovntwn,    
hJnika oiJ e[scatoi ejkomivzonto, shmhvna" ajfulavktoi" ejph'lqen (Poly. Strat. 4.2.5).1030  
 
 Ex. 6.16 
Fivlippo" diwkovmeno" uJpo; Qra/kw'n parhvggeilen, ejpeida;n oJ salpigkth;" feuvgein shmhvnh
, toi'" me;n oujragou'si proballomevnoi" mevnein, toi'" de; a[lloi" feuvgein, o{pw" tou;" me;n   
polemivou" ejpisthvseie diwvkonta", toi'" de; oijkeivoi" prolabei'n th'" oJdou' paravscoi  (Poly
. Strat. 4.2.13).1031  
 
 Ex. 6.17 
Fivlippo" ta;" parovdou" th'" Boiwtiva" Boiwtw'n fulattovntwn - h\n de; steno;" o[rou"      
aujchvn - oujk ejpi; tou'ton w{rmhsen, ajlla; thvn te cwvran purpolw'n kai; ta;" povlei" porqw'n 
fanero;" h\n. Boiwtoi; de; oujc uJpomevnonte" oJra'n ta;" povlei"  porqoumevna" katevbhsan    
ajpo; tou' o[rou". Fivlippo" uJpostrevya" dia; tou' o[rou" diexepaivsato  
(Poly. Strat. 4.2.14).1032  
  
 Ex. 6.18 
Fivlippo" ajfikovmeno" ej" Lavrisan, i{na tina;" tw'n !Aleuadw'n e[xw oijkiva" kaqevloi, nosei'n
uJpekrivnato, o{pw" ejsiovnta" aujtou;" wJ" ejpiskeyomevnou" sullavbh/. Boi?sko" ejxhvggeile    
toi'" !Aleuavdai" th;n ejpiqesin, kai; dia; tou'to tevlo" oujk e[scen hJ pra'xi" (Poly. Strat. 
4.2.11).1033 
 
 
                                               
1028
 ‘Philip sent ambassadors to a hostile Thracian city. The Thracians summoned an assembly and told the ambassadors 
to speak, and everyone was eager to hear what they said. At this moment, when they did not expect it, Philip attacked 
and conquered the city.’  
1029
 ‘Philip requested an opportunity to address the Sarnusians in an assembly. They assembled. He ordered the soldiers 
to bring leather thongs concealed under their arms. When Philip stretched out his right hand as if to begin speaking, this 
was the signal to the soldiers to bind all those present. Thus more than 10,000 Sarnusians were taken bound to 
Macedonia.’ 
1030
 ‘Philip asked his Illyrian enemies for a truce to retrieve the corpses. After they granted the truce, while the last 
bodies were being brought in, he gave the signal and attacked the enemy off guard.’ 
1031
 ‘When Philip was being pursued by the Thracians, he commanded the men in the rear, when the trumpeter signalled 
to flee, to stand their ground as a cover, and the others to flee, so that he might stop the pursuing enemy and allow his 
own men to get a head start on the road.’ 
1032
 ‘When the Boeotians were guarding the entrance to Boeotia – it was a narrow mountain pass – Philip did not hurry 
to the pass, but openly burned the countryside and ravaged the cities. The Boeotians, unable to endure the sight of their 
cities being ravaged, came down from the mountain. Turning around, Philip broke through the mountain.’ 
1033
 ‘When Philip arrived at Larissa, in order to seize some of the Aleuadae outside of their homes, he pretended to be 
sick, so that when some of them came to visit him he might arrest them. Boïscus reported the deception to the Aleuadae, 
and therefore his action was unsuccessful.’ 
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Appendix B 
   Philip and Sparta 
 
 Ex. 39. 
!Arcivdamo" oJ !Aghsilavou, Filivppou meta; th;n ejn Cairwneiva/ mavchn sklhrotevran aujtw'/  
ejpistolh;n gravyanto", ajntevgrayen, ‘eij metrhvsai" th;n sautou' skiavn, oujk a[n eu{roi"     
aujth;n meivzona gegenhmevnhn h[ pri;n nika'n (Plut. Apoph. Lac. Archid. 1 = Mor. 218E-
F).’1034 
 
Ex. 40. 
!En de; tw'/ pro;" Fivlippon polevmw/ sumbouleuovntwn tinw'n o{ti povrrw th'" oijkeiva" th;n     
mavchn sunavptein dei', “ajll! ouj tou'to,” e[fh, “oJra'n dei', ajll! ou| macovmenoi  
kreivttone" tw'n polemivwn ejsovmeqa (Plut. Apoph. Lac. Archid. 4 = Mor. 218F).”1035  
  
 Ex. 41. 
Levgonto" dev tino" o{ti Fivlippo" aujtoi'" ajnepivbaton th;n @Ellavda poihvsei, “iJkanh;hJmi'n,” 
e[fh, “w\ xevne, hJ ejn th'/ ijdiva/ ajnastrofhv (Plut. Apoph. Lac. Agis 14= Mor. 216A).” 1036 
  
 Ex. 42. 
Presbeuvwn de; movno" h|ke pro;" Fivlippon: eijpovnto" d! ejkeivnou, “tiv tou'to; movno" h{kei";” 
e[fh, “kai; ga;r pro;" e{na (Plut. Apoph. Lac. Agis 16 = Mor. 216B; cf. Mor. 233E, 511A; 
Demetr. 42).”1037  
 
Ex. 43. 
!Antivoco" ejforeuvwn, wJ" h[kousen o{ti Messhnivoi" Fivlippo" th;n cwvran e[dwken,            
hjrwvthsen eij kai; duvnamin aujtoi'" parevsceto w{ste macomevnou" peri; th'" cwvra" kratei'n 
(Plut. Apophth. Lac. Antio. = Mor. 217F; cf. Mor. 192B).1038  
  
 Ex. 44. 
Qwrukivwn ejk Delfw'n paragenovmeno", ijdw;n to; Filivppou stratovpedon ejn !Isqmw'/  ta;      
stena; kateilhfovto", “kakouv",” e[fh, “pulwrou;" uJma'", w\ Korivnqioi, hJ Pelopovnnhso"  
e[cei (Plut. Apoph. Lac. Thor. = Mor. 221F).”1039  
 
Ex. 45. 
                                               
1034
 ‘Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, when Philip, after the battle of Chaeronea, wrote him a somewhat haughty 
letter, wrote in reply, ‘If you should measure your own shadow, you would not find that it has become any greater than 
before you were victorious.’’  
1035
 ‘In the war against Philip, when some proffered the advice that they ought to engage him in battle at a good distance 
from their own land, Archidamus said, ‘No, that is not what we ought to look to, but where, in fighting, we shall be 
superior to the enemy.’’ 
1036
 ‘When someone said that Philip would make Greece forbidden ground to them, he (Agis) said, ‘It is quite enough, 
my friend, for us to go and come within the confines of our own land.’’ 
1037
 ‘He (Agis) came alone on an embassy to Philip, and when Philip exclaimed, ‘What is this? Have you come all 
alone?’ He said, ‘Yes, for I came to only one man.’’ 
1038
 ‘Antiochus, when he was Ephor, hearing that Philip had given the Messenians their land, asked if he had also 
provided them with the power to prevail in fighting to keep it.’ 
1039
 ‘Thorycion, arriving from Delphi and seeing in the Isthmus the forces of Philip, who had already gained possession 
of the narrow entrance, said, ‘The Peloponnesus has poor gate-keepers in you, men of Corinth!’’ 
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Filivppou gravfonto", o{te eij" th;n cwvran aujtw'n paregevneto, povteron bouvlontai fivlion 
ejlqei'n h[ polevmion aujtovn, ajntefwvnhsan, “oujdevteron (Plut. Apoph. Lac. 28 = Mor. 
233E).”1040  
 
Ex. 46. 
Filivppou tou' Makedovno" prostavttontov" tina di! ejpistolh'", ajntevgrayan oiJ              
Lakedaimovnioi “peri; w|n a\min e[graya", Ou[ (Plut. Apophth. Lac. 50 = Mor. 235A-B).”1041  
 
 Ex. 47. 
eja;n de; Bouvlhtai lakwnivzein, kai; to; “e[ndon” ajfelw;n aujth;n movnhn fqevgxetai th;n         
ajpovfasin: wJ" ejkei'noi, Filivppou gravyanto" eij devxontai th'/ povlei aujtovn, eij" th;n         
cavrthn OU mevga gravyante" ajpevsteilan (Plut. De. Garr. 21 = Mor. 513A).1042  
 
Ex. 48. 
$Ote de; ejnevbalen eij" th;n Lakwnikh;n kai; ejdovkoun a{pante" ajpolei'sqai, ei\pe de; prov"    
tina tw'n Spartiatw'n, “tiv nu'n poihvsete, w\ Lavkwne";” “tiv gavr,” e[fh, “a[llo h[ ajndreivw" 
ajpoqanouvmeqa; movnoi ga;r hJmei'" @Ellhvnwn ejleuvqeroi ei\nai kai; mh; uJpakouvein a[lloi"  
ejmavqomen (Plut. Apophth. Lac. 53 = Mor. 235B).”1043  
 
Ex. 49. 
Atque haec quidem et animi magnifici et prosperi status: illa vero, qua legati 
Lacedaemoniorum apud patrem eius miseram fortitudinis suae condicionem testati sunt, 
gloriosior quam optabilior: intolerabilibus enim oneribus civitatem eorum implicanti, si 
quid morte gravius imperare perseveraret, mortem se praelaturos responderunt (Val. Max. 
6.4. ext.4).1044  
 
 Ex. 50. 
An Lacedaemonii, Philippo minitante per litteras se omnia, quae conarentur, prohibiturum, 
quaesiverunt num se esset etiam mori prohibiturus: vir is, quem quaerimus, non multo 
facilius tali animo reperietur quam civitas universa (Cic. Tusc. 5.14.42).1045   
 
Ex. 51. 
Lacedaemonius quidam nobilis, Philippo denuntiante multa se prohibiturum, nisi civitas sibi 
traderetur, ‘num,’ inquit, ‘et pro patria mori nos prohibebit?’ (Front. Strat. 4.5.12; cf. Plut. 
Apophth. Lac. Ignot. 50).1046  
 
                                               
1040
 ‘Philip wrote at the time when he entered their country, asking whether they wished that he should come as a friend 
or as a foe; and they made answer, ‘Neither.’’ 
1041
 ‘When Philip of Macedon sent some orders to the Spartans by letter, they wrote in reply, ‘What you wrote about, 
‘No.’’ 
1042
 ‘And if he wishes to adopt the Laconic style, he may omit the ‘At home’ and only utter the bare negative. So the 
Spartans, when Philip wrote to ask if they would receive him into their city, wrote a large ‘No’ on the paper and sent it 
back.’ 
1043
 ‘When he (Philip) invaded the Spartan’s country, and all thought that they should be destroyed, he said to one of the 
Spartans, ‘What shall you do now, men of Sparta? And the other said, ‘What else than die like men? For we alone of all 
the Greeks have learned to be free, and not to be subjects to others.’’ 
1044
 ‘That utterance befitted a proud soul and a prosperous state of affairs. But this with which the Lacedaemonian 
envoys before Alexander’s father testified to the sad plight of their bravery was more glorious than enviable. To his 
terms saddling their community with intolerable burdens they answered that if he persisted in demanding some-thing 
worse than death, they would prefer death.’ 
1045
 ‘Did the Lacedaemonians in answer to Philip’s threat, when he wrote that he would prevent all their efforts, ask him 
whether he also intended to ‘prevent’ them from dying: and shall not the true man of whom we are in quest be more 
readily found with such a spirit than a whole community?’ 
1046
 ‘A certain Spartan noble, when Philip declared he would cut them off from many things, unless the state 
surrendered to him, asked: ‘He won’t cut us off from dying in defence of our country, will he?’’ 
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Ex. 52. 
Kai; dei' ta; toiau'ta mavlista toi'" ajdolevscoi" probavllein o{shn cavrin e[cei kai; duvnamin, 
oi|ovn ejsti to; “Lakedaimovnioi Filivppw/: Dionuvsio" ejn Korivnqw/.” kai; pavlin gravyanto"  
aujtoi'" tou' Filivppou, “a[n ejmbavlw eij" th;n Lakwnikhvn, ajnastavtou" uJma'" poihvsw,” 
ajntevgrayan, “ai[ka.” (Plut. De. Garr. 17 = Mor. 511A; cf. Quint. 7.6.52).”1047  
 
 
                                               
1047
 ‘And we must be careful to offer to chatterers examples of this terseness, so that they may see how charming and 
how effective they are. For example: ‘The Spartans to Philip: Dionysius in Corinth.’ And again, when Philip wrote to 
them, ‘If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out,’ they wrote back, ‘If.’’ 
